Public and private saving and investment

We decompose aggregate saving and investment into its publicand private components and then document a variety of ``stylized facts''associated with saving and investment rates for a sample of15 countries over the period 1975--1989. In order to seewhether these empirical relationships are consistent with aworld of perfect capital mobility we develop a multi--countrymodel with free trade in a riskfree bond and calibrate it tothe fifteen OECD countries. We pay special attential tomodeling the fiscal policy rules. The model performsremarkably well in accounting for a wide variety of timeseries relationships. Nonetheless the model is not able to capture the crosssectional aspect of the data. In particular, the model cannot accountfor both the large cross country correlation between aggregate saving and investmentrates and the very negative cross country relationship between the public andprivate saving minus investment gaps.

Audit report of Iowa Public Employees’ Retirement System as of and for the year ended June 30, 2008

Audit report of Iowa Public Employees’ Retirement System as of and for the year ended June 30, 2008

Gerontocracy, retirement, and social security

Why are the old politically successful? We build a simple interest group model in which political pressure is time-intensive, showing that in the political competitive equilibrium each group lobbies for government policies that lower their own value of time but the old do so to a greater extent and as a result are net gainers from the political process. What distinguishes the elderly from other political groups (and what makes them more succesful) is that they have lower labor productivity and/or that we are all likely to become elderly at some point, while we are relatively unlikely to change gender, race, sexual orientation, or even ocupation, The model has a variety of implications for the design of social security programs, which we test using data from the Social Security Administration. For example, the model predicts that social security programs with retirement incentives are larger and that the old are more "single-minded" in their politics, implications which we verify using cross-country government finance data and cross-country political participation surveys. Finally, we show that the forced savings programs intended to "reform" the social security system may increase the amount of intergenerational redistribution. As a model for evaluating policy reforms, ours has the attractive feature that reforms must be time time consistent from a political point of view rather than a public interest point of view.

Asset prices and the measurement of wealth and saving

The paper defines concepts of real wealth and saving which take into account the intertemporal index number problem that results from changing interest rates. Unlike conventional measures of real wealth, which are based on the market value of assets and ignore the index number problem, the new measure correctly reflects the changes in the welfare of households over time. An empirically operational approximation to the theoretical measure is provided and applied to US data. A major empirical finding is that US real financial wealth increased strongly in the 1980s, much more than is revealed by the market value of assets.

Unemployment insurance with endogenous search intensity and precautionary saving

A welfare analysis of unemployment insurance (UI) is performed in a generalequilibrium job search model. Finitely-lived, risk-averse workers smooth consumption over time by accumulating assets, choose search effort whenunemployed, and suffer disutility from work. Firms hire workers, purchasecapital, and pay taxes to finance worker benefits; their equity is the assetaccumulated by workers. A matching function relates unemployment, hiringexpenditure, and search effort to the formation of jobs. The model is calibrated to US data; the parameters relating job search effort to the probability of job finding are chosen to match microeconomic studies ofunemployment spells. Under logarithmic utility, numerical simulation shows rather small welfaregains from UI. Even without UI, workers smooth consumption effectivelythrough asset accumulation. Greater risk aversion leads to substantiallylarger welfare gains from UI; however, even in this case much of its welfareimpact is due not to consumption smoothing effects, but rather to decreased work disutility, or to a variety of externalities.

Report on the Iowa Braille and Sight Saving School, Vinton, Iowa, for the year ended June 30, 2008

Report on the Iowa Braille and Sight Saving School, Vinton, Iowa, for the year ended June 30, 2008

Report on a review of selected general and application controls over the Iowa Public Employees’ Retirement System (IPERS) I-Que Pension Administration System for the period March 24, 2009 through April 22, 2009

Report on a review of selected general and application controls over the Iowa Public Employees’ Retirement System (IPERS) I-Que Pension Administration System for the period March 24, 2009 through April 22, 2009

Nearing Retirement, July 2008

IPERS provides the security you need through guaranteed benefits. With IPERS, unlike other retirement plans, benefits aren’t tied to the performance of the stock market and you don’t need to be an experienced investor to make your retirement dreams a reality. Your IPERS benefits are only one part of your overall retirement savings. Your total retirement income will come from a combination of your IPERS benefits, social security, personal savings, and any other retirement plan benefits.

Nearing Retirement, July 2008

IPERS provides the security you need through guaranteed benefits. With IPERS, unlike other retirement plans, benefits aren’t tied to the performance of the stock market and you don’t need to be an experienced investor to make your retirement dreams a reality. Your IPERS benefits are only one part of your overall retirement savings. Your total retirement income will come from a combination of your IPERS benefits, social security, personal savings, and any other retirement plan benefits.

Audit report on the Iowa Judicial Retirement System for the year ended June 30, 2009

Audit report on the Iowa Judicial Retirement System for the year ended June 30, 2009

Audit report on the Peace Officers' Retirement, Accident and Disability System for the year ended June 30, 2009

Audit report on the Peace Officers' Retirement, Accident and Disability System for the year ended June 30, 2009

Audit report of the Iowa Public Employees’ Retirement System (IPERS) as of and for the year ended June 30, 2009

Audit report of the Iowa Public Employees’ Retirement System (IPERS) as of and for the year ended June 30, 2009

Comprehensive Annual Financial Report (CAFR) of the Iowa Public Employees' Retirement System (IPERS) for the fiscal year ended June 30, 2009.

Comprehensive Annual Financial Report (CAFR) of the Iowa Public Employees Retirement System (IPERS) for the fiscal year ended June 30, 2009. NOTE: this is a large file and may take a moment to download.

Report on the Iowa Braille and Sight Saving School, Vinton, Iowa, for the year ended June 30, 2009

Report on the Iowa Braille and Sight Saving School, Vinton, Iowa, for the year ended June 30, 2009

Iowa Public Employees’ Retirement System An Annual Summary for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 2011, FY 2011

Report on the Iowa Public Employees’ Retirement System (IPERS) for the year ended June 30, 2011