Strategic entry deterrence : does it constitute a misuse of market power?

A challenge for regulators and the courts has been establishing the boundary between behaviour is exclusionary and should be condemned under s 46 of the then Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) (TPA), now s 46 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) (CCA), and behaviour that is not exclusionary and might even be pro-competitive. This boundary can be especially difficult to draw in the case of entry deterring strategies. Section 46(1) prohibits corporations with a substantial degree of market power from taking advantage of that market power for one of the statutorily proscribed purposes which include preventing the entry of a person into that or any other market. Section 45(2) separately prohibits corporations from making and giving effect to contracts arrangements and understandings that have the purpose, effect or likely effect of substantially lessening competition in a market. The latest case in which the ACCC has failed to satisfy the s 46 criteria is the decision of Greenwood J in ACCC v Cement Australia Pty Ltd [2013] FCA 909 (Cement Australia case). Final orders were published in a separate judgment, in ACCC v Cement Australia Pty Ltd [2014] FCA 148 (28 February 2014). The case concerned an entry deterring strategy, namely the pre-emptive buying of input factors in an upstream market to protect an incumbent with substantial market power in a downstream market and to prevent new entry in the downstream market. Greenwood J found that while Cement Australia Pty Ltd, formerly known as Queensland Cement Ltd (QCL), had substantial market power, its conduct in entering into the pre-emptive contracts was not a contravention of s 46, because Cement Australia had not “taken advantage” of its market power. However, since Cement Australia’s purpose in entering into the pre-emptive contracts was anti-competitive, they were held to contravene s 45(2) of the TPA. The purpose of this Note is to consider only the reasons for judgment in the Cement Australia case in relation to the “taking advantage” element. The judgment was handed down on 10 September 2013. The final hearing date was 15 July 2011, so it was long-awaited. At 714 pages, it is carefully drafted.

Behaviour v structure : Tribunal’s AGL Energy merger authorisation

Section 95AT of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) (CCA) provides that the Tribunal may grant an authorisation to acquire shares or assets that would otherwise contravene s 50. Section 95AT was inserted by the Trade Practices Legislation Amendment Act 2006 (Cth) and commenced on 1 January 2007. In Application for Authorisation of Macquarie Generation by AGL Energy Limited, (AGL Energy) the Tribunal has for the first time granted AGL Energy Limited (AGL) a conditional authorisation to acquire the assets of Macquarie Generation from the NSW Government.

Cartels – What are they and how to avoid being part of one : the implications of University fee deregulation

Universities supply a range of services to students. These include most obviously, tuition services in relation to undergraduate and postgraduate courses; research supervision services in relation to research degrees; as well as consultancy services in relation to Government and industry work. For the purposes of the CCA, universities are trading corporations. They engage in trade or commerce through the provision of a range of services for reward. As such Universities are subject to the same rules and regulations that govern the conduct of other trading corporations, such Coles and Woolworths. As senior officers and managers of a trading corporation you need to acquire some basic understanding of the rules that govern competition in the education sector. In other sectors, companies generally undertake a risk assessment of those areas where they are most at risk of contravening the CCA; to ascertain in advance how problems might arise so that they can put in place strategies to mitigate the risk of inadvertent contraventions.

Sector-specific regimes

This Chapter considers a number of sector-specific access regimes that apply to infrastructure that exhibits natural monopoly characteristics. With the exception of Pt XIC of the CCA which regulates access to telecommunications infrastructure, they adopt the same form of negotiate-arbitrate model found in Pt IIIA of the CCA. In the event of a failure to negotiate commercial terms and conditions of access they allow the regulator to impose cost based (building block)tariffs. The regulator's decisions are subject to merits review and/or judicial review. The Chapter is divided into four Parts: • Part I considers access regulation in the electricity sector; • Part II considers access regulation in the gas sector; • Part III considers access regulation in the telecommunications sector; and • Part N considers access regulation in relation to port and rail bulk supply chains.

Constitutive Regulation of the Firm: occupational health and safety, dismissal, discrimination and sexual harassment

As many other chapters in this book have noted, until recently labour lawyers have tended not to draaw on regulatory scholarship. In this chapter we look at certain areas of labour law through a particular kind of regulatory lens - regulation that requires firms to reconstitute their management processes and procedures, perhaps even their organisational cultures. In particular, we examine the kinds of regulatory demands made on firms by legal rules in four areas of labour law: (i) occupational health and safety (OHS)regulation; unfair dismissal law; equal opportunity (EO) and (iv) sexual harassment law.

Submission to the Australian Government’s Online Copyright Infringement Discussion Paper

Now is not the time to increase the strength of copyright law. Copyright law is facing a crisis of legitimacy: consumers increasingly appear to doubt its moral weight. To a large extent, this can be traced to the fact that Australian consumers do not believe they are being treated fairly by (predominantly US-based) copyright producers and distributors. Compared to their overseas peers, Australian consumers pay much more for access to books, films, television, and computer games, and are often subjected to long delays before material is available in Australia. Our research shows that this perceived unfairness increases the willingness of Australian consumers to seek out alternative distribution channels. Put simply, the failure of content distributors to meet consumer demand in Australia is a leading factor in copyright infringement. This submission argues that the best strategy to reduce copyright infringement in Australia, at the present time, is for distributors to focus on providing timely, affordable, convenient and fair access to copyright goods. Until this is done, the prevalence of copyright infringement in Australia should be seen as essentially a market problem, rather than a legal one. The Australian Government, meanwhile, should address the recommendations of the IT Pricing Report as a matter a priority. As a first step, the Government should urgently consider repealing the IP exception to competition law in s 51(3), as recommended by the Ergas committee, the IT Pricing report, and the ALRC. This change alone may go a long way to enhancing the efficiency of the copyright market in Australia.

A Submission to the Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Committee on the Copyright Amendment (Online Infringement) Bill 2015 (Cth)

The film company, Roadshow, the pay television company Foxtel, and Rupert Murdoch’s News Corp and News Limited — as well as copyright industries — have been clamouring for new copyright powers and remedies. In the summer break, the Coalition Government has responded to such entreaties from its industry supporters and donors, with a new package of copyright laws and policies. There has been significant debate over the proposals between the odd couple of Attorney-General George Brandis and the Minister for Communications, Malcolm Turnbull. There has been deep, philosophical differences between the two Ministers over the copyright agenda. The Attorney-General George Brandis has supported a model of copyright maximalism, with strong rights and remedies for the copyright empires in film, television, and publishing. He has shown little empathy for the information technology companies of the digital economy. The Attorney-General has been impatient to press ahead with a copyright regime. The Minister for Communications, Malcolm Turnbull, has been somewhat more circumspect,recognising that there is a need to ensure that copyright laws do not adversely impact upon competition in the digital economy. The final proposal is a somewhat awkward compromise between the discipline-and-punish regime preferred by Brandis, and the responsive regulation model favoured by Turnbull. In his new book, Information Doesn’t Want to Be Free: Laws for the Internet Age, Cory Doctorow has some sage advice for copyright owners: Things that don’t make money: * Complaining about piracy. * Calling your customers thieves. * Treating your customers like thieves. In this context, the push by copyright owners and the Coalition Government to have a copyright crackdown may well be counter-productive to their interests. This submission considers a number of key elements of the Coalition Government’s Copyright Crackdown. Part 1 examines the proposals in respect of the Copyright Amendment (Online Infringement) Bill 2015 (Cth). Part 2 focuses upon the proposed Copyright Code. Part 3 considers the question of safe harbours for intermediaries. Part 4 examines the question of copyright exceptions – particularly looking at the proposal of the Australian Law Reform Commission for the introduction of a defence of fair use. Part 5 highlights the recommendations of the IT Pricing Inquiry and the Harper Competition Policy Review in respect of copyright law, consumer rights, and competition law.

Regulating unilateral supermarket misconduct as customer/acquirer of goods and services

Supermarkets in Australia may have substantial market power as buyers in wholesale markets for grocery products. They may also have substantial bargaining power in negotiating contracts with their suppliers of grocery products. The Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) (CCA) regulates misconduct by supermarkets as customer/acquirers in three ways. First, s 46(1) of the CCA prohibits the ‘taking advantage’ of buyer power for the purpose of damaging a competitor, preventing entry or deterring or preventing competitive conduct. Secondly, s 21 of the ACL prohibits unconscionable conduct in business–to–business transactions. Thirdly, Pt IVB of the CCA provides for the promulgation of mandatory and voluntary industry codes of conduct. Since 1 July 2015 the conduct of supermarkets as customer/acquirers has been regulated by the Food and Grocery Industry Code of Conduct. This article examines these three different approaches. It considers them against the background of the misconduct at issue in ACCC v Coles Supermarkets Australia Pty Ltd which the ACCC chose to litigate as an unconscionable conduct case, rather than a misuse of market power case. The article also considers the strengths and weaknesses of each of the three approaches and concludes that while the three approaches address different problems there is scope for overlap and all three should be retained for compete coverage.

Who Rules Japan? Popular Participation in the Japanese Legal Process

"The dramatic growth of the Japanese economy in the postwar period, and its meltdown in the 1990s, has attracted sustained interest in the power dynamics underlying the management of Japan’s administrative state. Scholars and commentators have long debated over who wields power in Japan, asking the fundamental question: who really governs Japan? This important volume revisits this question by turning its attention to the regulation and design of the Japanese legal system. With essays covering the new lay-judge system in Japanese criminal trials, labour dispute resolution panels, prison policy, gendered justice, government lawyers, welfare administration and administrative transparency, this comprehensive book explores the players and processes in Japan’s administration of justice."--publisher website

‘Lemon Laws’: an inquiry into consumer protections and remedies for buyers of new motor vehicles

1. Under the Terms of Reference for the Committee’s Inquiry, ‘lemons’ are defined as ‘new motor vehicles with numerous, severe defects that re-occur despite multiple repair attempts or where defects have caused a new motor vehicle to be out of service for a prolonged period of time’. Consumers are currently protected in relation to lemon purchases by the Australian Consumer Law (ACL) located in Schedule 2 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) (CCA). The ACL applies as a law of Queensland pursuant to the Fair Trading Act 1989 (Qld). The voluntary recall and consumer guarantees law took effect on 1 January 2011. 2. In 2006, the Government of Victoria made a commitment to introduce a lemon law into the provisions of the then Fair Trading Act 1999 (Vic). The public consultation process on the proposal to introduce a lemon law for motor vehicle purchases in Victoria was conducted by Ms Janice Munt MP, with the assistance of Consumer Affairs Victoria (CAV). CAV released an Issues Paper to canvas with industry and the community options for the development and introduction of a motor vehicle lemon law.(Consumer Affairs Victoria, Introducing Victorian motor vehicle lemon laws, Issues Paper, (September, 2007). 3. A CAV report prepared by Janice Munt MP was released in July, 2008 (Consumer Affairs Victoria, Motor Cars: A report on the motor vehicle lemon law consultations (July 2008) (Victorian Lemon Law Report). However, the Victorian proposal was overtaken by events leading to the adoption of a uniform consumer protection law in all Australian jurisdictions, the ACL. 4. The structure of this submission is to consider first the three different bases upon which consumers can obtain relief for economic loss arising from defects in motor vehicles. The second part of the submission considers the difficulties encountered by consumers in litigating motor vehicle disputes in the courts and tribunals. The third part of the submission examines the approach taken in other jurisdictions to resolving motor vehicle disputes. The final part of the submission considers a number of possible reforms that could be made to the existing law and its enforcement to reduce consumer detriment arising from the purchase of ‘lemon’ motor vehicles. 5. There are three principal bases upon which a consumer can obtain redress for defects in new motor vehicles under the ACL. The first is where the manufacturer admits liability and initiates the voluntary recall procedure provided for in s 128 of the ACL. Under this basis the manufacturer generally repairs or replaces the part subject to the recall free of charge. The second basis is where the manufacturer or dealer denies liability and the consumer is initiates proceedings in the court or tribunal seeking a statutory remedy under the ACL, the nature of which will depend on whether the failure to comply with the consumer guarantee was major or not. The third basis upon which a consumer can obtain redress is pursuant to public enforcement by the ACCC. Each basis will be considered in this part. What all three bases have in common is the need to conduct an investigation to identify the nature of the defect and how it arose.

O impacto da cláusula de raio nas relações entre o lojista e o empreendedor e seus efeitos no direito da concorrência

A pesquisa analisa a validade da cláusula de raio no aspecto do direito civil-empresarial (privado) e da concorrência (público). No âmbito do direito civil-empresarial analisa-se a cláusula de raio em conjunto com a cláusula de aluguel percentual e possível lesão à boa-fé objetiva. No aspecto do direito da concorrência é analisado o mercado relevante na dimensão produto e geográfica, bem como as externalidades positivas e negativas produzidas pela cláusula de raio. Para a realização da pesquisa adota-se o método dedutivo, realizado a partir de pesquisa bibliográfica e jurisprudencial sobre o tema. Traz como resultado os parâmetros que devem ser utilizados para a análise da cláusula de raio e a hipótese em que ela pode ser prevista.

Układy zbiorowe pracy a prawo antymonopolowe Unii Europejskiej i Stanów Zjednoczonych

Względy społeczne są silnie chronione w prawie Unii Europejskiej i Stanów Zjednoczonych. Ważnym elementem wskazanych systemów prawnych jest również prawo antymonopolowe, którego cel, najogólniej rzecz ujmując, stanowi zapewnienie właściwego funkcjonowania rynku. Kwestie socjalne nie mieszczą się w optyce prawa antymonopolowego. Może to prowadzić do powstania bardzo skomplikowanej sytuacji między prawem antymonopolowym a unormowaniami służącymi ochronie względów socjalnych. Istnieją obszary, na których te dwa zespoły norm są komplementarne, ale zauważyć należy również, że na pewnych płaszczyznach cele prawa pracy są odmienne, a nawet przeciwstawne wobec zadań stawianych przed prawem antymonopolowym. Sferę, w której powstanie konfliktów jest najbardziej prawdopodobne stanowią układy zbiorowe pracy. Zgodnie z unijnym i amerykańskim orzecznictwem prawo antymonopolowe nie może być wykorzystywane do uniemożliwienia osiągnięcia celów socjalnych chronionych przez prawo. Istnieją jednak przypadki, w których stosownie prawa antymonopolowego do układów zbiorowych pracy jest możliwe.

Stosunki pomiędzy uprawnionym autorsko a organizacjami zbiorowego zarządzania w prawie polskim

Wydział Prawa i Administracji: Katedra Prawa Cywilnego, Ubezpieczeniowego i Handlowego