Reversible thermal transition of polydiacetylene based on KTTKS collagen sequence

Here we explore the physico-chemical properties of a peptide amphiphile obtained by chemical conjugation of the collagenstimulating peptide KTTKS with 10,12-pentacosadiynoic acid which photopolymerizes as a stable and extended polydiacetylene. We investigate the self-assembly of this new polymer and rationalize its peculiar behavior in terms of a thermal conformational transition. Surprisingly, this polymer shows a thermal transition associated with a non-cooperative increase in b-sheet content at high temperature.

Multiproduct activity in an experimental differentiated oligopoly

In a symmetric differentiated experimental oligopoly with multiproduct firms we test the predictive power of the corresponding Bertrand-Nash equilibria. Subjects are not informed on the specification of the underlying demand model. In the presence of intense multiproduct activity, and provided that a parallel pricing rule is imposed to multiproduct firms, strategies tend to confirm the non-cooperative multiproduct solution.

Uma Contribuição à Contabilidade das Sociedades Cooperativas: Estudo de Caso sobre a Contabilização dos Atos Cooperativos e não Cooperativos em uma Cooperativa de Produção Vinícola do Sul do Brasil, de Acordo com a Norma Brasileira de Contabilidade - NBC T 10.8.

The main goal of this study is to contribute to the understanding of the appropriate accounting treatment of the operations in cooperatives, which differentiates them from other Brazilian commercial societies. This treatment is objectively examined under the lens of the norm NBC T 10.8 of Federal Council of Accounting, which determines distinction between cooperative acts and non-cooperative acts. The theoretical foundation of this paperwork is centered in examining, from both the cooperative doctrine and the accounting theory viewpoint, the issues related to the origin, nature and purpose of the cooperatives, as well as the accounting regulation applicable to them. The author developed a method to treat adequately the norm NBC T 10.8 and applied it to a case study of a wine producer cooperative in southern Brazil. As a result of this work, it is demonstrated that NBC T 10.8 eliminated a historical deficiency that permeated the accounting practice in cooperatives, whose accounting procedures - implicit in both technical and scientific content in NBC T 10.8 ¿ are presented in a detailed manner.

Regional integration and the issue of choosing an appropriate exchange-rate regime in Latin America

Includes bibliography

Weak local Nash equilibrium

In this paper, we consider a concept of local Nash equilibrium for non-cooperative games - the so-called weak local Nash equilibrium. We prove its existence for a significantly more general class of sets of strategies than compact convex sets. The theorems on existence of the weak local equilibrium presented here are applications of Brouwer and Lefschetz fixed point theorems. © 2013 Juliusz Schauder Centre for Nonlinear Studies Nicolaus Copernicus University.

Alívio de sobrecargas em redes de transmissão com o auxílio de geradores distribuídos

Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico (CNPq)

Caracterização da interação de inositol hexafosfato e cloreto com hemoglobina humana: aspectos energéticos e estruturais

Pós-graduação em Biofísica Molecular - IBILCE

Alocação de perdas e custos pelo uso do sistema de transmissão

Pós-graduação em Engenharia Elétrica - FEIS

Redução do medo durante o tratamento odontológico utilizando pontas ultrassônicas

Over the last few years, new technologies have been developed to making cavity preparations, among which the diamond burs CVDentus® (CVDentus, São José dos Campos, Brazil) are outstanding. These points are produced by chemical deposition from the vapor phase, forming a single diamond stone, with greater durability than the conventional diamond burs. Coupled to the ultrasound appliance, they have several clinical applications in Dentistry with advantages over conventional rotary instruments, such as lower pressure, noise, vibration and heat, as well as reducing the need to use local anesthesia, contributing to minimize patient’s fear and anxiety. The aim of this study was to present the complete restorative dental treatment performed with this system in a child patient with a prior history of non-cooperative behavior. The use of this new technology offered the patient greater comfort, making it possible recondition the patient’s attitude to dental treatment, in addition to favoring conservative cavity preparations to be made.

ARBOT: augmented reality system for teaching logic algorithmic

This article purposes the ARBot, a system that has as main objective the presentation of concepts of logic for students of elementary and secondary education. The system was developed using the technology known as Augmented Reality (AR), which allows complement the actual environment where the user is, by adding virtual objects. In this scenario the RA created from a virtual game interface is used, through which cognitive challenges are presented. To solve these challenges, users must set up three-dimensional virtual characters using visual language. As a result it follows that, in a playful way, concepts of algorithms and programming are assimilated by users. In addition, the system enables two users to interact in a cooperative game mode. In cooperative mode, the system focuses on collaborative learning, since it allows users to jointly solve the cognitive challenge presented by the system.

Lo spazio senso-motorio come rappresentazione dei comportamenti intersoggettivi. Una nuova ipotesi sperimentale dalla filosofia alle neuroscienze

La ricerca ha preso le mosse da tre ipotesi fondamentali: 1) Esiste un legame tra processi cognitivi di basso ed alto livello; 2) Lo spazio senso-motorio è una percezione soggettiva; 3) Lo spazio senso-motorio varia in funzione delle diverse modalità di interazione sociale. La tesi sostiene che lo spazio senso-motorio si lascia modulare dalla semplice co-presenza di un altro agente umano e da interazioni cooperative e non cooperative. I capitoli I, II, III, hanno lo scopo di scomporre e spiegare il significato della prima, seconda e terza ipotesi; giungendo a formulare la tesi centrale che sarà poi dimostrata sperimentalmente nel capitolo IV. Il capitolo V introduce future linee di ricerca nell’ambito dell’etica proponendo una nuova ipotesi sul legame che potrebbe sussistere tra la percezione dello spazio durante l’interazione sociale e i giudizi morali. Il lavoro svolto chiama ad operare insieme diverse discipline che concorrono a formare le scienze cognitive: la storia della filosofia, la filosofia della mente contemporanea, la neuropsicologia sperimentale ed alcuni temi della psicologia sociale.

Caratteristiche ed efficienza economica del Distretto agroalimentare del Pecorino Romano DOP

Una delle realtà economiche più importanti della Sardegna è la produzione di Pecorino Romano DOP. Il contesto nel quale è nato e si è sviluppato ingloba molte delle precondizioni che favoriscono la nascita di un distretto. Il principale obiettivo di questo studio è verificare se il comparto lattiero caseario della Sardegna, focalizzato nella produzione di Pecorino Romano DOP, può creare un effetto distretto. Ciò potrebbe suggerire l'esistenza dello stesso distretto anche se atipico. Per verificare questa ipotesi, in primo luogo è stata esaminata l'efficienza produttiva delle imprese trasformatrici di Pecorino Romano utilizzando il metodo della Frontiera stocastica di produzione. Successivamente sono state cercate le cause delle differenze. Lo studio mostra che i livelli di efficienza osservati sono quasi interamente attribuibili agli input di produzione utilizzati, in particolare al latte. Risulta chiaro che il sistema delle cooperative funziona e che tali aziende ottengono sistematicamente margini di efficienza migliori rispetto alle non cooperative. Le variabili analizzate non permettono di concludere che esiste un "effetto distretto".

Théorie des jeux expérimentale & action motrice

How do sportspeople succeed in a non-collaborative game? An illustration of a perverse side effect of altruism Are team sports specialists predisposed to collaboration? The scientific literature on this topic is divided. The present article attempts to end this debate by applying experimental game theory. We constituted three groups of volunteers (all students aged around 20): 25 team sports specialists; 23 individual sports specialists (gymnasts, track & field athletes and swimmers) and a control group of 24 non-sportspeople. Each subgroup was divided into 3 teams that played against each other in turn (and not against teams from other subgroups). The teams played a game based on the well-known Prisoner's Dilemma (Tucker, 1950) - the paradoxical "Bluegill Sunbass Game" (Binmore, 1999) with three Nash equilibria (two suboptimal equilibria with a pure strategy and an optimal equilibrium with a mixed, egotistical strategy (p= 1/2)). This game also features a Harsanyi equilibrium (based on constant compliance with a moral code and altruism by empathy: "do not unto others that which you would not have them do unto you"). How, then, was the game played? Two teams of 8 competed on a handball court. Each team wore a distinctive jersey. The game lasted 15 minutes and the players were allowed to touch the handball ball with their feet or hands. After each goal, each team had to return to its own half of the court. Players were allowed to score in either goal and thus cooperate with their teammates or not, as they saw fit. A goal against the nominally opposing team (a "guardian" strategy, by analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game) earned a point for everyone in the team. For an own goal (a "sneaker" strategy), only the scorer earned a point - hence the paradox. If all the members of a team work together to score a goal, everyone is happy (the Harsanyi solution). However, the situation was not balanced in the Nashian sense: each player had a reason to be disloyal to his/her team at the merest opportunity. But if everyone adopts a "sneaker" strategy, the game becomes a free-for-all and the chances of scoring become much slimmer. In a context in which doubt reigns as to the honesty of team members and "legal betrayals", what type of sportsperson will score the most goals? By analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game, we recorded direct motor interactions (passes and shots) based on either a "guardian" tactic (i.e. collaboration within the team) or a "sneaker" tactic (shots and passes against the player's designated team). So, was the group of team sports specialist more collaborative than the other two groups? The answer was no. A statistical analysis (difference from chance in a logistic regression) enabled us to draw three conclusions: ?For the team sports specialists, the Nash equilibrium (1950) was stronger than the Harsanyi equilibrium (1977). ?The sporting principles of equilibrium and exclusivity are not appropriate in the Bluegill Sunbass Game and are quickly abandoned by the team sports specialists. The latter are opportunists who focus solely on winning and do well out of it. ?The most altruistic players are the main losers in the Bluegill Sunbass Game: they keep the game alive but contribute to their own defeat. In our experiment, the most altruistic players tended to be the females and the individual sports specialists

Théorie des jeux expérimentale & action motrice

How do sportspeople succeed in a non-collaborative game? An illustration of a perverse side effect of altruism Are team sports specialists predisposed to collaboration? The scientific literature on this topic is divided. The present article attempts to end this debate by applying experimental game theory. We constituted three groups of volunteers (all students aged around 20): 25 team sports specialists; 23 individual sports specialists (gymnasts, track & field athletes and swimmers) and a control group of 24 non-sportspeople. Each subgroup was divided into 3 teams that played against each other in turn (and not against teams from other subgroups). The teams played a game based on the well-known Prisoner's Dilemma (Tucker, 1950) - the paradoxical "Bluegill Sunbass Game" (Binmore, 1999) with three Nash equilibria (two suboptimal equilibria with a pure strategy and an optimal equilibrium with a mixed, egotistical strategy (p= 1/2)). This game also features a Harsanyi equilibrium (based on constant compliance with a moral code and altruism by empathy: "do not unto others that which you would not have them do unto you"). How, then, was the game played? Two teams of 8 competed on a handball court. Each team wore a distinctive jersey. The game lasted 15 minutes and the players were allowed to touch the handball ball with their feet or hands. After each goal, each team had to return to its own half of the court. Players were allowed to score in either goal and thus cooperate with their teammates or not, as they saw fit. A goal against the nominally opposing team (a "guardian" strategy, by analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game) earned a point for everyone in the team. For an own goal (a "sneaker" strategy), only the scorer earned a point - hence the paradox. If all the members of a team work together to score a goal, everyone is happy (the Harsanyi solution). However, the situation was not balanced in the Nashian sense: each player had a reason to be disloyal to his/her team at the merest opportunity. But if everyone adopts a "sneaker" strategy, the game becomes a free-for-all and the chances of scoring become much slimmer. In a context in which doubt reigns as to the honesty of team members and "legal betrayals", what type of sportsperson will score the most goals? By analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game, we recorded direct motor interactions (passes and shots) based on either a "guardian" tactic (i.e. collaboration within the team) or a "sneaker" tactic (shots and passes against the player's designated team). So, was the group of team sports specialist more collaborative than the other two groups? The answer was no. A statistical analysis (difference from chance in a logistic regression) enabled us to draw three conclusions: ?For the team sports specialists, the Nash equilibrium (1950) was stronger than the Harsanyi equilibrium (1977). ?The sporting principles of equilibrium and exclusivity are not appropriate in the Bluegill Sunbass Game and are quickly abandoned by the team sports specialists. The latter are opportunists who focus solely on winning and do well out of it. ?The most altruistic players are the main losers in the Bluegill Sunbass Game: they keep the game alive but contribute to their own defeat. In our experiment, the most altruistic players tended to be the females and the individual sports specialists

Théorie des jeux expérimentale & action motrice

How do sportspeople succeed in a non-collaborative game? An illustration of a perverse side effect of altruism Are team sports specialists predisposed to collaboration? The scientific literature on this topic is divided. The present article attempts to end this debate by applying experimental game theory. We constituted three groups of volunteers (all students aged around 20): 25 team sports specialists; 23 individual sports specialists (gymnasts, track & field athletes and swimmers) and a control group of 24 non-sportspeople. Each subgroup was divided into 3 teams that played against each other in turn (and not against teams from other subgroups). The teams played a game based on the well-known Prisoner's Dilemma (Tucker, 1950) - the paradoxical "Bluegill Sunbass Game" (Binmore, 1999) with three Nash equilibria (two suboptimal equilibria with a pure strategy and an optimal equilibrium with a mixed, egotistical strategy (p= 1/2)). This game also features a Harsanyi equilibrium (based on constant compliance with a moral code and altruism by empathy: "do not unto others that which you would not have them do unto you"). How, then, was the game played? Two teams of 8 competed on a handball court. Each team wore a distinctive jersey. The game lasted 15 minutes and the players were allowed to touch the handball ball with their feet or hands. After each goal, each team had to return to its own half of the court. Players were allowed to score in either goal and thus cooperate with their teammates or not, as they saw fit. A goal against the nominally opposing team (a "guardian" strategy, by analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game) earned a point for everyone in the team. For an own goal (a "sneaker" strategy), only the scorer earned a point - hence the paradox. If all the members of a team work together to score a goal, everyone is happy (the Harsanyi solution). However, the situation was not balanced in the Nashian sense: each player had a reason to be disloyal to his/her team at the merest opportunity. But if everyone adopts a "sneaker" strategy, the game becomes a free-for-all and the chances of scoring become much slimmer. In a context in which doubt reigns as to the honesty of team members and "legal betrayals", what type of sportsperson will score the most goals? By analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game, we recorded direct motor interactions (passes and shots) based on either a "guardian" tactic (i.e. collaboration within the team) or a "sneaker" tactic (shots and passes against the player's designated team). So, was the group of team sports specialist more collaborative than the other two groups? The answer was no. A statistical analysis (difference from chance in a logistic regression) enabled us to draw three conclusions: ?For the team sports specialists, the Nash equilibrium (1950) was stronger than the Harsanyi equilibrium (1977). ?The sporting principles of equilibrium and exclusivity are not appropriate in the Bluegill Sunbass Game and are quickly abandoned by the team sports specialists. The latter are opportunists who focus solely on winning and do well out of it. ?The most altruistic players are the main losers in the Bluegill Sunbass Game: they keep the game alive but contribute to their own defeat. In our experiment, the most altruistic players tended to be the females and the individual sports specialists