The Role of Monetary Policy in Pursuing Economic Activity in Selected Transition Countries

The process of transition has brought an urgent need to develop many new market-oriented institutions or in some cases to reconstruct existing ones. One of the most important institutions of western-type economies is a central bank. It fulfils several "public good" functions, the most important of which are the achievement of stable price levels and assuring the financial stability of the economy. Nevertheless, even in economies with a long-standing market tradition, the question of whether a central bank is able to stimulate economic activity or whether all its cyclical actions lead only to changes in price levels remains open. The main purpose of this analysis was to empirically prove or disprove the relation between monetary policy and economic activity in more advanced transition countries. Basing his findings on commonly used econometric methods (causality tests, VAR modelling and simulations, simultaneous equations models), Delakorda concludes that the relation between money and economic activity is a mutual one, as there are significant differences between different countries in the conduct of monetary policy and in the environment of central banks. It is the latter which determines the relation between money and economic activity.

Unconventional Monetary Policy and the Great Recession: Estimating the Macroeconomic Effects of a Spread Compression at the Zero Lower Bound

We explore the macroeconomic effects of a compression in the long-term bond yield spread within the context of the Great Recession of 2007–09 via a time-varying parameter structural VAR model. We identify a “pure” spread shock defined as a shock that leaves the policy rate unchanged, which allows us to characterize the macroeconomic consequences of a decline in the yield spread induced by central banks’ asset purchases within an environment in which the policy rate is constrained by the effective zero lower bound. Two key findings stand out. First, compressions in the long-term yield spread exert a powerful effect on both output growth and inflation. Second, conditional on available estimates of the impact of the Federal Reserve’s and the Bank of England’s asset purchase programs on long-term yield spreads, our counterfactual simulations suggest that U.S. and U.K. unconventional monetary policy actions have averted significant risks both of deflation and of output collapses comparable to those that took place during the Great Depression.

Monetary Policy Delegation, Contract Costs, and Contract Targets

We reconsider the optimal central banker contract derived in Walsh (1995). We show that if the government's objective function places weight (value) on the cost of the contract, then the optimal inflation contract does not completely neutralize the inflation bias. That is, a fraction of the inflation bias emerges in the resulting inflation rate after the central banker's monetary policy decision. Furthermore, the more concerned the government is about the cost of the contract or the less selfish (more benevolent) is the central banker, the smaller is the share of the inflation bias eliminated by the contract. No matter how concerned the government is about the cost of the contract or how unselfish (benevolent) the central banker is, the contract always reduces the inflationary bias by at least half. Finally, a central banker contract written in terms of output (i.e., incorporating an output target) can completely eradicate the inflationary bias, regardless of concerns about contract costs.