Partial Equal Treatment in Wage Offers

We analyse a labour matching model with wage posting, where- refl ecting institutional constraints-fi rms cannot dfferentiate their wage offers within certain subsets of workers. Inter alia, we find that the presence of impersonal wage offers leads to wage compression, which propagates to the wages for high productivity workers who receive personalised offers.

Spillovers of Equal Treatment in Wage Offers

We analyse a labour matching model with wage posting, where re flecting institutional constraints firms cannot differentiate their wage offers within certain subsets of workers. Inter alia, we find that the presence of impersonal wage offers leads to wage compression, which propagates to the wages for high productivity workers who receive personalised offers.

The Market for "Rough Diamonds": Information, Finance and Wage Inequality

During the past four decades both between and within group wage inequality increased significantly in the US. I provide a microfounded justification for this pattern, by introducing private employer learning in a model of signaling with credit constraints. In particular, I show that when financial constraints relax, talented individuals can acquire education and leave the uneducated pool, this decreases unskilled inexperienced wages and boosts wage inequality. This explanation is consistent with US data from 1970 to 1997, indicating that the rise of the skill and the experience premium coincides with a fall in unskilled-inexperienced wages, while at the same time skilled or experienced wages do not change much. The model accounts for: (i) the increase in the skill premium despite the growing supply of skills; (ii) the understudied aspect of rising inequality related to the increase in the experience premium; (iii) the sharp growth of the skill premium for inexperienced workers and its moderate expansion for the experienced ones; (iv) the puzzling coexistence of increasing experience premium within the group of unskilled workers and its stable pattern among the skilled ones. The results hold under various robustness checks and provide some interesting policy implications about the potential conflict between inequality of opportunity and substantial economic inequality, as well as the role of minimum wage policy in determining the equilibrium wage inequality.

Unemployment Risk and Wage Differentials

Workers in less secure jobs are often paid less than identical-looking workers in more secure jobs. We show that this lack of compensating differentials for unemployment risk can arise in equilibrium when all workers are identical and firms differ only in job security (i.e. the probability that the worker is not sent into unemployment). In a setting where workers search for new positions both on and off the job, the worker's marginal willingness to pay for job security is endogenous: it depends on the behavior of all firms in the labor market and increases with the rent the employing firm leaves to the worker. We solve for the labor market equilibrium, finding that wages increase with job security for at least all firms in the risky tail of the distribution of firm-level unemployment risk. Meanwhile, unemployment becomes persistent for low-wage and unemployed workers, a seeming pattern of 'unemployment scarring' created entirely by firm heterogeneity. Higher in the wage distribution, workers can take wage cuts to move to more stable employment.

The rise and fall of piecework–timework wage differentials: market volatility, labor heterogeneity, and output pricing

Based on detailed payroll data of blue collar male and female labor in Britain’s engineering and metal working industrial sectors between the mid-1920s and mid-1960s, we provide empirical evidence in respect of several central themes in the piecework-timework wage literature. The period covers part of the heyday of pieceworking as well as the start of its post-war decline. We show the importance of relative piece rate flexibility during the Great Depression as well as during the build up to WWII and during the war itself. We account for the very significant decline in the differentials after the war. Labor market topics include piecework pay in respect of compensating differentials, labor heterogeneity, and the transaction costs of pricing piecework output.

Unemployment Risk and Wage Differentials

Workers in less-secure jobs are often paid less than identical-looking workers in more secure jobs. We show that this lack of compensating differentials for unemployment risk can arise in equilibrium when all workers are identical and firms differ only in job security (i.e. the probability that the worker is not sent into unemployment). In a setting where workers search for new positions both on and off the job, the worker’s marginal willingness to pay for job security is endogenous, increasing with the rent received by a worker in his job, and depending on the behavior of all firms in the labor market. We solve for the labor market equilibrium and find that wages increase with job security for at least all firms in the risky tail of the distribution of firm-level unemployment risk. Unemployment becomes persistent for low-wage and unemployed workers, a seeming pattern of ‘unemployment scarring’ created entirely by firm heterogeneity. Higher in the wage distribution, workers can take wage cuts to move to more stable employment.

A Theory of Wage Setting Behavior

Concerns for fairness, workers' morale and reciprocity infuence firms' wage setting policy. In this paper we formalize a theory of wage setting behavior in a simple and tractable model that explicitly considers these behavioral aspects. A worker is assumed to have reference-dependent preferences and displays loss aversion when evaluating the fairness of a wage contract. The theory establishes a wage-effort relationship that captures the worker's reference-dependent reciprocity, which in turn in uences the firm's optimal wage policy. The paper makes two key contributions: it identifies loss aversion as an explanation for a worker's asymmetric reciprocity; and it provides realistic and generalized microfoundation for downward wage rigidity. We further illustrate the implications of our theory for both wage setting and hiring behavior. Downward wage rigidity generates several implications for the outcome of the initial employment contract. The worker's reference wage, his extent of negative reciprocity and the firms expectations are key drivers of the propositions derived.

Selection bias and unobservable heterogeneity applied at the wage equation of European married women

This paper utilizes a panel data sample selection model to correct the selection in the analysis of longitudinal labor market data for married women in European countries. We estimate the female wage equation in a framework of unbalanced panel data models with sample selection. The wage equations of females have several potential sources of.

Risk Attitude And Wage Growth: Replication And Reconstruction

We replicate Shaw (1996) who found that individual wage growth is higher for individuals with greater preference for risk taking. Expanding her dataset with more American observations and data for Germany, Spain and Italy, we find mixed support for the earlier results. We present and estimate a new model and find that in particular the wage level is sensitive to attitudes towards risk taking. Comments given at the Labour Economics Conference in honour of Niels Westergaard (Nyborg, August 2008) and EALE 2008 (Amsterdam) and at seminars in Maastricht,Reus and Essen (RWI) are gratefully acknowledged. The authors also acknowledge financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation (grant number SEJ2007-66318) and from the Barcelona Economics Program of CREA. JEL code: J24; J30. Key words: wage growth, risk, post-school investment.

Effects of anxiety on visuospatial pattern discrimination and decision-making processes: what can we learn from brain dynamics ?

Detection and discrimination of visuospatial input involve at least extracting, selecting and encoding relevant information and decision-making processes allowing selecting a response. These two operations are altered, respectively, by attentional mechanisms that change discrimination capacities, and by beliefs concerning the likelihood of uncertain events. Information processing is tuned by the attentional level that acts like a filter on perception, while decision-making processes are weighed by subjective probability of risk. In addition, it has been shown that anxiety could affect the detection of unexpected events through the modification of the level of arousal. Consequently, purpose of this study concerns whether and how decision-making and brain dynamics are affected by anxiety. To investigate these questions, the performance of women with either a high (12) or a low (12) STAI-T (State-Trait Anxiety Inventory, Spielberger, 1983) was examined in a decision-making visuospatial task where subjects have to recognize a target visual pattern from non-target patterns. The target pattern was a schematic image of furniture arranged in such a way as to give the impression of a living room. Non-target patterns were created by either the compression or the dilatation of the distances between objects. Target and non-target patterns were always presented in the same configuration. Preliminary behavioral results show no group difference in reaction time. In addition, visuo-spatial abilities were analyzed trough the signal detection theory for quantifying perceptual decisions in the presence of uncertainty (Green and Swets, 1966). This theory treats detection of a stimulus as a decision-making process determined by the nature of the stimulus and cognitive factors. Astonishingly, no difference in d' (corresponding to the distance between means of the distributions) and c (corresponds to the likelihood ratio) indexes was observed. Comparison of Event-related potentials (ERP) reveals that brain dynamics differ according to anxiety. It shows differences in component latencies, particularly a delay in anxious subjects over posterior electrode sites. However, these differences are compensated during later components by shorter latencies in anxious subjects compared to non-anxious one. These inverted effects seem indicate that the absence of difference in reaction time rely on a compensation of attentional level that tunes cortical activation in anxious subjects, but they have to hammer away to maintain performance.

Robust discrimination between EEG responses to categories of environmental sounds in early coma.

Humans can recognize categories of environmental sounds, including vocalizations produced by humans and animals and the sounds of man-made objects. Most neuroimaging investigations of environmental sound discrimination have studied subjects while consciously perceiving and often explicitly recognizing the stimuli. Consequently, it remains unclear to what extent auditory object processing occurs independently of task demands and consciousness. Studies in animal models have shown that environmental sound discrimination at a neural level persists even in anesthetized preparations, whereas data from anesthetized humans has thus far provided null results. Here, we studied comatose patients as a model of environmental sound discrimination capacities during unconsciousness. We included 19 comatose patients treated with therapeutic hypothermia (TH) during the first 2 days of coma, while recording nineteen-channel electroencephalography (EEG). At the level of each individual patient, we applied a decoding algorithm to quantify the differential EEG responses to human vs. animal vocalizations as well as to sounds of living vocalizations vs. man-made objects. Discrimination between vocalization types was accurate in 11 patients and discrimination between sounds from living and man-made sources in 10 patients. At the group level, the results were significant only for the comparison between vocalization types. These results lay the groundwork for disentangling truly preferential activations in response to auditory categories, and the contribution of awareness to auditory category discrimination.

The role of multisensory memories in unisensory object discrimination.

Past multisensory experiences can influence current unisensory processing and memory performance. Repeated images are better discriminated if initially presented as auditory-visual pairs, rather than only visually. An experience's context thus plays a role in how well repetitions of certain aspects are later recognized. Here, we investigated factors during the initial multisensory experience that are essential for generating improved memory performance. Subjects discriminated repeated versus initial image presentations intermixed within a continuous recognition task. Half of initial presentations were multisensory, and all repetitions were only visual. Experiment 1 examined whether purely episodic multisensory information suffices for enhancing later discrimination performance by pairing visual objects with either tones or vibrations. We could therefore also assess whether effects can be elicited with different sensory pairings. Experiment 2 examined semantic context by manipulating the congruence between auditory and visual object stimuli within blocks of trials. Relative to images only encountered visually, accuracy in discriminating image repetitions was significantly impaired by auditory-visual, yet unaffected by somatosensory-visual multisensory memory traces. By contrast, this accuracy was selectively enhanced for visual stimuli with semantically congruent multisensory pasts and unchanged for those with semantically incongruent multisensory pasts. The collective results reveal opposing effects of purely episodic versus semantic information from auditory-visual multisensory events. Nonetheless, both types of multisensory memory traces are accessible for processing incoming stimuli and indeed result in distinct visual object processing, leading to either impaired or enhanced performance relative to unisensory memory traces. We discuss these results as supporting a model of object-based multisensory interactions.

The Wage-Productivity gap revisited: is the labour share neutral to employment?

This paper challenges the prevailing view of the neutrality of the labour income share to labour demand, and investigates its impact on the evolution of employment. Whilst maintaining the assumption of a unitary long-run elasticity of wages with respect to productivity, we demonstrate that productivity growth affects the labour share in the long run due to frictional growth (that is, the interplay of wage dynamics and productivity growth). In the light of this result, we consider a stylised labour demand equation and show that the labour share is a driving force of employment. We substantiate our analytical exposition by providing empirical models of wage setting and employment equations for France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Spain, the UK, and the US over the 1960-2008 period. Our findings show that the timevarying labour share of these countries has significantly influenced their employment trajectories across decades. This indicates that the evolution of the labour income share (or, equivalently, the wage-productivity gap) deserves the attention of policy makers.

Monopolistic competition and different wage setting systems

In this paper we match the static disequilibrium unemployment model without frictions in the labor market and monopolistic competition with an infinite horizon model of growth. We compare the wages set at the firm, sector and national (centralized) levels, their unemployment rates and growth of the economic variables, for the Cobb-Douglas production function, in order to see under wich conditions the inverse U hypothesis between unemployment and centralization of wage bargain is confirmed. We also analyze, in the three wage setting systems, the effect of an increase in the monopoly power on employment and growth.

Growth, unemployment and wage inertia

We introduce wage setting via efficiency wages in the neoclassical one-sector growth model to study the growth effects of wage inertia. We compare the dynamic equilibrium of an economy with wage inertia with the equilibrium of an economy without wage inertia. We show that wage inertia affects the long run employment rate and that the transitional dynamics of the main economic variables will be different because wages are a state variable when wage inertia is introduced. In particular, we show non-monotonic transitions in the economy with wage inertia that do not arise in the economy with flexible wages. We also study the growth effects of permanent technological and fiscal policy shocks in these two economies. During the transition, the growth effects of technological shocks obtained when wages exhibit inertia may be the opposite from the ones obtained when wages are flexible. In the long run, these technological shocks may have long run effects if there is wage inertia. We also show that the growth effects of fiscal policies will be delayed when there is wage inertia.