Latin America and the Caribbean in the World Economy 2010-2011: The region in the decade of the emerging economies

Incluye Bibliografía

Trade and investment flows between the Caribbean and the rest of the hemisphere in the context of the FTAA

Includes bibliography

Going through the labyrinth: the political economy of Argentina’s abandonment of the gold standard (1929-1933)

This article is the short but crucial history of four years of transition in a monetary and exchange-rate regime that culminated in 1933 with the final abandonment of the gold standard in Argentina. That process involved decisions made at critical junctures at which the government authorities had little time to deliberate and against which they had no analytical arsenal, no technical certainties and few political convictions. The objective of this study is to analyse those “decisions” at seven milestone moments, from the external shock of 1929 to the submission to Congress of a bill for the creation of the central bank and a currency control regime characterized by multiple exchange rates. The new regime that this reordering of the Argentine economy implied would remain in place, in one form or another, for at least a quarter of a century.

Alteração da fertilidade do solo como indicador do processo de antropização e presença de atividades não agrícolas no assentamento rural Horto Aimorés, municípios de Bauru e Pederneiras/SP =: Change of soil fertility as an indicator of the anthropization process and presence of non agricultural activities at the rural settlement Horto Aimorés, cities of Bauru and Pederneiras/ SP

Pós-graduação em Geografia - FCT

Essays on the political economy of European integration

Recently, a rising interest in political and economic integration/disintegration issues has been developed in the political economy field. This growing strand of literature partly draws on traditional issues of fiscal federalism and optimum public good provision and focuses on a trade-off between the benefits of centralization, arising from economies of scale or externalities, and the costs of harmonizing policies as a consequence of the increased heterogeneity of individual preferences in an international union or in a country composed of at least two regions. This thesis stems from this strand of literature and aims to shed some light on two highly relevant aspects of the political economy of European integration. The first concerns the role of public opinion in the integration process; more precisely, how economic benefits and costs of integration shape citizens' support for European Union (EU) membership. The second is the allocation of policy competences among different levels of government: European, national and regional. Chapter 1 introduces the topics developed in this thesis by reviewing the main recent theoretical developments in the political economy analysis of integration processes. It is structured as follows. First, it briefly surveys a few relevant articles on economic theories of integration and disintegration processes (Alesina and Spolaore 1997, Bolton and Roland 1997, Alesina et al. 2000, Casella and Feinstein 2002) and discusses their relevance for the study of the impact of economic benefits and costs on public opinion attitude towards the EU. Subsequently, it explores the links existing between such political economy literature and theories of fiscal federalism, especially with regard to normative considerations concerning the optimal allocation of competences in a union. Chapter 2 firstly proposes a model of citizens’ support for membership of international unions, with explicit reference to the EU; subsequently it tests the model on a panel of EU countries. What are the factors that influence public opinion support for the European Union (EU)? In international relations theory, the idea that citizens' support for the EU depends on material benefits deriving from integration, i.e. whether European integration makes individuals economically better off (utilitarian support), has been common since the 1970s, but has never been the subject of a formal treatment (Hix 2005). A small number of studies in the 1990s have investigated econometrically the link between national economic performance and mass support for European integration (Eichenberg and Dalton 1993; Anderson and Kalthenthaler 1996), but only making informal assumptions. The main aim of Chapter 2 is thus to propose and test our model with a view to providing a more complete and theoretically grounded picture of public support for the EU. Following theories of utilitarian support, we assume that citizens are in favour of membership if they receive economic benefits from it. To develop this idea, we propose a simple political economic model drawing on the recent economic literature on integration and disintegration processes. The basic element is the existence of a trade-off between the benefits of centralisation and the costs of harmonising policies in presence of heterogeneous preferences among countries. The approach we follow is that of the recent literature on the political economy of international unions and the unification or break-up of nations (Bolton and Roland 1997, Alesina and Wacziarg 1999, Alesina et al. 2001, 2005a, to mention only the relevant). The general perspective is that unification provides returns to scale in the provision of public goods, but reduces each member state’s ability to determine its most favoured bundle of public goods. In the simple model presented in Chapter 2, support for membership of the union is increasing in the union’s average income and in the loss of efficiency stemming from being outside the union, and decreasing in a country’s average income, while increasing heterogeneity of preferences among countries points to a reduced scope of the union. Afterwards we empirically test the model with data on the EU; more precisely, we perform an econometric analysis employing a panel of member countries over time. The second part of Chapter 2 thus tries to answer the following question: does public opinion support for the EU really depend on economic factors? The findings are broadly consistent with our theoretical expectations: the conditions of the national economy, differences in income among member states and heterogeneity of preferences shape citizens’ attitude towards their country’s membership of the EU. Consequently, this analysis offers some interesting policy implications for the present debate about ratification of the European Constitution and, more generally, about how the EU could act in order to gain more support from the European public. Citizens in many member states are called to express their opinion in national referenda, which may well end up in rejection of the Constitution, as recently happened in France and the Netherlands, triggering a European-wide political crisis. These events show that nowadays understanding public attitude towards the EU is not only of academic interest, but has a strong relevance for policy-making too. Chapter 3 empirically investigates the link between European integration and regional autonomy in Italy. Over the last few decades, the double tendency towards supranationalism and regional autonomy, which has characterised some European States, has taken a very interesting form in this country, because Italy, besides being one of the founding members of the EU, also implemented a process of decentralisation during the 1970s, further strengthened by a constitutional reform in 2001. Moreover, the issue of the allocation of competences among the EU, the Member States and the regions is now especially topical. The process leading to the drafting of European Constitution (even if then it has not come into force) has attracted much attention from a constitutional political economy perspective both on a normative and positive point of view (Breuss and Eller 2004, Mueller 2005). The Italian parliament has recently passed a new thorough constitutional reform, still to be approved by citizens in a referendum, which includes, among other things, the so called “devolution”, i.e. granting the regions exclusive competence in public health care, education and local police. Following and extending the methodology proposed in a recent influential article by Alesina et al. (2005b), which only concentrated on the EU activity (treaties, legislation, and European Court of Justice’s rulings), we develop a set of quantitative indicators measuring the intensity of the legislative activity of the Italian State, the EU and the Italian regions from 1973 to 2005 in a large number of policy categories. By doing so, we seek to answer the following broad questions. Are European and regional legislations substitutes for state laws? To what extent are the competences attributed by the European treaties or the Italian Constitution actually exerted in the various policy areas? Is their exertion consistent with the normative recommendations from the economic literature about their optimum allocation among different levels of government? The main results show that, first, there seems to be a certain substitutability between EU and national legislations (even if not a very strong one), but not between regional and national ones. Second, the EU concentrates its legislative activity mainly in international trade and agriculture, whilst social policy is where the regions and the State (which is also the main actor in foreign policy) are more active. Third, at least two levels of government (in some cases all of them) are significantly involved in the legislative activity in many sectors, even where the rationale for that is, at best, very questionable, indicating that they actually share a larger number of policy tasks than that suggested by the economic theory. It appears therefore that an excessive number of competences are actually shared among different levels of government. From an economic perspective, it may well be recommended that some competences be shared, but only when the balance between scale or spillover effects and heterogeneity of preferences suggests so. When, on the contrary, too many levels of government are involved in a certain policy area, the distinction between their different responsibilities easily becomes unnecessarily blurred. This may not only leads to a slower and inefficient policy-making process, but also risks to make it too complicate to understand for citizens, who, on the contrary, should be able to know who is really responsible for a certain policy when they vote in national,local or European elections or in referenda on national or European constitutional issues.

A mixed methods inquiry into the political economy of agriculture and rural areas in Lebanon

The present work, then, is concerned with the forgotten elements of the Lebanese economy, agriculture and rural development. It investigates the main problematic which arose from these forgotten components, in particular the structure of the agricultural sector, production technology, income distribution, poverty, food security, territorial development and local livelihood strategies. It will do so using quantitative Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) modeling and a qualitative phenomenological case study analysis, both embedded in a critical review of the historical development of the political economy of Lebanon, and a structural analysis of its economy. The research shows that under-development in Lebanese rural areas is not due to lack of resources, but rather is the consequence of political choices. It further suggests that agriculture – in both its mainstream conventional and its innovative locally initiated forms of production – still represents important potential for inducing economic growth and development. In order to do so, Lebanon has to take full advantage of its human and territorial capital, by developing a rural development strategy based on two parallel sets of actions: one directed toward the support of local rural development initiatives, and the other directed toward intensive form of production. In addition to its economic returns, such a strategy would promote social and political stability.

Can the green economy enhance sustainable mountain development? The potential role of awareness building

Mountain socio-ecological systems produce valuable but complex ecosystem services resulting from biomes stratified by altitude and gravity. These systems are often managed and shaped by smallholders whose marginalization is exacerbated by uncertainties and a lack of policy attention. Human–environment interfaces in mountains hence require holistic policies. We analyse the potential of the Global Mountain Green Economy Agenda (GMGEA) in building awareness and thus prompting cross-sectoral policy strategies for sustainable mountain development. Considering the critique of the green economy presented at the Rio + 20 conference, we argue that the GMGEA can nevertheless structure knowledge and inform regional institutions about the complexity of mountain socio-ecological systems, a necessary pre-condition to prompt inter-agency collaboration and cross-sectoral policy formulation. After reviewing the content of the GMGEA, we draw on two empirical cases in the Pakistani and Nepali Himalayas. First, we show that lack of awareness has led to a sequence of fragmented interventions with unanticipated, and unwanted, consequences for communities. Second, using a green economy lens, we show how fragmentation could have been avoided and cross-sectoral policies yielded more beneficial results. Project fragmentation reflects disconnected or layered policies by government agencies, which inherently keep specialized agendas and have no incentive to collaborate. Awareness makes agencies more likely to collaborate and adopt cross-sectoral approaches, allowing them to target more beneficiaries, be more visible, and raise more funds. Nevertheless, we also identify four factors that may currently still limit the effect of the GMGEA: high costs of inter-agency collaboration, lack of legitimacy of the green economy, insufficiently-secured smallholder participation, and limited understanding of the mechanisms through which global agendas influence local policy.

Reconsidering the logic of World Federation of Neurosurgical Societies grading in patients with severe subarachnoid hemorrhage.

OBJECT Current data show a favorable outcome in up to 50% of patients with World Federation of Neurosurgical Societies (WFNS) Grade V subarachnoid hemorrhage (SAH) and a rather poor prediction of worst cases. Thus, the usefulness of the current WFNS grading system for identifying the worst scenarios for clinical studies and for making treatment decisions is limited. One reason for this lack of differentiation is the use of "negative" or "silent" diagnostic signs as part of the WFNS Grade V definition. The authors therefore reevaluated the WFNS scale by using "positive" clinical signs and the logic of the Glasgow Coma Scale as a progressive herniation score. METHODS The authors performed a retrospective analysis of 182 patients with SAH who had poor grades on the WFNS scale. Patients were graded according to the original WFNS scale and additionally according to a modified classification, the WFNS herniation (hWFNS) scale (Grade IV, no clinical signs of herniation; Grade V, clinical signs of herniation). The prediction of poor outcome was compared between these two grading systems. RESULTS The positive predictive values of Grade V for poor outcome were 74.3% (OR 3.79, 95% CI 1.94-7.54) for WFNS Grade V and 85.7% (OR 8.27, 95% CI 3.78-19.47) for hWFNS Grade V. With respect to mortality, the positive predictive values were 68.3% (OR 3.9, 95% CI 2.01-7.69) for WFNS Grade V and 77.9% (OR 6.22, 95% CI 3.07-13.14) for hWFNS Grade V. CONCLUSIONS Limiting WFNS Grade V to the positive clinical signs of the Glasgow Coma Scale such as flexion, extension, and pupillary abnormalities instead of including "no motor response" increases the prediction of mortality and poor outcome in patients with severe SAH.

An aided economy: the characteristics of the Transnistrian economic model. OSW Commentary No. 108, 2013-05-14

The economy of breakaway Transnistria is a peculiar combination of the command-and-distribution model inherited from the USSR with elements of a free-market economy which is heavily dependent on Russian energy and financial subsidies. The main pillars of the region’s economy are several large industrial plants, built in the Soviet era, which generate more than half of its GDP (in 2012, Transnistria’s GDP reached around US$1 billion). As a consequence, the condition of each of these companies, whose production is almost exclusively export- -oriented, has a huge impact on the economic situation in Transnistria. This makes the region extremely sensitive to any changes in the economic situation of its key trade partners. This problem is additionally aggravated by the extremely low diversification of Transnistrian exports. The only major economic entity in Transnistria which regularly yields profits and is not so heavily dependent on the external situation is Sheriff. This corporation controls the greater part of the local wholesale and retail trade, as well as a major part of the services sector on the domestic market.

An economy with unrealistic indicators: an evaluation of the economic situation in Belarus and a forecast for 2013. OSW Commentary No. 103, 2013-02-20

The macroeconomic results achieved by Belarus in 2012 laid bare the weakness and the inefficiency of its economy. Belarus’s GDP and positive trade balance were growing in the first half of last year. However, this trend was reversed when Russia blocked the scheme of extremely lucrative manipulations in the re-export of Russian petroleum products by Belarus and when the demand for potassium fertilisers fell on the global market. It became clear once again that the outdated Belarusian model of a centrally planned economy is unable to generate sustainable growth, and the Belarusian economy needs thorough structural reforms. Nevertheless, President Alyaksandr Lukashenka consistently continues to block any changes in the system and at the same time expects that the economic indicators this year will reach levels far beyond the possibilities of the Belarusian economy. Therefore, there is a risk that the Belarusian government may employ – as they used to do – instruments aimed at artificially stimulating domestic demand, including money creation. This may upset the relative stability of state finances, which the regime managed to achieve last year. The worst case scenario would see a repeat of what happened in 2011, when a serious financial crisis occurred, forcing Minsk to make concessions (including selling the national network of gas pipelines) to Moscow, its only real source of loans. It thus cannot be ruled out that also this time the only way to recover from the slump will be to receive additional loan support and energy subsidies from Russia at the expense of selling further strategic companies to Russian investors.

The political economy of war,

pt. 1. Policy and economics of war.--pt. 2. On war debts.--pt. 3. On the great war of 1914-15.

Megtakarítások és külső finanszírozás az amerikai gazdaságban. A hitelpiaci válság háttere (1997-2007) (Savings and external financing in the American economy. The background to the credit-market crisis (1997–2007))

A tanulmány nem az aktuális hitelpiaci válság enyhítésének kérdésével foglalkozik, hanem az amerikai gazdaság elmúlt négy évtizedének általános és az utolsó tíz évének konkrét beruházási-megtakarítási és növekedési tendenciáit igyekszik feltárni. Azt vizsgálja, hogy milyen mélyebb, belföldi eredetű szerkezeti okai vannak a nemzetközivé dagadt jelzáloghitel-válságnak. A cikk a nyitott gazdaság külső finanszírozással összefüggő mérlegazonosságainak alapján arra a következtetésre jut, hogy az ingatlanpiaci visszaesés és a kibocsátás zsugorodása az Egyesült Államok gazdaságában már több mint másfél évtizede kialakult kedvezőtlen, de még tovább romló belföldi megtakarítási folyamatok következménye. A jelzálogpiac krízise és a lakásépítés drámai visszaesése a túlfogyasztásra és túlhitelezésre ösztönző pénzügyi környezet eredménye. A lakáspiaci és a hitelezési ciklusok pénzügyi innovációkkal történő megnyújtása inkább növelte, mint csökkentette a kibocsátásingadozás érzékenységét. A legfőbb hitelezők Kína, Japán, Németország inkább dolláralapú amerikai vállalati felvásárlásokkal ellensúlyozták a dollárgyengülésből elszenvedett veszteségeiket. 1997-2007 között az Amerikából külföldön befektetett dolláraktívák - javarészt a valuta leértékelődése nyomán - jelentős hozamemelkedést élveztek, és számottevően tompították a belföldön képződött jövedelmek csökkenését. A dollárleértékelődés az eszköz- (és nemcsak az áruexport) oldalon is előnyöket hozott számos nagyvállalatnak. / === / Rather than dealing with the immediate policy steps to dampen the crisis, this paper attempts to reveal the worsening savings/consumption pattern of the US economy over the last ten years. Based on the closed logic of open-economy GDP-accounting, it argues that the current crisis is deeply rooted in shrinking public and private savings trends discernible as early as 1997. The current mortgage-market crisis and deep fall in new residential housing are products of a distorted financial environment that encourages over-borrowing and over-consumption. Expansion of the credit cycle through successive financial innovations has increased, not decreased output volatility. But the main foreign lenders to the US—Japan, China and Germany—have managed to offset their losses on US securities by buying into US companies. Large US firms have also benefited from rapid dollar depreciation as USD-denominated yields on their foreign assets experienced strong run-ups. The weak dollar has also helped American firms with large assets on foreign markets. So there were strong benefits for the US, not just on the goods-export side, but on the asset side, an aspect rarely emphasized.

A globális pénzügyi központok világgazdasági szerepének változásai (The changing role of global financial centres in the world economy)

A pénzügyi központok jelentős mértékben hozzájárulhatnak a bankok nemzetköziesedéséhez. A világgazdaság története során már évszázadokkal ezelőtt létrejött a nemzetközi pénzügyi központok többsége, amelyek szerepe és súlya folytonosan változott. A vezető globális pénzügyi központokban általában mindenféle pénzügyi művelet végrehajtható, intenzíven egy helyre koncentrálódnak a pénzügyi-üzleti műveletek és tranzakciók. Az 1990-es évekre még jellemző globális triád – amit New York, London és Tokió alkotott – napjainkra már megszűnt. A globális pénzügyi központok szerepét a 2010-es években London és New York képes betölteni. Kérdéses azonban, hogy az ázsiai térségben globális pénzügyi központtá válhat-e Hong Kong, esetleg Szingapúr. _____ Financial centres significantly contribute to the internationalization of the banks. Most of the international financial centres were founded centuries ago, but their roles and magnitudes have always changed. All kinds of financial operations can be carried out in the leading global financial centres, and a wide scale of financial operations and transactions concentrate in these places. The dominance of the global triad of New York, London and Tokyo of the 1990s, has recently ended. Only two main financial centres, London and New York, can unambiguously fulfil the role of the global financial centres in the 2010s. However, it is questionable whether Hong Kong or Singapore can become global financial centres in the Asian region of the global economy.

Állami támogatások és gazdasági teljesítmény. Támogatás-túladagolás a magyar gazdaságfejlesztésben? (An overdose of state aid in the Hungarian economy)

Magyarországon az elmúlt évtizedben a vállalatoknak nyújtott állami támogatás GDP-arányosan számolva az európai uniós átlag 2,7-szerese volt. A cikk megvizsgálja, hogy a támogatások hatása megjelenik-e a magyar gazdaság beruházási, foglalkoztatási, jövedelemtermelési teljesítményében és versenyképességében. Arra a következtetésre jut, hogy egyik területen sem jobb a helyzet, mint azokban az országokban, amelyekben lényegesen alacsonyabb a támogatási arány. A mikroszintű elemzések, értékelések sem támasztják alá azt a vélekedést, hogy az állami támogatások érzékelhetően javítják a gazdasági teljesítményt. A források bősége önmagában is okoz hatékonysági problémákat, mert sok program és szervezet versenyez egymással. A rossz (gyengébb hatékonysági követelményeket támasztó) programok kiszorítják a jó programokat. Ha a versenyképességet érdemben befolyásoló tényezők, például a kedvező jogi szabályozási környezet és az üzleti szolgáltatások jól működő piacai nem adottak, akkor ezek hiányát nem ellensúlyozza a támogatások magas szintje. Magyarország az idén indult hétéves programozási időszakban tovább kívánja növelni a vállalatoknak nyújtott állami támogatások mértékét, miközben nincs egyértelmű válasz arra a kérdésre, hogy milyen módon növelhető a támogatási rendszer jelenleg alacsony hatékonysága. _____ State aid given to enterprises as a proportion of Hungary�s GDP has been 2.7 times the EU average over the past decade. The article examines whether any impact of this high level of state aid can be discerned in investment, employment, income- generation performance, or competitiveness of the Hungarian economy. It seems that in none of these areas is the situation better than in countries that have a markedly lower rate of state aid. Micro-level analyses and evaluations do not support the belief that state aid appreciably improves economic performance. A wealth of resources on its own can cause problems with efficiency, as many programs and organizations compete with each other. Bad (less demanding) programs nudge out the good ones. If the factors significantly determining competitiveness, including a favourable legal and regulatory environment and well-functioning markets of business services, are not in place, a high level of state aid cannot be a proxy for them. In the seven-year programming period beginning this year, Hungary plans to further increase the amount of state aid to enterprises, while there is no clear answer as to how to improve the currently poor efficiency of the state aid system.

The 3 per cent Barcelona Target: A Critical Appraisal of the Failure of the Lisbon Strategy’s Knowledgebased Economy and Society Project

Ten years after the unanimous approval of the Lisbon Strategy at a special meeting of the European Council on 23-24 March 2000 in Lisbon, it will be inevitable for the European Council, the European Commission and the majority of the EU member states to face with its fi asco and to account for the reasons of their fundamental policy, governance and economic failures in 2010. The recent turbulence of the global economy offers some excuses for the underperformance of the main objectives of the Lisbon Strategy in the essential social and economic domains, like job creation, economic growth, and environmental sustainability. Negative growth rates, macroeconomic and fi nancial instability, the contraction of the internal and external markets of the European economy, drop in demand for capital investment, goods and services, sinking corporate revenues, depreciation of corporate assets, increasing private and public indebtedness, falling rate of employment, weakening social cohesion, widening social inequality, and so forth not only deprive the majority of the EU member states of fulfi lling the main objectives of the Lisbon Strategy but also drive them into worse social and economic conditions in many policy domains than they were in 2000.