Victims of War must be loyal to deserve protection: International law and national legislation on enemy aliens 1907-1918

In international law the internment of civilians has only been regulated in writing in the context of the 4th Geneva Convention of 1949. Nevertheless this did not mean that civilians were not protected by at least some rules of customary international law before that date and especially in World War I. Furthermore specialists of international law expected states – at least those considered to be part of the community of civilized nations – to continue to treat all men equal before the law even in wartime. As research already conducted (Bird, Panayi, Fischer) has shown, this was not the case during World War I. Based on these findings the presentation proposed here wants to look into the development of international law and into some national preparations for treating so called “enemy aliens” in the period before 1914 (Austria-Hungary, Australia, United Kingdom), in order to see to what extent principles of international law protecting civilians from the consequences of war can be detected in the pre-war preparations. As far as can be judged so far the issue of loyalty was central in this context. Looking at the war itself, the presentation proposed here will try to look at how far the principles of international law alluded to above continued to influence the policies on “enemy aliens” in the countries mentioned and to see, how the International Committee of the Red Cross tried to use them to legitimize and expand its protective policies in regard to civilians interned in belligerent as well as neutral countries throughout the war.

The New EU Criminal Law Competence in Action: The Proposal for a Directive on Criminal Sanctions for Insider Dealing and Market Manipulation. IES WORKING PAPER 5/2013

The aim of this paper is to analyse the proposed Directive on criminal sanctions for insider dealing and market manipulation (COM(2011)654 final), which represents the first exercise of the European Union competence provided for by Article 83(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. The proposal aims at harmonising the sanctioning regimes provided by the Member States for market abuse, imposing the introduction of criminal sanctions and providing an opportunity to critically reflect on the position taken by the Commission towards the use of criminal law. The paper will discuss briefly the evolution of the EU’s criminal law competence, focusing on the Lisbon Treaty. It will analyse the ‘essentiality standard’ for the harmonisation of criminal law included in Article 83(2) TFEU, concluding that this standard encompasses both the subsidiarity and the ultima ratio principles and implies important practical consequences for the Union’s legislator. The research will then focus on the proposed Directive, trying to assess if the Union’s legislator, notwithstanding the ‘symbolic’ function of this proposal in the financial crisis, provides consistent arguments on the respect of the ‘essentiality standard’. The paper will note that the proposal raises some concerns, because of the lack of a clear reliance on empirical data regarding the essential need for the introduction of criminal law provisions. It will be stressed that only the assessment of the essential need of an EU action, according to the standard set in Article 83(2) TFEU, can guarantee a coherent choice of the areas interested by the harmonisation process, preventing the legislator to choose on the basis of other grounds.

The Soviet legal system : post-Stalin documentation and historical commentary /

Includes bibliographies.

A treatise on the law of rights of common, with a supplement, containing the cases and statutes, and the Act of 4 & 5 W. 4, c. 30, to facilitate the exchange of lands, with explanatory notes.

The supplement and the Act of 4 & 5 W. 4, c. 30, have individual title pages.

Cyberstalking:a new challenge for criminal law

Cyberstalking has recently emerged as a new and growing problem and is an area that will probably receive a higher profile within criminal law as more cases reach court (see Griffiths, 1999; Griffiths, Rogers and Sparrow, 1998; Bojic and McFarlane, 2002a; 2002b). For the purposes of this article we define cyberstalking as the use of information and communications technology (in particular the Internet) in order to harass individuals. Such harassment may include actions such as the transmission of offensive e-mail messages, identity theft and damage to data or equipment. Whilst a more comprehensive definition has been presented elsewhere (Bocij and McFarlane, 2002), it is hoped that the definition here is sufficient for those unfamiliar with this field. The stereotypical stalker conjures up images of someone harassing a victim who is the object of their affection. However, not all stalking incidents are motivated by unrequited love. Stalking can also be motivated by hate, a need for revenge, a need for power and/or racism. Similarly, cyberstalking can involve acts that begin with the issuing of threats and end in physical assault. We also make distinctions between conventional stalking and cyberstalking. Whilst some may view cyberstalking as an extension of conventional stalking, we believe cyberstalking should be regarded as an entirely new form of deviant behaviour. It is not surprising that cyberstalking is sometimes thought of as a trivial problem. A number of writers and researchers have suggested that cyberstalking and associated activities are of little genuine concern. Koch (2000), for example, goes as far as accusing those interested in cyberstalking as promoting hysteria over a problem that may be minuscule or even imaginary. The impression gained is that cyberstalking represents a relatively small problem where victims seldom suffer any real harm. Whilst there are no genuinely reliable statistics that can be used to determine how common cyberstalking incidents are, a great deal of evidence is available to show that cyberstalking is a significant and growing problem (Griffiths et al, 1998). For instance, CyberAngels (a well-known Internet safety organization) receives some 500 complaints of cyberstalking each day, of which up to 100 represent legitimate cases (Dean, 2000). Another Internet safety organization (Working to Halt Online Abuse) reports receiving an average of 100 cases per week (WHOA, 2001). To highlight the types of cyberstalking behaviours that take place and some of the major issues facing criminal law, we briefly examine four high profile cases of cyberstalking (adapted from Bocij and MacFarlane, 2002b).

Organized crime legislation in the European Union. Harmonization and approximation of criminal law, national legislations and the EU framework decision on the fight against organised crime, by Francesco Calderoni

Book review: Heidelberg, Dordrecht, London, and New York, Springer, 2010, 189 pp., £93.55 (hardcover), ISBN 978-3-642-04330-7, e-ISBN 978-3-642-04331-4

TAKING ORGANIZATIONS SERIOUSLY: RESPONSIBLE AGENCY, ORGANIZATIONS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW

In the post-Enlightenment period, Anglo-American criminal law has been applied with increased force, and an ever expanding scope, to collective actors like corporations and other organizations. Recent scholarship has focused on developing “truly organizational” bases of liability that break with the conventional approach of imputing individual conduct to an organization and instead analyze culpable conduct and intent in a way that reflects the distinct and independent capacity of organizations to pursue their interests or goals collaboratively. In 2004, Canada enacted amendments inspired by these ideas in the hope they would lead to more effective criminal enforcement against organizations. Twelve years later, however, the promise of Bill C-45 is largely unfulfilled. In this thesis, I explore how much of this failure of law reform to deliver transformational change is attributable to an individualist bias that permeates how we think about what it means to be responsible and how this then shapes the responsibility ascription process. Using an analytical framework that combines criminal law theory with selected aspects of rational-structural theory and organization culture, I suggest that a promising way forward may lie in reframing the essential qualities required to be a subject of the criminal law in a way that captures the unique attributes that make organizations different from individuals. The resulting organizational concept of responsible agency allows for an integration of organizational reality into how we assess organizational culpability while keeping the ambit of criminal liability within the limits of what is practicable and fair. This better aligns with the spirit of Bill C-45: to impose criminal liability in a way that takes organizations – and their crimes – seriously.

Murri Courts : Indigenous Magistrate Courts : communicating for better outcomes

In setting the scene for this paper, it is useful to briefly outline the history of the Queensland legal system. Our legal system was largely inherited from Britain, so it is, therefore, based in European-Western cultural and legal traditions. Alongside this, and over many thousands of years, Australian Indigenous communities devised their own socio-cultural-legal structures. As a result, when Indigenous people are drawn into interactions with our English-based law and court system, which is very different from Aboriginal law, they face particular disadvantages. Problems may include structural and linguistic differences, the complex language of the law and court processes, cultural differences, gender issues, problems of age, communication differences, the formalities of the courtroom, communication protocols used by judges, barristers, and court administrators, and particularly, the questioning techniques used by police and lawyers.

Mainstreaming therapeutic jurisprudence and the adversarial paradigm—incommensurability and the possibility of a shared disciplinary matrix

Problem-solving courts appear to achieve outcomes that are not common in mainstream courts. There are increasing calls for the adoption of more therapeutic and problem-solving practices by mainstream judges in civil and criminal courts in a number of jurisdictions, most notably in the United States and Australia. Currently, a judge who sets out to exercise a significant therapeutic function is likely to be doing so in a specialist court or jurisdiction, outside the mainstream court system, and arguably, outside the adversarial paradigm itself. To some extent, this work is tolerated but marginalised. However, do therapeutic and problem-solving functions have the potential to help define, rather than simply complement, the role of judicial officers? The core question addressed in this thesis is whether the judicial role could evolve to be not just less adversarial, but fundamentally non-adversarial. In other words, could we see—or are we seeing—a juristic paradigm shift not just in the colloquial, casual sense of the word, but in the strong, worldview changing sense meant by Thomas Kuhn? This thesis examines the current relationship between adversarialism and therapeutic jurisprudence in the context of Kuhn’s conception of the transition from periods of ‘normal science’, through periods of anomaly and disciplinary crises to paradigm shifts. It considers whether therapeutic jurisprudence and adversarialism are incommensurable in the Kuhnian sense, and if so, what this means for the relationship between the two, and for the agenda to mainstream therapeutic jurisprudence. The thesis asserts that Kuhnian incommensurability is, in fact, a characteristic of the relationship between adversarialism and therapeutic jurisprudence, but that the possibility of a therapeutic paradigm shift in law can be reconciled with many adversarial and due process principles by relating this incommensurability to a broader disciplinary matrix.