An intensive survey of Bear Creek in West-Central Illinois, August-September, 1992 /

"December, 1994."

Ameren Central Illinois Light Company workforce adequacy analysis report /

"December 2008"--Colophon.

Ameren Central Illinois Public Service Company workforce adequacy analysis report /

"December 2008"--Colophon.

Opportunity Returns : Central Region.

Opportunity Returns is Governor Blagojevich's comprehensive strategy to restore jobs and economic vitality throughout Illinois. This new and innovative plan recognizes that we can't solve the challenges of economic development with a one-size-fits-all approach. Instead, Opportunity Returns focuses on the specific strengths and needs of each region in the state. Opportunity Returns divides the state into ten geographic regions with each region receiving its own unique and tailored strategy. The plan outlines the economic development priorities for the Central region, which consists of Cass, Christian, Greene, Logan, Macon, Macoupin, Menard, Montgomery, Morgan, Sangamon, Scott, and Shelby Counties. Governor Blagojevich understands that no one knows a community better than the people who live and work in it. This plan is the result of extensive community input from business, community and government leaders throughout the Central region.

Opportunity Returns : East Central Region.

Opportunity Returns is Governor Blagojevich's comprehensive strategy to restore jobs and economic vitality throughout Illinois. This new and innovative plan recognizes that we can't solve the challenges of economic development with a one-size-fits-all approach. Instead, Opportunity Returns focuses on the specific strengths and needs of each region in the state. Opportunity Returns divides the state into ten geographic regions with each region receiving its own unique and tailored strategy. This plan outlines the economic development priorities for the East Central region, which consists of Champaign, Douglas, Ford, Iroquois, Piatt, and Vermilion Counties. Governor Blagojevich understands that no one knows a community better than the people who live and work in it. This strategy is the result of extensive community input from business, community and government leaders throughout the East Central region.

Opportunity Returns : West Central Region.

Opportunity Returns is Governor Blagojevich's comprehensive plan for restoring economic opportunity to Illinois -- an approach designed to create jobs and spur growth. This historic approach to economic development in Illinois focuses the state's resources on the specific strengths and priorities of each region -- recognizing that local communities understand their needs the best. Ten regional plans have been developed to fit each of the regions. This plan outlines economic and workplace goals for the West Central region, which is comprised of Adams, Brown, Hancock, Henderson, Knox, McDonough, Pike, Schuyler and Warren counties.

Regional profile: West Central Illinois /

Cover title.

A proposal for renewal of the Iowa City central business district and adjacent areas.

Cover-title: Iowa City in the future.

Inventory of information basic to the planning of agricultural development in Latin America.

Bibliographical footnotes.

A redevelopment plan for the central business district : a part of the master plan for the City of Muskegon /

Cover title: Central business district redevelopment plan.

Planning for a Communist Future: Professionalization, Nationalism, and Planning Practice in Soviet Moscow, 1964-1974

Thesis (Master's)--University of Washington, 2016-06

GIS-Based Suitability Analysis and Planning of Green Infrastructure: A Case of the PPCOD, Capitol Hill

Thesis (Master's)--University of Washington, 2016-06

A vulnerability analysis of the temperate forests of south central Chile A vulnerability analysis of the temperate forests of south central Chile. Biological Conservation, 122 2005: 9-21.

Areas of the landscape that are priorities for conservation should be those that are both vulnerable to threatening processes and that if lost or degraded, will result in conservation targets being compromised. While much attention is directed towards understanding the patterns of biodiversity, much less is given to determining the areas of the landscape most vulnerable to threats. We assessed the relative vulnerability of remaining areas of native forest to conversion to plantations in the ecologically significant temperate rainforest region of south central Chile. The area of the study region is 4.2 million ha and the extent of plantations is approximately 200000 ha. First, the spatial distribution of native forest conversion to plantations was determined. The variables related to the spatial distribution of this threatening process were identified through the development of a classification tree and the generation of a multivariate. spatially explicit, statistical model. The model of native forest conversion explained 43% of the deviance and the discrimination ability of the model was high. Predictions were made of where native forest conversion is likely to occur in the future. Due to patterns of climate, topography, soils and proximity to infrastructure and towns, remaining forest areas differ in their relative risk of being converted to plantations. Another factor that may increase the vulnerability of remaining native forest in a subset of the study region is the proposed construction of a highway. We found that 90% of the area of existing plantations within this region is within 2.5 km of roads. When the predictions of native forest conversion were recalculated accounting for the construction of this highway, it was found that: approximately 27000 ha of native forest had an increased probability of conversion. The areas of native forest identified to be vulnerable to conversion are outside of the existing reserve network. (C) 2004 Elsevier Ltd. All tights reserved.

Objectives for multiple-species conservation planning

The first step in conservation planning is to identify objectives. Most stated objectives for conservation, such as to maximize biodiversity outcomes, are too vague to be useful within a decision-making framework. One way to clarify the issue is to define objectives in terms of the risk of extinction for multiple species. Although the assessment of extinction risk for single species is common, few researchers have formulated an objective function that combines the extinction risks of multiple species. We sought to translate the broad goal of maximizing the viability of species into explicit objectives for use in a decision-theoretic approach to conservation planning. We formulated several objective functions based on extinction risk across many species and illustrated the differences between these objectives with simple examples. Each objective function was the mathematical representation of an approach to conservation and emphasized different levels of threat Our objectives included minimizing the joint probability of one or more extinctions, minimizing the expected number of extinctions, and minimizing the increase in risk of extinction from the best-case scenario. With objective functions based on joint probabilities of extinction across species, any correlations in extinction probabilities bad to be known or the resultant decisions were potentially misleading. Additive objectives, such as the expected number of extinctions, did not produce the same anomalies. We demonstrated that the choice of objective function is central to the decision-making process because alternative objective functions can lead to a different ranking of management options. Therefore, decision makers need to think carefully in selecting and defining their conservation goals.

The missing ingredient:inter-municipal cooperation and central-local relations in the UK

The thrust of the argument presented in this chapter is that inter-municipal cooperation (IMC) in the United Kingdom reflects local government's constitutional position and its exposure to the exigencies of Westminster (elected central government) and Whitehall (centre of the professional civil service that services central government). For the most part councils are without general powers of competence and are restricted in what they can do by Parliament. This suggests that the capacity for locally driven IMC is restricted and operates principally within a framework constructed by central government's policy objectives and legislation and the political expediencies of the governing political party. In practice, however, recent examples of IMC demonstrate that the practices are more complex than this initial analysis suggests. Central government may exert top-down pressures and impose hierarchical directives, but there are important countervailing forces. Constitutional changes in Scotland and Wales have shifted the locus of central- local relations away from Westminster and Whitehall. In England, the seeding of English government regional offices in 1994 has evolved into an important structural arrangement that encourages councils to work together. Within the local government community there is now widespread acknowledgement that to achieve the ambitious targets set by central government, councils are, by necessity, bound to cooperate and work with other agencies. In recent years, the fragmentation of public service delivery has affected the scope of IMC. Elected local government in the UK is now only one piece of a complex jigsaw of agencies that provides services to the public; whether it is with non-elected bodies, such as health authorities, public protection authorities (police and fire), voluntary nonprofit organisations or for-profit bodies, councils are expected to cooperate widely with agencies in their localities. Indeed, for projects such as regeneration and community renewal, councils may act as the coordinating agency but the success of such projects is measured by collaboration and partnership working (Davies 2002). To place these developments in context, IMC is an example of how, in spite of the fragmentation of traditional forms of government, councils work with other public service agencies and other councils through the medium of interagency partnerships, collaboration between organisations and a mixed economy of service providers. Such an analysis suggests that, following changes to the system of local government, contemporary forms of IMC are less dependent on vertical arrangements (top-down direction from central government) as they are replaced by horizontal modes (expansion of networks and partnership arrangements). Evidence suggests, however that central government continues to steer local authorities through the agency of inspectorates and regulatory bodies, and through policy initiatives, such as local strategic partnerships and local area agreements (Kelly 2006), thus questioning whether, in the case of UK local government, the shift from hierarchy to network and market solutions is less differentiated and transformation less complete than some literature suggests. Vertical or horizontal pressures may promote IMC, yet similar drivers may deter collaboration between local authorities. An example of negative vertical pressure was central government's change of the systems of local taxation during the 1980s. The new taxation regime replaced a tax on property with a tax on individual residency. Although the community charge lasted only a few years, it was a highpoint of the then Conservative government policy that encouraged councils to compete with each other on the basis of the level of local taxation. In practice, however, the complexity of local government funding in the UK rendered worthless any meaningful ambition of councils competing with each other, especially as central government granting to local authorities is predicated (however imperfectly) on at least notional equalisation between those areas with lower tax yields and the more prosperous locations. Horizontal pressures comprise factors such as planning decisions. Over the last quarter century, councils have competed on the granting of permission to out-of-town retail and leisure complexes, now recognised as detrimental to neighbouring authorities because economic forces prevail and local, independent shops are unable to compete with multiple companies. These examples illustrate tensions at the core of the UK polity of whether IMC is feasible when competition between local authorities heightened by local differences reduces opportunities for collaboration. An alternative perspective on IMC is to explore whether specific purposes or functions promote or restrict it. Whether in the principle areas of local government responsibilities relating to social welfare, development and maintenance of the local infrastructure or environmental matters, there are examples of IMC. But opportunities have diminished considerably as councils lost responsibility for services provision as a result of privatisation and transfer of powers to new government agencies or to central government. Over the last twenty years councils have lost their role in the provision of further-or higher-education, public transport and water/sewage. Councils have commissioning power but only a limited presence in providing housing needs, social care and waste management. In other words, as a result of central government policy, there are, in practice, currently far fewer opportunities for councils to cooperate. Since 1997, the New Labour government has promoted IMC through vertical drivers and the development; the operation of these policy initiatives is discussed following the framework of the editors. Current examples of IMC are notable for being driven by higher tiers of government, working with subordinate authorities in principal-agent relations. Collaboration between local authorities and intra-interand cross-sectoral partnerships are initiated by central government. In other words, IMC is shaped by hierarchical drivers from higher levels of government but, in practice, is locally varied and determined less by formula than by necessity and function. © 2007 Springer.