Benefits from competition:some illustrative UK cases

This study provides a powerful demonstration of the real world impact of increasedcompetition. By presenting six market case studies drawn from a variety of sectors itgives evidence of the type and magnitude of the benefits following marketinterventions to develop competition and free up the operation of these sectors. In discussing the types and form such interventions take, whether competition policy,deregulation or liberalisation, this report explores market conditions before and afterintervention, paying careful attention to both the envisaged benefits and the potentialfor negative side effects. Overall, the evidence suggests these benefits materialised,and in a number of instances proved more sizeable than anticipated. Concerns aboutharmful side effects have proved unfounded, with market stimuli impacting not only onthe price and range of goods available but also acting as a motivating force to productand process innovation. As Professor Davies points out, although active competition policy proves an importantcomponent in the competitive process, it is not sufficient in its own right. In order todeliver greater productivity, of which competition is a key driver, the UK needs a pool of resourceful entrepreneurs able to exploit changing market conditions. In order togive these people the best chance of success the framework conditions need to becorrect with strength in the complementary capabilities of innovation, investment, skillsand enterprise. Ensuring the competition framework is world class is central to the DTI’s strategy. The most recent peer review of the UK competition regime demonstrates that the UK isa strong performer, ranked third in the 2004 study, with the US first and Germanysecond. This study provides further evidence of the important role played by thatframework in delivering tangible benefits to consumers.

A critical analysis of the prospects for the effective development of a regional approach to competition law in the ASEAN region

This thesis is an examination of the ASEAN’s prospects in establishing regional competition policy in the Southeast Asia region, a topic of contemporary relevance in light of the ASEAN’s recent foray into the economic integration field on 31 December 2015. It questions whether the current approach undertaken by the ASEAN could contribute to an effective regional competition policy under the regional market integration. In answering this question, the thesis first critically surveys the current terrain of regional competition laws and policies in order to determine the possible existence of an optimal template. It argues that although the EU model is oft used as a source of inspiration, each regional organisation conceives different configurations of the model in order to best adjust to the local regional contexts. The thesis makes an inquiry into the narratives of the ASEAN’s competition policy, as well as the ASEAN’s specific considerations in the development of competition policy, before comparing the findings to the actual approaches taken by the ASEAN in its pursuit of regional competition policy. This thesis reveals that the actual approach taken by the ASEAN demonstrates an important discrepancy from the economic integration goal. The ASEAN applies a soft harmonisation approach regarding substantive competition law while refraining from establishing a centralised institution or a representative institution. The sole organ with regards to competition policy at the regional level is an expert organ. The thesis also conducts an investigation into the reception of the ASEAN’s regional policy by the member states in order to ascertain the possibility of the achievement of the ASEAN’s aspiration of regional competition policy. The study reveals that despite some shared similarities in the broad principles of competition law amongst the member states, the various competition law regimes are not harmonised thus creating challenging obstacle to the ASEAN’s ambition. The thesis then concludes that the ASEAN’s approach to regional competition law is unlikely to be effective.

An interpretation of current progress towards an industry model for Queensland's surveying and mapping industry

A strongly progressive surveying and mapping industry depends on a shared understanding of the industry as it exists, some shared vision or imagination of what the industry might become, and some shared action plan capable of bringing about a realisation of that vision. The emphasis on sharing implies a need for consensus reached through widespread discussion and mutual understanding. Unless this occurs, concerted action is unlikely. A more likely outcome is that industry representatives will negate each other's efforts in their separate bids for progress. The process of bringing about consensual viewpoints is essentially one of establishing an industry identity. Establishing the industry's identity and purpose is a prerequisite for rational development of the industry's education and training, its promotion and marketing, and operational research that can deal .with industry potential and efficiency. This paper interprets evolutionary developments occurring within Queensland's surveying and mapping industry within a framework that sets out logical requirements for a viable industry.

Environmental technologies, intellectual property and climate change (2013) edited by Abbe Brown

Abbe Brown from the University of Aberdeen, Scotland, is one of the leading international researchers on intellectual property and climate change. She is an intellectual dynamo. Her work brings together a mastery of intellectual property, with a strong interest in innovation theory and practice, and an engagement with public policy issues surrounding human rights, competition policy, and access to knowledge. Abbe Brown has shown a particular aptitude for tackling big ideas and wicked global problems, with intelligence, gusto, insight, and formidable wisdom.

The dead poets society: The copyright term and the public domain

In a victory for corporate control of cultural heritage, the Supreme Court of the United States has rejected a constitutional challenge to the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act 1998 (U.S.) by a majority of seven to two. This paper evaluates the litigation in terms of policy debate in a number of discourses — history, intellectual property law, constitutional law and freedom of speech, cultural heritage, economics and competition policy, and international trade. It argues that the extension of the copyright term will inhibit the dissemination of cultural works through the use of new technologies — such as Eric Eldred's Eldritch Press and Project Gutenberg. It concludes that there is a need to resist the attempts of copyright owners to establish the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act 1998 (U.S.) as an international model for other jurisdictions — such as Australia.

Trick or treaty?: The Australian debate over the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement

The secretive 2011 Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement – known in short by the catchy acronym ACTA – is a controversial trade pact designed to provide for stronger enforcement of intellectual property rights. The preamble to the treaty reads like pulp fiction – it raises moral panics about piracy, counterfeiting, organised crime, and border security. The agreement contains provisions on civil remedies and criminal offences; copyright law and trademark law; the regulation of the digital environment; and border measures. Memorably, Susan Sell called the international treaty a TRIPS Double-Plus Agreement, because its obligations far exceed those of the World Trade Organization's TRIPS Agreement 1994, and TRIPS-Plus Agreements, such as the Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement 2004. ACTA lacks the language of other international intellectual property agreements, which emphasise the need to balance the protection of intellectual property owners with the wider public interest in access to medicines, human development, and transfer of knowledge and technology. In Australia, there was much controversy both about the form and the substance of ACTA. While the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade was a partisan supporter of the agreement, a wide range of stakeholders were openly critical. After holding hearings and taking note of the position of the European Parliament and the controversy in the United States, the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties in the Australian Parliament recommended the deferral of ratification of ACTA. This was striking as representatives of all the main parties agreed on the recommendation. The committee was concerned about the lack of transparency, due process, public participation, and substantive analysis of the treaty. There were also reservations about the ambiguity of the treaty text, and its potential implications for the digital economy, innovation and competition, plain packaging of tobacco products, and access to essential medicines. The treaty has provoked much soul-searching as to whether the Trick or Treaty reforms on the international treaty-making process in Australia have been compromised or undermined. Although ACTA stalled in the Australian Parliament, the debate over it is yet to conclude. There have been concerns in Australia and elsewhere that ACTA will be revived as a ‘zombie agreement’. Indeed, in March 2013, the Canadian government introduced a bill to ensure compliance with ACTA. Will it be also resurrected in Australia? Has it already been revived? There are three possibilities. First, the Australian government passed enhanced remedies with respect to piracy, counterfeiting and border measures in a separate piece of legislation – the Intellectual Property Laws Amendment (Raising the Bar) Act 2012 (Cth). Second, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade remains supportive of ACTA. It is possible, after further analysis, that the next Australian Parliament – to be elected in September 2013 – will ratify the treaty. Third, Australia is involved in the Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations. The government has argued that ACTA should be a template for the Intellectual Property Chapter in the Trans-Pacific Partnership. The United States Trade Representative would prefer a regime even stronger than ACTA. This chapter provides a portrait of the Australian debate over ACTA. It is the account of an interested participant in the policy proceedings. This chapter will first consider the deliberations and recommendations of the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties on ACTA. Second, there was a concern that ACTA had failed to provide appropriate safeguards with respect to civil liberties, human rights, consumer protection and privacy laws. Third, there was a concern about the lack of balance in the treaty’s copyright measures; the definition of piracy is overbroad; the suite of civil remedies, criminal offences and border measures is excessive; and there is a lack of suitable protection for copyright exceptions, limitations and remedies. Fourth, there was a worry that the provisions on trademark law, intermediary liability and counterfeiting could have an adverse impact upon consumer interests, competition policy and innovation in the digital economy. Fifth, there was significant debate about the impact of ACTA on pharmaceutical drugs, access to essential medicines and health-care. Sixth, there was concern over the lobbying by tobacco industries for ACTA – particularly given Australia’s leadership on tobacco control and the plain packaging of tobacco products. Seventh, there were concerns about the operation of border measures in ACTA. Eighth, the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties was concerned about the jurisdiction of the ACTA Committee, and the treaty’s protean nature. Finally, the chapter raises fundamental issues about the relationship between the executive and the Australian Parliament with respect to treaty-making. There is a need to reconsider the efficacy of the Trick or Treaty reforms passed by the Australian Parliament in the 1990s.

A Submission to the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties on the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 (# ACTA)

“If Hollywood could order intellectual property laws for Christmas, what would they look like? This is pretty close.” David Fewer “While European and American IP maximalists have pushed for TRIPS-Plus provisions in FTAs and bilateral agreements, they are now pushing for TRIPS-Plus-Plus protections in these various forums.” Susan Sell “ACTA is a threat to the future of a free and open Internet.” Alexander Furnas “Implementing the agreement could open a Pandora's box of potential human rights violations.” Amnesty International. “I will not take part in this masquerade.” Kader Arif, Rapporteur for the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 in the European Parliament Executive Summary As an independent scholar and expert in intellectual property, I am of the view that the Australian Parliament should reject the adoption of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011. I would take issue with the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade’s rather partisan account of the negotiations, the consultations, and the outcomes associated with the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011. In my view, the negotiations were secretive and biased; the local consultations were sometimes farcical because of the lack of information about the draft texts of the agreement; and the final text of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 is not in the best interests of Australia, particularly given that it is a net importer of copyright works and trade mark goods and services. I would also express grave reservations about the quality of the rather pitiful National Interest Analysis – and the lack of any regulatory impact statement – associated with the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011. The assertion that the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 does not require legislative measures is questionable – especially given the United States Trade Representative has called the agreement ‘the highest-standard plurilateral agreement ever achieved concerning the enforcement of intellectual property rights.’ It is worthwhile reiterating that there has been much criticism of the secretive and partisan nature of the negotiations surrounding the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011. Sean Flynn summarizes these concerns: "The negotiation process for ACTA has been a case study in establishing the conditions for effective industry capture of a lawmaking process. Instead of using the relatively transparent and inclusive multilateral processes, ACTA was launched through a closed and secretive “‘club approach’ in which like-minded jurisdictions define enforcement ‘membership’ rules and then invite other countries to join, presumably via other trade agreements.” The most influential developing countries, including Brazil, India, China and Russia, were excluded. Likewise, a series of manoeuvres ensured that public knowledge about the specifics of the agreement and opportunities for input into the process were severely limited. Negotiations were held with mere hours notice to the public as to when and where they would be convened, often in countries half away around the world from where public interest groups are housed. Once there, all negotiation processes were closed to the public. Draft texts were not released before or after most negotiating rounds, and meetings with stakeholders took place only behind closed doors and off the record. A public release of draft text, in April 2010, was followed by no public or on-the-record meetings with negotiators." Moreover, it is disturbing that the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 has been driven by ideology and faith, rather than by any evidence-based policy making Professor Duncan Matthews has raised significant questions about the quality of empirical evidence used to support the proposal of Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011: ‘There are concerns that statements about levels of counterfeiting and piracy are based either on customs seizures, with the actual quantities of infringing goods in free circulation in any particular market largely unknown, or on estimated losses derived from industry surveys.’ It is particularly disturbing that, in spite of past criticism, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade has supported the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011, without engaging the Productivity Commission or the Treasury to do a proper economic analysis of the proposed treaty. Kader Arif, Rapporteur for the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 in the European Parliament, quit his position, and said of the process: "I want to denounce in the strongest possible manner the entire process that led to the signature of this agreement: no inclusion of civil society organisations, a lack of transparency from the start of the negotiations, repeated postponing of the signature of the text without an explanation being ever given, exclusion of the EU Parliament's demands that were expressed on several occasions in our assembly. As rapporteur of this text, I have faced never-before-seen manoeuvres from the right wing of this Parliament to impose a rushed calendar before public opinion could be alerted, thus depriving the Parliament of its right to expression and of the tools at its disposal to convey citizens' legitimate demands.” Everyone knows the ACTA agreement is problematic, whether it is its impact on civil liberties, the way it makes Internet access providers liable, its consequences on generic drugs manufacturing, or how little protection it gives to our geographical indications. This agreement might have major consequences on citizens' lives, and still, everything is being done to prevent the European Parliament from having its say in this matter. That is why today, as I release this report for which I was in charge, I want to send a strong signal and alert the public opinion about this unacceptable situation. I will not take part in this masquerade." There have been parallel concerns about the process and substance of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 in the context of Australia. I have a number of concerns about the substance of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011. First, I am concerned that the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 fails to provide appropriate safeguards in respect of human rights, consumer protection, competition, and privacy laws. It is recommended that the new Joint Parliamentary Committee on Human Rights investigate this treaty. Second, I argue that there is a lack of balance to the copyright measures in the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 – the definition of piracy is overbroad; the suite of civil remedies, criminal offences, and border measures is excessive; and there is a lack of suitable protection for copyright exceptions, limitations, and remedies. Third, I discuss trade mark law, intermediary liability, and counterfeiting. I express my concerns, in this context, that the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 could have an adverse impact upon consumer interests, competition policy, and innovation in the digital economy. I also note, with concern, the lobbying by tobacco industries for the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 – and the lack of any recognition in the treaty for the capacity of countries to take measures of tobacco control under the World Health Organization Framework Convention on Tobacco Control. Fourth, I note that the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 provides no positive obligations to promote access to essential medicines. It is particularly lamentable that Australia and the United States of America have failed to implement the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health 2001 and the WTO General Council Decision 2003. Fifth, I express concerns about the border measures in the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011. Such measures lack balance – and unduly favour the interests of intellectual property owners over consumers, importers, and exporters. Moreover, such measures will be costly, as they involve shifting the burden of intellectual property enforcement to customs and border authorities. Interdicting, seizing, and destroying goods may also raise significant trade issues. Finally, I express concern that the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 undermines the role of existing international organisations, such as the United Nations, the World Intellectual Property Organization and the World Trade Organization, and subverts international initiatives such as the WIPO Development Agenda 2007. I also question the raison d'être, independence, transparency, and accountability of the proposed new ‘ACTA Committee’. In this context, I am concerned by the shift in the position of the Labor Party in its approach to international treaty-making in relation to intellectual property. The Australian Parliament adopted the Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement 2004, which included a large Chapter on intellectual property. The treaty was a ‘TRIPs-Plus’ agreement, because the obligations were much more extensive and prescriptive than those required under the multilateral framework established by the TRIPS Agreement 1994. During the debate over the Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement 2004, the Labor Party expressed the view that it would seek to mitigate the effects of the TRIPS-Plus Agreement, when at such time it gained power. Far from seeking to ameliorate the effects of the Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement 2004, the Labor Government would seek to lock Australia into a TRIPS-Double Plus Agreement – the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011. There has not been a clear political explanation for this change in approach to international intellectual property. For both reasons of process and substance, I conclude that the Australian Parliament and the Australian Government should reject the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011. The Australian Government would do better to endorse the Washington Declaration on Intellectual Property and the Public Interest 2011, and implement its outstanding obligations in respect of access to knowledge, access to essential medicines, and the WIPO Development Agenda 2007. The case study of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 highlights the need for further reforms to the process by which Australia engages in international treaty-making.

A Submission to the Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Committee on the Copyright Amendment (Online Infringement) Bill 2015 (Cth)

The film company, Roadshow, the pay television company Foxtel, and Rupert Murdoch’s News Corp and News Limited — as well as copyright industries — have been clamouring for new copyright powers and remedies. In the summer break, the Coalition Government has responded to such entreaties from its industry supporters and donors, with a new package of copyright laws and policies. There has been significant debate over the proposals between the odd couple of Attorney-General George Brandis and the Minister for Communications, Malcolm Turnbull. There has been deep, philosophical differences between the two Ministers over the copyright agenda. The Attorney-General George Brandis has supported a model of copyright maximalism, with strong rights and remedies for the copyright empires in film, television, and publishing. He has shown little empathy for the information technology companies of the digital economy. The Attorney-General has been impatient to press ahead with a copyright regime. The Minister for Communications, Malcolm Turnbull, has been somewhat more circumspect,recognising that there is a need to ensure that copyright laws do not adversely impact upon competition in the digital economy. The final proposal is a somewhat awkward compromise between the discipline-and-punish regime preferred by Brandis, and the responsive regulation model favoured by Turnbull. In his new book, Information Doesn’t Want to Be Free: Laws for the Internet Age, Cory Doctorow has some sage advice for copyright owners: Things that don’t make money: * Complaining about piracy. * Calling your customers thieves. * Treating your customers like thieves. In this context, the push by copyright owners and the Coalition Government to have a copyright crackdown may well be counter-productive to their interests. This submission considers a number of key elements of the Coalition Government’s Copyright Crackdown. Part 1 examines the proposals in respect of the Copyright Amendment (Online Infringement) Bill 2015 (Cth). Part 2 focuses upon the proposed Copyright Code. Part 3 considers the question of safe harbours for intermediaries. Part 4 examines the question of copyright exceptions – particularly looking at the proposal of the Australian Law Reform Commission for the introduction of a defence of fair use. Part 5 highlights the recommendations of the IT Pricing Inquiry and the Harper Competition Policy Review in respect of copyright law, consumer rights, and competition law.

Turing and the Trans-Pacific Partnership: Intellectual Property, Public Health, and Access to Essential Medicines

A recent controversy in the United States over drug pricing by Turing Pharmaceuticals AG has raised larger issues in respect of intellectual property, access to medicines, and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). In August 2015, Turing Pharmaceuticals AG – a private biopharmaceutical company with offices in New York, the United States, and Zug, Switzerland - acquired the exclusive marketing rights to Daraprim in the United States from Impax Laboratories Incorporated. Martin Shkreli, Turing’s Founder and Chief Executive Officer, maintained: “The acquisition of Daraprim and our toxoplasmosis research program are significant steps along Turing’s path of bringing novel medications to patients with serious disorders, some of whom often go undiagnosed and untreated.” He emphasised: “We intend to invest in the development of new drug candidates that we hope will yield an even better clinical profile, and also plan to launch an educational effort to help raise awareness and improve diagnosis for patients with toxoplasmosis.” In September 2015, there was much public controversy over the decision of Martin Shkreli to raise the price of a 62 year old drug, Daraprim, from $US13.50 to $US750 a pill. The drug is particularly useful in respect to the treatment and prevention of malaria, and in the treatment of infections in individuals with HIV/AIDS. Daraprim is listed on the World Health Organization’s (WHO) List of Essential Medicines. In the face of much criticism, Martin Shkreli has said that he will reduce the price of Daraprim. He observed: “We've agreed to lower the price on Daraprim to a point that is more affordable and is able to allow the company to make a profit, but a very small profit.” He maintained: “We think these changes will be welcomed.” However, he has been vague and ambiguous about the nature of the commitment. Notably, the lobby group, Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhARMA), disassociated itself from the claims of Turing Pharmaceuticals. The group said: “PhRMA members have a long history of drug discovery and innovation that has led to increased longevity and improved lives for millions of patients.” The group noted: “Turing Pharmaceutical is not a member of PhRMA and we do not embrace either their recent actions or the conduct of their CEO.” The biotechnology peak body Biotechnology Industry Organization also sought to distance itself from Turing Pharmaceuticals. A hot topic: United States political debate about access to affordable medicines This controversy over Daraprim is unusual – given the age of drug concerned. Daraprim is not subject to patent protection. Nonetheless, there remains a monopoly in respect of the marketplace. Drug pricing is not an isolated problem. There have been many concerns about drug pricing – particularly in respect of essential medicines for HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria. This recent controversy is part of a larger debate about access to affordable medicines. The dispute raises larger issues about healthcare, consumer rights, competition policy, and trade. The Daraprim controversy has provided impetus for law reform in the US. US Presidential Candidate Hillary Clinton commented: “Price gouging like this in this specialty drug market is outrageous.” In response to her comments, the Nasdaq Biotechnology Index fell sharply. Hillary Clinton has announced a prescription drug reform plan to protect consumers and promote innovation – while putting an end to profiteering. On her campaign site, she has emphasised that “affordable healthcare is a basic human right.” Her rival progressive candidate, Bernie Sanders, was also concerned about the price hike. He wrote a letter to Martin Shkreli, complaining about the price increase for the drug Daraprim. Sanders said: “The enormous, overnight price increase for Daraprim is just the latest in a long list of skyrocketing price increases for certain critical medications.” He has pushed for reforms to intellectual property to make medicines affordable. The TPP and intellectual property The Daraprim controversy and political debate raises further issues about the design of the TPP. The dispute highlights the dangers of extending the rights of pharmaceutical drug companies under intellectual property, investor-state dispute settlement, and drug administration. Recently, the civil society group Knowledge Ecology International published a leaked draft of the Intellectual Property Chapter of the TPP. Knowledge Ecology International Director, James Love, was concerned the text revealed that the US “continues to be the most aggressive supporter of expanded intellectual property rights for drug companies.” He was concerned that “the proposals contained in the TPP will harm consumers and in some cases block innovation.” James Love feared: “In countless ways, the Obama Administration has sought to expand and extend drug monopolies and raise drug prices.” He maintained: “The astonishing collection of proposals pandering to big drug companies make more difficult the task of ensuring access to drugs for the treatment of cancer and other diseases and conditions.” Love called for a different approach to intellectual property and trade: “Rather than focusing on more intellectual property rights for drug companies, and a death-inducing spiral of higher prices and access barriers, the trade agreement could seek new norms to expand the funding of medical research and development (R&D) as a public good, an area where the US has an admirable track record, such as the public funding of research at the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and other federal agencies.” In addition, there has been much concern about the Investment Chapter of the TPP. The investor-state dispute settlement regime would enable foreign investors to challenge government policy making, which affected their investments. In the context of healthcare, there is a worry that pharmaceutical drug companies will deploy their investor rights to challenge public health measures – such as, for instance, initiatives to curb drug pricing and profiteering. Such concerns are not merely theoretical. Eli Lilly has brought an investor action against the Canadian Government over the rejection of its drug patents under the investor-state dispute settlement regime of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The Health Annex to the TPP also raises worries that pharmaceutical drug companies will able to object to regulatory procedures in respect of healthcare. It is disappointing that the TPP – in the leaks that we have seen – has only limited recognition of the importance of access to essential medicines. There is a need to ensure that there are proper safeguards to provide access to essential medicines – particularly in respect of HIV/AIDs, malaria, and tuberculosis. Moreover, there must be protection against drug profiteering and price gouging in any trade agreement. There should be strong measures against the abuse of intellectual property rights. The dispute over Turing Pharmaceuticals AG and Daraprim is an important cautionary warning in respect of some of the dangers present in the secret negotiations in respect of the TPP. There is a need to preserve consumer rights, competition policy, and public health in trade negotiations over an agreement covering the Pacific Rim.

Computing abuse related damages in the case of new entry: An illustration for the Directory Enquiry Services market

A number of European countries, among which the UK and Spain, have opened up their Directory Enquiry Services (DQs, or 118AB) market to competition. We analyse the Spanish case, where both local and foreign firms challenged the incumbent as of April 2003. We argue that the incumbent had the ability to abuse its dominant position, and that it was a perfectly rational strategy. In short,the incumbent raised its rivals' costs directly by providing an inferior quality version of the (essential) input, namely the incumbent's subscribers' database. We illustrate how it is possible to quantify the effect of abuse in situation were the entrant has no previous history in the market. To do this, we use the UK experience to construct the relevant counterfactual, that is the "but for abuse" scenario. After controlling for relative prices and advertising intensity, we find that one of the foreign entrants achieved a Spanish market share of only half of what it would have been in the absence of abuse.

Any Nearer to Victory in the Fifty Years War?:Assessing the European Commission’s Leadership, Weapons and Strategies towards combating Cartels

Some 50 years after its creation EU competition policy remains firmly entrenched as one of the most developed examples of supranational governance within the European Union. Although there has been a marked increase in interest among political scientists in competition policy in recent years there are still gaps in terms of overall coverage. One area that has been largely overlooked centres on cartels. Cartel policy has emerged as a highly salient issue and main priority of the Commission's competition policy since the late 1990s. Certainly, the recent restructuring of the EU cartel enforcement regime, the imposition of ever higher fines and a determined EU Competition Commissioner have fuelled growing media attention while new notices and regulations increasingly occupy the interests and minds of practitioners. The European Commission has constantly extended its activities on the competition policy front and its increasingly aggressive strategies to combat cartels provides political scientists with a fascinating case study of governance in action and illustrates the ways – such as leniency programmes, higher fines, enhanced and better equipped resources as well as internal reorganisation in which the European regulator is pursuing such conspiracies. This article traces the evolution and development of EU cartel policy since its inception and assesses the Commission's strategies and considers just to what extent the European Commission is winning its war against business cartelisation.

Avoidance Techniques: State Related Defences in International Antitrust Cases

Despite its economic significance, competition law still remains fragmented, lacking an international framework allowing for dispute settlement. This, together with the growing importance of non-free-market economies in world trade require us to re-consider and re-evaluate the possibilities of bringing an antitrust suit against a foreign state. If the level playing field on the global marketplace is to be achieved, the possibility of hiding behind the bulwark of state sovereignty should be minimised. States should not be free to act in an anti-competitive way, but at present the legal framework seems ill-equipped to handle such challenges.

This paper deals with the defences available in litigation concerning transnational anti-competitive agreements involving or implicating foreign states. Four important legal doctrines are analysed: non-justiciability (political question doctrine), state immunity, act of state doctrine and foreign state compulsion. The paper addresses also the general problem of applicability of competition laws to a foreign state as such. This is a tale about repetitive unsuccessful efforts to sue OPEC and recent attempts in the US to deal with export cartels of Chinese state-owned enterprises

Coopetencia y modelos de asociatividad en colombia

El concepto de coopetencia surgen los planteamientos relacionados con los clústers y las redes empresariales, en donde empresas con características similares fortalecen sus relaciones para desarrollar mayores niveles de eficiencia o alcanzar objetivos que individualmente serian difíciles de lograr, especialmente en el caso de las pymes. Es fundamental que el estado desarrolle las relaciones y la conformación de iniciativas de asociatividad que permitan que la fluidez y los vínculos entre empresas, instituciones gubernamentales, financieras, universidades, centros de investigación, entre otros; para promover la integración de esfuerzos, la fluidez de información y el acceso a tecnologías, mejores posiciones competitivas. En Colombia desde hace aproximadamente 20 años, dentro de la política de competitividad del gobierno nacional (a partir del informe monitor), se ha identificado la importancia de las relaciones entre empresas e instituciones conexas para mejorar los estándares y la eficiencia que se pueda lograr para mantener una posición competitiva en los mercados internacionales.

Estado del arte acerca de las discusiones teóricas sobre soberanía del estado y la unión monetaria europea entre 2002 - 2010. Caso: El Reino Unido

El siguiente trabajo tiene como objetivo el Estado del arte acerca de la discusión teórica de la repercusión de la unión monetaria en el principio de soberanía nacional, específicamente el caso de Gran Bretaña, ya que éste es el único país que expresa abiertamente su incertidumbre referente a algún tipo de amenaza a su soberanía. Se pretende precisar si existen criterios concluyentes, o por el contrario determinar si no hay claridad con respecto al futuro de Gran Bretaña como miembro de la unión monetaria.A partir de lo anterior, se plantean como sus propósitos particulares construir un marco conceptual acerca de la soberanía. Este estado del arte se inicia con citas de los principales autores de finales de siglo XVII y XVIII y finaliza con las posiciones conceptuales aportadas por los teóricos modernos motivados por el nacimiento de la Unión Europea como un nuevo orden político. Entre las que se citan: modelo centrico o intergubernamentalista, modelo de gobernabilidad multi-nivel, modelo neo-funcionalista y modelo federalista. Igualmente, el trabajo, busca desarrollar un marco conceptual sobre Unión Monetaria y su evolución hasta el logro de una unión fiscal europea en el periodo de 1950-2010, establecer las relaciones teóricas entre Soberanía del Estado y Unión Monetaria y por último realizar un análisis histórico hermenéutico de la Unión Europea y el caso del Reino Unido de acuerdo a las relaciones evidenciadas en los apartados teóricos entre soberanía del Estado y Unión Monetaria.