Political science and public administration: The saga of a difficult relationship

This paper is based on 'The perennial ugly duckling-public sector education in tertiary institutions before and after Coombs, an invited contribution on management education delivered at the Sydney Academics Symposium on the Coombs Commission in Retrospect, IPAA National Conference, 28 November 2001.

In the most high and palmy state of Queensland

Peter Beattie's efforts to improve the lives of Indigenous Australians needs support.

Foxes and hedgehogs in Canada

Indigenous rights under the government of Stephen Harper.

Kontraszelekció és erkölcsi kockázat a politikában. Vázlat az információs aszimmetria közgazdaságtani fogalmainak politikatudományi alkalmazhatóságáról (Negative selection and moral risk in politics. An outline of the usefulness to political science of the economic concept of information asymmetry)

Az írás a kontraszelekció és az erkölcsi kockázat információ-gazdaságtani fogalmának politikatudományi alkalmazhatósága mellett érvel. Azt kívánja bemutatni, hogy a politikai piac szereplői közti információs aszimmetria mechanizmusainak éppúgy lehetnek súlyos negatív hatásai a demokratikus politikai rendszer működésére nézve, mint ahogy a gazdasági szereplők közti információs aszimmetria - Nobel-díjas közgazdászok érvei szerint - alááshatja a piaci verseny hatékonyságát. Az írás új megvilágításba helyezi a - már Platón óta ismert - politikai kontraszelekció jelenségét, továbbá részletesen foglalkozik az erkölcsi kockázat és a megbízó-megbízott relációk megjelenésével a politikában. Érinti tovább azoknak a mechanizmusoknak - a jelzésnek és a szűrésnek - a megjelenését a politikában, melyeket a közgazdászok az információs aszimmetria csökkentésére ajánlanak. / === / The paper argues in favour of employing in political science the economic concept of information asymmetry, seeking to show that the mechanisms of information asymmetry among the players on the political market may have negative effects on the operation of a democratic political system as information asymmetry among economic actors – according to arguments of Nobel prize-winning economists – has on the efficiency of market competition. The paper sheds new light on the phenomenon of negative political selection (known since Plato's time), and goes on to deal in detail with the appearance of moral risk and client/agent relations in politics. The author touches also on the appearance in politics of mechanisms – signals and filters – that economists suggest for reducing information asymmetry.

Essays on the political economy of the Dominican reform process

This dissertation provides an analytical framework to study the political economy of policy reform in the Dominican Republic during the nineties. Based on a country study, I develop two theoretical models that replicate the mechanisms of policy approval in developing countries with weak democracies. The first model considers a pro-reform President who submits a tariff bill to an anti-reform Congress dominated by the opposition party. In between, two opposing lobbies try to get their favored policy approved. Lobbies act as Stackelberg leaders vis a vis a weak President. The behavior of the Congress is determined exogenously while the lobbies act strategically pursuing the approval of the reform bill and indirectly affecting the President's decision. I show that in such a setting external agents like the Press play an important role in the decision-making process of the political actors. ^ The second model presents a similar framework. However, the President, who is a Stackelberg leader, is allowed only two choices, total reform or status-quo. I show how a lobby reacts to an increase in its rival's or its own size. These reactions depend on the President's level of commitment to the reform. Finally, I discuss the effect of variations in the size of the lobbies on the President's choice. The model suitably explains real events that took place in the Dominican Republic in the mid-nineties. ^

The recruitment process of the Shining Path and MRTA guerrilla groups: A political psychological perspective

This thesis is an analysis of the recruitment process of the Shining Path -SP- and Revolutionary Movement “Túpac Amaru” -MRTA- guerrilla groups. Although SP was considered more aggressive, it gained more followers than MRTA. This thesis tries to explain why. Social Revolution Theory and Social Movement Theory provide explanations based on issues of “poverty”, disregarding the specific characteristics of the guerrilla groups and their supporters, as well as the influence of specific persuasive processes between the leaders of the groups and their followers. Integrative complexity theory, on the contrary, provides a consistent method to analyze cognitive processes: because people tend to reject complex and sophisticated explanations that require mental efforts, simplicity was the key for success. To prove which guerrilla group provided a simpler worldview, a sample of official documents of SP and MRTA are compared. Finally, content analysis is applied through the Paragraph Completion Test (P.C.T.). ^

Political corruption in the Caribbean Basin: A comparative analysis of Jamaica and Costa Rica

Political corruption in the Caribbean Basin retards state economic growth and development, undermines government legitimacy, and threatens state security. In spite of recent anti-corruption efforts of intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations (IGO/NGOs), Caribbean political corruption problems appear to be worsening in the post-Cold War period. This dissertation discovers why IGO/NGO efforts to arrest corruption are failing by investigating the domestic and international causes of political corruption in the Caribbean. The dissertation's theoretical framework centers on an interdisciplinary model of the causes of political corruption built within the rule-oriented constructivist approach to social science. The model first employs a rational choice analysis that broadly explains the varying levels of political corruption found across the region. The constructivist theory of social rules is then used to develop the structural mechanisms that further explain the region's levels of political corruption. The dissertation advances its theory of the causes of political corruption through qualitative disciplined-configurative case studies of political corruption in Jamaica and Costa Rica. The dissertation finds that IGO/NGO sponsored anti-corruption programs are failing because they employ only technical measures (issuing anti-corruption laws and regulations, providing transparency in accounting procedures, improving freedom of the press, establishing electoral reforms, etc.). While these IGO/NGO technical measures are necessary, they are not sufficient to arrest the Caribbean's political corruption problems. This dissertation concludes that to be successful, IGO/NGO anti-corruption programs must also include social measures, e.g., building civil societies and modernizing political cultures, for there to be any hope of lowering political corruption levels and improving Caribbean social conditions. The dissertation also highlights the key role of Caribbean governing elite in constructing the political and economic structures that cause their states' political corruption problems. ^

Essays on the determinants of private investment: The effects of relative price uncertainty and political instability

The objective of this study was to provide empirical evidence on the effects of relative price uncertainty and political instability on private investment. My effort is expressed in a single-equation model using macroeconomic and socio-political data from eight Latin American countries for the period 1970–1996. Relative price uncertainty is measured by the implied volatility of the exchange rate and political instability is measured by using indicators of social unrest and political violence. ^ I found that, after controlling for other variables, relative price uncertainty and political instability are negatively associated with private investment. Macroeconomic and political stability are key ingredients for the achievement of a strong investment response. This highlights the need to develop the state and build a civil society in which citizens can participate in decision-making and express consent without generating social turmoil. At the same time the government needs to implement structural policies along with relative price adjustments to eliminate excess volatility in price movements in order to provide a stable environment for investment. ^

The winds of change? Exploring political effects of Hurricane Andrew

Before dawn on August 24, 1992, Hurricane Andrew smashed into south Florida, particularly southern Dade County, and soon become the costliest natural disaster in U.S. history. Andrew's impacts quickly overwhelmed local and state emergency response capabilities and eventually required major federal assistance, including regular military units. While the social and economic impacts of Hurricane Andrew are relatively well researched, much less attention has been given to its possible political effects. ^ Focusing on incumbent officeholders at three levels (municipal, state legislative, and statewide) who stood for reelection after Hurricane Andrew, this study seeks to determine whether they experienced any political effects from Andrew. That is, this study explores the possible interaction between the famous “incumbency advantage” and an “extreme event,” in this case a natural disaster. The specific foci were (1) campaigns and campaigning (a research process that included 43 personal interviews), and (2) election results before and after the event. ^ Given well-documented response problems, the working hypothesis was that incumbents experienced largely negative political fallout from the disaster. The null hypothesis was that incumbents saw no net political effects, but the reverse hypothesis was also considered: incumbents benefited politically from the event. ^ In the end, this study found that although the election process was physically disrupted, especially in south Dade County, the disaster largely reinforced the incumbency advantage. More specifically, the aftermath of Hurricane Andrew allowed most incumbent officeholders to (1) enhance constituency service, (2) associate themselves with the flow of external assistance, (3) achieve major personal visibility and media coverage, and yet (4) appear non-political or at least above normal politics. Overall, this combination allowed incumbents to very effectively “campaign without campaigning,” a point borne out by post-Andrew election results. ^

The unintended [or intended?] political consequences of electoral systems: The case of Bolivia

The present study was concerned with evaluating one basic institution in Bolivian democracy: its electoral system. The study evaluates the impact of electoral systems on the interaction between presidents and assemblies. It sought to determine whether it is possible to have electoral systems that favor multipartism but can also moderate the likelihood of executive-legislative confrontation by producing the necessary conditions for coalition building. ^ This dissertation utilized the case study method as a methodology. Using the case of Bolivia, the research project studied the variations in executive-legislative relations and political outcomes from 1985 to the present through a model of executive-legislative relations that provided a typology of presidents and assemblies based on the strategies available to them to bargain with each other for support. A complementary model that evaluated the state of their inter-institutional interaction was also employed. ^ Results indicated that executive-legislative relations are profoundly influenced by the choice of the electoral system. Similarly, the project showed that although the Bolivian mixed system for legislative elections, and executive formula favor multipartism, these electoral systems do not necessarily engender executive-legislative confrontation in Bolivia. This was mainly due to the congressional election of the president, and the formulas utilized to translate the popular vote into legislative seats. However, the study found that the electoral system has also allowed for anti-systemic forces to emerge and gain political space both within and outside of political institutions. ^ The study found that government coalitions in Bolivia that are promoted by the system of congressional election of the president and the D'Hondt system to allocate legislative seats have helped ameliorate one of the typical problems of presidential systems in Latin America: the presence of a minority government that is blocked in its capacity to govern. This study was limited to evaluating the impact of the electoral system, as the independent variable, on executive-legislative interaction. However, the project revealed a need for more theoretical and empirical work on executive-legislative bargaining models in order to understand how institutional reforms can have an impact on the incentives of presidents and legislators to form coherent coalitions. ^

The political economy of poverty alleviation strategies. The initiative for heavily indebted poor countries in Bolivia: More of the same

In the year 2000, approximately 1.1 billion people lived in extreme poverty while developed countries spent US$600 billion a year on defense. The Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative is a recent component of a larger poverty reduction strategy supported by the International Financial Institutions, as well as many developed and developing countries. By implementing lessons of the past fifty years, this program attempts to diminish misery around the globe. As such, it provides debt relief while seeking to enable the poorest countries to simultaneously attain sustainable debt and promote human development. Interest in poverty reduction around the globe reemerged in the 1990s. This study contributes directly to this recent effort by presenting a nuanced approach that builds on the stepping-stones generated by other poverty scholars. To fulfill its goal, this investigation applies a political economy framework. Within this framework, the author conducts an actor-specific analysis. This dissertation addresses the following question: How do domestic and international actors respond to the implementation of poverty alleviation strategies? The author assumes actors desire to maximize their utility calculation and suggests these calculations are based on the player's motivations and external influences. Based on their motivations, the external influences, and the initiative's guidelines, each actor develops a set of expectations. To fulfill those expectations, stake holders utilize one or several strategies. Finally, the actors' ability to achieve their expectations determines each player's assessment of the initiative. The framework described is applied in an in-depth, actor-specific analysis of the HIPC in Bolivia. Bolivia's National Revolution represents the country's first attempt at reducing poverty. Since then, all governments have taken specific steps to combat poverty at the local and national levels. The Initiative for Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) is one of the most recent macro strategies of this kind. The case study demonstrated that three factors (national ownership, effective sponsorship and the local context) determine the success levels of poverty reduction strategies from abroad. In addition, the investigation clearly shows that poverty reduction is not the sole motivation in the implementation of poverty alleviation strategies. All actors, however, share the dream of poverty reduction.