Expertise and finance: Mergers motivated by technological change

This paper argues that a large technological innovation may lead to a merger wave by inducing entrepreneurs to seek funds from technologically knowledgeable firms -experts. When a large technological innovation occurs, the ability of non-experts (banks) to discriminate between good and bad quality projects is reduced. Experts can continue to charge a low rate of interest for financing because their expertise enables them to identify good quality projects and to avoid unprofitable investments. On the other hand, non-experts now charge a higher rate of interest in order to screen bad projects. More entrepreneurs, therefore, disclose their projects to experts to raise funds from them. Such experts are, however, able to copy the projects and disclosure to them invites the possibility of competition. Thus the entrepreneur and the expert may merge so as to achieve product market collusion. As well as rationalizing mergers, the model can also explain various forms of venture financing by experts such as corporate investors and business angels.

Iowa Finance Authority Performance Plan, FY 2009

Agency Performance Plan, Iowa Finance Authority

A two-mean reverting-factor model of the term structure of interest rates

This paper presents a two--factor model of the term structure ofinterest rates. We assume that default free discount bond prices aredetermined by the time to maturity and two factors, the long--term interestrate and the spread (difference between the long--term rate and theshort--term (instantaneous) riskless rate). Assuming that both factorsfollow a joint Ornstein--Uhlenbeck process, a general bond pricing equationis derived. We obtain a closed--form expression for bond prices andexamine its implications for the term structure of interest rates. We alsoderive a closed--form solution for interest rate derivatives prices. Thisexpression is applied to price European options on discount bonds andmore complex types of options. Finally, empirical evidence of the model'sperformance is presented.

Iowa Finance Authority, Strategic Plan, 2003

This report outlines the strategic plan for Iowa Finance Authority, goals and mission.

2008 Annual Report of the Iowa Railway Finance Authority

The Iowa Railway Finance Authority (IRFA) was created in 1980 by the 68th General Assembly to provide for the financing of rail facilities and to enhance and continue the operation of essential rail facilities. IRFA was authorized to offer financial assistance for the acquisition, rehabilitation, construction, refinancing, extension, replacement, maintenance, repair, or leasing of any rail facility. Rail Revolving Loan and Grant Program The 2005 legislative session amended Iowa Code 327H.20 by assigning all repayments of IRFA and other Iowa Department of Transportation (Iowa DOT) rail assistance loans to the Rail Revolving Loan and Grant Program (RRLGP). In addition, the following annual appropriations were allocated to the fund: • FY 2007: $235,000 • FY 2008: $2 million • FY 2009: $2 million Since the creation of the RRLGP in 2005, IRFA has awarded funding to 23 projects totaling over $7.2 million in grants and loans in its three rounds of competitive funding. These projects have pledged to create 1,672 jobs within two years of project completion and 1,361 jobs have been retained. Funded projects are associated with over $2 billion in total private capital investment. In 2008, the IRFA Board directed all available funds be used to help repair railroads devastated by summer flooding. On July 31, $3.9 million in deferred payment loans were offered to seven Iowa based railroads to allow for immediate repair of rail beds, including the cost of materials, labor and equipment.

Credit derivatives in emerging markets

Credit Derivatives are securities that offer protection against credit or default risk ofbonds or loans. The credit derivatives emerging market has grown rapidly and creditderivatives are widely used. This paper describes the emerging credit derivativesmarket structure. The current market activity is analyzed through elementary pricingdynamics and the study of the term structure of default risk. Focusing on theperformance of credit derivatives in stress situation, including legal and market risks,we discuss the potential consequences of a debt restructuring in a large emergingmarket borrower. The contribution of credit derivatives to the risk sharing in emergingmarkets is also examined.

Adjustment to target capital, finance and growth

Does financial development result in capital being reallocated more rapidly to industries where it is most productive? We argue that if this was the case, financially developed countries should see faster growth in industries with investment opportunities due to global demand and productivity shifts. Testing this cross-industry cross-country growth implication requires proxies for (latent) global industry investment opportunities. We show that tests relying only on data from specific (benchmark) countries may yield spurious evidence for or against the hypothesis. We therefore develop an alternative approach that combines benchmark-country proxies with a proxy that does not reflect opportunities specific to a country or level of financial development. Our empirical results yield clear support for the capital reallocation hypothesis.

Lending to the borrower from hell: Debt and default in the age of Philip II, 1556-1598

What sustained borrowing without third-party enforcement, in the early days of sovereignlending? Philip II of Spain accumulated towering debts while stopping all payments tohis lenders four times. How could the sovereign borrow much and default often? Weargue that bankers ability to cut off Philip II s access to smoothing services was key. Aform of syndicated lending created cohesion among his Genoese bankers. As a result,lending moratoria were sustained through a cheat the cheater mechanism (Kletzer andWright, 2000). Our paper thus lends empirical support to a recent literature emphasizingthe role of bankers incentives for continued sovereign borrowing.

Banks, government bonds, and default: what do the data say?

We use data from Bankscope to analyze the holdings of public bonds by over 18,000 banks located in 185 countries and the role of these bonds in 18 sovereign debt crises over the period 1998-2012. We find that: (i) banks hold a sizeable share of their assets in government bonds (about 9% on average), particularly in less financially developed countries; (ii) during sovereign crises, banks on average increase their bondholdings by 1% of their assets, but this increase is concentrated among larger and more profitable banks, and; (iii) the correlation between a bank's holdings of public bonds and its future loans is positive in normal times, but turns negative during defaults. A 10% increase in bank bond-holdings during default is associated with a 3.2% reduction in future loans, and bonds bought in normal times account for 75% of this effect. Our results are consistent with the view that there is a liquidity benefit for banks to hold public bonds in normal times, which is critical for understanding bank fragility during sovereign crises.

Audit report on the Iowa Water Pollution Control Works Financing Program and the Iowa Drinking Water Facilities Financing Program, joint programs of the Iowa Finance Authority and the Iowa Department of Natural Resources for the year ended June 30, 2008

Audit report on the Iowa Water Pollution Control Works Financing Program and the Iowa Drinking Water Facilities Financing Program, joint programs of the Iowa Finance Authority and the Iowa Department of Natural Resources for the year ended June 30, 2008

Relationship and transaction lending in a crisis

We study how relationship lending and transaction lending varyover the business cycle. We develop a model in which relationshipbanks gather information on their borrowers, which allows them toprovide loans for profitable firms during a crisis. Due to the servicesthey provide, operating costs of relationship-banks are higher thanthose of transaction-banks. In our model, where relationship-bankscompete with transaction-banks, a key result is that relationship-banks charge a higher intermediation spread in normal times, butoffer continuation-lending at more favorable terms than transactionbanks to profitable firms in a crisis. Using detailed credit registerinformation for Italian banks before and after the Lehman Brothers'default, we are able to study how relationship and transaction-banksresponded to the crisis and we test existing theories of relationshipbanking. Our empirical analysis confirms the basic prediction of themodel that relationship banks charged a higher spread before the crisis, offered more favorable continuation-lending terms in response tothe crisis, and suffered fewer defaults, thus confirming the informational advantage of relationship banking.

Department of Iowa Finance Authority, FY 2007

These Facts sheets have been developed to provide a multitude of information about executive branch agencies/departments on a single sheet of paper. The Facts provides general information, contact information, workforce data, leave & benefits information, and affirmative action data. This is the most recent update of information for the fiscal year 2007.

Department of Iowa Finance Authority, FY 2008

These Facts sheets have been developed to provide a multitude of information about executive branch agencies/departments on a single sheet of paper. The Facts provides general information, contact information, workforce data, leave & benefits information, and affirmative action data. This is the most recent update of information for the fiscal year 2007.

Audit report on the Iowa Water Pollution Control Works Financing Program (Clean Water Program) and the Iowa Drinking Water Facilities Financing Program (Drinking Water Program), joint programs of the Iowa Finance Authority and the Iowa Department of Natural Resources for the year ended June 30, 2009

Audit report on the Iowa Water Pollution Control Works Financing Program (Clean Water Program) and the Iowa Drinking Water Facilities Financing Program (Drinking Water Program), joint programs of the Iowa Finance Authority and the Iowa Department of Natural Resources for the year ended June 30, 2009