Reinventar o Welfare State ou construir o pós-managerialismo?

Comunicação apresentada no 7.º Congresso Nacional de Administração Pública "Estado e Administração na resposta à crise", no Centro de Congressos de Lisboa, de

Do welfare state ao conceiro de governance: que futuro para as administrações públicas no início do século XXI?

Comunicação apresentada no 2º Congresso Nacional de Administração Pública "Projectos de mudança", em Lisboa, de 3 a 4 de Novembro de 2004.

Social Policy Preferences and Party Choice in the 2011 Swiss Elections

To what extent do social policy preferences explain party choice? This question has received little attention over the past years, because the bulk of the literature has argued that electoral choice is increasingly shaped by identity-based attitudes, rather than by preferences for economic-distributive social policies. We argue that in the wake of this debate, the significance of social policy preferences for electoral choice has been underestimated, because most contributions neglect social policy debates that are specific to post-industrial societies. In particular, they merely focus on income redistribution, while neglecting distributive conflicts around social investment. The Selects 2011 data allows investigating this crucial distinction for Switzerland. Our empirical analyses confirm that it is pivotal to take the pluridimensionality of distributive conflicts seriously: when looking at preferences for social investment rather than income redistribution, we find that social policy preferences are significant explanatory factors for the choice of the five major Swiss political parties.

The macroeconomic effects of German unification: Real adjustments and the welfare state

We study the effects of German unification in a model with capital accumulation, skill differences and a welfare state. We argue that this event is similar to a mass migration of low-skilled agents holding no capital into a foreign country. Absent a welfare state, we observe an investment boom, depressed output and employment conditions. Capital owners and high-skilled agents are willing to give up to 4% of per-capita consumption to favor unification. When a welfare state exists the investment boom disappears and the recession is prolonged. Now, with unification, capital owners and high-skilled agents lose 4% of per-capita consumption.