Options for a Euro-area fiscal capacity. Bruegel Policy Brief 2013/01, January 2013

Europe has responded to the crisis with strengthened budgetary and macroeconomic surveillance, the creation of the European Stability Mechanism, liquidity provisioning by resilient economies and the European Central Bank and a process towards a banking union. However, a monetary union requires some form of budget for fiscal stabilisation in case of shocks, and as a backstop to the banking union. This paper compares four quantitatively different schemes of fiscal stabilisation and proposes a new scheme based on GDP-indexed bonds. The options considered are: (i) A federal budget with unemployment and corporate taxes shifted to euro-area level; (ii) a support scheme based on deviations from potential output;(iii) an insurance scheme via which governments would issue bonds indexed to GDP, and (iv) a scheme in which access to jointly guaranteed borrowing is combined with gradual withdrawal of fiscal sovereignty. Our comparison is based on strong assumptions. We carry out a preliminary, limited simulation of how the debt-to-GDP ratio would have developed between 2008-14 under the four schemes for Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and an ‘average’ country.The schemes have varying implications in each case for debt sustainability

Euroland - The effect of Euro on international trade : Are there winners and losers in this ''Euro-game''?

This paper examines whether European Monetary Union (EMU) countries share fairly the effect of their membership in Eurozone (EZ) or whether are winners and losers in this ''Euro-game''. By using panel data of 27 European Union (EU) Member States for the period 2001-2012 in the context of a gravity model, we focus on estimating the Euro’s effect on bilateral trade and we detect whether this effect differs across the Member States of EZ. Two estimation methods are applied: Pooled OLS estimator and Fixed Effects estimator. The empirical results come to the conclusion that the individual country effects differ and are statistically significant, indicating that EMU’s effect on trade differs across the Member States of EZ. The overall effect of the Euro is statistically insignificant, regardless the estimation method, demonstrating that the common European currency may have no effect on bilateral trade.

Speculative attacks on debts and optimum currency area: a welfare analysis

Traditionally the issue of an optimum currency area is based on the theoretical underpinnings developed in the 1960s by McKinnon [13], Kenen [12] and mainly Mundell [14], who is concerned with the benefits of lowering transaction costs vis-à- vis adjustments to asymmetrical shocks. Recently, this theme has been reappraised with new aspects included in the analysis, such as: incomplete markets, credibility of monetary policy and seigniorage, among others. For instance, Neumeyer [15] develops a general equilibrium model with incomplete asset markets and shows that a monetary union is desirable when the welfare gains of eliminating the exchange rate volatility are greater than the cost of reducing the number of currencies to hedge against risks. In this paper, we also resort to a general equilibrium model to evaluate financial aspects of an optimum currency area. Our focus is to appraise the welfare of a country heavily dependent on foreign capital that may suffer a speculative attack on its public debt. The welfare analysis uses as reference the self-fulfilling debt crisis model of Cole and Kehoe ([6], [7] and [8]), which is employed here to represent dollarization. Under this regime, the national government has no control over its monetary policy, the total public debt is denominated in dollars and it is in the hands of international bankers. To describe a country that is a member of a currency union, we modify the original Cole-Kehoe model by including public debt denominated in common currency, only purchased by national consumers. According to this rule, the member countries regain some influence over the monetary policy decision, which is, however, dependent on majority voting. We show that for specific levels of dollar debt, to create inflation tax on common-currency debt in order to avoid an external default is more desirable than to suspend its payment, which is the only choice available for a dollarized economy when foreign creditors decide not to renew their loans.

Ataques especulativos sobre dívidas e regimes monetários

A tese pretende conhecer de forma profunda a metodologia de ataques especulativos sobre dívidas, desenvolvida por Cole e Kehoe (1996), e tem três objetivos principais: (i) aplicá-la a outros países, além do México, que é feito na versão original; (ii) entender a opção de um país dolarizar, em relação à alternativa de manter sua moeda local, quando a economia depende da entrada de capitais financeiros internacionais; e (iii) estudar a união monetária como uma terceira alternativa de regime monetário, em comparação com a dolarização e o regime de moeda local. O modelo de crises da dívida de Cole-Kehoe é aplicado às economias da Coréia, da Rússia e do Brasil. Modifica-se este modelo para incluir dívida denominada em moeda local, que é totalmente adquirida pelos consumidores nacionais e que dá ao governo a possibilidade de obter receitas por meio da cobrança de um imposto inflacionário sobre estes ativos. As receitas obtidas desta forma podem ser utilizadas para pagar os banqueiros internacionais e evitar uma crise da dívida externa, que ocorreria, em caso contrário. Considera-se também, neste caso, que o banco central possa estar sujeito a pressões de seu governo para gerar estas receitas. Analogamente, para representar um país pertencente a uma união monetária, inclui-se dívida denominada em moeda comum e um governo central no modelo original. A política monetária da união está subordinada à decisão conjunta de todos os países membros. Supõe-se também que o banco central da união possa sofrer pressões políticas de alguns governos nacionais sem disciplina fiscal e dispostos a obter receitas de imposto inflacionário sobre a dívida. Na dolarização, a política monetária está submetida a do banco central do país âncora e, portanto, não há possibilidade de o governo gerar receitas extraordinárias sobre a dívida, a menos que haja forte simetria dos choques que atingem a economia dolarizada e o país âncora. Considerando estas peculiaridades dos três regimes monetários, os níveis de bem-estar são caracterizados e avaliados numericamente para o Brasil. Além disso, obtém-se a política ótima do governo para a dívida em dólar, segundo os três regimes.

Speculative attacks on debts, dollarization and optimum currency areas

The purpose of this article is to contribute to the discussion of the financial aspects of dollarization and optimum currency areas. Based on the model of self-fulfilling debt crisis developed by Cole and Kehoe [4], it is possible to evaluate the comparative welfare of economies, which either keep their local currency and an independent monetary policy, join a monetary union or adopt dollarization. In the two former monetary regimes, governments can issue debt denominated, respectively, in local and common currencies, which is completely purchased by national consumers. Given this ability, governments may decide to impose an inflation tax on these assets and use the revenues so collected to avoid an external debt crises. While the country that issues its own currency takes this decision independently, a country belonging to a monetary union depends on the joint decision of all member countries about the common monetary policy. In this way, an external debt crises may be avoided under the local and common currency regimes, if, respectively, the national and the union central banks have the ability to do monetary policy, represented by the reduction in the real return on the bonds denominated in these currencies. This resource is not available under dollarization. In a dollarized economy, the loss of control over national monetary policy does not allow adjustments for exogenous shocks that asymmetrically affect the client and the anchor countries, but credibility is strengthened. On the other hand, given the ability to inflate the local currency, the central bank may be subject to the political influence of a government not so strongly concerned with fiscal discipline, which reduces the welfare of the economy. In a similar fashion, under a common currency regime, the union central bank may also be under the influence of a group of countries to inflate the common currency, even though they do not face external restrictions. Therefore, the local and common currencies could be viewed as a way to provide welfare enhancing bankruptcy, if it is not abused. With these peculiarities of monetary regimes in mind, we simulate the levels of economic welfare for each, employing recent data for the Brazilian economy.

Europe’s financial crisis: the Euro’s flawed design and the consequences of lack of a government banker

This paper argues the euro zone requires a government banker that manages the bond market and helps finance country budget deficits. The euro solved Europe’s problem of exchange rate speculation by creating a unified currency managed by a single central bank, but in doing so it replaced the exchange rate speculation problem with bond market speculation. Remedying this requires a central bank that acts as government banker and maintains bond interest rates at sustainable levels. Because the euro is a monetary union, this must be done in a way that both avoids favoring individual countries and avoids creating incentives for irresponsible country fiscal policy that leads to “bail-outs”. The paper argues this can be accomplished via a European Public Finance Authority (EPFA) that issues public debt which the European Central Bank (ECB) is allowed to trade. The debate over the euro’s financial architecture has significant political implications. The current neoliberal inspired architecture, which imposes a complete separation between the central bank and public finances, puts governments under continuous financial pressures. That will make it difficult to maintain the European social democratic welfare state. This gives a political reason for reforming the euro and creating an EPFA that supplements the economic case for reform.

Fostering economic policy coordination in Latin America: the REDIMA approach to escaping the prisoner's dilemma

Includes bibliography

Regional integration and the issue of choosing an appropriate exchange-rate regime in Latin America

Includes bibliography

Exchange rate regimes in the Caribbean

This document analyses exchange rate regimes in the Caribbean subregion. Caribbean exchange rate regimes are typified into hard and soft pegs. Hard pegs refer to those arrangements that maintain a constant value of the domestic currency in terms of the currency of a major trading partner. The Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS); economies established a monetary union in 1983. The Bahamas, Belize and Barbados also fixed the value of their domestic currency in relation to the United States dollar in the middle of the 1970s. Soft pegs are monetary arrangements characterized by a forcefully managed exchange rate. Three countries are included in this category, Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago

A união econômica e monetária e a dinâmica da integração européia: uma abordagem das relações internacionais

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES)

Implicações da União Econômica e Monetária Europeia sobre a política econômica dos PIGS: uma análise sobre a crise das dívidas soberanas

The present work intends to analyze the impacts of the European Economic and Monetary Union in the economic policies of the countries named PIGS, with an analysis about the sovereign debt crisis, in view of the autonomy loss to adopt own monetary and exchange rate policies of countries with different levels of development

On The Timing of Default Losses: When and Why?

At the light of what happened in 2010 and 2011, a lot of European countries founded themselves in a difficult position where all the credit rating agencies were downgrading debt states. Problem of solvency and guarantees on the states' bond were perceived as too risky for a Monetary Union as Europe is. Fear of a contagion from Greece as well was threatening the other countries as Italy, Spain, Portugal and Ireland; while Germany and France asked for a division between risky and riskless bond in order to feel more safe. Our paper gets inspiration by Roch and Uhlig (2011), it refers to the Argentinian case examined by Arellano (2008) and examine possible interventions as monetization or bailout as proposed by Cole and Kehoe (2000). We propose a model in which a state defaults and cannot repay a fraction of the old bond; but contrary to Roch and Uhlig that where considering a one-time cost of default we consider default as an accumulation of losses, perceived as unpaid fractions of the old debts. Our contributions to literature is that default immediately imply that economy faces a bad period and, accumulating losses, government will be worse-off. We studied a function for this accumulation of debt period by period, in order to get an idea of the magnitude of this waste of resources that economy will face when experiences a default. Our thesis is that bailouts just postpone the day of reckoning (Roch, Uhlig); so it's better to default before accumulate a lot of debts. What Europe need now is the introduction of new reforms in a controlled default where the Eurozone will be saved in its whole integrity and a state could fail with the future promise of a resurrection. As experience show us, governments are not interested into reducing debts since there are ECB interventions. That clearly create a distortion between countries in the same monetary union, giving to the states just an illusion about their future debtor position.

Integration under 'One Country, Two Systems' - The Case of Mainland China and Hong Kong-

Ever since the handover of the territory in 1997, Hong Kong has had its own unique law and its own economic system and international legal personality, and has not been integrated with Mainland China. The Basic Law guarantees the uniqueness of the Hong Kong SAR until 2047. But close economic ties between Hong Kong and the Mainland will promote closer economic integration. The Basic Law limits only a customs union and the introduction of a single currency, but not the formation of a Free Trade Agreement (hereafter FTA) and monetary union. FTA has already been realized in the form of the Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (hereafter CEPA). The Hong Kong SAR government, including the bureaucrat as well as the Chief Executive Tung Chee Hwa, was opposed to, and hesitant towards, the formation of a regional trade agreement with the Mainland, but the business community made them to adopt a positive attitude towards the CEPA. It is unclear how much integration can been deepened, but it can be argued that the current policy of the Hong Kong SAR is too supportive of business, and an excessive degree of economic integration may threaten the uniqueness of Hong Kong. But if Hong Kong achieves democracy and enjoys complete autonomy, it will be easy for economic integration to co-exist with the 'One Country, Two Systems' approach, in the interests of the business community and of the citizens of the SAR.

Trade and Business Cycle Correlations in Asia-Pacific

Recent empirical studies challenge the traditional theory of optimum currency areas by arguing that a monetary union enhances trade and business cycle co-movements among its member countries sufficiently as to obviate the need for national monetary policy. This paper examines the empirical relationship between trade and business cycle correlations among thirteen Asia-Pacific countries, paying particular attention to the structural characteristics of their economies and other issues not explored fully in the literature. According to our result, although trade is relevant to the business cycles of individual countries, the main determinant of their international correlations is not the geographical structure of their trade but what they produce and export --more specifically the extent to which their output and exports are concentrated on electronic products.