"Sub Tiberio quies"? Judaea’s Political Situation under the Prefects (6-41 c.e.), between Reality and Ideology

Deeply conflicting views on the political situation of Judaea under the Roman prefects (6-41 c.e.) have been offered. According to some scholars, this was a period of persistent political unrest and agitation, whilst according to a widespread view it was a quiescent period of political calm (reflected in Tacitus’ phrase sub Tiberio quies). The present article critically examines again the main available sources –particularly Josephus, the canonical Gospels and Tacitus– in order to offer a more reliable historical reconstruction. The conclusions drawn by this survey calls into question some widespread and insufficiently nuanced views on the period. This, in turn, allows a reflection on the non-epistemic factors which might contribute to explain the origin of such views.

Money, (Co)Production and Power in Digital

This article discusses the contribution of critical political economy approaches to digital journalism studies and argues that these offer important correctives to celebratory perspectives. The first part offers a review and critique of influential claims arising from self-styled new studies of convergence culture, media and creative industries. The second part discusses the contribution of critical political economy in examining digital journalism and responding to celebrant claims. The final part reflects on problems of restrictive normativity and other limitations within media political economy perspectives and considers ways in which challenges might be addressed by more synthesising approaches. The paper proposes developing radical pluralist, media systems and comparative analysis, and advocates drawing on strengths in both political economy and culturalist traditions to map and evaluate practices across all sectors of digital journalism.

What Does Value Matter? The Interest-Relational Theory of the Semantics and Metaphysics of Value

Value and reasons for action are often cited by rationalists and moral realists as providing a desire-independent foundation for normativity. Those maintaining instead that normativity is dependent upon motivation often deny that anything called '"value" or "reasons" exists. According to the interest-relational theory, something has value relative to some perspective of desire just in case it satisfies those desires, and a consideration is a reason for some action just in case it indicates that something of value will be accomplished by that action. Value judgements therefore describe real properties of objects and actions, but have no normative significance independent of desires. It is argued that only the interest-relational theory can account for the practical significance of value and reasons for action. Against the Kantian hypothesis of prescriptive rational norms, I attack the alleged instrumental norm or hypothetical imperative, showing that the normative force for taking the means to our ends is explicable in terms of our desire for the end, and not as a command of reason. This analysis also provides a solution to the puzzle concerning the connection between value judgement and motivation. While it is possible to hold value judgements without motivation, the connection is more than accidental. This is because value judgements are usually but not always made from the perspective of desires that actually motivate the speaker. In the normal case judgement entails motivation. But often we conversationally borrow external perspectives of desire, and subsequent judgements do not entail motivation. This analysis drives a critique of a common practice as a misuse of normative language. The "absolutist" attempts to use and, as philosopher, analyze normative language in such a way as to justify the imposition of certain interests over others. But these uses and analyses are incoherent - in denying relativity to particular desires they conflict with the actual meaning of these utterances, which is always indexed to some particular set of desires.

Proportion dominance in valuing lives: The role of deliberative thinking

Proportion responding (PR) is the preference for proportionally higher gains, such that the same absolute quantity is valued more as the reference group decreases. This research investigated this kind of proportion PR in decisions about saving lives (e.g., saving 10/10 lives is preferred to saving 10/100 lives). The results of two studies suggest that PR does not stem from an overall tendency to choose higher proportions, but rather from faulty deliberative reasoning. In particular, people who display PR are less likely to engage in deliberative reflection as measured by response time, the Process Dissociation Procedure, the Cognitive Reflection Test, a numeracy test, and a task assessing denominator neglect. This association between faulty deliberation and PR was observed only when choosing the highest proportion was non-normative because it came at the expense of absolute gains (e.g., saving 10/10 lives is preferred to saving 11/100 lives). These results help to make sense of discrepant findings in previous research, pertaining to how PR relates to biased reasoning and decision making.

Realismo congnitivo, naturalismo e pragmatismo ético : a estrutura normativa das "formas de vida" segundo Hebermas e Putnam

Pretendo explicitar algumas implicações epistemológicas do debate entre Putnam e Habermas acerca da objetividade dos valores. Inicialmente, gostaria de construir, recorrendo a reflexões em filosofia da linguagem e no neopragmatismo, o horizonte teórico no qual se possa entender de maneira menos unilateral a relação entre naturalismo e a normatividade das “formas de vida” (1). Tais considerações devem funcionar como uma explanação do contexto filosófico em que se desenvolve o debate Habermas/Putnam. Em seguida, gostaria de resumir a posição de Putnam (2). Em terceiro lugar, a partir daquilo que parece ser a direção argumentativa compartilhada, pretendo evidenciar a pertinência do debate para os atuais questionamentos em filosofia prática, delineando os contornos do “pragmatismo ético” (3). Finalmente, procuro mostrar que Habermas escapa à crítica de Putnam aderindo implicitamente à tese da vinculação da moral deontológica a uma orientação axiológica em termos de vulnerabilidade (4). ______________________________________________________________________________ ABSTRACT

Entre a teoria social e a teoria da justiça : intersubjetividade, normatividade e vulnerabilidade

Este artigo pretende apresentar os motivos por trás de algumas propostas intersubjetivistas na teoria social e na teoria da justiça. Primeiramente, tentarei desenvolver alguns temas da filosofia de Hegel no sentido de formular a tese de que se estabelece aí uma relação fundamental entre teoria social e teoria da justiça (1). Em seguida, pretendo especificar o conteúdo desta relação num argumento duplo: mostrando (a) que ela consiste, do ponto de vista da teoria social, em uma dialética entre socialização e individualização; e (b) que esta dialética se vincula ao problema da normatividade, tornando-se relevante para a teoria da justiça (2). Em terceiro lugar, desejo mostrar que a ética do discurso projetou uma ampliação filosófico-jurídica não apenas para estabilizar a tensão entre validade e facticidade, mas que também, não sendo apenas especializada em questões de justiça, assume a tarefa de pensar a vulnerabilidade daquela dialética (3). Finalmente, procuro mostrar como uma teoria da justiça fundada no conceito intersubjetivo de liberdade é capaz de preencher mais adequadamente esta lacuna, criando condições para uma crítica terapêutica da modernidade (4). ______________________________________________________________________________ ABSTRACT

The problem of spontaneous goodness: from Kierkegaard to Løgstrup (via Zhuangzi and Eckhart)

Historically, Western philosophy has struggled to accommodate, or has simply denied, the moral value of spontaneous, non-reflective action. One important exception is in the work of K.E. Løgstrup, whose phenomenological ethics involves a claim that the ‘ethical demand’ of care for the other can only be realized through spontaneous assent to ‘sovereign expressions of life’ such as trust and mercy. Løgstrup attacks Kierkegaard for devaluing spontaneous moral action, but as I argue, Kierkegaard too offers an implicit view of spontaneous moral response (‘second immediacy’) as a regulative ideal. In attempting to articulate the model of character-formation that such an ethics requires, we can see both Løgstrup and Kierkegaard as engaging with an ancient problematic, running from Classical Daoism to medieval mysticism, of achieving spontaneity through purgation rather than edification—not building the subject up, but demolishing personality in order to become a conduit for a transcendent normativity.

Efficience et normativité : examen de la légitimité de l'utilisation de la notion d’efficience économique pour l'évaluation de politiques publiques

Ce texte a pour but de monter que l’efficience telle qu’utilisée par les économistes dans le cadre de recommandations de politiques publiques suppose toujours l’adoption de certains critères moraux. Je voudrai d’abord montrer que les recommandations des économistes en matière de politiques publiques ont déjà été identifiées aux recommandations de l’utilitarisme. Plusieurs économistes ont voulu abstraire leur science de toute discussion morale au XXe siècle. Cette séparation entre faits et valeur s’est soldée par l’apparition de l’efficience de Pareto, grandement utilisée dans le cadre de l’économie du bien-être. Cependant, cette utilisation de l’efficience suppose à la fois qu’il est moralement désirable d’améliorer le bien-être des individus et que ce bien-être peut être évalué en termes de satisfaction des préférences, ce qui constitue un jugement de nature éthique et morale qui ne peut être fait seulement à partir de faits scientifiques. L’efficience ne peut plutôt être utilisée de manière non moralement discutable seulement si l’on examine au préalable les objectifs sociaux que l’utilisation de cette mesure présuppose. D’un point de vue scientifique, l’économiste qui veut utiliser une mesure d’efficience doit donc toujours prendre pour acquis les éléments normatifs qui sont intégrés aux calculs d’efficience. La discussion concernant la pertinence de ces objectifs sociaux ainsi que l’importance relative de chacun des objectifs sociaux est une discussion portant avant tout sur des questions morales qui ne sont pas du domaine des sciences économiques.

Efficience et normativité : examen de la légitimité de l'utilisation de la notion d’efficience économique pour l'évaluation de politiques publiques

Ce texte a pour but de monter que l’efficience telle qu’utilisée par les économistes dans le cadre de recommandations de politiques publiques suppose toujours l’adoption de certains critères moraux. Je voudrai d’abord montrer que les recommandations des économistes en matière de politiques publiques ont déjà été identifiées aux recommandations de l’utilitarisme. Plusieurs économistes ont voulu abstraire leur science de toute discussion morale au XXe siècle. Cette séparation entre faits et valeur s’est soldée par l’apparition de l’efficience de Pareto, grandement utilisée dans le cadre de l’économie du bien-être. Cependant, cette utilisation de l’efficience suppose à la fois qu’il est moralement désirable d’améliorer le bien-être des individus et que ce bien-être peut être évalué en termes de satisfaction des préférences, ce qui constitue un jugement de nature éthique et morale qui ne peut être fait seulement à partir de faits scientifiques. L’efficience ne peut plutôt être utilisée de manière non moralement discutable seulement si l’on examine au préalable les objectifs sociaux que l’utilisation de cette mesure présuppose. D’un point de vue scientifique, l’économiste qui veut utiliser une mesure d’efficience doit donc toujours prendre pour acquis les éléments normatifs qui sont intégrés aux calculs d’efficience. La discussion concernant la pertinence de ces objectifs sociaux ainsi que l’importance relative de chacun des objectifs sociaux est une discussion portant avant tout sur des questions morales qui ne sont pas du domaine des sciences économiques.

Estudio sobre la operatividad y eficacia de las multas en el marco de la contratación estatal

El trabajo de grado se estructuró en tres capítulos. El primero constituye un marco teórico sobre el cual se fundamentan los siguientes, pues se realiza un análisis de la cláusula penal en el derecho privado, incluidas las prácticas comerciales internacionales. El segundo capítulo aborda el tema de las multas en la contratación estatal, para lo cual se estudió la normatividad y jurisprudencia pertinente; en esa parte del escrito se incluyó el apartado correspondiente al derecho comparado. Finalmente, en el tercer capítulo, se formula una propuesta que permite hacer de esta medida coercitiva provisional una herramienta idónea para lograr el correcto y oportuno cumplimiento del contrato.