Audit report on the Office of Treasurer of State, Iowa Educational Savings Plan Trust for the year ended June 30, 2009

Audit report on the Office of Treasurer of State, Iowa Educational Savings Plan Trust for the year ended June 30, 2009

Audit report on the Northeast Iowa Schools Insurance Trust for the year ended June 30, 2009

Audit report on the Northeast Iowa Schools Insurance Trust for the year ended June 30, 2009

Audit report on the Office of Treasurer of State, Iowa Educational Savings Plan Trust for the year ended June 30, 2010

Audit report on the Office of Treasurer of State, Iowa Educational Savings Plan Trust for the year ended June 30, 2010

Audit report on the Northeast Iowa Schools Insurance Trust for the year ended June 30, 2010

Audit report on the Northeast Iowa Schools Insurance Trust for the year ended June 30, 2010

Audit report on the Office of Treasurer of State, Iowa Educational Savings Plan Trust for the year ended June 30, 2011

Audit report on the Office of Treasurer of State, Iowa Educational Savings Plan Trust for the year ended June 30, 2011

Audit report on the Northeast Iowa Schools Insurance Trust for the year ended June 30, 2011

Audit report on the Northeast Iowa Schools Insurance Trust for the year ended June 30, 2011

Audit report on the Office of Treasurer of State, Iowa Educational Savings Plan Trust for the year ended June 30, 2012

Audit report on the Office of Treasurer of State, Iowa Educational Savings Plan Trust for the year ended June 30, 2012

Audit report on the Northeast Iowa Schools Insurance Trust for the year ended June 30, 2012

Audit report on the Northeast Iowa Schools Insurance Trust for the year ended June 30, 2012

Audit report on the Office of Treasurer of State, Iowa Educational Savings Plan Trust for the year ended June 30, 2013

Audit report on the Office of Treasurer of State, Iowa Educational Savings Plan Trust for the year ended June 30, 2013

Mutual trust and cooperation in the evolutionary hawks-doves game

Using a new dynamical network model of society in which pairwise interactions are weighted according to mutual satisfaction, we show that cooperation is the norm in the hawks-doves game when individuals are allowed to break ties with undesirable neighbors and to make new acquaintances in their extended neighborhood. Moreover, cooperation is robust with respect to rather strong strategy perturbations. We also discuss the empirical structure of the emerging networks, and the reasons that allow cooperators to thrive in the population. Given the metaphorical importance of this game for social interaction, this is an encouraging positive result as standard theory for large mixing populations prescribes that a certain fraction of defectors must always exist at equilibrium.