Toward democratic alternatives

Includes bibliography

Toward democratic alternatives

Includes bibliography

A participação dos conselhos de saúde na fiscalização da política de saúde: uma análise da sua ineficiência na RMB

Historicamente, o controle social das políticas públicas como direito Constitucional foi uma conquista da sociedade civil, por meio de inúmeras reivindicações e lutas pela defesa do SUS, como garantia de direito à saúde para todos os cidadãos. A participação social surge também como resultado desse processo de luta popular, e a inserção de novos atores sociais na gestão das políticas públicas é reconhecido e legitimado com a promulgação da Constituição federal de 1988. Neste sentido, os Conselhos de Saúde têm apresentado um quadro favorável à inserção de diversos segmentos nas decisões da agenda governamental. Os Conselhos de Saúde da Região Metropolitana de Belém (RMB), especificamente os municípios Belém, Marituba e Benevides, foram objeto de pesquisa neste trabalho, que tem como objetivo central identificar a atuação dos Conselhos de Saúde da Região Metropolitana de Belém na fiscalização das ações do SUS. Os procedimentos metodológicos utilizados nesta pesquisa foram: a entrevista; a observação; o questionário de entrevista aplicado aos conselheiros; e a pesquisa documental e bibliográfica. Utilizamos também a análise de discurso e de conteúdo, considerando principalmente a análise de anunciação e a análise temática, configurando em uma pesquisa quali e quantitativa. Os resultados da pesquisa constataram que, por meio de dados empíricos e conceituais de organização, na perspectiva de Olson (1999) e Michels (1982), de participação social, controle social e fiscalização utilizada neste trabalho, os entraves de cunho ideológico, social e econômico interferem de forma direta ou indireta na ineficiência das ações dos Conselhos. Sobretudo, são as questões políticas que influenciam de forma expressiva na fiscalização dos CS, muitas vezes de maneira “silenciosa” nas decisões e, consequentemente, na ineficiência da participação da sociedade nos Conselhos em sua função que, apesar de ser inerente, não funciona – a função fiscalizadora. Portanto, contribuir conceitual e metodologicamente para a análise dos níveis de fiscalização existentes nos CS foi o grande desafio deste trabalho, realizado por meio da construção da matriz da fiscalização, a fim de alterar o quadro situacional da ineficiência dos Conselhos na atualidade, considerando as diversidades, divergências e convergências existentes entre os atores envolvidos no processo de construção da Política de Saúde Municipal. Os resultados da pesquisa refletem um panorama desfavorável à efetiva fiscalização dos Conselhos, quando nos remetemos aos resultados centrais da referida pesquisa: os CS não cumprem seu papel fiscalizador; não há relação direta entre o que é decidido nas plenárias pelos conselheiros e os serviços implementados nos municípios; e não existem prioridades estabelecidas no processo decisório das ações a serem implementadas pelo CS. Sendo assim, o nível de fiscalização dos CS da RMB é predominantemente o nível 1, isto é, sem fiscalização. Neste sentido, afirmamos que os Conselhos de Saúde, apesar de ser uma conquista de lutas populares pela ampliação da participação na gestão pública, ainda predomina um baixo nível de fiscalização ou até mesmo nenhuma fiscalização da política municipal de saúde, o que pode ser considerado um dos entraves à consolidação do SUS, como estratégia à concretização do Estado democrático no país.

Liberalism, Marxism and Democratic Theory Revisited: Proposal of a Joint Index of Political and Economic Democracy

Liberalism and Marxism are two schools of thought which have left deep imprints in sociological, political and economic theory. They are usually perceived as opposite, rival approaches. In the field of democracy there is a seemingly insurmountable rift around the question of political versus economic democracy. Liberals emphasize the former, Marxists the latter. Liberals say that economic democracy is too abstract and fuzzy a concept, therefore one should concentrate on the workings of an objective political democracy. Marxists insist that political democracy without economic democracy is insufficient. The article argues that both propositions are valid and not mutually exclusive. It proposes the creation of an operational, quantifiable index of economic democracy that can be used alongside the already existing indexes of political democracy. By using these two indexes jointly, political and economic democracy can be objectively evaluated. Thus, the requirements of both camps are met and maybe a more dialogical approach to democracy can be reached in the debate between liberals and Marxists. The joint index is used to evaluate the levels of economic and political democracy in the transition countries of Eastern Europe.

Congressional Endorsements in the Presidential Nomination Process: Democratic Superdelegates in the 2008 Election

Examining congressional superdelegate endorsements in the 2008 Democratic presidential nomination, the authors show that changes in the political context affected the balance of factors in members’ decisions to endorse Clinton or Obama. Specifically, the national standing of the candidates became increasingly important—and local opinion less important—to Obama endorsements even as constituency views became a stronger influence over Clinton endorsements. The findings reveal how constituency considerations affect the elite endorsement choices that shape the presidential nominating process. In addition, the analysis highlights the ways in which members of Congress balance conflicting considerations in a changing political context when an issue plays out over an extended period.

Congressional Endorsements in the Presidential Nomination Process: Democratic Superdelegates in the 2008 Election

Examining congressional superdelegate endorsements in the 2008 Democratic presidential nomination, the authors show that changes in the political context affected the balance of factors in members' decisions to endorse Clinton or Obama. Specifically, the national standing of the candidates became increasingly important-and local opinion less important-to Obama endorsements even as constituency views became a stronger influence over Clinton endorsements. The findings reveal how constituency considerations affect the elite endorsement choices that shape the presidential nominating process. In addition, the analysis highlights the ways in which members of Congress balance conflicting considerations in a changing political context when an issue plays out over an extended period.

Democratic Transition and Political Patronage

Mr. Korosenyi begins by analysing the particular relationship holding between politics and administration in different countries. Within Europe three major patterns have emerged in the 20th century. Firstly there is the politically neutral British Civil Service, secondly the German and French state bureaucracies, which traditionally are supposed to embody the "common good", and thirdly there is the patronage system of the so-called consociate democracies, e.g. Austria. In general Mr. Korosenyi believes that, though politics do not penetrate into the Hungarian administration to the extent they do in Belgium and Austria, nevertheless, there is a stronger fusion than there is in the traditional British pattern. He is particularly interested in this relationship with regard to its effect on democratic institution building and the stabilisation of the new regime in Hungary, now the old "nomenklatura" system has been abolished. The structure of the Hungarian government was a result of the constitutional amendments of 1989 and 1990. Analysing this period, it becomes clear that for all the political actors who initiated and supported the democratic transition to democracy, the underlying assumption was a radical depoliticisation of the administration in order to maintain its stability. The political leadership of the executive is a cabinet government. The government is structured along ministries, each headed by a politician, i.e. the minister, who is a member of the cabinet. The minister's political secretary is not a cabinet member, but he or she is a politician, usually a member of the parliament. The head of the administration of the ministry is the administrative state secretary, who is a civil servant. He or she usually has four deputies, also civil servants. Naturally it is assumed that there should be a clear separation between politicians and civil servants. However in practice, the borders can be blurred, giving rise to a hybrid known as the "political civil servant". Mr. Korosenyi analyses the different faces of these hybrids. They are civil servants for the following reasons. They need special educational qualifications, working experience, a civil service exam etc., they are not allowed to do anything which is incompatible with their impartial role, and they cannot occupy political office nor may they appear in the name of any political party. On the other hand, the accepted political dimension to their function is revealed by the following facts. The state secretary (a civil servant) may participate in cabinet meetings instead of the minister. The state secretary is employed by the minister. A state secretary or any of their deputies can be dismissed at any time by the minister or the prime minister. In practice then, ministers appoint to these senior administrative positions civil servants whose personal and political loyaties are strong. To the second level of political patronage in ministries belong the ministerial cabinet, press office and public relation office. The ministerial cabinet includes the private advisors and members of the personal staff of the minister. The press office and the PR office, if they exist, are not adjusted to the administrative hierarchy of the ministry, but under the direct control of the minister. In the beginning of the 1990s, such offices were exceptions; in the second half of the 90s they are accepted and to be found in most ministries. Mr. Korosenyi's work, a 92-page manuscript of a book in Hungarian, marks the first piece of literature within the field of political science which analyses the structure of the Hungarian government in the 1990s and the relationship between the political leadership and the public administration.