Wage Flexibility and Contract Structure in Germany

In this paper, we look at how labor market conditions at different points during the tenure of individuals with firms are correlated with current earnings. Using data on individuals from the German Socioeconomic Panel for the 1985-1994 period, we find that both the contemporaneous unemployment rate and prior values of the unemployment rate are significantly correlated with current earnings, contrary to results for the American labor market. Estimated elasticities vary between 9 and 15 percent for the elasticity of earnings with respect to current unemployment rates, and between 6 and 10 percent with respect to unemployment rates at the start of current firm tenure. Moreover, whereas local unemployment rates determine levels of earnings, national rates influence contemporaneous variations in earnings. We interpret this result as evidence that German unions do, in fact, bargain over wages and employment, but that models of individualistic contracts, such as the implicit contract model, may explain some of the observed wage drift and longer-term wage movements reasonably well. Furthermore, we explore the heterogeneity of contracts over a variety of worker and job characteristics. In particular, we find evidence that contracts differ across firm size and worker type. Workers of large firms are remarkably more insulated from the job market than workers for any other type of firm, indicating the importance of internal job markets.

Sector-Specific on-the-Job Training: Evidence from U.S. Data.

Using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY), we re-examine the effect of formal on-the-job training on mobility patterns of young American workers. By employing parametric duration models, we evaluate the economic impact of training on productive time with an employer. Confirming previous studies, we find a positive and statistically significant impact of formal on-the-job training on tenure with the employer providing the training. However, the expected net duration of the time spent in the training program is generally not significantly increased. We proceed to document and analyze intra-sectoral and cross-sectoral mobility patterns in order to infer whether training provides firm-specific, industry-specific, or general human capital. The econometric analysis rejects a sequential model of job separation in favor of a competing risks specification. We find significant evidence for the industry-specificity of training. The probability of sectoral mobility upon job separation decreases with training received in the current industry, whether with the last employer or previous employers, and employment attachment increases with on-the-job training. These results are robust to a number of variations on the base model.

The Shape of the Risk Premium: Evidence from a Semiparametric Garch Model.

We examine the relationship between the risk premium on the S&P 500 index return and its conditional variance. We use the SMEGARCH - Semiparametric-Mean EGARCH - model in which the conditional variance process is EGARCH while the conditional mean is an arbitrary function of the conditional variance. For monthly S&P 500 excess returns, the relationship between the two moments that we uncover is nonlinear and nonmonotonic. Moreover, we find considerable persistence in the conditional variance as well as a leverage effect, as documented by others. Moreover, the shape of these relationships seems to be relatively stable over time.

Jumps in the Volatility of Financial Markets.

Recent work suggests that the conditional variance of financial returns may exhibit sudden jumps. This paper extends a non-parametric procedure to detect discontinuities in otherwise continuous functions of a random variable developed by Delgado and Hidalgo (1996) to higher conditional moments, in particular the conditional variance. Simulation results show that the procedure provides reasonable estimates of the number and location of jumps. This procedure detects several jumps in the conditional variance of daily returns on the S&P 500 index.

Distortionary Taxation and Labor Supply: Evidence from Canada.

This paper examines empirically the effects of distortionary taxation on labor supply using a general equilibrium framework. The long-term relations predicted by the model are derived and tested using Canadian data between 1966 and 1993. While the cointegrating predictions of the model without taxation are rejected, the ones of the model with labor taxation are not. Persistent labor tax rate increases appear to play an important role in the observed downward trend in hours worked.

Environmental Risks : Should Banks Be Liable?

This paper studies the impact of banks' liability for environmental damages caused by their borrowers. Laws or court decisions that declare banks liable for environmental damages have two objectives : (1) finding someone to pay for the damages and (2) exerting a pressure on a firm's stakeholders to incite them to invest in environmental risk prevention. We study the effect that such legal decisions can have on financing relationships and especially on the incentives to reduce environmental risk in an environment where banks cannot commit to refinance the firm in all circumstances. Following an environmental accident, liable banks more readily agree to refinance the firm. We then show that bank liability effectively makes refinancing more attractive to banks, therefore improving the firm's risk-sharing possibilities. Consequently, the firm's incentives to invest in environmental risk reduction are weakened compared to the (bank) no-liability case. We also show that, when banks are liable, the firm invests at the full-commitment optimal level of risk reduction investment. If there are some externalities such that some damages cannot be accounted for, the socially efficient level of investment is greater than the privately optimal one. in that case, making banks non-liable can be socially desirable.

Testing Mean-Variance Efficiency in CAPM with Possibly Non-Gaussian Errors : An Exact Simulation-Based Approach

In this paper we propose exact likelihood-based mean-variance efficiency tests of the market portfolio in the context of Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), allowing for a wide class of error distributions which include normality as a special case. These tests are developed in the frame-work of multivariate linear regressions (MLR). It is well known however that despite their simple statistical structure, standard asymptotically justified MLR-based tests are unreliable. In financial econometrics, exact tests have been proposed for a few specific hypotheses [Jobson and Korkie (Journal of Financial Economics, 1982), MacKinlay (Journal of Financial Economics, 1987), Gib-bons, Ross and Shanken (Econometrica, 1989), Zhou (Journal of Finance 1993)], most of which depend on normality. For the gaussian model, our tests correspond to Gibbons, Ross and Shanken’s mean-variance efficiency tests. In non-gaussian contexts, we reconsider mean-variance efficiency tests allowing for multivariate Student-t and gaussian mixture errors. Our framework allows to cast more evidence on whether the normality assumption is too restrictive when testing the CAPM. We also propose exact multivariate diagnostic checks (including tests for multivariate GARCH and mul-tivariate generalization of the well known variance ratio tests) and goodness of fit tests as well as a set estimate for the intervening nuisance parameters. Our results [over five-year subperiods] show the following: (i) multivariate normality is rejected in most subperiods, (ii) residual checks reveal no significant departures from the multivariate i.i.d. assumption, and (iii) mean-variance efficiency tests of the market portfolio is not rejected as frequently once it is allowed for the possibility of non-normal errors.

Responsibility and Cross-Subsidization in Cost Sharing

We propose two axiomatic theories of cost sharing with the common premise that agents demand comparable -though perhaps different- commodities and are responsible for their own demand. Under partial responsibility the agents are not responsible for the asymmetries of the cost function: two agents consuming the same amount of output always pay the same price; this holds true under full responsibility only if the cost function is symmetric in all individual demands. If the cost function is additively separable, each agent pays her stand alone cost under full responsibility; this holds true under partial responsibility only if, in addition, the cost function is symmetric. By generalizing Moulin and Shenker’s (1999) Distributivity axiom to cost-sharing methods for heterogeneous goods, we identify in each of our two theories a different serial method. The subsidy-free serial method (Moulin, 1995) is essentially the only distributive method meeting Ranking and Dummy. The cross-subsidizing serial method (Sprumont, 1998) is the only distributive method satisfying Separability and Strong Ranking. Finally, we propose an alternative characterization of the latter method based on a strengthening of Distributivity.

Altruism, Intergenerational Transfers of Time and Bequests

This paper uses a standard two-period overlapping generation model to examine the behavior of an economy where both intergenerational transfers of time and bequests are available. While bequests have been examined extensively, time transfers have received little or no attention in the literature. Assuming a log-linear utility function and a Cobb-Douglas production function, we derive an explicit solution for the dynamics and show that altruistic intergenerational time transfers can take place in presence of a binding non-negativity constraint on bequests. We also show that with either type of transfers capital is an increasing function of the intergenerational degree of altruism. However, while with time transfers the labor supply of the young increases with the degree of altruism, with bequests it may decrease

Finite-Sample Diagnostics for Multivariate Regressions with Applications to Linear Asset Pricing Models

In this paper, we propose several finite-sample specification tests for multivariate linear regressions (MLR) with applications to asset pricing models. We focus on departures from the assumption of i.i.d. errors assumption, at univariate and multivariate levels, with Gaussian and non-Gaussian (including Student t) errors. The univariate tests studied extend existing exact procedures by allowing for unspecified parameters in the error distributions (e.g., the degrees of freedom in the case of the Student t distribution). The multivariate tests are based on properly standardized multivariate residuals to ensure invariance to MLR coefficients and error covariances. We consider tests for serial correlation, tests for multivariate GARCH and sign-type tests against general dependencies and asymmetries. The procedures proposed provide exact versions of those applied in Shanken (1990) which consist in combining univariate specification tests. Specifically, we combine tests across equations using the MC test procedure to avoid Bonferroni-type bounds. Since non-Gaussian based tests are not pivotal, we apply the “maximized MC” (MMC) test method [Dufour (2002)], where the MC p-value for the tested hypothesis (which depends on nuisance parameters) is maximized (with respect to these nuisance parameters) to control the test’s significance level. The tests proposed are applied to an asset pricing model with observable risk-free rates, using monthly returns on New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) portfolios over five-year subperiods from 1926-1995. Our empirical results reveal the following. Whereas univariate exact tests indicate significant serial correlation, asymmetries and GARCH in some equations, such effects are much less prevalent once error cross-equation covariances are accounted for. In addition, significant departures from the i.i.d. hypothesis are less evident once we allow for non-Gaussian errors.

Exact Skewness-Kurtosis Tests for Multivariate Normality and Goodness-of-fit in Multivariate Regressions with Application to Asset Pricing Models

We study the problem of testing the error distribution in a multivariate linear regression (MLR) model. The tests are functions of appropriately standardized multivariate least squares residuals whose distribution is invariant to the unknown cross-equation error covariance matrix. Empirical multivariate skewness and kurtosis criteria are then compared to simulation-based estimate of their expected value under the hypothesized distribution. Special cases considered include testing multivariate normal, Student t; normal mixtures and stable error models. In the Gaussian case, finite-sample versions of the standard multivariate skewness and kurtosis tests are derived. To do this, we exploit simple, double and multi-stage Monte Carlo test methods. For non-Gaussian distribution families involving nuisance parameters, confidence sets are derived for the the nuisance parameters and the error distribution. The procedures considered are evaluated in a small simulation experi-ment. Finally, the tests are applied to an asset pricing model with observable risk-free rates, using monthly returns on New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) portfolios over five-year subperiods from 1926-1995.

In Search of Advice for Physicians in Entry-Level Medical Markets

We consider entry-level medical markets for physicians in the United Kingdom. These markets experienced failures which led to the adoption of centralized market mechanisms in the 1960's. However, different regions introduced different centralized mechanisms. We advise physicians who do not have detailed information about the rank-order lists submitted by the other participants. We demonstrate that in each of these markets in a low information environment it is not beneficial to reverse the true ranking of any two acceptable hospital positions. We further show that (i) in the Edinburgh 1967 market, ranking unacceptable matches as acceptable is not profitable for any participant and (ii) in any other British entry-level medical market, it is possible that only strategies which rank unacceptable positions as acceptable are optimal for a physician.

Temporary Natural Resource Cartels

We analyze the behavior of a nonrenewable resource cartel that anticipates being forced, at some date in the future, to break-up into an oligopolistic market in which its members will then have to compete as rivals. Under reasonable assumptions about the value function of the individual firms in the oligopolistic equilibrium that follows the break-up, we show that the cartel will then produce more over the same interval of time than it would if there were no threat of dissolution, and that its rate of extraction is a decreasing function of the cartel's life; that there are circumstances under which the cartel will attach a negative marginal value to the resource stocks, in which case the rate of depletion will be increasing over time during the cartel phase; that, for a given date of dissolution, the equilibrium stocks allocated to the post-cartel phase will increase as a function of the total initial stocks, whereas those allocated to the cartel phase will increase at first, but begin decreasing beyond some level of the total initial stocks.

Environmental Risk: Should Banks Be Liable?

This paper studies the impact of banks' liability for environmental damages caused by their borrowers. Laws or court decisions that declare banks liable for environmental damages have two objectives : (1) finding someone to pay for the damages and (2) exerting a pressure on a firm's stakeholders to incite them to invest in environmental risk prevention. We study the effect that such legal decisions can have on financing relationships and especially on the incentives to reduce environmental risk in an environment where banks cannot commit to refinance the firm in all circumstances. Following an environmental accident, liable banks more readily agree to refinance the firm. We then show that bank liability effectively makes refinancing more attractive to banks, therefore improving the firm's risk-sharing possibilities. Consequently, the firm's incentives to invest in environmental risk reduction are weakened compared to the (bank) no-liability case. We also show that, when banks are liable, the firm invests at the full-commitment optimal level of risk reduction investment. If there are some externalities such that some damages cannot be accounted for, the socially efficient level of investment is greater than the privately optimal one. in that case, making banks non-liable can be socially desirable.

Bayesian Analysis for a Theory of Random Consumer Demand: The Case of Indivisible Goods

McCausland (2004a) describes a new theory of random consumer demand. Theoretically consistent random demand can be represented by a \"regular\" \"L-utility\" function on the consumption set X. The present paper is about Bayesian inference for regular L-utility functions. We express prior and posterior uncertainty in terms of distributions over the indefinite-dimensional parameter set of a flexible functional form. We propose a class of proper priors on the parameter set. The priors are flexible, in the sense that they put positive probability in the neighborhood of any L-utility function that is regular on a large subset bar(X) of X; and regular, in the sense that they assign zero probability to the set of L-utility functions that are irregular on bar(X). We propose methods of Bayesian inference for an environment with indivisible goods, leaving the more difficult case of indefinitely divisible goods for another paper. We analyse individual choice data from a consumer experiment described in Harbaugh et al. (2001).