The 2015 Swiss elections: A landslide win for the right, despite limited changes in vote share

Switzerland held federal elections on 18 October, with the conservative Swiss People’s Party winning the largest share of the votes. Daniel Bochsler, Marlène Gerber and David Zumbach write that while the increase in vote share for the Swiss People’s Party was relatively limited, the party managed to significantly increase the number of seats it holds in Switzerland’s lower house of parliament, the National Council. Nevertheless, the party is unlikely to make substantial gains in the country’s upper house, the Senate, as it traditionally struggles under the two-round electoral system used in Senate elections.

Political conditions for fair elections

Democracy is not necessarily consolidated simply by the introduction of formal democratic institutions. It is often observed in new democracies that democratic institutions are neglected and eroded in actual practice. Particularly, electoral fraud committed by a ruler is one of the main problems in this regard. This paper deals with two questions, (1) under what conditions does a ruler have an incentive to hold fair elections (or to rig elections), and (2) what makes a ruler prefer to establish an independent election governing institution? Assuming that a ruler prefers to maintain her power, basically she has an incentive to rig elections in order to be victorious in the political competition. A ruler, however, faces the risk of losing power if the opposition stages successful protests on a sufficiently large scale. If opponents are able to pose a credible threat to a ruler, she will have an incentive to hold fair elections. The problem is that information on electoral fraud is not shared by every player in the game. For the opposition, imperfect information deepens their coordination problems. Imperfect information, on the other hand, in some cases causes a problem for a ruler. If the opposition is sufficiently cohesive and have little tolerance of cheating, even unverified suspicions of fraud may trigger menacing protests. In such a case, a ruler has an incentive to establish an independent election commission to avoid unnecessary collisions by revealing the nature of the elections.

Ethnicity and Elections under Authoritarianism: The Case of Kazakhstan

Despite the ethnicisation of power since independence in 1991, Kazakhstan has managed to maintain political stability without experiencing large-scale mobilisation to oppose Kazakh domination. This paper examines government strategy to avoid ethnic voting in an attempt to explain why ethnic divisions were rarely reflected in the struggle for power in the republic. While the arbitrary use of legal provisions considerably limited participation in elections by ethnic leaders, powerful pro-president parties that exhibited a cross-ethnic character were created to curtail ethnically based movements. The control strategy in elections aimed not simply at ethnicising the parliament in favour of Kazakhs, but at having loyal Russians and other minorities represented in the legislature through nomination by the president and catch-all pro-regime parties, or through the presidential consultative body—Assembly of the People of Kazakhstan. This well-controlled representation of minorities served not only to placate non-Kazakhs but also to provide legitimacy for the Kazakh-dominated leadership by projecting the image of cross-ethnic support for the president and some degree of power-sharing.

Changing local elite selection in Thailand : emergence of new local government presidents after direct elections and their capabilities

Before rural local government units were established in Thailand, reform debates within the country faced a crucial issue: Candidates at the rural sub-district levels might adopt electioneering methods such as vote buying and the patronage system of the local political and economic elite, the methods that had been used in the national elections. In fact, the results of the 2006 survey in this paper, which followed the introduction of direct elections in rural local government units in 2003, contrast with the result anticipated during the debates on political reform. The preliminary data of the survey shows that the decentralization process and the introduction of the direct election system in the rural areas had some effect in changing the selection process of the local elite in Thailand.

Elections, information aggregation, and strategic voting

A central role of elections is the aggregation of information dispersed within a population. This article surveys recent work on elections as mechanisms for aggregating information and on the incentives for voters to vote strategically in such elections.

Electoral Systems and Ethnic Conciliation: A Structured, Focused Analysis of Vote-Pooling in Northern Ireland Elections 1998-2011

This research project examines the role of electoral system rules in affecting the extent of conciliatory behavior and cross-ethnic coalition making in Northern Ireland. It focuses on the role of the Single Transferable Vote (STV) electoral system in shaping party and voter incentives in a post-conflict divided society. The research uses a structured, focused comparison of the four electoral cycles since the Belfast Agreement of 1998. This enables a systematic examination of each electoral cycle using a common set of criteria focused on conciliation and cross-ethnic coalition making. Whilst preference voting is assumed to benefit moderate candidates, in Northern Ireland centrist and multi-ethnic parties outside of the dominant ethnic communities have received little electoral success. In Northern Ireland the primary effect of STV has not been to encourage inter-communal voting but to facilitate intra-community and intra-party moderation. STV has encouraged the moderation of the historically extreme political parties in each of the ethnic bloc. Patterns across electoral cycles suggest that party elites from the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and Sinn Fein have moderated their policy positions due to the electoral system rules. Therefore they have pursued lower-preference votes from within their ethnic bloc but in doing so have marginalized parties of a multi-ethnic or non-ethnic orientation.

Forecasting Elections with High Volatility

This article uses data from the social survey Allbus 1998 to introduce a method of forecasting elections in a context of electoral volatility. The approach models the processes of change in electoral behaviour, exploring patterns in order to model the volatility expressed by voters. The forecast is based on the matrix of transition probabilities, following the logic of Markov chains. The power of the matrix, and the use of the mover-stayer model, is debated for alternative forecasts. As an example of high volatility, the model uses data from the German general election of 1998. The unification of two German states in 1990 caused the incorporation of around 15 million new voters from East Germany who had limited familiarity and no direct experience of the political culture in West Germany. Under these circumstances, voters were expected to show high volatility.

Elections to the European Parliament and the trouble with vox populi. EPIN Commentary No. 12, 22 August 2013

Declining support for the European Union in many member states is causing some disquiet about the possibility of an even lower voter turnout in the upcoming European Parliament (EP) elections to be held next May. This discontent might well be exploited by populist anti-European parties and boost protest-vote participation, cautions Sonia Piedrafita in this EPIN Commentary, and this would pose a serious risk for EU decision-making and undermine the sense of common identity and any plans for further integration. This Commentary, which looks at the elections from an EU perspective, is the first in a series of Commentaries by EPIN (European Policy Institutes Network) that will examine the outlook for the European Parliament elections in various member states.