The Multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sales and multi-unit demands: competitive equilibria

A multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sales and multiunit demands consists of a set of sellers that own a given number of indivisible units of (potentially many different) goods and a set of buyers who value those units and want to buy at most an exogenously fixed number of units. We define a competitive equilibrium for this generalized assignment game and prove its existence by using only linear programming. In particular, we show how to compute equilibrium price vectors from the solutions of the dual linear program associated to the primal linear program defined to find optimal assignments. Using only linear programming tools, we also show (i) that the set of competitive equilibria (pairs of price vectors and assignments) has a Cartesian product structure: each equilibrium price vector is part of a competitive equilibrium with all optimal assignments, and vice versa; (ii) that the set of (restricted) equilibrium price vectors has a natural lattice structure; and (iii) how this structure is translated into the set of agents' utilities that are attainable at equilibrium.

On Cooperative solutions of a generalized assignment game: limit theorems to the set of competitive equilibria

We study two cooperative solutions of a market with indivisible goods modeled as a generalized assignment game: Set-wise stability and Core. We first establish that the Set-wise stable set is contained in the Core and it contains the non-empty set of competitive equilibrium payoffs. We then state and prove three limit results for replicated markets. First, the sequence of Cores of replicated markets converges to the set of competitive equilibrium payoffs when the number of replicas tends to infinity. Second, the Set-wise stable set of a two-fold replicated market already coincides with the set of competitive equilibrium payoffs. Third, for any number of replicas there is a market with a Core payoff that is not a competitive equilibrium payoff.

Product differentiation, competitive pressure and the effects of innovation on the success and survivability of firms in oligopoly markets

In a recent paper Tishler and Milstein (2009) fi…nd that increased competition may increase aggregate R&D spending while market output decreases. Therefore, they obtain the surprising result that R&D spending is excessive when competition becomes intense. Their result is based on the standard linear demand function for differentiated products introduced by Bowley (1924) where decreased product differentiation is interpreted as more competitive pressure. In this paper I show that at an aggregate level this interpretation is problematic because equilibrium effects are dominated by a demand reduction effect. A slight modifi…cation of the standard demand function eliminates this effect. For the Tishler and Milstein (2009) setting it is shown that then increased competition increases both R&D spending and aggregate market output. Therefore, at least for consumers, more intense competition increases welfare. Journal of Economic Literature Classi…fication Numbers: D43, L1, O3. Keywords: Oligopoly markets, Product differentiation, Competitive pressure.

Pseudomarkets with priorities in large random assignment economies

I study large random assignment economies with a continuum of agents and a finite number of object types. I consider the existence of weak priorities discriminating among agents with respect to their rights concerning the final assignment. The respect for priorities ex ante (ex-ante stability) usually precludes ex-ante envy-freeness. Therefore I define a new concept of fairness, called no unjustified lower chances: priorities with respect to one object type cannot justify different achievable chances regarding another object type. This concept, which applies to the assignment mechanism rather than to the assignment itself, implies ex-ante envy-freeness among agents of the same priority type. I propose a variation of Hylland and Zeckhauser' (1979) pseudomarket that meets ex-ante stability, no unjustified lower chances and ex-ante efficiency among agents of the same priority type. Assuming enough richness in preferences and priorities, the converse is also true: any random assignment with these properties could be achieved through an equilibrium in a pseudomarket with priorities. If priorities are acyclical (the ordering of agents is the same for each object type), this pseudomarket achieves ex-ante efficient random assignments.

NI Draft Priorities and Budget Consultation 2006-2008 - Institute response

The Institute of Public Health in Ireland works to combat health inequalities and influence public policies in favour of health in Ireland, North and South. The Institute applies a holistic model of health which emphasises a wide range of determinants, including economic, educational, environmental, social and biological factors, as well as public services. The Institute’s work is based on the premise that improving health and reducing health inequalities in a sustainable way can only be achieved through addressing these broader determinants of health. We believe that the strategic direction of public spending in Northern Ireland has enormous potential to impact on people’s health, well being and prosperity.  We welcome the opportunity to comment on the draft priorities and the associated budget for 2006-2008 as set out in the consultation document.

Priorities for Action 2008-09 (PDF 146 KB)

Priorities for Action 2008/09

Innovation or Imitation? The effect of spillovers and competitive pressure on firms' R&D strategy choice

This article provides a theoretical and empirical analysis of a firm's optimal R&D strategy choice. In this paper a firm's R&D strategy is assumed to be endogenous and allowed to depend on both internal firms. characteristics and external factors. Firms choose between two strategies, either they engage in R&D or abstain from own R&D and imitate the outcomes of innovators. In the theoretical model this yields three types of equilibria in which either all firms innovate, some firms innovate and others imitate, or no firm innovates. Firms'equilibrium strategies crucially depend on external factors. We find that the efficiency of intellectual property rights protection positively affects firms'incentives to engage in R&D, while competitive pressure has a negative effect. In addition, smaller firms are found to be more likely to become imitators when the product is homogeneous and the level of spillovers is high. These results are supported by empirical evidence for German .rms from manufacturing and services sectors. Regarding social welfare our results indicate that strengthening intellectual property protection can have an ambiguous effect. In markets characterized by a high rate of innovation a reduction of intellectual property rights protection can discourage innovative performance substantially. However, a reduction of patent protection can also increase social welfare because it may induce imitation. This indicates that policy issues such as the optimal length and breadth of patent protection cannot be resolved without taking into account specific market and firm characteristics. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C35, D43, L13, L22, O31. Keywords: Innovation; imitation; spillovers; product differentiation; market competition; intellectual property rights protection.

Priorities For Action 2004/05 (PDF 427 KB)

PRIORITIES FOR ACTION- 2004/2005 Planning Priorities and Actions for the Health and Personal Social Services

Priorities For Action 2003/04 (PDF 136 KB)

Priorities For Action 2003/04

Priorities For Action 2002/03 (PDF 108 KB)

Priorities For Action 2002/03

Possible competitive displacement of planorbids by Melanoides tuberculata in Minas Gerais, Brazil

Several species of snails, including Pomacea haustrum, Marisa cornuarietis and Helisoma duryi, have been identified as probable competitors and/or predators of planorbid intermediate hosts of Schistosoma. During the last few years, studies carried out in the Caribbean region have shown reductions and even disappearances of populations of Biomphalaria glabrata and B. straminea in breeding places where the snail Melanoides tuberculata was introduced. Observations made over a period of 10 years in two lakes close to Belo Horizonte, MG, showed that there were marked reductions in autochthonous populations of B. glabrata and B. straminea after the arrival of M. tuberculata, both Biomphalaria species disappearing completely after eight years.

Priorities For Action 2001/02 (PDF 77.3 KB)

Priorities For Action 2001/02

8-Methoxy-naphtho[2,3-b]thiophen-4,9-quinone, a non-competitive inhibitor of trypanothione reductase

The enzyme trypanothione reductase is a recognised drug target in trypanosomatids and has been used in the search of new compounds with potential activity against diseases such as leishmaniasis, Chagas disease and African trypanosomiasis. 8-Methoxy-naphtho [2,3-b] thiophen-4,9-quinone was selected in a screening of natural and synthetic compounds using an in vitro assay with the recombinant enzyme from Trypanosoma cruzi. Its mode of inhibition fits a non-competitive model with respect to the substrate (trypanothione) and to the co-factor (NADPH), with Ki-values of 5 and 3.6 µM, respectively. When tested against human glutathione reductase, this compound did not display any significant inhibition at 100 µM, indicating a good selectivity against the parasite enzyme.

Chagas disease: current epidemiological trends after the interruption of vectorial and transfusional transmission in the Southern Cone countries

Chagas disease, named after Carlos Chagas who first described it in 1909, exists only on the American Continent. It is caused by a parasite, Trypanosoma cruzi, transmitted to humans by blood-sucking triatomine bugs and by blood transfusion. Chagas disease has two successive phases, acute and chronic. The acute phase lasts 6 to 8 weeks. After several years of starting the chronic phase, 20% to 35% of the infected individuals, depending on the geographical area will develop irreversible lesions of the autonomous nervous system in the heart, esophagus, colon and the peripheral nervous system. Data on the prevalence and distribution of Chagas disease improved in quality during the 1980's as a result of the demographically representative cross-sectional studies carried out in countries where accurate information was not available. A group of experts met in Brasília in 1979 and devised standard protocols to carry out countrywide prevalence studies on human T. cruzi infection and triatomine house infestation. Thanks to a coordinated multi-country program in the Southern Cone countries the transmission of Chagas disease by vectors and by blood transfusion has been interrupted in Uruguay in1997, in Chile in 1999, and in 8 of the 12 endemic states of Brazil in 2000 and so the incidence of new infections by T. cruzi in the whole continent has decreased by 70%. Similar control multi-country initiatives have been launched in the Andean countries and in Central America and rapid progress has been recorded to ensure the interruption of the transmission of Chagas disease by 2005 as requested by a Resolution of the World Health Assembly approved in 1998. The cost-benefit analysis of the investments of the vector control program in Brazil indicate that there are savings of US$17 in medical care and disabilities for each dollar spent on prevention, showing that the program is a health investment with good return. Since the inception in 1979 of the Steering Committee on Chagas Disease of the Special Program for Research and Training in Tropical Diseases of the World Health Organization (TDR), the objective was set to promote and finance research aimed at the development of new methods and tools to control this disease. The well known research institutions in Latin America were the key elements of a world wide network of laboratories that received - on a competitive basis - financial support for projects in line with the priorities established. It is presented the time line of the different milestones that were answering successively and logically the outstanding scientific questions identified by the Scientific Working Group in 1978 and that influenced the development and industrial production of practical solutions for diagnosis of the infection and disease control.