Playing the Game: A Hermeneutic Phenomenology of Graduate Education Students’ Perceptions of Instructor Power in a Higher Education Classroom

The purpose of this hermeneutic phenomenological study was to explore students’ experiences with the power of their instructors in a higher education classroom. This study provides a deeper understanding of instructor power from student perspectives to inform teaching practices in the higher education classroom.

Disformal scalars as dark matter candidates: Branon phenomenology

Scalar particles coupled to the Standard Model fields through a disformal coupling arise in different theories, such as massive gravity or braneworld models. We will review the main phenomenology associated with such particles. Distinctive disformal signatures could be measured at colliders and with astrophysical observations. The phenomeno-logical relevance of the disformal coupling demands the introduction of a set of symmetries, which may ensure the stability of these new degrees of freedom. In such a case, they constitute natural dark matter candidates since they are generally massive and weakly coupled. We will illustrate these ideas by paying particular attention to the branon case, since these questions arise naturally in braneworld models with low tension, where they were first discussed.

Heat transport in low dimensions : introduction and phenomenology

Review paper, to appear in the Springer Lecture Notes in Physics volume "Thermal transport in low dimensions: from statistical physics to nanoscale heat transfer" (S. Lepri ed.)

The gift of the ungiven: Jean-Luc Marion’s phenomenology of giveness facing Levinas’ “there is”

Jean-Luc Marion’s phenomenology of giveness constitutes one of the most outstanding attempts to set up a universal theory of the phenomenologically given as a whole within the framework of contemporary philosophical thought. The aim of the present study is to apply the main categories of this phenomenological theory concerning gift to the singular type of phenomenon represented by the pure indeterminate and anonymous being to which Emmanuel Levinas refers by the name of il y a (“there is”) in his early writings (and also subsequently). Therefore, this concerns examining the multiple specific modes of giveness proper to the impersonal “there is” and also its paradoxical relationship both with the donor and with the receiver of such gift in order to show the possibility of a “third way” of phenomenological investigation. This is a way equally distant from the western traditional concept of Being as “stable presence” and from Levinas’ proposal geared to substitute ontology for ethics as “first philosophy”.

A meditation on boredom: Re-appraising its value through introspective phenomenology

Boredom is almost universally regarded as a dysphoric mental state, characterised by features such as disengagement and low arousal. However, in certain quarters (e.g., Zen Buddhism), boredom is seen as potentially having great value and even importance. The current study sought to explore boredom through a case study involving introspective phenomenology. The author created conditions in which he would experience boredom for an hour, and recorded his experience in real-time using a variant of the Experiencing Sampling Method. The data were analysed using an adaptation of Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis. The results indicated that the state of boredom contained three main sources of value: (a) altered perception of time; (b) awakened curiosity about the environment; and (c) exploration of self. Consequently, the paper offers a re-appraisal of boredom, suggesting that rather than necessarily being a negative state, if engaged with, boredom has the potential to be a positive and rewarding experience.

Is Merleau-Ponty's position in phenomenology of perception a new type of transcendental idealism?

It has recently been suggested that Merleau-Ponty’s position in Phenomenology of Perception is a unique form of transcendental idealism. The general claim is that in spite of his critique of “Kantianism,” Merleau-Ponty’s position comes out as a form of transcendental idealism that takes the perceptual processes of the lived body as the transcendental constituting condition for the possibility of experience. In this article I critically appraise this claim. I argue that if the term “idealist” is intended in a sufficiently similar sense to Kant’s usage of the term in naming his position as a “transcendental idealism” then it is a misrepresentation to subsume Merleau-Ponty’s position under that term. This is because Merleau-Ponty rejects the transcendental metaphysics of the reflecting subject that underpins transcendental idealism. In its place he advocates a methodological transcendentalism that, whilst being anti-realist, is not idealist. Thus to call his position “a new kind of transcendental idealism,” as Sebastian Gardner has, is to misunderstand the significance of his existentialist break with what he sees as the “intellectualism” of this position.

Phenomenology and naturalism: a hybrid and heretical proposal

In this paper I aim to develop a largely non-empirical case for the compatibility of phenomenology and naturalism. To do so, I will criticise what I take to be the standard construal of the relationship between transcendental phenomenology and naturalism, and defend a ‘minimal’ version of phenomenology that is compatible with liberal naturalism in the ontological register (but incompatible with scientific naturalism) and with weak forms of methodological naturalism, the latter of which is understood as advocating ‘results continuity’, over the long haul, with the relevant empirical sciences. Far from such a trajectory amounting to a Faustian pact in which phenomenology sacrifices its soul, I contend that insofar as phenomenologists care about reigning in the excesses of reductive versions of naturalism, the only viable way for this to be done is via the impure and hybrid account of phenomenology I outline here.

A PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIMETIC LEARNING AND MULTIMODAL COGNITION: INTEGRATING EXPERIENTIAL KNOWLEDGE INTO PROGRAMS IN RHETORIC, COMPOSITION, AND TECHNICAL COMMUNICATION

My dissertation emphasizes a cognitive account of multimodality that explicitly integrates experiential knowledge work into the rhetorical pedagogy that informs so many composition and technical communication programs. In these disciplines, multimodality is widely conceived in terms of what Gunther Kress calls “socialsemiotic” modes of communication shaped primarily by culture. In the cognitive and neurolinguistic theories of Vittorio Gallese and George Lakoff, however, multimodality is described as a key characteristic of our bodies’ sensory-motor systems which link perception to action and action to meaning, grounding all communicative acts in knowledge shaped through body-engaged experience. I argue that this “situated” account of cognition – which closely approximates Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of perception, a major framework for my study – has pedagogical precedence in the mimetic pedagogy that informed ancient Sophistic rhetorical training, and I reveal that training’s multimodal dimensions through a phenomenological exegesis of the concept mimesis. Plato’s denigration of the mimetic tradition and his elevation of conceptual contemplation through reason, out of which developed the classic Cartesian separation of mind from body, resulted in a general degradation of experiential knowledge in Western education. But with the recent introduction into college classrooms of digital technologies and multimedia communication tools, renewed emphasis is being placed on the “hands-on” nature of inventive and productive praxis, necessitating a revision of methods of instruction and assessment that have traditionally privileged the acquisition of conceptual over experiential knowledge. The model of multimodality I construct from Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology, ancient Sophistic rhetorical pedagogy, and current neuroscientific accounts of situated cognition insists on recognizing the significant role knowledges we acquire experientially play in our reading and writing, speaking and listening, discerning and designing practices.

Book review : intending the world : a phenomenology of international affairs

Book review of Intending the World: A Phenomenology of International Affairs by Ralph Pettman.

Merleau-Ponty’s Gordian knot: transcendental phenomenology, science, and naturalism

In this paper, I explore a series of fertile ambiguities that Merleau-Ponty's work is premised upon. These ambiguities concern some of the central methodological commitments of his work, in particular his commitment (or otherwise) to transcendental phenomenology and how he transforms that tradition, and his relationship to science and philosophical naturalism and what they suggest about his philosophical methodology. Many engagements with Merleau-Ponty's work that are more ‘analytic’ in orientation either deflate it of its transcendental heritage, or offer a "modest" rendering of its transcendental dimensions. This is also true, albeit perhaps to a lesser extent, of the work of the more empirically-minded phenomenological philosophers who engage very seriously with Merleau-Ponty – e.g. Hubert Dreyfus, Shaun Gallagher, Evan Thompson, Alva Noë, and others. At the same time, many other scholars contest these proto-scientific and more naturalistic uses of Merleau-Ponty's work on hermeneutical and exegetical grounds, and they likewise criticise the deflated reading of his transcendental phenomenology that tends to support them. By working through some of the key passages and ideas, I seek to establish that the former view captures something pivotal to Merleau-Ponty's philosophy. I extend these interpretations by arguing that, at least around the time of Phenomenology of Perception, his philosophy might be reasonably regarded as a form of minimal methodological naturalism.

Merleau-Ponty's conception of dialectics in phenomenology of perception

Although the fact that Merleau-Ponty has a dialectical approach in Phenomenology of Perception has been discussed in recent Anglophone readings, there has not been an explicit clarification as to how his varying usages of the term hang together. Given his repeated references to Hegel and to dialectics, coupled with the fact that dialectics are not part of the Husserlian phenomenology or Heideggerean existentialism from which Merleau-Ponty draws so much, the question of just what he does with the idea of dialectics presents itself. In this paper I argue that, in Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty saw Hegel as providing a model for the conception of rationality and meaning that must underpin the existentialist response to the problems bequeathed him by Husserlian phenomenology: namely, the problems of embodiment, perception and the constitution of the world. In connection with this, I suggest an interpretation of Merleau-Ponty's “existential dialectics” that focuses on his three principal uses of the term: 1) a “dialectic of objective thought,” 2) a set of existential-dialectical categories intended to capture the ontological structure of the “body-subject” as “being-in-the-world,” and 3) a dialectic at the cultural level concerning others and history.

Existential experience : the unfolding

This paper reports on a project concerned with the relationship between person and space in the context of achieving a contemplative state. The need for such a study originated with the desire to contribute to the design of multicultural spaces which could be used for a range of activities including prayer and meditation. Given that the words ‘prayer’ and ‘meditation’ are highly value-laden and potentially alienating for some people, it was decided to use the more accessible term ‘contemplative’. While the project is still underway,several findings have emerged that can be reported on and are of relevance to the conference both methodologically and substantively. Informed by phenomenological methodology, data were collected from a diverse group of people using photo-elicitation and interviewing. The technique of photo-elicitation proved to be highly effective in helping people to reveal their everyday lived experience of contemplative spaces. This methodological aspect of the project is described more fully in the paper. The initial stage of analysis produced two categories of data: varying conceptions of contemplation and contemplative space; and, common understandings of contemplation and contemplative space. From this it was found that achieving a state of contemplation involves both the person and the environment in a dialectic process of unfolding. The unfolding has various physical, psycho-social, and existential dimensions or qualities which operate sequentially and simultaneously. In the paper, these are labelled:the unfolding of the core; distinction; manifestation; cleansing; creation; and sharing, and have parallels with Mircea Eliade’s 1959 definition of sacred as 'something that manifests itself, shows itself, as something wholly different from the profane’. It also connects with the views of Nishida Kitaro from the Kyoto School of Philosophy on the theme of ‘absolute nothingness’: ‘the body-mind is dropped off and we are united with the consciousness of absolute nothingness’ (Kitaro in Heisig, 2001, p. 169). According to Marion (2005), ‘nothingness’ is defined by givenness. In the paper, this fold of givenness is interpreted in the context of the qualities of the environment that accomplish the act of coming forward into visibility through the dialectic relationship with a person. (Eliade, 1959, Heisig, 2001, Marion, 2002)

Young children’s experience of visual displays of their artwork

The practice of displaying children's artwork in early childhood classrooms poses a number of questions about the child and his or her visual artwork. This paper focuses on young children’s experiences with the display of their own visual artwork. Following Giorgi's (1985a; 1985b) approach to conducting phenomenological psychological research, 13 children between the ages of 4 and 6 years attending an independent school outside metropolitan Detroit, Michigan (USA) participated in semi-structured interviews as a way of uncovering their lived experiences of seeing their artwork displayed. The study yielded 12 essential themes and from these three key issues and their implications for early childhood art education are explored.

Researching with and for young children : congruence and authenticity in methodology

Early childhood educators insist on recognition of young children’s personal agency and have identified that young children experience life more holistically than any other age group. This paper identifies the irony that, despite clear evidence that artistic expression is essential to development in young children, to date, the field of art in early childhood education has rarely embraced phenomenology which would appear to be an ideal means of illuminating young children’s experiences. We exemplify the importance of congruence and authentic artistic experience with a study into young children’s experiences of displaying their art. We describe the central features of Giorgi’s (1985a, 1985b) approach to phenomenological psychology and assert its appropriateness not only on the grounds that it is an empirical, clear and concise way of uncovering human experience, but also because it is congruent with current understandings of early childhood and reveals the children’s authentic experiences of themselves as artists.