Modelling of a symmetric molten carbonate fuel cell stack

Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Verfahrens- und Systemtechnik, Diss., 2011

Neural dynamics and their relationship to learning behavior in response tot stimulation with a cortical neuroprosthesis

Sensory cortex, neuroprosthetics, brain-machine-interfaces, neurodynamics, learning, perception, embodied cognition

Diagnosespezifische katamnestische Erhebung zur Nachhaltigkeit stationärer psychodynamischer Psychotherapie

Magdeburg, Univ., Medizin. Fakultät, Diss., 2009

Lattice point inequalities and face numbers of polytopes in view of central symmetry

Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Mathematik, Diss., 2012

Discovery and visualization of interesting patterns

Die Preise für Speicherplatz fallen stetig, da verwundert es nicht, dass Unternehmen riesige Datenmengen anhäufen und sammeln. Diese immensen Datenmengen müssen jedoch mit geeigneten Methoden analysiert werden, um für das Unternehmen überlebensnotwendige Muster zu identifizieren. Solche Muster können Probleme aber auch Chancen darstellen. In jedem Fall ist es von größter Bedeutung, rechtzeitig diese Muster zu entdecken, um zeitnah reagieren zu können. Um breite Nutzerschichten anzusprechen, müssen Analysemethoden ferner einfach zu bedienen sein, sofort Rückmeldungen liefern und intuitive Visualisierungen anbieten. Ich schlage in der vorliegenden Arbeit Methoden zur Visualisierung und Filterung von Assoziationsregeln basierend auf ihren zeitlichen Änderungen vor. Ich werde lingustische Terme (die durch Fuzzymengen modelliert werden) verwenden, um die Historien von Regelbewertungsmaßen zu charakterisieren und so eine Ordnung von relevanten Regeln zu generieren. Weiterhin werde ich die vorgeschlagenen Methoden auf weitereModellarten übertragen, die Software-Plattformvorstellen, die die Analysemethoden dem Nutzer zugänglich macht und schließlich empirische Auswertungen auf Echtdaten aus Unternehmenskooperationen vorstellen, die die Wirksamkeit meiner Vorschläge belegen.

Integrated consideration of product quality within factory automation systems

Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Maschinenbau, Diss., 2013

Feststoffdynamik und Partikelverweilzeiten am Beispiel der Top-Spray Wirbelschichtsprühgranulation

Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Verfahrens- und Systemtechnik, Diss., 2013

Entwicklung einer kompetenzgeleiteten Spielanalyse zur Auswahl und Bewertung von Brettspielen

[s.c.]

Konzeption einer Benutzerschnittstelle sowie Realisierung von Usability– und UI-Tests im Rahmen der prototypischen Entwicklung einer Android-App für eine Crowdtesting-Plattform

[s.c.]

Weiterentwicklung des Systems der zuverlässigkeitsorientierten Instandhaltung mittels Erstellung einer FMEC-Analyse für alle ausfallrelevanten Ausrüstungen einer Hochdruckpolymerisationsanlage.

[s.c.]

Investigating polyhedra by oracles and analyzing simple extensions of polytopes

Otto-von-Guericke-Universität Magdeburg, Fakultät für Mathematik, Dissertation, 2016

Trials, tricks and transparency: how disclosure rules affect clinical knowledge

Scandals of selective reporting of clinical trial results by pharmaceutical firms have underlined the need for more transparency in clinical trials. We provide a theoretical framework which reproduces incentives for selective reporting and yields three key implications concerning regulation. First, a compulsory clinical trial registry complemented through a voluntary clinical trial results database can implement full transparency (the existence of all trials as well as their results is known). Second, full transparency comes at a price. It has a deterrence effect on the incentives to conduct clinical trials, as it reduces the firms'gains from trials. Third, in principle, a voluntary clinical trial results database without a compulsory registry is a superior regulatory tool; but we provide some qualified support for additional compulsory registries when medical decision-makers cannot anticipate correctly the drug companies' decisions whether to conduct trials. Keywords: pharmaceutical firms, strategic information transmission, clinical trials, registries, results databases, scientific knowledge JEL classification: D72, I18, L15

All-pay auction equilibria in contests

We analyze (non-deterministic) contests with anonymous contest success functions. There is no restriction on the number of contestants or on their valuations for the prize. We provide intuitive and easily verifiable conditions for the existence of an equilibrium with properties similar to the one of the (deterministic) all-pay auction. Since these conditions are fulfilled for a wide array of situations, the predictions of this equilibrium are very robust to the specific details of the contest. An application of this result contributes to fill a gap in the analysis of the popular Tullock rent- seeking game because it characterizes properties of an equilibrium for increasing returns to scale larger than two, for any number of contestants and in contests with or without a common value. Keywords: (non-) deterministic contest, all-pay auction, contest success functions. JEL Classification Numbers: C72 (Noncooperative Games), D72 (Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections), D44 (Auctions).

Foundations for contest success functions

In the literature the outcome of contests is either interpreted as win probabilities or as shares of the prize. With this in mind, we examine two approaches to contest success functions. In the first we analyze the implications of contestants' incomplete information concerning the "type" of the contest administrator. While in the case of two contestants this approach can rationalize prominent contest success functions, we show that it runs into difficulties when there are more agents. Our second approach interprets contest success functions as sharing rules and establishes a connection to bargaining and claims problems which is independent of the number of contestants. Both approaches provide foundations for popular contest success functions and guidelines for the definition of new ones. Keywords: Endogenous Contests, Contest Success Function. JEL Classification: C72 (Noncooperative Games), D72 (Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections), D74 (Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances).