The French Constitutional Council as the Rottweiler of the Republican Ideal in the Language Field: Does Jurisprudence Really Reflect Reality? EDAP 03/2012, 2012

France is known for being a champion of individual rights as well as for its overt hostility to any form of group rights. Linguistic pluralism in the public sphere is rejected for fear of babelization and Balkanization of the country. Over recent decades the Conseil Constitutionnel (CC) has, together with the Conseil d’État, remained arguably the strongest defender of this Jacobin ideal in France. In this article, I will discuss the role of France’s restrictive language policy through the prism of the CC’s jurisprudence. Overall, I will argue that the CC made reference to the (Jacobin) state-nation concept, a concept that is discussed in the first part of the paper, in order to fight the revival of regional languages in France over recent decades. The clause making French the official language in 1992 was functional to this policy. The intriguing aspect is that in France the CC managed to standardise France’s policy vis-à-vis regional and minority languages through its jurisprudence; an issue discussed in the second part of the paper. But in those regions with a stronger tradition of identity, particularly in the French overseas territories, the third part of the paper argues, normative reality has increasingly become under pressure. Therefore, a discrepancy between the ‘law in courts’ and the compliance with these decisions (‘law in action’) has been emerging over recent years. Amid some signs of opening of France to minorities, this contradiction delineates a trend that might well continue in future.

Legitimacy and rights in the EU: questions of identity

Rights as well as democracy play a crucial role in the legitimacy of the EU and constitutional patriotism has been influential in attempting to link them together. The article seeks to engage in a critique of constitutional patriotism on two fronts. First, it distinguishes between the various types of right that exist within EU law-Community, citizenship and fundamental-and then analyses the place of these rights within various political models of the EU ranging from nationalism to republicanism. It argues that constitutional patriotism does not enjoy a monopoly on rights discourse in the EU: most models of the EU see a place for rights; it is just that the type of right supported varies. Secondly, advocates of constitutional patriotism argue that EU rights generate European identity. The article questions the extent to which this is the case, arguing that identity potential varies considerably according to the type of EU right concerned.

The unpatriotism of the economic constitution? Rights to free movement and their impact on national and European identity

Abstract: Instead of the political reading of the EU Constitution adopted by advocates of constitutional patriotism, this article examines the European economic constitution. The four single market freedoms can be used by the Court of Justice to strike down Member State laws which represent deeply held aspects of national cultural identity. The article examines whether the court does in fact act in this way and proceeds to argue that the issue of identity protection does not stop with the court. In those policy areas where the court is more interventionist, and its case-law is perceived as an identity threat, one is likely to find binding Treaty-based derogations. Where, in contrast, the effect of the court's case-law poses less of a threat, one is more likely to see non-binding declarations. The article examines a number of policy areas in which specific cultural derogations and declarations are to be found, including abortion, property acquisition, football and alcohol control.

Legal outlier, again? U.S. felon suffrage: comparative and international human rights perspectives

The judiciousness of American felon suffrage policies has long been the subject of scholarly debate, not least due to the large number of affected Americans: an estimated 5.3 million citizens are ineligible to vote as a result of a criminal conviction. This article offers comparative law and international human rights perspectives and aims to make two main contributions to the American and global discourse. After an introduction in Part I, Part II offers comparative law perspectives on challenges to disenfranchisement legislation, juxtaposing U.S. case law against recent judgments rendered by courts in Canada, South Africa, Australia, and by the European Court of Human Rights. The article submits that owing to its unique constitutional stipulations, as well as to a general reluctance to engage foreign legal sources, U.S. jurisprudence lags behind an emerging global jurisprudential trend that increasingly views convicts’ disenfranchisement as a suspect practice and subjects it to judicial review. This transnational judicial discourse follows a democratic paradigm and adopts a “residual liberty” approach to criminal justice that considers convicts to be rights-holders. The discourse rejects regulatory justifications for convicts’ disenfranchisement, and instead sees disenfranchisement as a penal measure. In order to determine its suitability as a punishment, the adverse effects of disenfranchisement are weighed against its purported social benefits, using balancing or proportionality review. Part III analyzes the international human rights treaty regime. It assesses, in particular, Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”), which proclaims that “every citizen” has a right to vote without “unreasonable restrictions.” The analysis concludes that the phrase “unreasonable restrictions” is generally interpreted in a manner which tolerates certain forms of disenfranchisement, whereas other forms (such as life disenfranchisement) may be incompatible with treaty obligations. This article submits that disenfranchisement is a normatively flawed punishment. It fails to treat convicts as politically-equal community members, degrades them, and causes them grave harms both as individuals and as members of social groups. These adverse effects outweigh the purported social benefits of disenfranchisement. Furthermore, as a core component of the right to vote, voter eligibility should cease to be subjected to balancing or proportionality review. The presumed facilitative nature of the right to vote makes suffrage less susceptible to deference-based objections regarding the judicial review of legislation, as well as to cultural relativity objections to further the international standardization of human rights obligations. In view of this, this article proposes the adoption of a new optional protocol to the ICCPR proscribing convicts’ disenfranchisement. The article draws analogies between the proposed protocol and the ICCPR’s “Optional Protocol Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty.” If adopted, the proposed protocol would strengthen the current trajectory towards expanding convicts’ suffrage that emanates from the invigorated transnational judicial discourse.

Labor rights, formality and spillovers: evidence from Brazil

Nós analisamos o efeito da emenda constitucional 72/13 no Brasil, que igualou direitos trabalhistas de empregadas domésticas a aqueles de outros empregados. Mostramos que, após a legislação, uma considerável cobertura midiática e um interesse público intensificado aumentou o conhecimento geral de direitos trabalhistas de empregadas domésticas. Como consequência, o não-seguimento de legislações trabalhistas no setor de serviços domésticos ficou mais difícil. Ao mesmo tempo, a necessidade de regulamentar adicionalmente a emenda fez com que custos trabalhistas ficassem praticamente inalterados. Usando uma abordagem de diferença-em-diferenças que compara ocupações selecionadas ao longo do tempo, mostramos que a emenda -- e a discussão que ela causou -- levou a um aumento na formalização e nos salários de empregados domésticos. Então, usando a heterogeneidade do impacto da emenda em grupos demográficos, nossos resultados mostram que emprego doméstico foi reduzido e que mulheres pouco qualificadas saíram força de trabalho e foram para empregos de menor qualidade. Testes de placebo e análises de robustez indicam que nossos resultados não são explicados por diversas interpretações alternativas.

Hemangioendothelioma of bone in a patient with a constitutional supernumerary marker

A 13-year old girl was diagnosed as having a bone hemangioendothelioma. Cytogenetic studies identified the presence of a small supernumerary marker chromosome in this patient. Classical cytogenetic methods using G-, C-, Ag-NOR-banding were supplemented by spectral karyotyping (SKY) and fluorescence in situ hybridization to reveal a karyotype 47,XX,+mar.ish der(22)(D22S543+) karyotype in cells derived from the tumor and lymphocytes. These findings suggest that the supernumerary marker chromosome originated from the proximal centromeric region of chromosome 22, and that trisomy of the region 22q11: was not associated with adverse phenotypic effects, but that the presence of trisomy 22q11 may be related to the development of this tumor. (C) Elsevier B.V., 1999. All rights reserved.

Legality and Human Rights: Administrative Justice in Russia 1862-1917

The question of how far pre-revolutionary Russia was from the ideal of a lawful state has received little academic attention, particularly as relates to the legal regulation of relations between person, society and state within the state administration. Pravilova explored the methods of settling disputes between individuals and the administration, and the emergence of legal controls of the administration, analysed projects for the organisation of administrative justice and studied the particular nature of concepts from Russian administrative justice. The idea of an organisation of special bodies examining complaints by private persons against the actions of officials and state bureaucratic organs first appeared in the early 1860s. In the 1870s-1890s various projects for the reform of administrative justice (reorganisation of the Senate and local administrative institutions) were proposed by the Ministries of Justice and Finance, but none of these was put into practice, largely due to resistance from the bureaucracy. At the same time, however, the rapid development of private enterprise, the activities of the zemstvo and self-government produced new norms and mechanisms for the regulation of authorities and social relations. Despite the lack of institutional conditions, the Senate did consider complaints from private persons against illegal actions by administrative officials, playing a role similar to that of the supreme administrative courts in France and Germany. The spread of concepts of a 'lawful state' aroused support for a system of administrative justice and the establishment of administrative tribunals was seen as a condition of legality and a guarantee of human rights. The government was forced to understand that measures to maintain legality were vital to preserve the stability of the system of state power, but plans for liberal reforms were pushed into the background by constitutional reforms. The idea of guarantees of human rights in relations with the authorities was in contradiction with the idea of the monarchy and it was only when the Provisional Government took power in 1917 that the liberal programme of legal reforms had any chance of being put into practice. A law passed in June 1917 ordained the organisation of local administrative justice bodies, but its implementation was hampered by the war, the shortage of qualified judges and the existing absolute legal illiteracy, and the few administrative courts that were set up were soon abolished by the new Soviet authorities. Pravilova concluded that the establishment of a lawful state in pre-revolutionary Russia was prevented by a number of factors, particularly the autocratic nature of the supreme authority, which was incompatible with the idea of administrative justice as a guarantee of the rights of citizens in their relations with the state.

The Benefits of Multilingualism for Statutory and Constitutional Interpretation in South Africa

Taking the South African experience as an example, this article considers the interpretive benefits to be reaped from having access to bi- and multilingual versions of a statutory text. The discussion takes place against the backdrop of a history of statutory bi- and multilingualism in the said jurisdiction as well as, at present, constitutional guarantees of language rights and the “parity of esteem” of eleven official languages. It is argued that, if invoked with due discretion and in a non-rigid way, statutory multilingualism can be a boon to statutory and constitutional interpretation. The South African courts – whose traditional approach to statutory inter-pretation has tended to be literalist, formalistic and formulaic – are, generally speaking, to be commended for their supple use of bilingualism as an aid to interpretation over the years. The advent of constitutional multilingualism and the (potential) availability of statutory texts (and the Constitution) in more than two languages, have moreover created conditions conducive to the further development and refinement of reliance on multilingualism in statutory and constitutional interpretation – certain challenges notwithstanding.

Conventions in comparative constitutional law. Research Paper in Law 4/2003

Introduction. “Convention” is an ambiguous term, not only for lawyers, containing a wide variety of different meanings. Even when restricted to denote an assembly it may be used for all sorts of gatherings. In the context of constitutional law a convention is a very specific instrument, and the question is to what extent it is actually known in European constitutional law and whether the “Convention on the Future of Europe” as called forth by the Declaration of Laeken conforms to what is understood in constitutional law by “convention”.1 Or did the Laeken Council pick up a term without any foundation in European constitutional law, rarely practiced and even less understood, the only precedents of which are supposed to be the American Federal Convention in Philadelphia in 1787 and the convention that drafted the European Charter on Fundamental Rights, as can be read time and again? 2 As it is the privilege of the constitutional historian to make aware the evolution of legal institutions and to analyze their conferred meaning so that they will be available in political discourse, I shall examine the meaning of “convention” in constitutional history and comparative constitutional law in a first part, while a second part will place the Convention on the Future of the European Union according to its composition and commission into the context of constitutional conventions as understood in law.

Diritti sociali e crisi del costituzionalismo europeo [Social rights and the crisis of European constitutionalism]. WP C.S.D.L.E. “Massimo D’Antona”.INT – 95/2012

In the face of what looks like a real impasse of the the line of European constitutionalism, partly due to an orientation of the Court of Justice which tends to favor the protection of economic freedoms over the protection of social rights, two opposing trends occurr. The first amounts to a new "constitutional patriotism"; the second entrusts the protection of fundamental social rights no longer to a single Chart or to a single court but to a multi-level system of protection. A dialogue between the European courts that truly valorizes fundamental rights, however, might be hindered by what someone has seen as a resurgence of the dualist theories, evident in an ECJ’s decision as Kadi.

l bilanciamento tra le libertà economiche e i diritti sociali collettivi operato dalla Corte di Giustizia è un contemperamento tra diritti equiordinati?* = The balance between economic freedoms and collective social rights and actions; Court of Justice is a choice between rights equiordinati? Actions by the Court of Justice. WP C.S.D.L.E. “Massimo D’Antona”.INT – 98/2012

In the Viking and Laval judgments and more recently in the Comm. v. Germany ruling, the Court of Justice applied the proportionality test to collective rights, setting a series of restrictions to the exercise of the right to strike and the right to collective bargaining. The way the ECJ balances the economic freedoms and the social rights is indeed very different from that of the Italian Constitutional Court. Unlike the European Union Treaties, the Italian Constitution recognizes an important role to the right to take collective action which has to be connected with article 3, paragraph 2, consequently the right of strike is more protected than the exercise of economic freedoms.

The future of human rights protection in the new Libya: prospects and challenges. Jean Monnet Occasional Paper No. 6/2014

There is no doubt that demand for the respect of human rights was one of the factors behind the Arab Spring and Libya is no exception. Four decades of absolute dictatorship headed by Muammar Gaddafi had been further tainted with gross violations of human rights of Libyan citizens and restrictions on their basic freedoms. Before the revolution, Libya was a country where no political parties were allowed. Freedom of expression and the press were extremely restricted. Reports about the country’s human rights violations published by a number of international organizations documented large scale human rights abuses at the hands of the Gaddafi regime. The 17 February 2011 revolution in Libya led to a turning point in the country’s history. The regime of Muammar Gaddafi which had dominated the country since 1969 eventually collapsed, leading to the beginning of the painful task of reconciliation and state building. Nonetheless it is estimated that more than 7000 prisoners are held captive by various militias and armed groups without due process. This in addition to thousands of internally displaced persons. State building involves the consolidation of a democratic state based on a democratic constitution. In 2011, a constitutional declaration was adopted to replace the one that had been in effect since 1969. This was intended as a stop-gap solution to allow the new political forces unleashed in the country time to write a new democratic constitution. To help consolidate the democratic state, three elements are required: that human rights be placed at its core; that these rights are truly implemented and applied; and lastly that the independence of the judiciary is safeguarded. For all this to happen it is also essential to strengthen education on human rights by encouraging non-governmental organizations to take a stronger role in promoting human rights. Libyan citizens can only avail themselves of these rights and strengthen their implementation if they know what they are and how they can benefit from their implementation

The 2011 Constitutional reform in Morocco: more flaws than merits. Jean Monnet Occasional Paper No. 07/2014

Introduction. In the speech given to both Houses of Parliament on 11 October 2013 during the first parliamentary session, King Mohammed VI said that the “Moroccan democratic model” was “a precursor in the region as well as on the continental level.”1 Similarly, with the purpose of stressing the “democratic exceptionalism”2 of the country, the new government, led by Abdeilah Benkirane, emphasised that Morocco represents a “third way” compared to countries such as Tunisia, Libya or Egypt since it “…has not embarked on a limited process of reform from the top, driven and controlled by the King. Nor has it experienced a revolution brought a angry citizens rising up against the regime. Rather, it has chosen an alternate path based on a genuine partnership between the King and the PJD (Parti de la justice et du développement) that promises to bring about more far-reaching reform than palace alone would grant, without the disruption caused by uncontrolled popular upheaval.”4 It should not be at all surprising that the regime and the new Government consider Morocco a “democratic model” or a “third way.” After all, they are refe country. What is harder to understand is that when discussing the Arab uprisings, even prominent Western political leaders, representatives of the European Union institutions and the mainstream media (when they do not forget about Morocc to praise the process of democratic reform carried out by Mohammed VI. For example, on 12 September 2012, Hillary Clinton, former US Secretary of State, said, “in many ways, the United States looks to Morocco to be a leader and a model […] On political reform, we have all seen remarkable changes taking place across North Africa and the Middle East. I commend Morocco and your government for your efforts to stay ahead of these changes by holding free and fair elections, empowering the elected parliament, taking other steps to ensure that the government reflects the will of the people.”5 Similarly, former French President Nicolas Sarkozy sang the praises of the process that led to the adoption of the new 2011 Constitution: “King Mohammed VI has shown the path towards a profound, peaceful and modern transformation of Moroccan institutions and society […] France fully supports this exemplary process.” Interestingly enough, even at the European Union level the constitutional reform that took more far-reaching reform than palace alone would grant, without the disruption caused by uncontrolled popular upheaval.”4 It should not be at all surprising that the regime and the new Government consider Morocco a “democratic model” or a “third way.” After all, they are refe country. What is harder to understand is that when discussing the Arab uprisings, even prominent Western political leaders, representatives of the European Union institutions and the mainstream media (when they do not forget about Morocc to praise the process of democratic reform carried out by Mohammed VI. For example, on 12 September 2012, Hillary Clinton, former US Secretary of State, said, “in many ways, the United States looks to Morocco to be a leader and a model […] On political reform, we have all seen remarkable changes taking place across North Africa and the Middle East. I commend Morocco and your government for your efforts to stay ahead of these changes by holding free and fair elections, empowering the elected parliament, taking other steps to ensure that the government reflects the will of the people.”5 Similarly, former French President Nicolas Sarkozy sang the praises of the process that led to the adoption of the new 2011 Constitution: “King Mohammed VI has shown the path towards a profound, peaceful and modern transformation of Moroccan institutions and society […] France fully supports this exemplary process.” Interestingly enough, even at the European Union level the constitutional reform that took place in Morocco was considered an extremely positive step taken by the country, as well as a means to strengthen the cooperation between the EU and Morocco. Indeed, according to the High Representative Catherine Ashton, this reform “constitute[s] a significant response to the legitimate aspirations of the Moroccan people and [is] consistent with Morocco’s Advanced Status with the EU.”7 When it comes to the media, it is worth noting that following the ratification of the 2011 Constitution, The New York Times headlined: “All Hail the (Democratic) King.” Even sections of the academic literature have commended the constitutional reform carried out by the Moroccan Sovereign.9 In this paper I argue against the aforementioned idea, according to which Morocco should be considered a model in the region, and in particular I show that the constitution-making process, the 2011 Constitution and its subsequent implementation have more flaws than merits. Accordingly, this paper proceeds in five steps. First of all, I examine the reaction of the regime to the upheavals that broke out in the country after 20 February 2011. Secondly, I analyse the process of constitution showing its main strengths and weaknesses, and comparing it with other constituent processes that took place in the region following the Arab uprisings. In the third section, I highlight the most significant elements of continuity and discontinuity with the previous 1996 Constitution. The fourth section deals with the process of implementation: specifically process is proceeding quite slowly and that in some cases ordinary legislation is in contrast with the new Constitution and international human rights treaties. Moreover, I discuss the role that the judiciary and the Constitutional Court can play in the implementation and interpretation of the Constitution. Finally, I draw some concluding remarks.