994 resultados para 1878-1908
Resumo:
Donateur : Demaffey (18..-1...)
Resumo:
Donateur : Chaudoir, Maurice (18..-18..?)
Resumo:
Qui sait qu'en Suisse, les associations patronales mettent en oeuvre l'Etat social ? Qui sait que associations organisent la majorité des caisses de compensation, dont la fonction principale est de collecter les cotisations et de payer les rentes de l'Assurance-vieillesse et survivants ? Qui connaît ces caisses par lesquelles transitent les milliards de l'Etat social ? L'objectif de cette thèse consiste à comprendre les raisons qui ont poussé le patronat helvétique à mettre en oeuvre les politiques de protection sociale, dont il a pourtant toujours essayé de limiter le développement. Résoudre ce paradoxe implique de se pencher sur près d'un siècle d'histoire mêlée du patronat et des politiques sociales. Ce travail retrace, sur la base d'archives privées et publiques souvent inédites, les raisons qui ont poussé les patrons à créer les premières caisses de compensation dans l'entre-deux-guerres, puis à imposer cette forme d'organisation pour l'aide aux soldats mobilisés (autour de 1940) et l'Assurance- vieillesse et survivants (autour de 1948). Il étudie également comment les associations patronales sont parvenues à défendre leurs caisses jusqu'à aujourd'hui, contre ceux qui dénonçaient l'irrationalité de l'existence d'une centaine de caisses de compensation publiques et privées concurrentes pour mettre en oeuvre un seul système d'assurances sociales. Cette recherche amène deux grands résultats. D'une part, elle propose une histoire originale des politiques sociales en Suisse. Le prisme des caisses de compensation patronales contribue en effet à interroger notre compréhension de l'histoire des politiques de protection sociale, dans laquelle on sous-estime parfois l'importance des conflits pour fixer les frontières entre formes de protection publique et privée. D'autre part, ce travail présente une histoire inédite de l'action collective des patrons dans les régulations du travail au sens large. A travers les caisses de compensation, c'est en effet à réaliser une histoire de l'Union centrale des associations patronales suisses que je me suis aussi attelé. Faute de parvenir à empêcher tout développement des politiques sociales, les patrons ont fait en sorte d'acquérir sur ces politiques une forme de mainmise. Entre histoire des politiques sociales et histoire du patronat, ce travail tente d'expliquer comment les caisses de compensation y ont contribué. Who knows that, in Switzerland, employers' associations implement the best known policies constituting the welfare state? Who knows that the equalization funds, (Caisses de compensation / Ausgleichskassen), organized by employers' associations or by the Swiss Cantons, are responsible for pooling payroll deductions and for paying benefits of the Swiss public pay-as-you-go, old-age insurance and many other branches of the welfare policies? Who knows these caisses de compensation that channel the monies dedicated to the financing of the Welfare state ? The main objective of this research is to understand the reasons why Swiss employers do implement such welfare policies that they usually reject for political reasons. In order to solve this puzzle, this research investigates half of a century of the connected histories of welfare policies and employers' collective action. It also investigates, based on public and private archive records, how employers founded the first caisses in the Interwar period, and imposed them to organize the main developments of the Welfare state during the Second World War. The research also underlines how employers defended their caisses de compensation against those questioning the rationality of this fragmented system aiming to implement one single set of public welfare through one hundred competing private and public caisses de compensation. This research highlights two main results. On the one hand, it helps to improve our understanding of the history of the welfare policies in Switzerland. Underlining the role of the caisses de compensation helps to highlight the importance of the interplay of public and private actors regarding social polices. On the other hand, this research charts a pioneering history of Swiss' employers' collective action regarding labor issues. Because they could not prevent all public welfare policy, employers achieved a form of stranglehold (mainmise) on the welfare State. Halfway between social policy and employers' associations' history, this research try to reveal how their caisses de compensation helped them in this objective.
Resumo:
Searching and handling time of Chrysoperla externa (Hagen, 1861) (Neuroptera, Chrysopidae) larvae fed on Uroleucon ambrosiae (Thomas, 1878) (Hemiptera, Aphididae). The objective of this research was to determine the searching and handling times of three larval instars of C. externa fed on U. ambrosiae at densities of 30, 40 and 50 per vial, with the feeding of the larvae at the preceding instars being U. ambrosiae nymphs or Sitotroga cerealella (Olivier, 1819) eggs. The larvae were maintained at 25 ± 2 ºC, 70 ± 10% RH and a 14-h photophase. A completely randomized design in a 6 x 3 factorial scheme with 12 replicates was adopted. The shortest searching time was found for the 2nd and 3rd instar larvae of C. externa, and this parameter was variable depending on the feeding given to the larvae previously. The handling time was similar for the 1st, 2nd and 3rd instar larvae. The longest searching time was found at an aphid density of 30, as compared to densities of 40 and 50 prey, with which there were no significant differences. Prey density did not have any influence on handling time.
Resumo:
Feeding potential of Chrysoperla externa (Hagen) (Neuroptera, Chrysopidae) in different densities of Uroleucon ambrosiae (Thomas) (Hemiptera, Aphididae). The feeding potential of 2nd and 3rd instar larvae of Chrysoperla externa (Hagen, 1861) in relation to different densities of 30, 40 and 50 nymphs of Uroleucon ambrosiae (Thomas, 1878) at 3rd and 4th instars was evaluated. The treatments were individualized into 2.5 cm in diameter and 8.5 cm tall flat bottom glass vials and maintained in a controlled environmental chamber at 25±2 ºC temperature, 70±10% RH and 14 h photophase. A completely randomized experimental design with 10 replications was used. The consumption of the prey nymphs by the predator larvae was evaluated after 1, 2, 4, 8, 16 and 24 h from the beginning of the experiment and at every subsequent 24 h period until 2nd instar larvae molted or 3rd instar larvae pupated. Results have shown that for 2nd instar larvae, during the 1 h to 24 h period, there was a decreasing prey consumption at the 30 and 40 prey densities. However an increase in the consumption at the 50 prey density was observed. After this period, C. externa larvae presented a progressive increase on nymphs consumption as a function of the prey density. The same occurred with de 3rd instar predator larvae in all treatments. When daily mean consumption was evaluated the predator/prey ratio was 1:23, 1:27 and 1:33 for 2nd instar larvae and 1:27, 1:33 and 1:41 for 3rd instar larvae at 30, 40 and 50 nymph densities, respectively.