Entrepreneurial opportunities, implicit contracts and market making for complex consumer goods

This article extends the theory of entrepreneurial opportunity exploitation, outlining how under certain conditions, opportunity exploitation is dependent on market making innovations. Where adverse selection and moral hazard characterize markets, consumers are likely to withdraw regardless of product quality. In order to overcome consumer resistance, entrepreneurs must signal credible commitments. But because consumers purchase without fully specifying requirements, entrepreneurs' commitments take the partial form of implicit contracts, creating strong mutual commitments to repeated transactions. These commitments enable novel markets to function, but introduce additional costs. This article illustrates the theory with the historic case of Singer in sewing machines

Transfers, contracts and regulation: a new institutional economics perspective on the changing provision of social housing in Britain

Social housing policy in the UK mirrors wider processes Associated with shifts in broad welfare regimes. Social housing has moved from dominance by state housing provision to the funding of new investment through voluntary sector housing associations to what is now a greater focus on the regulation and private financing of these not-for-profit bodies. If these trends run their course, we are likely to see a range of not-for-profit bodies providing non-market housing in a highly regulated quasi-market. This paper examines these issues through the lens of new institutional economics, which it is believed can provide important insights into the fundamental contractual and regulatory relationships that are coming to dominate social housing from the perspective of the key actors in the sector (not-for-profit housing organisations, their tenants, private lenders and the regulatory state). The paper draws on evidence recently collected from a study evaluating more than 100 stock transfer organisations that inherited ex-public housing in Scotland, including 12 detailed case studies. The paper concludes that social housing stakeholders need to be aware of the risks (and their management) faced across the sector and that the state needs to have clear objectives for social housing and coherent policy instruments to achieve those ends.

Construction contracts: law and management. 4th edition

This is a fully revised edition of the UK’s leading textbook on the law governing construction contracts and the management and administration of those contracts. Although the legal principles involved are an aspect of general contract law, the practical and commercial complexities of the construction industry have increasingly made this a specialist area. This new edition has been brought up to date with recent cases and developments in the law as it stands at March 2007. The basic approach of the book has been retained. Rather than provide a commentary on standard-form contracts, our approach is to introduce the general principles that underlie contracts in construction, illustrating them by reference to the most important standard forms currently in use. Some of the common standard-form contracts have been revised since the previous edition, and the text has been revised to take account of these changes. Practitioners (consultants, builders, clients and lawyers) will find this an extremely useful source of reference, providing in-depth explanations for all of the features found in contemporary construction contracts, with reasons. A unique feature of this book is the way that it brings together the relevant principles of law with the practical issues arising in construction cases. It is a key text for construction undergraduates and postgraduates as well as for those taking the RIBA Part III and CIOB Part II examinations.

Psychological contracts and independent sales contractors: an examination of the predictors of contractor-level outcomes

Over the past decade, the independent sales contractor (ISC) has emerged as both an important distribution channel and a management challenge. This study makes two contributions to this evolving field. First, it explores the interrelations of the psychological contract with sales performance, voluntary turnover and organisational advocacy of ISCs, which have hitherto been largely unexplored. Second, it examines differences between high- and low-performing sales contractors on these linkages, due to findings in the literature that a small number of sales contractors often achieve a majority of sales. Based on survey data as well as 7 years of contractor-level data related to sales performance and voluntary turnover (n = 189), results indicate that psychological contract fulfilment and perceived dependency are important determinants of subsequent sales performance, voluntary turnover and organisational advocacy, with significant differences reported between high- and low-performing ISCs. A notable finding pertinent for sales managers responsible for managing ISCs is that high-performing sales contractors are motivated by psychological contract fulfilment and a low perception of dependency, while low-performing sales contractors are more likely to act as advocates for the firm due to perceived dependency, but may concurrently engage in organisational advocacy as a means to leave the firm.

Compensation and Rewards for Environmental Services (CRES) and efficient design of contracts in developing countries. Behavioral insights from a natural field experiment

The use of economic incentives for biodiversity (mostly Compensation and Reward for Environmental Services including Payment for ES) has been widely supported in the past decades and became the main innovative policy tools for biodiversity conservation worldwide. These policy tools are often based on the insight that rational actors perfectly weigh the costs and benefits of adopting certain behaviors and well-crafted economic incentives and disincentives will lead to socially desirable development scenarios. This rationalist mode of thought has provided interesting insights and results, but it also misestimates the context by which ‘real individuals’ come to decisions, and the multitude of factors influencing development sequences. In this study, our goal is to examine how these policies can take advantage of some unintended behavioral reactions that might in return impact, either positively or negatively, general policy performances. We test the effect of income's origin (‘Low effort’ based money vs. ‘High effort’ based money) on spending decisions (Necessity vs. Superior goods) and subsequent pro social preferences (Future pro-environmental behavior) within Madagascar rural areas, using a natural field experiment. Our results show that money obtained under low effort leads to different consumption patterns than money obtained under high efforts: superior goods are more salient in the case of low effort money. In parallel, money obtained under low effort leads to subsequent higher pro social behavior. Compensation and rewards policies for ecosystem services may mobilize knowledge on behavioral biases to improve their design and foster positive spillovers on their development goals.

Endogenous managerial compensation contracts in experimental quantity-setting duopolies

Given the ongoing debate on managerial compensation schemes, our paper offers empirical insights on the strategic choice of firms' owners over the terms of a managerial compensation contract, as a commitment device aiming at gaining competitive advantage in the product market. In a quantity setting duopoly we experimentally test whether firms' owners compensate their managers through contracts combining own profits either with revenues or with relative performance, and the resulting managerial behaviour in the product market. Prominent among our results is that firms' owners choose relative performance over profit revenue contracts more frequently. Further, firms' owners successfully induce a more aggressive behaviour by their managers in the market, by setting incentives which deviate from strict profit maximization.

Risk taking of executives under different incentive contracts: experimental evidence

Classic financial agency theory recommends compensation through stock options rather than shares to counteract excessive risk aversion in agents. In a setting where any kind of risk taking is suboptimal for shareholders, we show that excessive risk taking may occur for one of two reasons: risk preferences or incentives. Even when compensated through restricted company stock, experimental CEOs take large amounts of excessive risk. This contradicts classical financial theory, but can be explained through risk preferences that are not uniform over the probability and outcome spaces, and in particular, risk seeking for small probability gains and large probability losses. Compensation through options further increases risk taking as expected. We show that this effect is driven mainly by the personal asset position of the experimental CEO, thus having deleterious effects on company performance.

Construction contracts: law and management. 5th edition

The fifth edition of this best-selling textbook has been thoroughly revised to provide the most up-to-date and comprehensive coverage of the legislation, administration and management of construction contracts. It now includes comparison of working with JCT, NEC3 and FIDIC contracts, throughout. In line with new thinking in construction management research, this authoritative guide is essential reading for every construction undergraduate and is an extremely useful source of reference for practitioners.

Handling Mitigating Circumstances for Electronic Contracts

Electronic contracts are a means of representing agreed responsibilities and expected behaviour of autonomous agents acting on behalf of businesses. They can be used to regulate behaviour by providing negative consequences, penalties, where the responsibilities and expectations are not met, i.e. the contract is violated. However, long-term business relationships require some flexibility in the face of circumstances that do not conform to the assumptions of the contract, that is, mitigating circumstances. In this paper, we describe how contract parties can represent and enact policies on mitigating circumstances. As part of this, we require records of what has occurred within the system leading up to a violation: the provenance of the violation. We therefore bring together contract-based and provenance systems to solve the issue of mitigating circumstances.