Economic Implications of Enlargement. Bruges European Economic Policy (BEEP) Briefing 1/2002

The Eastern enlargement is about to be decided by the European Council. As expected, the “end game “ of the negotiations and assessments is heavily biased by a narrow perspective on net transfers, on income compensations to Central European farmers and on the psychological politics of a single “big bang “. None of these three so-called key items of the end game are of much relevance to appreciate the significance of enlargement. Net transfers have little to do with the costs and benefits of club membership for countries which pay, and can lead to addiction and lethargy rather than extra growth if market integration, macro-economic stability and domestic reforms are not taken serious (as the case of Greece before 1997 has demonstrated). Income compensations for Eastern farmers are crucial for this pressure group, and symbolically of some importance in domestic politics because of the perversity that rich farmers get more, but their absence is likely to serve the public interest in candidate countries far better. And being part of the big bang, as against getting in one or three years later, has assumed a dramatic meaning during this end game, far beyond its true proportions. This hectic European theatre tends to obscure what enlargement is mainly about, now that the stability and values have been secured for the peoples from Central Europe. In a guaranteed setting of peace, freedom and security, enlargement is about greater prosperity.

European Industrial Policy. Bruges European Economic Policy (BEEP) Briefing 15/2006

This survey of European industrial policy aims to set out and explain the great significance of European integration in determining (changes in) structure and performance of industry in the EU. This influence is explored from the policy side by analysing the transformation of the framework within which both EU and Member States' industrial policy can be pursued. Empirical economic analysis is not included because this BEEP Briefing was originally written for a handbook3 in which other authors were assigned a range of industrial economics subjects. In the last 25 years or so, the transformation is such that the nature and scope of industrial policy at both levels of government has profoundly changed as well. Indeed, the toolkit of measures has shrunk considerably, disciplines have been tightened and the economic policy views behind industrial policy have altered everywhere. The pro-competitive logic of deeper market integration itself is rarely questioned nowadays and industrial policy at the two levels takes on different forms. The survey discusses at some length the division of powers between, and the complementarity of, the Member States' and EU levels of government when it comes to industrial policy, based on a fairly detailed classification of industrial policy instruments. The three building blocks of the wide concept of industrial policy as defined in this BEEP Briefing consist of the EU framework of market integration, EU horizontal industrial policy and its EU sectoral or specific counterpart. Each one is surveyed at the EU level. Preceding these three sections is a discussion of three cross-cutting issues, namely, the indiscriminate use of the 'competitiveness' label in the EU circuit of business and policy makers, the relation between services and EU industrial policy and, finally, that of European infrastructure. One major conclusion is that, today, the incentive structure for industry and industrial markets is dominated by the stringency of the overall EU framework and to some moderate degree by the horizontal approach.

The Eurasian Economic Union – more political, less economic. OSW Commentary Number 157/20.01.2015

The Eurasian Economic Union is undoubtedly the most comprehensive form of economic integration of the post-Soviet countries since the break-up of the Soviet Union. However, the way in which the integration process has been unfolding, as well as Russia’s aggressive policy over the last year, are indications that the EEU has become primarily a political project, and the importance of its economic aspects has eroded. This has triggered a change in the way Kazakhstan and Belarus treat the EEU. Initially, the two countries viewed integration as an opportunity for the development of genuine economic co-operation. However, Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the conflict in Ukraine have revealed the real significance of the EEU project – as a tool to reinforce Russian influence in the post-Soviet area and isolate the post-Soviet countries from the West and China. While the Kremlin presents the EEU as the Eurasian equivalent of the European Union, the project is in reality an imitation of integration. The reasons for this include the nature of the political systems in the participating countries, which are authoritarian, prone to instrumentalise law, and affected by systemic corruption; the aggressive policy that Russia has been pursuing over the last year; and Russia’s dominant role in defining the shape of the EEU. The EEU appears to be based on forceful integration, and is becoming less and less economically attractive for its member countries other than Russia. Moreover, it is clearly assuming a political dimension that those other member countries perceive as dangerous. For these reasons, its functioning will depend on the power and position of Russia. In the longer term it is likely that the other member states will try to ‘sham’ and delay closer integration within the EEU. This means that if Russia becomes politically and economically weaker, the EEU may evolve into an increasingly dysfunctional organisation – a development that will be reinforced by the low standards of legal culture in its member states and their reluctance to integrate. Should Russia’s power increase, the EEU will become an effective instrument of Russian dominance in the area of the former USSR.

Russia marks the 70th anniversary of the victory over Nazism: What significance does it have in an epoch of global confrontation? OSW Commentary No. 171, 20 May 2015

The Victory Day celebrations held in Russia on 9 May 2015 were special for marking the seventieth anniversary of the end of World War II but the particular international and domestic context they were set in was of yet greater importance. The element which set the celebrations in 2015 apart from those in the preceding years was how the military and moral aspects of Soviet victory over Nazi Germany was made part of the current geopolitical confrontation with the West concerning the Ukrainian crisis. The escalation of the aggressive rhetoric on Europe and the USA and accusations that the West is destabilising the international situation and striving for conflict was accompanied by a display of the increasing military power of the Russian Federation; the display itself was stronger than has been seen in preceding years. This was a clear sign that Moscow is ready to protect its national interests in the area of foreign policy by any means. At the same time, the creation of an atmosphere of threat and stoking patriotic feelings was intended to mobilise the Russian public around the political leadership while the country’s economic problems are deteriorating further.

Germany as the EU's reluctant hegemon? Of economic strength and political constraints

This article explores the growing perception, prompted by the eurozone crisis, of Germany as a hegemonic power in the European Union. The article explores the realignments in the power balance within the European Union (EU) by making an original application of the insights from the literature on hegemony. It reviews the evidence for Germany playing a hegemonic role, but then emphasizes three sets of constraints. First, German pre-eminence is largely confined to the economic sphere. Even in this area Germany has not acted fully in line with the role ascribed by hegemonic stability theory. Second, its pre-eminence in the EU encounters problems of international legitimacy. Third, growing constraints arising from German domestic politics further hamper playing the role of hegemon. In consequence, Germany is intrinsically a reluctant hegemon: one whose economic leadership is recognized but politically contested. The conclusion considers the significance of these findings on the EU's most important member state. © 2013 Taylor & Francis.

Absorptive capability and economic growth:how do countries catch-up?

This paper investigates empirically the importance of technological catch-up in explaining productivity growth in a sample of countries since the 1960s. New proxies for a country's absorptive capability—based on data for students studying abroad, telecommunications and publications—are tested in regression models. The results indicate that absorptive capability is a factor in explaining growth, with the most robust finding that countries with relatively high numbers of students studying science or engineering abroad experience faster subsequent growth. However, the paper also indicates that the significance of coefficients varies across specifications and samples, suggesting caution in focusing on individual results.

Designed for Patience. The Significance of International Factors in the Ukrainian and Belarusian Transitions

This paper focuses on Belarus in order to find explanation as to why could Lukashenko remain the authoritarian leader of Belarus, while in Ukraine the position of the political elite had proved less stable and collapsed in 2004. We seek to determine whether the internal factors (macroeconomic conditions, standard of living, the oppressive nature of the political system) play a significant role in the operation of the domino effect. This article emphasises the determining role of immanent internal factors, thus the political stability in Belarus can be explained by the role of the suppressing political regime, the hindrance of democratic rights and the relatively good living conditions that followed the transformational recession. Whilst in Ukraine, the markedly different circumstances brought forth the success of the Orange Revolution.

Kameralizmus, történelmi iskola, osztrák gazdaságtan. Három vázlat a német és osztrák közgazdasági diskurzus történetéből (Cameralism, the historical school and Austrian economics. Three outlines from the history of German and Austrian economic debate)

A kameralizmus a 16-18. századi német gyakorlati államtudomány és egyetemi tantárgy volt, amely összefoglalta a hivatalnokok képzéséhez szükséges elméleti és gyakorlati gazdasági ismereteket. Felfogása szerint az alattvalók jóléte és boldogsága feltétele az uralkodó gazdagságának, de az alattvalók önmaguktól nem képesek utat találni ehhez a boldogsághoz, szükség van az állandó külső irányításra. Igazgatásközpontúsága és egyetemi intézményesülése miatt nem tekinthető a merkantilizmus helyi változatának. Az 1840 és 1945 közötti német történeti iskola hagyományos ábrázolása több mint egy évszázadon át a német és a neoklasszikus tradíció szembenállását hangsúlyozta, kiemelve az organicizmus, a fejlődésgondolat és az egyediség jelentőségét, a szociális kérdés fontosságát, illetve a deduktív módszer és a gazdaság változatlan törvényeinek tagadását. A modern rekonstrukciók a történeti iskolát a posztklasszikus válságra adott egyik európai válaszként fogják fel, amely a történelemből levont, empirikusan megalapozott induktív alternatívát kínált. Az 1871-től kialakult osztrák iskola a neoklasszikus paradigmának egyszerre volt alkotórésze és versenytársa. A módszertani individualizmus, a szubjektivizmus, az idő fontossága, a tudás szerepe, az alternatív költségek elmélete stb. ugyan beépültek a mainstream közgazdaságtanba, de hangsúlyos kiemelésük lehetővé tette, hogy a társadalomelméleti magyarázat igényét őrző osztrák iskola megtartson valamit önálló beszédmódjából. / === / Cameralism was a practical political science and university subject in 16th–18th century Germany, summarizing the theoretical and practical economic knowledge required in the training of officials. The assumption was that the prosperity of the ruler depended on the welfare and happiness of the subjects, but the subjects themselves were not capable of achieving this happiness without permanent directions from above. Cameralism’s emphasis on administration and university institutionalization means that this approach cannot be seen as a local variant of mercantilism. The traditional account of the German historical school from 1840 to 1945 emphasized for over a century the contrast between the German and the Neoclassical traditions. It underlined the significance of the organic approach, the concept of development and individuality, the importance of the social question, and the denial of the deductive method and unalterable laws of the economy. Modern reconstructions see the historical school as one European response to the post-Classical crisis, offering an inductive alternative grounded empirically on history. The Austrian school formed in 1871 was at once a constituent of the Neoclassical paradigm and a rival to it. Methodological individualism, subjectivism, the importance of time, the role of knowledge, the theory of alternative costs etc. were absorbed into mainstream economics, but the focusing on these issues allowed the Austrian school, in keeping alive its demand for a social-theoretical explanation, to preserve something of an alternative discourse.

The effect of domestic credit in the economic *development process

A commonly held view is that creation of excessive domestic credit may lead to inflation problems, however, many economists uphold the possibility that, generous domestic credit under appropriate conditions will result in increases of output. This hypothesis is examined for Japan and Colombia for the period 1950-1993.^ Domestic credit theories are reviewed since the times of Thornton and Smith, until the recent times of Lewis, McKinnon, Stiglitz and of Japanese economists like K. Emi, Tachi R. and others. It is found that in Japan of the Post-War period, efficient financial markets and the decisive role of the government in orienting investment decisions seem to have influenced positively the effectiveness of domestic credit as an output-stimulating variable. On the contrary, in Colombia the absence of the above features seems to explain why domestic credit is not very effective as an output-stimulating variable.^ Multiple regression analyses show that domestic credit is a strong explanatory variable for output increases in Japan and a weak one for Colombia's case in the studied period. For Japan the correlation depicts a positive relationship between the two variables with a decreasing rate very similar to a typical production function. Moreover, the positive decreasing rate is confirmed if net domestic credit is used in the correlations. For Colombia a positive relationship is also found when accumulated domestic credit is used, but, if net domestic credit is the source of correlations, the positive decreasing rate is not obtained.^ Granger causality tests determined causality from domestic credit to output for Japan and no-causality for Colombia at the 1% significance level; the differences are explained by: (1) The low development level of the financial system in Colombia. (2) The nonexistence of consistent domestic credit policy to foster economic development. (3) The lack of an authoritative orientation in the allocation of financial resources and the nonexistence of long range industrialization programs in Colombia that could channel productively credit resources. For the system of equations relating domestic credit and exports, the Granger causality tests determined no-causality between domestic credit and exports for both Japan and Colombia also at the 1% significance level. ^

The contribution of higher education to economic *development in a globalized environment

Amidst concerns about achieving high levels of technology to remain competitive in the global market without compromising economic development, national economies are experiencing a high demand for human capital. As higher education is assumed to be the main source of human capital, this analysis focused on a more specific and less explored area of the generally accepted idea that higher education contributes to economic growth. The purpose of this study, therefore, was to find whether higher education also contributes to economic development, and whether that contribution is more substantial in a globalized context. ^ Consequently, a multiple linear regression analysis was conducted to support with statistical significance the answer to the research question: Does higher education contributes to economic development in the context of globalization? The information analyzed was obtained from historical data of 91 selected countries, and the period of time of the study was 10 years (1990–2000). Some variables, however, were lagged back 5, 10 or 15 years along a 15-year timeframe (1975–1990). The resulting comparative static model was based on the Cobb-Douglas production function and the Solow model to specify economic growth as a function of physical capital, labor, technology, and productivity. Then, formal education, economic development, and globalization were added to the equation. ^ The findings of this study supported the assumption that the independent contribution of the changes in higher education completion and globalization to changes in economic growth is more substantial than the contribution of their interaction. The results also suggested that changes in higher and secondary education completion contribute much more to changes in economic growth in less developed countries than in their more developed counterparts. ^ As a conclusion, based on the results of this study, I proposed the implementation of public policy in less developed countries to promote and expand adequate secondary and higher education systems with the purpose of helping in the achievement of economic development. I also recommended further research efforts on this topic to emphasize the contribution of education to the economy, mainly in less developed countries. ^

Measured parental weight status and familial socio-economic status correlates with childhood overweight and obesity at age 9

Background: Parental obesity is a predominant risk factor for childhood obesity. Family factors including socio-economic status (SES) play a role in determining parent weight. It is essential to unpick how shared family factors impact on child weight. This study aims to investigate the association between measured parent weight status, familial socio-economic factors and the risk of childhood obesity at age 9. Methodology/Principal Findings: Cross sectional analysis of the first wave (2008) of the Growing Up in Ireland (GUI) study. GUI is a nationally representative study of 9-year-old children (N = 8,568). Schools were selected from the national total (response rate 82%) and age eligible children (response rate 57%) were invited to participate. Children and their parents had height and weight measurements taken using standard methods. Data were reweighted to account for the sampling design. Childhood overweight and obesity prevalence were calculated using International Obesity Taskforce definitions. Multinomial logistic regression examined the association between parent weight status, indicators of SES and child weight. Overall, 25% of children were either overweight (19.3%) or obese (6.6%). Parental obesity was a significant predictor of child obesity. Of children with normal weight parents, 14.4% were overweight or obese whereas 46.2% of children with obese parents were overweight or obese. Maternal education and household class were more consistently associated with a child being in a higher body mass index category than household income. Adjusted regression indicated that female gender, one parent family type, lower maternal education, lower household class and a heavier parent weight status significantly increased the odds of childhood obesity. Conclusions/Significance: Parental weight appears to be the most influential factor driving the childhood obesity epidemic in Ireland and is an independent predictor of child obesity across SES groups. Due to the high prevalence of obesity in parents and children, population based interventions are required.

The Causal Links between FDI and Economic Growth in Developing Countries: A Case Study of the Republic of Rwanda

The study examines the short-run and long-run causality running from real economic growth to real foreign direct investment inflows (RFDI). Other variables such as education (involving combination of primary, secondary and tertiary enrolment as a proxy to education), real development finance, unskilled labour, to real RFDI inflows are included in the study. The time series data covering the period of 1983 -2013 are examined. First, I applied Augmented Dicky-Fuller (ADF) technique to test for unit root in variables. Findings shows all variables integrated of order one [I(1)]. Thereafter, Johansen Co-integration Test (JCT) was conducted to establish the relationship among variables. Both trace and maximum Eigen value at 5% level of significance indicate 3 co-integrated equations. Vector error correction method (VECM) was applied to capture short and long-run causality running from education, economic growth, real development finance, and unskilled labour to real foreign direct investment inflows in the Republic of Rwanda. Findings shows no short-run causality running from education, real development finance, real GDP and unskilled labour to real FDI inflows, however there were existence of long-run causality. This can be interpreted that, in the short-run; education, development finance, finance and economic growth does not influence inflows of foreign direct investment in Rwanda; but it does in long-run. From the policy perspective, the Republic of Rwanda should focus more on long term goal of investing in education to improve human capital, undertake policy reforms that promotes economic growth, in addition to promoting good governance to attract development finance – especially from Nordics countries (particularly Norway and Denmark).

Social Return on Investment: Valuing Health Outcomes or Promoting Economic Values?

Interventions and activities that influence health are often concerned with intangible outcomes that are difficult to value despite their potential significance. Social Return on Investment is an evaluation framework that explores all aspects of change and expresses these in comparable terms. It combines qualitative narratives and quantitative measurements with a financial approach to enable outcomes that can otherwise be overlooked or undervalued to be incorporated appropriately. This article presents Social Return on Investment as an effective tool for supporting the development of a holistic appreciation of how interventions impact on the health and well-being of individuals, communities and societies.

The significance of restorative justice in schools

Este artículo trata de abordar el uso dominante de los enfoques punitivos a los problemas de comportamiento en las escuelas, y se propone un enfoque de justicia restaurativa. En los Estados Unidos, y especialmente después de 1994, las políticas de tolerancia cero han transformado los problemas de control social en una crisis de graves proporciones. Estas políticas («tolerancia cero») parece que han servido, principalmente, para sólo marginalizar más a los chicos latinos y afroamericanos y para agravar, a largo plazo, los retos políticos, económicos y sociales del país. Sobre la base de las tradiciones de justicia restaurativa internacionales y la experiencia de los pueblos indígenas en los Estados Unidos, el objetivo de la justicia restaurativa es devolver a la víctima a la situación anterior al delito y reconstruir la relación del agresor tanto con el ofendido como con la comunidad. El artículo establece los principios que rigen un proceso de restauración, así como sus componentes esenciales.