Countervailing incentives in adverse selection models. A synthesis

In this paper we propose a simple method of characterizing countervailing incentives in adverse selection problems. The key element in our characterization consists of analyzing properties of the full information problem. This allows solving the principal problem without using optimal control theory. Our methodology can also be applied to different economic settings: health economics, monopoly regulation, labour contracts, limited liabilities and environmental regulation.

Oscillations in a decentralized economic network

The study of exchange markets dates back to LeonWalras's general equilibrium theory. Since then the economic market has been studied for its' equilibrium properties, fairness of allocations of private and public goods, and even the psychological incentives of participants. This paper studies the dynamics of an exchange economy built on a network of markets where consumers trade with suppliers to optimize utility. Viewing the market in as a decentralized network we study the system from the usual control theory point of view, evaluating the system's dynamic performance, stability and robustness. It is shown that certain consumer demand dynamics can lead to oscillations while others can converge to optimal allocations. © 2011 IFAC.

Reversal of impairment losses, firm performance and reporting incentives: Evidence from Malaysia

Malaysian Financial Reporting Standard (FRS) No. 136, Impairment of Assets, was issued in 2005. The standard requires public listed companies to report their non-current assets at no more than their recoverable amount. When the value of impaired assets is recovered, or partly recovered, FRS 136 requires the impairment charges to be reversed to its new recoverable amount. This study tests whether the reversal of impairment losses by Malaysian firms is more closely associated with economic reasons or reporting incentives. The sample of this study consists of 182 public companies listed on Bursa Malaysia (formerly known as the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange) that reported reversals of their impairment charges during the period 2006-2009. These firms are matched with firms which do not reverse impairment on the basis of industrial classification and size. In the year of reversal, this study finds that the reversal firms are more profitable (before reversals) than their matched firms. On average, the Malaysian stock market values the reversals of impairment losses positively. These results suggest that the reversals generally reflect increases in the value of the previously impaired assets. After partitioning firms that are likely to manage earnings and those that are not, this study finds that there are some Malaysian firms which reverse the impairment charges to manage earnings. Their reversals are not value-relevant, and are negatively associated with future firm performance. On the other hand, the reversals of firms which are deemed not to be earnings managers are positively associated with both future firm performance and current stock price performance, and this is the dominant motivation for the reversal of impairment charges in Malaysia. In further analysis, this study provides evidence that the opportunistic reversals are also associated with other earnings management manifestations, namely abnormal working capital accruals and the motivation to avoid earnings declines. In general, the findings suggest that the fair value measurement in impairment standard provides useful information to the users of financial statements.

Impact of economic, regulatory, and patent policies on innovation in cancer chemoprevention.

Chemoprevention agents are an emerging new scientific area that holds out the promise of delaying or avoiding a number of common cancers. These new agents face significant scientific, regulatory, and economic barriers, however, which have limited investment in their research and development (R&D). These barriers include above-average clinical trial scales, lengthy time frames between discovery and Food and Drug Administration approval, liability risks (because they are given to healthy individuals), and a growing funding gap for early-stage candidates. The longer time frames and risks associated with chemoprevention also cause exclusivity time on core patents to be limited or subject to significant uncertainties. We conclude that chemoprevention uniquely challenges the structure of incentives embodied in the economic, regulatory, and patent policies for the biopharmaceutical industry. Many of these policy issues are illustrated by the recently Food and Drug Administration-approved preventive agents Gardasil and raloxifene. Our recommendations to increase R&D investment in chemoprevention agents include (a) increased data exclusivity times on new biological and chemical drugs to compensate for longer gestation periods and increasing R&D costs; chemoprevention is at the far end of the distribution in this regard; (b) policies such as early-stage research grants and clinical development tax credits targeted specifically to chemoprevention agents (these are policies that have been very successful in increasing R&D investment for orphan drugs); and (c) a no-fault liability insurance program like that currently in place for children's vaccines.

Economic return of clinical trials performed under the pediatric exclusivity program.

CONTEXT: In 1997, Congress authorized the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to grant 6-month extensions of marketing rights through the Pediatric Exclusivity Program if industry sponsors complete FDA-requested pediatric trials. The program has been praised for creating incentives for studies in children and has been criticized as a "windfall" to the innovator drug industry. This critique has been a substantial part of congressional debate on the program, which is due to expire in 2007. OBJECTIVE: To quantify the economic return to industry for completing pediatric exclusivity trials. DESIGN AND SETTING: A cohort study of programs conducted for pediatric exclusivity. Nine drugs that were granted pediatric exclusivity were selected. From the final study reports submitted to the FDA (2002-2004), key elements of the clinical trial design and study operations were obtained, and the cost of performing each study was estimated and converted into estimates of after-tax cash outflows. Three-year market sales were obtained and converted into estimates of after-tax cash inflows based on 6 months of additional market protection. Net economic return (cash inflows minus outflows) and net return-to-costs ratio (net economic return divided by cash outflows) for each product were then calculated. MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES: Net economic return and net return-to-cost ratio. RESULTS: The indications studied reflect a broad representation of the program: asthma, tumors, attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder, hypertension, depression/generalized anxiety disorder, diabetes mellitus, gastroesophageal reflux, bacterial infection, and bone mineralization. The distribution of net economic return for 6 months of exclusivity varied substantially among products (net economic return ranged from -$8.9 million to $507.9 million and net return-to-cost ratio ranged from -0.68 to 73.63). CONCLUSIONS: The economic return for pediatric exclusivity is variable. As an incentive to complete much-needed clinical trials in children, pediatric exclusivity can generate lucrative returns or produce more modest returns on investment.

Using Behavioral Insights For a Better Understanding of Economic Decisions (Regarding Savings, Inequality and Dishonesty)

This dissertation consists of three essays on behavioral economics, with a general aim of enriching our understanding of economic decisions using behavioral insights and experimental methodology. Each essay takes on one particular topic with this general aim.

The first chapter studies savings behavior of the poor. In this project, partnering with a savings product provider in Kenya, we tested the extent to which behavioral interventions and financial incentives can increase the saving rate of individuals with low and irregular income. Our experiment lasted for six months and included a total of twelve conditions. The control condition received weekly reminders and balance reporting via text messages. The treatment conditions received in addition one of the following interventions: (1) reminder text messages framed as if they came from the participant’s kid (2) a golden colored coin with numbers for each week of the trial, on which participants were asked to keep track of their weekly deposits (3) a match of weekly savings: The match was either 10% or 20% up to a certain amount per week. The match was either deposited at the end of each week or the highest possible match was deposited at the start of each week and was adjusted at the end. Among these interventions, by far the most effective was the coin: Those in the coin condition saved on average the highest amount and more than twice as those in the control condition. We hypothesize that being a tangible track-keeping object; the coin made subjects remember to save more often. Our results support the line of literature suggesting that saving decisions involve psychological aspects and that policy makers and product designers should take these influences into account.

The second chapter is related to views towards inequality. In this project, we investigate how the perceived fairness of income distributions depends on the beliefs about the process that generated the inequality. Specifically, we examine how two crucial features of this process affect fairness views: (1) Procedural justice - equal treatment of all, (2) Agency - one's ability to determine his/her income. We do this in a lab experiment by varying the equality of opportunity (procedural justice), and one's ability to make choices, which consequently influence subjects’ ability to influence their income (agency). We then elicit ex-post redistribution decisions of the earnings as a function of these two elements. Our results suggest both agency and procedural justice matter for fairness. Our main findings can be summarized as follows: (1) Highlighting the importance of agency, we find that inequality resulting from risk is considered to be fair only when risk is chosen freely; (2) Highlighting the importance of procedural justice, we find that introducing inequality of opportunity significantly increases redistribution, however the share of subjects redistributing none remain close to the share of subjects redistributing fully revealing an underlying heterogeneity in the population about how fairness views should account for inequality of opportunity.

The third chapter is on morality. In this project, we study whether religious rituals act as an internal reminder for basic moral principles and thus affect moral judgments. To this end, we conducted two survey experiments in Turkey and Israel to specifically test the effect of Ramadan and Yom Kippur. The results from the Turkish sample how that Ramadan has a significant effect on moral judgments to some extent for those who report to believe in God. Those who believe in God judged the moral acceptability of ten out of sixty one actions significantly differently in Ramadan, whereas those who reported not to believe in God significantly changed their judgments only for one action in Ramadan. Our results extends the hypothesis established by lab experiments that religious reminders have a significant effect on morality, by testing it in the field in the natural environment of religious rituals.

This thesis is part of a broader collaborative research agenda with both colleagues and advisors. The programming, analyses, and writing, as well as any errors in this work, are my own.

Hiring Incentives and Labour Force Participation in Italy

A long-standing economic tradition maintains that labour supply reacts to market tightness; its sensitivity to job quality has received less attention. If firms hire workers with both temporary and open-ended contracts, does participation increase when more permanent jobs are available? We investigate this relationship within a policy evaluation framework; in particular, we examine how labour supply reacted in Italy to a recent subsidy in favour of open-ended contracts. This subsidy increased labour force participation by 1.4% in 2001 and 2.1% in 2002. This increase was concentrated on males aged 35-54, with a low or at most a secondary schooling level.

The incentives of a resource owner: Evidence from a private oyster fishery

European flat oyster Ostrea edulis fisheries were once abundant around the UK coastline. The sole remaining productive O. edulis fishery in Scotland is in Loch Ryan. This fishery has been privately owned and managed by a single family since 1701. Economic theory predicts that ownership, whether public or private, is a necessary condition for rational fishery management. In this paper, a series of four leases and a licence are examined, covering an 85-year period over the 20th and 21st century, to examine whether the management of the Loch Ryan fishery conforms to the expected norms of rational management. The leases show that, over this period, the owners appear more willing to expend resources on regulating tenant behaviour, supporting the conclusion that successive generations of owners developed an evolving sense of what "rational management" might require. The results of this study could inform the management of other fisheries - both public and private - by emphasising the importance of learning from experience.

Incentives and Principles for Individuals in Rawls’s Theory of Justice

Philippe van Parijs (2003) has argued that an egalitarian ethos cannot be part of a post- Political Liberalism Rawlsian view of justice, because the demands of political justice are confined to principles for institutions of the basic structure alone. This paper argues, by contrast, that certain principles for individual conduct—including a principle requiring relatively advantaged individuals to sometimes make their economic choices with the aim of maximising the prospects of the least advantaged—are an integral part of a Rawlsian political conception of justice. It concludes that incentive payments will have a clearly limited role in a Rawlsian theory of justice.

Biosecurity in agriculture: an economic analysis of coexistence of professional and hobby production

One component of biosecurity is protection against invasive alien species, which are one of the most important threats worldwide to native biodiversity and economic profitability in various sectors, including agriculture. However, agricultural producers are not homogeneous. They may have different objectives and priorities, use different technologies, and occupy heterogeneous parcels of land. If the producers differ in terms of their attitude towards invasive pests and the damages they cause, there are probably external effects in the form of pest spread impacts and subsequent damages caused. We study such impacts in the case of two producer types: profit-seeking professional producers and utility-seeking hobby producers. We show that the hobby producer, having first set a breeding ground for the pest, under-invests in pest control. We also discuss potential policy instruments to correct this market failure and highlight the importance of considering different stakeholders and their heterogeneous incentives when designing policies to control invasive alien species.

Economic models and algorithms for distributed systems

Distributed computing paradigms for sharing resources such as Clouds, Grids, Peer-to-Peer systems, or voluntary computing are becoming increasingly popular. While there are some success stories such as PlanetLab, OneLab, BOINC, BitTorrent, and SETI@home, a widespread use of these technologies for business applications has not yet been achieved. In a business environment, mechanisms are needed to provide incentives to potential users for participating in such networks. These mechanisms may range from simple non-monetary access rights, monetary payments to specific policies for sharing. Although a few models for a framework have been discussed (in the general area of a "Grid Economy"), none of these models has yet been realised in practice. This book attempts to fill this gap by discussing the reasons for such limited take-up and exploring incentive mechanisms for resource sharing in distributed systems. The purpose of this book is to identify research challenges in successfully using and deploying resource sharing strategies in open-source and commercial distributed systems.

The role of incentives for sustainable implementation of marine protected areas: an example from Tanzania

Although Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) are an increasingly popular policy tool for protecting marine stocks and biodiversity, they pose high costs for small-scale fisherfolk in poor countries. With Tanzania’s Mnazi Bay Ruvuma Estuary Marine Park as an example, we develop a spatial economic decision-modelling framework as a lens to examine fishers’ reactions to incentives created by an MPA. We argue that MPAs in poor countries can only contribute to sustainability if management induces changes in incentives to fish through a combination of enforcement (‘sticks’) and livelihood projects (‘carrots’). We emphasise practical implementation issues and implications for fostering marine ecosystem sustainability.

Public investment in basic education and economic growth

The main objective of this paper was to visualize the relation between government spending on basic education and the human capital accumulation process, observing the impacts of this spending on individual investments in higher education, and on economic growth. It is used an overlapping-generations model where the government tax the adult generation and spent it in basic education of the next generations. It was demonstrated that the magnitude of the marginal effect of government spending in basic education on growth crucially depends on public budget constrains. The paper explains why some countries with a lot of public investment in basic education growth at low rates. In that sense if a country has only a lot of public investment in basic education without investment in higher education it may growth at low rates because the taxation can cause distortions in the agents incentives to invest in higher education.

The long run economic impact of AIDS

This paper studies the long-run impact of HIV/AIDS on per capita income and education. We introduce a channel from HIV/AIDS to long-run income that has been overlooked by the literature, the reduction of the incentives to study due to shorter expected longevity. We work with a continuous time overlapping generations mo deI in which life cycle features of savings and education decision play key roles. The simulations predict that the most affected countries in Sub-Saharan Africa will be in the future, on average, a quarter poorer than they would be without AIDS, due only to the direct (human capital reduction) and indirect (decline in savings and investment) effects of life-expectancy reductions. Schooling will decline on average by half. These findings are well above previous results in the literature and indicate that, as pessimistic as they may be, at least in economic terms the worst could be yet to come.

Formation and destruction of coalition groups under economic growth

This paper introduces a model economy in which formation of coalition groups under technological progress is generated endogenously. The coalition formation depends crucially on the rate of arrival of new technologies. In the model, an agent working in the saroe technology for more than one period acquires skills, part of which is specific to this technology. These skills increase the agent productivity. In this case, if he has worked more than one period with the same technology he has incentives to construct a coalition to block the adoption of new technologies. Therefore, in every sector the workers have incentives to construct a coalition and to block the adoption of new technologies. They will block every time that a technology stay in use for more than one period.