Three essays in labor economics and applied econometrics

Méthodologie:Cadre conceptuel: Principal-agent

Hierarchical Forest Management Planning: A Bilevel Wood Supply Modelling Approach

Le processus de planification forestière hiérarchique présentement en place sur les terres publiques risque d’échouer à deux niveaux. Au niveau supérieur, le processus en place ne fournit pas une preuve suffisante de la durabilité du niveau de récolte actuel. À un niveau inférieur, le processus en place n’appuie pas la réalisation du plein potentiel de création de valeur de la ressource forestière, contraignant parfois inutilement la planification à court terme de la récolte. Ces échecs sont attribuables à certaines hypothèses implicites au modèle d’optimisation de la possibilité forestière, ce qui pourrait expliquer pourquoi ce problème n’est pas bien documenté dans la littérature. Nous utilisons la théorie de l’agence pour modéliser le processus de planification forestière hiérarchique sur les terres publiques. Nous développons un cadre de simulation itératif en deux étapes pour estimer l’effet à long terme de l’interaction entre l’État et le consommateur de fibre, nous permettant ainsi d’établir certaines conditions pouvant mener à des ruptures de stock. Nous proposons ensuite une formulation améliorée du modèle d’optimisation de la possibilité forestière. La formulation classique du modèle d’optimisation de la possibilité forestière (c.-à-d., maximisation du rendement soutenu en fibre) ne considère pas que le consommateur de fibre industriel souhaite maximiser son profit, mais suppose plutôt la consommation totale de l’offre de fibre à chaque période, peu importe le potentiel de création de valeur de celle-ci. Nous étendons la formulation classique du modèle d’optimisation de la possibilité forestière afin de permettre l’anticipation du comportement du consommateur de fibre, augmentant ainsi la probabilité que l’offre de fibre soit entièrement consommée, rétablissant ainsi la validité de l’hypothèse de consommation totale de l’offre de fibre implicite au modèle d’optimisation. Nous modélisons la relation principal-agent entre le gouvernement et l’industrie à l’aide d’une formulation biniveau du modèle optimisation, où le niveau supérieur représente le processus de détermination de la possibilité forestière (responsabilité du gouvernement), et le niveau inférieur représente le processus de consommation de la fibre (responsabilité de l’industrie). Nous montrons que la formulation biniveau peux atténuer le risque de ruptures de stock, améliorant ainsi la crédibilité du processus de planification forestière hiérarchique. Ensemble, le modèle biniveau d’optimisation de la possibilité forestière et la méthodologie que nous avons développée pour résoudre celui-ci à l’optimalité, représentent une alternative aux méthodes actuellement utilisées. Notre modèle biniveau et le cadre de simulation itérative représentent un pas vers l’avant en matière de technologie de planification forestière axée sur la création de valeur. L’intégration explicite d’objectifs et de contraintes industrielles au processus de planification forestière, dès la détermination de la possibilité forestière, devrait favoriser une collaboration accrue entre les instances gouvernementales et industrielles, permettant ainsi d’exploiter le plein potentiel de création de valeur de la ressource forestière.

Standardized environmental management systems as an internal management tool

In a principal-agent model we analyze the firm’s decision to adopt an informal or a standardized Environmental Management System (EMS). Our results are consistent with empirical evidence in several respects. A standardized EMS increases the internal control at the cost of introducing some degree of rigidity that entails an endogenous setup cost. Standardized systems are more prone to be adopted by big and well established firms and under tougher environmental policies. Firms with standardized EMS tend to devote more effort to abatement although this effort results in lower pollution only if public incentives are strong enough, suggesting a complementarity relationship between standardized EMS and public policies. Emission charges have both a marginal effect on abatement and a qualitative effect on the adoption decision that may induce a conflict between private and public interests. As a result of the combination of these two effects it can be optimal for the government to distort the tax in a specific way in order to push the firm to choose the socially optimal EMS. The introduction of standardized systems can result in win-win situations where firms, society and the environment get better off.

L’interface politico-administrative au Québec : champ de bataille? Transmission stratégique de l’information dans les affaires d’État

En vertu de l’expertise qu’il détient, l’agent public contribue à la réflexion du politique. L’acteur public est en quelque sorte un outil d’aide à la décision. Le paradigme classique en théorie des organisations assume que le bureaucrate est un acteur programmé dont les actions sont guidées par la règlementation et la codification juridico-légale entourant sa pratique. Quant à elle, l’École de la nouvelle gestion publique suppose que l’agent public doit opérer librement selon les indicateurs de la sphère privée ; il doit viser l’efficacité au moindre coût et prioriser la culture du résultat. De plus, dans des conditions respectant l’environnement où se dessine le partage de renseignements, les chercheurs ne s’entendent pas sur le principe de l’allié qui postule conventionnellement que des préférences similaires favorisent la transmission optimale de l’information entre le politique et la fonction publique. Quel modèle prévaut au Québec ? Sous quelles formes s’opérationnalise-t-il en contexte de transfert ? La thèse d’une compatibilité préférentielle est-elle garante d’une translation informationnelle améliorée ? En usant du modèle canonique principal-agent, ce mémoire confronte la croyance répandue voulant que l’État québécois soit foncièrement webérien en adressant certaines des plus importantes conclusions théoriques dans la discipline. Les résultats démontrent que l’appareil d’État est issu d’un croisement entre les deux principaux paradigmes reconnus dans la littérature. Aussi, le mémoire fait état d’une similarité entre l’interprétation traditionnelle de l’ally principle et la réalité empirique retrouvée dans la relation entre le haut fonctionnaire et le législateur québécois. Ultimement, l’étude démontre que l’administrateur d’État est stratégique dans certaines situations qu’il sait instrumentaliser et où il peut occuper un espace discrétionnaire suffisant pour valoriser ses intérêts professionnels et ceux de son organisation.

Achieving better stewardship of major infrastructure assets through configuration of governance arrangements utilising Stewardship Theory

Major infrastructure assets are often governed by a mix of public and private organizations, each fulfilling a specific and separate role i.e. policy, ownership, operation or maintenance. This mix of entities is a legacy of Public Choice Theory influenced NPM reforms of the late 20th century. The privatization of the public sector has resulted in agency theory based ‘self-interest’ relationships and governance arrangements for major infrastructure assets which emphasize economic efficiency but which do not do not advance non-economic public values and the collective Public Interest. The community is now requiring that governments fulfill their stewardship role of also satisfying non-economic public values such as sustainability and intergenerational responsibility. In the 21st century governance arrangements which minimize individual self-interest alone and look to also pursue the interests of other stakeholders have emerged. Relational contracts, Public-Private Partnerships (PPP’s) and hybrid mixes of organizations from the state, market and network modes (Keast et al 2006) provide options for governance which better meet the interests of contractors, government and the community there is emerging a body of research which extends the consideration of the immediate governance configuration to the metagovernance environment constituted by hierarchy, regulation, industry standards, trust, culture and values. Stewardship theory has reemerged as a valuable aid in the understanding of the features of governance configurations which establish relationships between principal and agent which maximize the agent acting in the interests of the principal, even to the detriment of the agent. This body of literature suggests that an improved stewardship outcome from infrastructure governance configurations can be achieved by the application of the emerging options as to the immediate governance configuration, and the surrounding metagovernance environment. Stewardship theory provides a framework for the design of the relationships within that total governance environment, focusing on the achievement of a better, complete stewardship outcome. This paper explores the directions future research might take in seeking to improve the understanding of the design of the governance of major, critical infrastructure assets.

Multi-level knowledge transfer in software development outsourcing projects : the agency theory view

In recent years, software development outsourcing has become even more complex. Outsourcing partner have begun‘re- outsourcing’ components of their projects to other outsourcing companies to minimize cost and gain efficiencies, creating a multi-level hierarchy of outsourcing. This research in progress paper presents preliminary findings of a study designed to understand knowledge transfer effectiveness of multi-level software development outsourcing projects. We conceptualize the SD-outsourcing entities using the Agency Theory. This study conceptualizes, operationalises and validates the concept of Knowledge Transfer as a three-phase multidimensional formative index of 1) Domain knowledge, 2) Communication behaviors, and 3) Clarity of requirements. Data analysis identified substantial, significant differences between the Principal and the Agent on two of the three constructs. Using Agency Theory, supported by preliminary findings, the paper also provides prescriptive guidelines of reducing the friction between the Principal and the Agent in multi-level software outsourcing.

Relação agente-principal entre deputados federais e gestores administrativos na Câmara dos Deputados

Descreve os principais elementos da teoria da agência e verifica, por meio de uma abordagem exploratória, se a relação agente-principal pode ser utilizada para caracterizar o relacionamento entre os deputados federais, por intermédio da Mesa Diretora, representada pelo Presidente, e os gestores administrativos da Câmara dos Deputados, na figura do Diretor- Geral.

India and India missions : including sketches of the gigantic system of hinduism, both in theory and practive : also notices of some of the principal agencies employed in conducting the process of Indian evangalization, etc. etc.

http://books.google.com/books?vid=OCLC05766993

Strategic Bidding in Electricity Markets: An agent-based simulator with game theory for scenario analysis

Electricity markets are complex environments, involving a large number of different entities, with specific characteristics and objectives, making their decisions and interacting in a dynamic scene. Game-theory has been widely used to support decisions in competitive environments; therefore its application in electricity markets can prove to be a high potential tool. This paper proposes a new scenario analysis algorithm, which includes the application of game-theory, to evaluate and preview different scenarios and provide players with the ability to strategically react in order to exhibit the behavior that better fits their objectives. This model includes forecasts of competitor players’ actions, to build models of their behavior, in order to define the most probable expected scenarios. Once the scenarios are defined, game theory is applied to support the choice of the action to be performed. Our use of game theory is intended for supporting one specific agent and not for achieving the equilibrium in the market. MASCEM (Multi-Agent System for Competitive Electricity Markets) is a multi-agent electricity market simulator that models market players and simulates their operation in the market. The scenario analysis algorithm has been tested within MASCEM and our experimental findings with a case study based on real data from the Iberian Electricity Market are presented and discussed.

Decision‐Making in Public Good Dilemmas: Theory and Agent‐Based Simulation

In many real world contexts individuals find themselves in situations where they have to decide between options of behaviour that serve a collective purpose or behaviours which satisfy one’s private interests, ignoring the collective. In some cases the underlying social dilemma (Dawes, 1980) is solved and we observe collective action (Olson, 1965). In others social mobilisation is unsuccessful. The central topic of social dilemma research is the identification and understanding of mechanisms which yield to the observed cooperation and therefore resolve the social dilemma. It is the purpose of this thesis to contribute this research field for the case of public good dilemmas. To do so, existing work that is relevant to this problem domain is reviewed and a set of mandatory requirements is derived which guide theory and method development of the thesis. In particular, the thesis focusses on dynamic processes of social mobilisation which can foster or inhibit collective action. The basic understanding is that success or failure of the required process of social mobilisation is determined by heterogeneous individual preferences of the members of a providing group, the social structure in which the acting individuals are contained, and the embedding of the individuals in economic, political, biophysical, or other external contexts. To account for these aspects and for the involved dynamics the methodical approach of the thesis is computer simulation, in particular agent-based modelling and simulation of social systems. Particularly conductive are agent models which ground the simulation of human behaviour in suitable psychological theories of action. The thesis develops the action theory HAPPenInGS (Heterogeneous Agents Providing Public Goods) and demonstrates its embedding into different agent-based simulations. The thesis substantiates the particular added value of the methodical approach: Starting out from a theory of individual behaviour, in simulations the emergence of collective patterns of behaviour becomes observable. In addition, the underlying collective dynamics may be scrutinised and assessed by scenario analysis. The results of such experiments reveal insights on processes of social mobilisation which go beyond classical empirical approaches and yield policy recommendations on promising intervention measures in particular.

An agent-based approach to value theory and wealth distribution in economics

Any attempt to model an economy requires foundational assumptions about the relations between prices, values and the distribution of wealth. These assumptions exert a profound influence over the results of any model. Unfortunately, there are few areas in economics as vexed as the theory of value. I argue in this paper that the fundamental problem with past theories of value is that it is simply not possible to model the determination of value, the formation of prices and the distribution of income in a real economy with analytic mathematical models. All such attempts leave out crucial processes or make unrealistic assumptions which significantly affect the results. There have been two primary approaches to the theory of value. The first, associated with classical economists such as Ricardo and Marx were substance theories of value, which view value as a substance inherent in an object and which is conserved in exchange. For Marxists, the value of a commodity derives solely from the value of the labour power used to produce it - and therefore any profit is due to the exploitation of the workers. The labour theory of value has been discredited because of its assumption that labour was the only ‘factor’ that contributed to the creation of value, and because of its fundamentally circular argument. Neoclassical theorists argued that price was identical with value and was determined purely by the interaction of supply and demand. Value then, was completely subjective. Returns to labour (wages) and capital (profits) were determined solely by their marginal contribution to production, so that each factor received its just reward by definition. Problems with the neoclassical approach include assumptions concerning representative agents, perfect competition, perfect and costless information and contract enforcement, complete markets for credit and risk, aggregate production functions and infinite, smooth substitution between factors, distribution according to marginal products, firms always on the production possibility frontier and firms’ pricing decisions, ignoring money and credit, and perfectly rational agents with infinite computational capacity. Two critical areas include firstly, the underappreciated Sonnenschein-Mantel- Debreu results which showed that the foundational assumptions of the Walrasian general-equilibrium model imply arbitrary excess demand functions and therefore arbitrary equilibrium price sets. Secondly, in real economies, there is no equilibrium, only continuous change. Equilibrium is never reached because of constant changes in preferences and tastes; technological and organisational innovations; discoveries of new resources and new markets; inaccurate and evolving expectations of businesses, consumers, governments and speculators; changing demand for credit; the entry and exit of firms; the birth, learning, and death of citizens; changes in laws and government policies; imperfect information; generalized increasing returns to scale; random acts of impulse; weather and climate events; changes in disease patterns, and so on. The problem is not the use of mathematical modelling, but the kind of mathematical modelling used. Agent-based models (ABMs), objectoriented programming and greatly increased computer power however, are opening up a new frontier. Here a dynamic bargaining ABM is outlined as a basis for an alternative theory of value. A large but finite number of heterogeneous commodities and agents with differing degrees of market power are set in a spatial network. Returns to buyers and sellers are decided at each step in the value chain, and in each factor market, through the process of bargaining. Market power and its potential abuse against the poor and vulnerable are fundamental to how the bargaining dynamics play out. Ethics therefore lie at the very heart of economic analysis, the determination of prices and the distribution of wealth. The neoclassicals are right then that price is the enumeration of value at a particular time and place, but wrong to downplay the critical roles of bargaining, power and ethics in determining those same prices.