Relational dimensions of corporate governance in translation: networked governance in China and India

The effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms has been a subject of academic research for many decades. Although the large majority of corporate governance studies prior to mid 1990s were based on data from developed market economies such as the U.S., U.K. and Japan, in recent years researchers have begun examining corporate governance in transition economies. A comparison of China and India offers a unique environment for analyzing the effectiveness of corporate governance. First, both countries state-owned enterprise (SOE) reform strategies hinges on the Modern Enterprise System characterized by the separation of ownership and control. Ownership of an SOE’s assets is distributed among the government, institutional investors, managers, employees, and private investors. Effective control rights are assigned to management, which generally has a very small, or even nonexistent ownership stake. This distinctive shareholding structure creates conflict of interest not only between management (insiders) and outside investors but also between large shareholders and minority investors. Moreover, because both governments desire to retain some control—in part through partial retained ownership of commercialized SOEs, further conflicts arise between politicians and firms. Second, directors in publicly listed firms in both countries are predominantly drawn from institutions with significant non-market objectives: the government and other state enterprises, particularly in China, and extended families, particularly in India. As a result, the effectiveness of internal governance mechanisms, such as the number of independent directors on the board and the number of independent supervisors on the supervisory committee, are likely to be quiet limited, although this has yet to be fully evaluated. Third, because of the political nature of the privatization process itself, typical external governance mechanisms, such as debt (in conjunction with appropriate bankruptcy procedures), takeover threats, legal protection of investors, product market competition, etc., have not been effective. Bank loans have traditionally been viewed as grants from the state designed to bail out failing firms. State-owned banks retain monopoly or quasi-monopoly positions in the banking sector and profit is not their overriding objective. If political favor is deemed appropriate, subsidized loans, rescheduling of overdue debt or even outright transfer of funds can be arranged with SOEs (soft budget constraints). In addition, a market for private, non-bank debt is limited in India and has yet to be established China. There is no active merger or takeover activity in Chinese stock markets to discipline management. Information available in the capital markets is insufficient to keep at arm’s length of the corporate decisions. In light of the above peculiarities, China and India share many of the typical institutional characteristics as a transition economy, including poor legal protection of creditors and investors, the absence of an effective takeover market, an underdeveloped capital market, a relative inefficient banking system and significant interference of politicians in firm management. Su (2005) finds that the extent of political interference, managerial entrenchment and institutional control can help explain corporate dividend policies and post-IPO financing choices in this situation. Allen et al. (2005) demonstrate that standard corporate governance mechanisms are weak and ineffective for publicly listed firms while alternative governance mechanisms based on reputation and relationship have been remarkably effective in the private sector. Because the peculiarities are significant in this context, the differences in the political-economies of the two countries are likely to be evident in such relational terms. In this paper we explore the peculiarities of corporate governance in this transitional environment through a systematic examination of certain aspects of these reputational and relationship dimensions. Utilising the methods of social network analysis we identify the inter-organisational relationships at board level formed by equity holdings and by shared directors. Using data drawn from the Orbis database we map these relations among the 3700 largest firms in India and China respectively and identify the roles played in these relational networks by the particularly characteristic institutions in each case. We find greatly different social network structures in each case with some support in these relational dimensions for their distinctive features of governance. Further, the social network metrics allow us to considerably refine proxies for political interference, managerial entrenchment and institutional control used in earlier econometric analysis.

The Development of Corporate Identity: A Political Perspective

A corporate identity denotes a set of attributes that senior managers ascribe to their organization. It is therefore an organizational identity articulated by a powerful interest group. It can constitute a claim which serves inter alia to justify the authority vested in top managers and to further their interests. The academic literature on organizational identity, and on corporate identity in particular, pays little attention to these political considerations. It focuses in an apolitical manner on shared meanings when corporate identity works, or on cognitive dissonance when it breaks down. In response to this analytical void, we develop a political analysis of corporate identity and its development, using as illustration a longitudinal study of successive changes in the corporate identity of a Brazilian telecommunications company. This suggests a cyclical model in which corporate identity definition and redefinition involve power relations, resource mobilization and struggles for legitimacy. © Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2007.

Corporate Co-evolution: A Political Perspective

Corporate Co–Evolution is one of the first major works in Blackwell’s Organization and Strategy research series of business texts. By tracing the history and growth of Telemig, a major Brazilian telecommunications company, Corporate Co–Evolution develops broader macro–economic principles that can be applied to today’s international corporate environment. After a general introduction to political regulations and other domains of the corporate environment that impact the growth of companies, Corporate Co–Evolution delves deeply into Telemig’s past. The text closely documents and analyzes the dramatic changes over the course of 30 years that transformed Telemig from a “lumbering dinosaur to a soaring eagle” as privatization takes the corporation into the 21st century. The authors skillfully draw out the practical and policy implications of the Telemig experience to develop a broader systematic theory of corporate evolution that is highly relevant to the contemporary business world.

Political intervention in economic activity

This paper proposes a political economy explanation of bailouts to declining industries. A model of probabilistic voting is developed, in which two candidates compete for the vote of two groups of the society through tactical redistribution. We allow politicians to have core support groups they understand better, this implies politicians are more or less effective to deliver favors to some groups. This setting is suited to reproduce pork barrels or machine politics and patronage. We use this model to illustrate the case of an economy with both an efficient industry and a declining one, in which workers elect their government. We present the conditions under which the political process ends up with the lagged-behind industry being allowed to survive.

Managing artisanal and small-scale mining in forest areas: perspectives from a poststructural political ecology

Artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) is an activity intimately associated with social deprivation and environmental degradation, including deforestation. This paper examines ASM and deforestation using a broadly poststructural political ecology framework. Hegemonic discourses are shown to consistently influence policy direction, particularly in emerging approaches such as Corporate Social Responsibility and the Forest Stewardship Council. A review of alternative discourses reveals that the poststructural method is useful for critiquing the international policy arena but does not inform new approaches. Synthesis of the analysis leads to conclusions that echo a growing body of literature advocating for policies to become increasingly sensitive to local contexts, synergistic between actors at difference scales, and to be integrated across sectors.

Political culture and corporate homicide liability in the UK and Europe

This chapter outlines recent developments in the emergence within Europe of systems of criminal law designed to hold corporate bodies liable where they cause the deaths of workers or members of the public. These changes point to the emergence of a new, more punitive, legal culture in relation to corporate crime. At the same time, however, there is evidence to suggest that this punitive culture is not uniform; different national jurisdictions reflect it to differing degrees. The chapter explores the degree to which the UK’s willingness to criminalise work-related deaths is mirrored elsewhere in Europe, and identifies some factors that might account for variations in this regard. In particular, attention is paid to the influence that social and political culture have on practices in this area. It is written as part of a research handbook on corporate crime in Europe, so has an eye on a more generalist audience in some regards.