959 resultados para False anglicisms
Resumo:
From the Introduction. One innovative element of the Lisbon Treaty was the creation of a European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI). At the time, this was sometimes hailed as a fundamental change in the European institutional system. A few years after the entry into force of the Treaty, however, much less is heard about this “first truly transnational instrument of modern direct democracy”, this “revolution in disguise”, this “very innovative and symbolic” provision. This could seem surprising at first sight. Since the entry into force of the Treaty, the implementation of this provision has been remarkably rapid. Meanwhile, new arguments have risen concerning the lack of democratic legitimacy of the European Union, and the lack of connection between the European institutions and the citizens.
Resumo:
In the wake of Osama Bin Ladin’s death and against the background of a more confident United States and a more anxious China, Marta Dassù explores in this EuropEos Commentary the prospect that these two leading countries could form a ‘G2’, further marginalising Europe.
Resumo:
Mode of access: Internet.
Resumo:
"Selected bibliography": p. 68-70.
Resumo:
In defence of William Pitt.
Resumo:
Mode of access: Internet.
Resumo:
Who is responsible for the present war and what is at stake?--The birth of pan-Germanism.--The progress and aims of German militarism.--The movement towards international reform.--Some illusions entertained by Germany.--Pacifism and an indecisive peace.--A durable peace.--A definitive peace.
Resumo:
Mode of access: Internet.
Resumo:
Mode of access: Internet.
Resumo:
Mode of access: Internet.
Resumo:
Mode of access: Internet.
Resumo:
Copy in Dept. of Rare Books and Special Collections has original pink printed boards with black leather spine.
Resumo:
Mode of access: Internet.
Resumo:
Mode of access: Internet.
Resumo:
"Counterinsurgency (COIN) requires an integrated military, political, and economic program best developed by teams that field both civilians and soldiers. These units should operate with some independence but under a coherent command. In Vietnam, after several false starts, the United States developed an effective unified organization, Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS), to guide the counterinsurgency. CORDS had three components absent from our efforts in Afghanistan today: sufficient personnel (particularly civilian), numerous teams, and a single chain of command that united the separate COIN programs of the disparate American departments at the district, provincial, regional, and national levels. This paper focuses on the third issue and describes the benefits that unity of command at every level would bring to the American war in Afghanistan. The work begins with a brief introduction to counterinsurgency theory, using a population-centric model, and examines how this warfare challenges the United States. It traces the evolution of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and the country team, describing problems at both levels. Similar efforts in Vietnam are compared, where persistent executive attention finally integrated the government's counterinsurgency campaign under the unified command of the CORDS program. The next section attributes the American tendency towards a segregated response to cultural differences between the primary departments, executive neglect, and societal concepts of war. The paper argues that, in its approach to COIN, the United States has forsaken the military concept of unity of command in favor of 'unity of effort' expressed in multiagency literature. The final sections describe how unified authority would improve our efforts in Afghanistan and propose a model for the future."--P. iii.