How the Euro divides the union: the effect of economic adjustment on support for democracy in Europe

As often pointed out in the literature on the European debt crisis, the policy programme of austerity and internal devaluation imposed on countries in the Eurozone's periphery exhibits a lack of democratic legitimacy. This article analyses the consequences these developments have for democratic support at both the European and national levels. We show that through the policies of economic adjustment, a majority of citizens in crisis countries has become ‘detached’ from their democratic political system. By cutting loose the Eurozone's periphery from the rest of Europe in terms of democratic legitimacy, the Euro has divided the union, instead of uniting it as foreseen by its architects. Our results are based on aggregated Eurobarometer surveys conducted in 28 European Union (EU) member states between 2002 and 2014. We employ quantitative time-series cross-sectional regression analyses. Moreover, we estimate the causal effect of economic adjustment in a comparative case study of four cases using the synthetic control method.

Wie der Euro Europa spaltet. Die Krise der gemeinsamen Währung und die Entfremdung von der Demokratie in der Europäischen Union

Um ihre verloren gegangene Wettbewerbsfähigkeit wiederherzustellen, bleibt den unter Zahlungsbilanzdefiziten leidenden Ländern des Euroraums nur die interne Abwertung: eine Politik zur Senkung des Lohn- und Preisniveaus. Wir argumentieren, dass diese Politik sowohl auf der Output- als auch auf der Input-Dimension einen Mangel an demokratischer Legitimation aufweist. Daher untersuchen wir die Entwicklung der Unterstützung des politischen Systems, sowohl auf der Ebene des Nationalstaats als auch der Europäischen Union. In einem empirischen Vergleich der 28 EU-Mitgliedsländer zwischen 2001 und 2013 zeigen wir anhand aggregierter Eurobarometerdaten, dass Europa im Bereich der politischen Legitimation auseinanderdriftet. Je stärker ein Land zur internen Abwertung gezwungen wird, desto mehr wendet sich seine Bevölkerung vom demokratischen politischen System auf der nationalen und supranationalen Ebene ab.

VAR models and methods for monetary and health economics

Negli ultimi anni i modelli VAR sono diventati il principale strumento econometrico per verificare se può esistere una relazione tra le variabili e per valutare gli effetti delle politiche economiche. Questa tesi studia tre diversi approcci di identificazione a partire dai modelli VAR in forma ridotta (tra cui periodo di campionamento, set di variabili endogene, termini deterministici). Usiamo nel caso di modelli VAR il test di Causalità di Granger per verificare la capacità di una variabile di prevedere un altra, nel caso di cointegrazione usiamo modelli VECM per stimare congiuntamente i coefficienti di lungo periodo ed i coefficienti di breve periodo e nel caso di piccoli set di dati e problemi di overfitting usiamo modelli VAR bayesiani con funzioni di risposta di impulso e decomposizione della varianza, per analizzare l'effetto degli shock sulle variabili macroeconomiche. A tale scopo, gli studi empirici sono effettuati utilizzando serie storiche di dati specifici e formulando diverse ipotesi. Sono stati utilizzati tre modelli VAR: in primis per studiare le decisioni di politica monetaria e discriminare tra le varie teorie post-keynesiane sulla politica monetaria ed in particolare sulla cosiddetta "regola di solvibilità" (Brancaccio e Fontana 2013, 2015) e regola del GDP nominale in Area Euro (paper 1); secondo per estendere l'evidenza dell'ipotesi di endogeneità della moneta valutando gli effetti della cartolarizzazione delle banche sul meccanismo di trasmissione della politica monetaria negli Stati Uniti (paper 2); terzo per valutare gli effetti dell'invecchiamento sulla spesa sanitaria in Italia in termini di implicazioni di politiche economiche (paper 3). La tesi è introdotta dal capitolo 1 in cui si delinea il contesto, la motivazione e lo scopo di questa ricerca, mentre la struttura e la sintesi, così come i principali risultati, sono descritti nei rimanenti capitoli. Nel capitolo 2 sono esaminati, utilizzando un modello VAR in differenze prime con dati trimestrali della zona Euro, se le decisioni in materia di politica monetaria possono essere interpretate in termini di una "regola di politica monetaria", con specifico riferimento alla cosiddetta "nominal GDP targeting rule" (McCallum 1988 Hall e Mankiw 1994; Woodford 2012). I risultati evidenziano una relazione causale che va dallo scostamento tra i tassi di crescita del PIL nominale e PIL obiettivo alle variazioni dei tassi di interesse di mercato a tre mesi. La stessa analisi non sembra confermare l'esistenza di una relazione causale significativa inversa dalla variazione del tasso di interesse di mercato allo scostamento tra i tassi di crescita del PIL nominale e PIL obiettivo. Risultati simili sono stati ottenuti sostituendo il tasso di interesse di mercato con il tasso di interesse di rifinanziamento della BCE. Questa conferma di una sola delle due direzioni di causalità non supporta un'interpretazione della politica monetaria basata sulla nominal GDP targeting rule e dà adito a dubbi in termini più generali per l'applicabilità della regola di Taylor e tutte le regole convenzionali della politica monetaria per il caso in questione. I risultati appaiono invece essere più in linea con altri approcci possibili, come quelli basati su alcune analisi post-keynesiane e marxiste della teoria monetaria e più in particolare la cosiddetta "regola di solvibilità" (Brancaccio e Fontana 2013, 2015). Queste linee di ricerca contestano la tesi semplicistica che l'ambito della politica monetaria consiste nella stabilizzazione dell'inflazione, del PIL reale o del reddito nominale intorno ad un livello "naturale equilibrio". Piuttosto, essi suggeriscono che le banche centrali in realtà seguono uno scopo più complesso, che è il regolamento del sistema finanziario, con particolare riferimento ai rapporti tra creditori e debitori e la relativa solvibilità delle unità economiche. Il capitolo 3 analizza l’offerta di prestiti considerando l’endogeneità della moneta derivante dall'attività di cartolarizzazione delle banche nel corso del periodo 1999-2012. Anche se gran parte della letteratura indaga sulla endogenità dell'offerta di moneta, questo approccio è stato adottato raramente per indagare la endogeneità della moneta nel breve e lungo termine con uno studio degli Stati Uniti durante le due crisi principali: scoppio della bolla dot-com (1998-1999) e la crisi dei mutui sub-prime (2008-2009). In particolare, si considerano gli effetti dell'innovazione finanziaria sul canale dei prestiti utilizzando la serie dei prestiti aggiustata per la cartolarizzazione al fine di verificare se il sistema bancario americano è stimolato a ricercare fonti più economiche di finanziamento come la cartolarizzazione, in caso di politica monetaria restrittiva (Altunbas et al., 2009). L'analisi si basa sull'aggregato monetario M1 ed M2. Utilizzando modelli VECM, esaminiamo una relazione di lungo periodo tra le variabili in livello e valutiamo gli effetti dell’offerta di moneta analizzando quanto la politica monetaria influisce sulle deviazioni di breve periodo dalla relazione di lungo periodo. I risultati mostrano che la cartolarizzazione influenza l'impatto dei prestiti su M1 ed M2. Ciò implica che l'offerta di moneta è endogena confermando l'approccio strutturalista ed evidenziando che gli agenti economici sono motivati ad aumentare la cartolarizzazione per una preventiva copertura contro shock di politica monetaria. Il capitolo 4 indaga il rapporto tra spesa pro capite sanitaria, PIL pro capite, indice di vecchiaia ed aspettativa di vita in Italia nel periodo 1990-2013, utilizzando i modelli VAR bayesiani e dati annuali estratti dalla banca dati OCSE ed Eurostat. Le funzioni di risposta d'impulso e la scomposizione della varianza evidenziano una relazione positiva: dal PIL pro capite alla spesa pro capite sanitaria, dalla speranza di vita alla spesa sanitaria, e dall'indice di invecchiamento alla spesa pro capite sanitaria. L'impatto dell'invecchiamento sulla spesa sanitaria è più significativo rispetto alle altre variabili. Nel complesso, i nostri risultati suggeriscono che le disabilità strettamente connesse all'invecchiamento possono essere il driver principale della spesa sanitaria nel breve-medio periodo. Una buona gestione della sanità contribuisce a migliorare il benessere del paziente, senza aumentare la spesa sanitaria totale. Tuttavia, le politiche che migliorano lo stato di salute delle persone anziane potrebbe essere necessarie per una più bassa domanda pro capite dei servizi sanitari e sociali.

Cyprus ... A Test Case for Future European Banking Policy. CEPS Commentary, 21 March 2013

In this CEPS Commentary, the former Irish Prime Minister calls the precedents being set in the Cypriot banking case “troubling” and reflective of a lack of clarity and consistency of thought by both the eurozone Finance Ministers and the European Commission. He welcomes the rejection of the deal by the Cypriot Parliament as it now gives eurozone policy-makers a chance to think again about the underlying philosophy of their approach to the financial crisis.

Banking Union with a Sovereign Virus. The self-serving regulatory treatment of sovereign debt in the euro area. CEPS Policy Brief No. 289, 27 March 2013

In many eurozone countries, domestic banks often hold more than 20% of domestic public debt, which is an unsatisfactory situation given that banks are highly leveraged and that sovereign debt is inherently subject to default risk within the euro area. This paper by Daniel Gros finds, however, that the relative concentration of public debt on bank balance sheets is not just a result of the euro crisis, for there are strong additional incentives for banks in some countries to increase their sovereign. His contribution discusses a number of these regulatory incentives – the most important of which is specific to the euro area – and explores ways in which euro area banks can be weaned from massive investments in government bonds.

The austerity debate is beside the point for Europe. CEPS Commentary, 8 May 2013

In surveying the heated debate in the eurozone about austerity and the cost of high public debt, this CEPS Commentary suggests that the influential paper by Carmen Reinhard and Kenneth Rogoff misses the key point that public debt owed to foreigners is different from debt owed to residents.

Economic Policy Coordination in the Economic and Monetary Union: From Maastricht via the SGP to the Fiscal Pact. CEPS Working Document No. 381, August 2013

This paper first takes a step backwards with an attempt to situate the recent adoption of the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union in the context of discussions on the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) and the ‘Maastricht criteria’, as fixed in the Maastricht Treaty for membership in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in a longer perspective of the sharing of competences for macroeconomic policy-making within the EU. It then presents the main features of the new so-called ‘Fiscal Compact’ and its relationship to the SGP and draws some conclusions as regards the importance and relevance of this new step in the process of economic policy coordination. It concludes that the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union does not seem to offer a definitive solution to the problem of finding the appropriate budgetary-monetary policy mix in EMU, which was already well identified in the Delors report in 1989 and regularly emphasised ever since and is now seriously aggravated due to the crisis in the eurozone. Furthermore, implementation of this Treaty may under certain circumstances contribute to an increase in the uncertainties as regards the distribution of the competences between the European Parliament and national parliaments and between the former and the Commission and the Council.

The euro before the financial crisis of 2008: an integrating and stabilizing factor. Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Vol. 13 No. 9, June 2013

From the Introduction. The main focus of this study is to examine whether the euro has been an economic, monetary, fiscal, and social stabilizer for the Eurozone. In order to do this, the underpinnings of the euro are analysed, and the requirements and benchmarks that have to be achieved, maintained, and respected are tested against the data found in three major statistics data sources: the European Central Bank’s Statistics Data Warehouse (http://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/), Economagic (www.economagic.com), and E-signal. The purpose of this work is to analyse if the euro was a stabilizing factor from its inception to the break of the financial crisis in summer 2008 in the European Union. To answer this question, this study analyses a number of indexes to understand the impact of the euro in three markets: (1) the foreign exchange market, (2) the stock market, and the Crude Oil and commodities markets, (3) the money market.

Obama 2: future implications for EU-US relations. Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Vol. 12, No. 8, November 2012

Introduction. The week following his reelection, President Obama traveled to Asia – Thailand, Myanmar, and Cambodia –, while facing at home a fiscal cliff, the need to select the next Secretaries of State, Defense, and Treasury, and the resignation of one of America’s most senior and respected generals and Director of the CIA, David Petraeus; all this at the moment wherein the Middle East is burning in flames due to another round of violence between Israel and Hamas. On the other side of the pond, the EU is currently trying to solve or at least contain several crises: the Eurozone, agreeing on the Multiannual Financial Framework 2014-2020, or MFF 2014-2020,2 and saving France.3 For both giants, the American and European priorities are domestic; they both need to do some ‘nation-building at home.’4 The threat of the fiscal cliff in the US and the one of the Eurocrisis in Europe are too important to be ignored and so visceral that they will affect the way both actors behave internationally and interact with one another. The big question since Obama’s reelection has been what will the EU-US relations look like under his second mandate? And will there be any differences from the first one?5 This paper argues that the US-EU relations will remain quite similar as it was under the first Obama presidency. Nevertheless, with the current shift to Asia, the ‘pivot,’ the EU will be required to increase its contributions to global politics and international security. This paper is structured in three parts. First, the economic and political climax of the EU and the US will be presented. In a second a part, the EU and US strategies and foreign policies will be laid out. Last but not least, several core issues facing the Euro-Atlantic community, such as the Asia pivot, Iran, climate change, and the economy will be addressed. Other issues such as Syria, Afghanistan, and the Middle East and North Africa will not be addressed in this paper.6

Prospects and challenges of a Pan-European post-trade infrastructure. ECMI Policy Brief No. 20, 8 November 2012

After more than a decade of indecision, the EU is finally now set to implement a consistent regulatory architecture for clearing and settlement. Following the agreement on a European market infrastructure Regulation (EMIR), the European Commission has proposed harmonised rules for centralised settlement depositaries (CSDs), while the European Central Bank is moving forward with its plans for a central eurozone settlement engine. This paper analyses three components of the new post-trade infrastructure measures: 1) the regulatory framework for and supervision of central counterparties under the new EMIR legislation, 2) the authorisation requirements of trade repositories and 3) the draft CSD Regulation and the progress with the ECB’s Target 2 Securities project. It then discusses the impact of the new rules, and argues that, analogous to the unexpected impact of MiFID on trading infrastructures, a similar EMIR revolution may be on its way.

The Discursive double game of EMU reform: the clash of titans between French White Knight and German Iron Lady. Paper presented at the 9th Biennial Conference European Community Studies Association–Canada (ECSA-C), Ottawa, Ontario, April 27-28, 2012

From the Introduction. In the aftermath of the EU’s enlargement towards Central and Eastern Europe, many scholars and observers of European integration were proclaiming that the French-German “engine” of Europe had come to an end. The political legitimacy of French-German initiatives was contested by coalitions of smaller member states and the ‘new Europe’ was calling for new leadership dynamics. However, the experience of the Eurozone debt crisis provided dramatic evidence that no alternative to the Franco-German partnership has yet to emerge in the enlarged EU. In a time of existential crisis, Franco-German initiatives appear to have remained the basic dynamic of integration. However, unlike in the past, agreements on steps forward have proven to be particularly difficult. This is largely due to these countries’ contrasting political economic policy ideas, cultures, and practices....the paper analyses the ideational ‘frames’ of the two leaders while tracing their discursive interactions against changing background conditions since the European debt crisis was triggered by Greece in October 2009 until the last measures taken in 2012 before the French Presidential elections. The empirical analysis is based on a systematic corpus of press conferences and media interviews by Nicolas Sarkozy and Angela Merkel after European summits. It is complemented by a number of press interviews including some given by their respective Finance Ministers) and important speeches in that same period of time.

Strong governments, weak banks. CEPS Policy Brief No. 305, 25 November 2013

Banks in the northern eurozone have capital ratios that are, on average, less than half of the capital ratios of banks in the eurozone’s periphery. The authors explain this by the fact that northern eurozone banks profit from the financial solidity of their governments and follow business strategies aimed at issuing too much subsidised debt. In doing so, they weaken their balance sheets and become more fragile – less able to withstand future shocks. Paradoxically, financially strong governments breed fragile banks. The opposite occurs in countries with financially weak governments. In these countries banks are forced to strengthen themselves because they are unable to rely on their governments. As a result they have significantly more capital and reserves than banks in the northern eurozone. Recommendations More than in the south, the governments of northern Europe should stand up and force the banks to issue more equity. This should go much further than what is foreseen in the Basel III accord. If the experience of the southern eurozone countries is any guide, banks in the north of the eurozone should at least double the capital and the reserves as a percentage of their balance sheets. Failure to do so risks destroying the financial solidity of the northern European governments when, in the future, negative shocks force these governments to come to the rescue of their undercapitalised banks. The new responsibilities entrusted to the European Central Bank as the single supervisor in the eurozone create a unique opportunity for that institution to change the regulatory and supervisory culture in the eurozone – one that has allowed the large banks to continue living dangerously, with insufficient capital.

European banking disunion. CEPS Commentary, 14 November 2013

In this CEPS Commentary Daniel Gros argues that the purpose of the euro was to create fully integrated financial markets; but, since the start of the financial crisis in 2008, markets have increasingly separated along national lines. So the future of the eurozone depends crucially on whether that trend continues or is reversed and Europe’s financial markets in the end become fully integrated. But either outcome would be preferable to something in between – neither fish nor fowl. Unfortunately, that is where the eurozone appears to be headed.

Germany as Scapegoat. CEPS Commentary, 10 December 2013

Germany has been an attractive target for external-deficit countries in Europe and beyond, but beating up on Germany alone appears to be the wrong way to get results. This CEPS Commentary by Daniel Gros argues that the discussion of Germany’s surplus confuses the issues in two ways. First, he points out that although the German economy and its surplus loom large in the context of Europe, an adjustment by Germany alone would only modestly benefit the eurozone periphery. Second, in the global context, he finds that adjustment by Germany alone would benefit many countries a little, but other surplus countries including Russia, China and Japan, would benefit disproportionally.

Falling short of expectations? Stress-testing the European banking system. CEPS Policy Brief No. 315, 15 January 2014

Before the ECB takes over responsibility for overseeing Europe’s largest banks, as foreseen in the establishment of a eurozone banking union, it plans to conduct an Asset Quality Review (AQR) throughout the coming year, which will identify the capital shortfalls of these banks. This study finds that a comprehensive and decisive AQR will most likely reveal a substantial lack of capital in many peripheral and core European banks. The authors provide estimates of the capital shortfalls of banks that will be stress-tested under the AQR using publicly available data and a series of shortfall measures. Their analysis identifies which banks will most likely need capital, where a public back stop is likely to be needed and, since many countries are already highly leveraged, where an EU-wide backstop might be necessary.