Investigating the development of the internal and external service tasks of non-executive directors: the case of the Netherlands (1997-2005)

During the last decade, globalisation and liberalisation of financial markets, changing societal expectations and corporate governance scandals have increased the attention for the fiduciary duties of non-executive directors. In this context, recent corporate governance reform initiatives have emphasised the control task and independence of non-executive directors. However, little attention has been paid to their impact on the external and internal service tasks of non-executive directors. Therefore, this paper investigates how the service tasks of non-executive directors have evolved in the Netherlands. Data on corporate governance at the top-100 listed companies in the Netherlands between 1997 and 2005 show that the emphasis on non-executive directors' external service task has shifted to their internal service task, i.e. from non-executive directors acting as boundary spanners to non-executive directors providing advice and counselling to executive directors. This shift in board responsibilities affects non-executive directors' ability to generate network benefits through board relationships and has implications for non-executive directors' functional requirements.

External auditors' reliance on internal auditing : further evidence.

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to explore whether internal audit’s reporting relationship with the audit committee and the client’s business risk environment impact external auditors’ reliance on the work of internal audit. Design/methodology/approach – An experiment is conducted using a 2 £ 2 between-subjects design where we manipulate the above two factors at strong and weak levels. Participants are 66 audit partners, managers and seniors, all experienced with clients having internal audit functions. Findings – The results indicate that both factors affect external auditors’ reliance on work already undertaken by internal audit and their use of internal auditors (IA) as assistants. The results also indicate that external auditors are more likely to use internal audit for control evaluation tasks than for substantive tests of balances. The study does not find any significant interaction effects between the two factors. Originality/value – No prior studies have examined the influence of reporting relationship and client business risk on external auditors’ reliance decisions in the current governance environment. Further, the paper examines the impact of these factors on reliance on work already undertaken by internal audit and on using IA as assistants, with respect to both control evaluation work and substantive testing of balances.