Economic growth with equity: challenges for Latin America

Includes bibliography

Growth with stability: financing for development in the new international context

Includes bibliography

Review of Caribbean economic and social performance in the 1980's and 1990's

Includes bibliography

Forum for East Asia-Latin America Cooperation (FEALAC): new biregional trade and investment relations in a changing world economic environment$c

Includes bibliography

Social dimensions of macroeconomic policy: report of the Executive Committee on Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations

Introduction The social agenda is long-term in nature, in the sense that poverty alleviation along with a better distribution of income, wealth and opportunities are long-term goals. A sound macroeconomic policy, on the other hand, has to do largely with the consistent management of short-term policy instruments pursuing a sustainable and predictable pace for aggregate economic variables and major prices (wages, inflation, interest rates and exchange rates). In spite of the different arena and rationale in which they play, there are strong links between the two. First and most obvious, macroeconomic adjustment and structural reform are more likely to be sustainable when they are equitable. Second, social intervention —i.e., policies, programmes and reforms aimed at improving social performance in the long run—, needs stable funding which is not always available in view of macroeconomic constraints. Third, macroeconomic instability —especially episodes of recession or hyperinflation— increases poverty and inequality, while restoring macroeconomic equilibrium does not restore previous social balances. Finally, there is no unique macroeconomic policy mix to tackle a given situation, and the policy options may not be neutral from a social standpoint. Monetary, fiscal and exchange rate policies, together with structural reform, have major consequences for the social wellbeing of societies, not only in terms of protection against shocks and crises but also in terms of equity. Many, if not all, of the necessary social policies are of a domestic nature. This report thus concentrates on domestic strategies aimed at maximizing the linkages between consistent macroeconomic policies and social progress. Pursuing them, however, depends to a considerable extent on the international enabling environment in which the global financial system, the unsettled debt crisis and increasing ODA flows play a significant role. Countries operate in a world economy where market players everywhere immediately scrutinize domestic monetary, financial or fiscal policy decisions and the performance of exchange rate regimes of individual countries. Under these conditions, the room for manoeuvre of policymakers has become considerably constrained. Consequently, it is becoming increasingly complex to incorporate the social dimensions into such policy decisions, to the extent that external analysts consider that authorities are sacrificing sound macroeconomic policies. The main message of the report is that the expediency of short-term economic efficiency as embedded in much of the advice on macroeconomic stability needs to be tempered by long-term development objectives. The report starts with a short historical background which describes the ascendancy of macroeconomic policies over social development policies (chapter I). It continues with an evaluation of the relation between macroeconomic consistency and social effort (chapter II), and the importance of sustainable and stable growth for social progress (chapter III). The report then turns to the need for an equity-enhancing growth strategy (chapter IV) and an analysis of the priorities of social policies in an integrated approach to growth (chapter V). The final chapter adds some final institutional remarks.

Economic policy, institutions and productive development in Latin America

Includes bibliography

Why is there so much economic insecurity in Latin America?

Includes bibliography

Global economic developments, 1999

Includes bibliography

Poly(epsilon-caprolactone) nanocapsules carrying the herbicide atrazine: effect of chitosan-coating agent on physico-chemical stability and herbicide release profile

Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP)

Development and validation of a simple, rapid and stability-indicating high performance liquid chromatography method for quantification of norfloxacin in a pharmaceutical product

A stability-indication high performance liquid chromatographic method has been developed for the determination of norfloxacin in tablet dosage forms. Optimum separation was achieved in less than 7 minutes using Eclipse Plus Zorbax C18 Agilent, 150 mm×4.6 mm i.d., 5 μm particle size column. The analyte was resolved by using a mobile phase 5% acetic acid aqueous solution and methanol (80:20, v/v) at a flow rate 1.0 ml/min on an isocratic high performance liquid chromatographic system at a wavelength of 277 nm. Linearity, system suitability, precision, sensitivity, selectivity, specific, and robustness were established by International Conference Harmonization guidelines. For stress studies the drug was subjected to photolysis, oxidation, acid, alkaline and neutral conditions. The analytical conditions and the solvent developed provided good resolution within a short analysis time and economic advantages. The proposed method not required sophisticated and expensive instrumentation.

Banking Regulation in Turkey and Russia: An Economic Analysis

The importance of the banks and financial markets relies on the fact that they promote economic efficiency by allocating savings efficiently to profitable investment opportunities.An efficient banking system is a key determinant for the financial stability.The theory of market failure forms the basis for understanding financial regulation.Following the detrimental economic and financial consequences in theaftermath of the crisis, academics and policymakers started to focus their attention on the construction of an appropriate regulatory and supervisory framework of the banking sector. This dissertation aims at understanding the impact of regulations and supervision on banks’ performance focusing on two emerging market economies, Turkey and Russia. It aims at examining the way in which regulations matter for financial stability and banking performance from a law & economics perspective. A review of the theory of banking regulation, particularly as applied to emerging economies, shows that the efficiency of certain solutions regarding banking regulation is open to debate. Therefore, in the context of emerging countries, whether a certain approach is efficient or not will be presented as an empirical question to which this dissertation will try to find an answer.

The Role of Monetary Policy in Pursuing Economic Activity in Selected Transition Countries

The process of transition has brought an urgent need to develop many new market-oriented institutions or in some cases to reconstruct existing ones. One of the most important institutions of western-type economies is a central bank. It fulfils several "public good" functions, the most important of which are the achievement of stable price levels and assuring the financial stability of the economy. Nevertheless, even in economies with a long-standing market tradition, the question of whether a central bank is able to stimulate economic activity or whether all its cyclical actions lead only to changes in price levels remains open. The main purpose of this analysis was to empirically prove or disprove the relation between monetary policy and economic activity in more advanced transition countries. Basing his findings on commonly used econometric methods (causality tests, VAR modelling and simulations, simultaneous equations models), Delakorda concludes that the relation between money and economic activity is a mutual one, as there are significant differences between different countries in the conduct of monetary policy and in the environment of central banks. It is the latter which determines the relation between money and economic activity.

Compensation, Incentives and Risk: Economic Theory and Russian Practise

Mr. Pechersky set out to examine a specific feature of the employer-employee relationship in Russian business organisations. He wanted to study to what extent the so-called "moral hazard" is being solved (if it is being solved at all), whether there is a relationship between pay and performance, and whether there is a correlation between economic theory and Russian reality. Finally, he set out to construct a model of the Russian economy that better reflects the way it actually functions than do certain other well-known models (for example models of incentive compensation, the Shapiro-Stiglitz model etc.). His report was presented to the RSS in the form of a series of manuscripts in English and Russian, and on disc, with many tables and graphs. He begins by pointing out the different examples of randomness that exist in the relationship between employee and employer. Firstly, results are frequently affected by circumstances outside the employee's control that have nothing to do with how intelligently, honestly, and diligently the employee has worked. When rewards are based on results, uncontrollable randomness in the employee's output induces randomness in their incomes. A second source of randomness involves the outside events that are beyond the control of the employee that may affect his or her ability to perform as contracted. A third source of randomness arises when the performance itself (rather than the result) is measured, and the performance evaluation procedures include random or subjective elements. Mr. Pechersky's study shows that in Russia the third source of randomness plays an important role. Moreover, he points out that employer-employee relationships in Russia are sometimes opposite to those in the West. Drawing on game theory, he characterises the Western system as follows. The two players are the principal and the agent, who are usually representative individuals. The principal hires an agent to perform a task, and the agent acquires an information advantage concerning his actions or the outside world at some point in the game, i.e. it is assumed that the employee is better informed. In Russia, on the other hand, incentive contracts are typically negotiated in situations in which the employer has the information advantage concerning outcome. Mr. Pechersky schematises it thus. Compensation (the wage) is W and consists of a base amount, plus a portion that varies with the outcome, x. So W = a + bx, where b is used to measure the intensity of the incentives provided to the employee. This means that one contract will be said to provide stronger incentives than another if it specifies a higher value for b. This is the incentive contract as it operates in the West. The key feature distinguishing the Russian example is that x is observed by the employer but is not observed by the employee. So the employer promises to pay in accordance with an incentive scheme, but since the outcome is not observable by the employee the contract cannot be enforced, and the question arises: is there any incentive for the employer to fulfil his or her promises? Mr. Pechersky considers two simple models of employer-employee relationships displaying the above type of information symmetry. In a static framework the obtained result is somewhat surprising: at the Nash equilibrium the employer pays nothing, even though his objective function contains a quadratic term reflecting negative consequences for the employer if the actual level of compensation deviates from the expectations of the employee. This can lead, for example, to labour turnover, or the expenses resulting from a bad reputation. In a dynamic framework, the conclusion can be formulated as follows: the higher the discount factor, the higher the incentive for the employer to be honest in his/her relationships with the employee. If the discount factor is taken to be a parameter reflecting the degree of (un)certainty (the higher the degree of uncertainty is, the lower is the discount factor), we can conclude that the answer to the formulated question depends on the stability of the political, social and economic situation in a country. Mr. Pechersky believes that the strength of a market system with private property lies not just in its providing the information needed to compute an efficient allocation of resources in an efficient manner. At least equally important is the manner in which it accepts individually self-interested behaviour, but then channels this behaviour in desired directions. People do not have to be cajoled, artificially induced, or forced to do their parts in a well-functioning market system. Instead, they are simply left to pursue their own objectives as they see fit. Under the right circumstances, people are led by Adam Smith's "invisible hand" of impersonal market forces to take the actions needed to achieve an efficient, co-ordinated pattern of choices. The problem is that, as Mr. Pechersky sees it, there is no reason to believe that the circumstances in Russia are right, and the invisible hand is doing its work properly. Political instability, social tension and other circumstances prevent it from doing so. Mr. Pechersky believes that the discount factor plays a crucial role in employer-employee relationships. Such relationships can be considered satisfactory from a normative point of view, only in those cases where the discount factor is sufficiently large. Unfortunately, in modern Russia the evidence points to the typical discount factor being relatively small. This fact can be explained as a manifestation of aversion to risk of economic agents. Mr. Pechersky hopes that when political stabilisation occurs, the discount factors of economic agents will increase, and the agent's behaviour will be explicable in terms of more traditional models.

Shifting cultivation stability and change: Contrasting pathways of land use and livelihood change in Laos

Rural areas in Laos are experiencing a rapid transformation from traditional rice-based shifting cultivation systems to more permanent and diversified market-oriented cultivation systems. The consequences of these changes for local livelihoods are not well known. This study analyzes the impact of shifting cultivation change on the livelihood of rural people in six villages in three districts of northern and central Laos. Focus group discussions and household interview questionnaires were employed for data collection. The study reveals that the shifting cultivation of rice is still important in these communities, but it is being intensified as cash crops are introduced. Changes in shifting cultivation during the past ten years vary greatly between the communities studied. In the northern study sites, it is decreasing in areas with rubber expansion and increasing in areas with maize expansion, while it is stable in the central site, where sugarcane is an important cash crop. The impacts of land use change on livelihoods are also diverse. Cash crop producers hold more agricultural land than non-cash crop producers, and rubber and sugarcane producers have fewer rice shortages than non-producers. In the future, livelihood improvements in the central study site may be replicated in the northern sites, but this depends to a large extent on the economic and agricultural settings into which cash crops and other development opportunities are introduced. Moreover, the expansion of cash crops appears to counteract Lao policies aimed at replacing shifting cultivation areas with forests.