Counter-reforms in times of prosperity. OSW Point of View, September 2006

In 2000, Vladimir Putin came to power after nearly a decade of the rule of the first Russian president, Boris Yeltsin. As prime minister, and later as a candidate for president, Putin announced that he would reform the state. The main assumptions of this reform were presented during a congress of the pro-Kremlin Unity movement, in Putin's address entitled 'Russia at the turn of the millennium' which was delivered on 29 December 1999, and later in a open letter to voters published on 25 February 2000. Both declarations were rather general, but they gave a clear picture of the principal directions of and priority areas for the future president's efforts: they outlined Russia's development path as pro-market and democratic. Nearly seven years have passed since Vladimir Putin came to power, a time for a summary of his achievements. In a way, Vladimir Putin has partially delivered on his initial declarations; indeed, Russia has undergone a deep transformation. However, when seen in the light of the president’s initial promises, the changes appear to be no more than 'counter-reforms', because instead of putting into practice the policy he outlined seven years ago, they have largely followed a different, if not entirely opposite direction.

Chechnya: Between a Caucasian Jihad and ‘hidden’ separatism. OSW Point of View, January 2007

1. Even though Chechnya remains the most unstable republic in the Russian North Caucasus, the open armed conflict known as the Second Chechen War, which broke out in the autumn of 1999, is gradually dying down. 2. Several years ago, the conflict in Chechnya could have been characterised as a war between Chechen separatists and the government of the Russian Federation. However, the nature of the conflict has changed significantly over the last four or five years. 3. Even though the intensity of fighting in Chechnya has abated in recent years, the conflict has spilt over to the other Caucasus republics such as Ingushetia, Dagestan and Kabardino-Balkaria. As a result, this is presently not so much a Chechen conflict as a regional clash between the authorities and the Caucasian (including Chechen) Islamists. 4. The Chechen militants are weaker now, and the conflict has changed from a struggle for national liberation into a fight for the Islamic cause; but this does not mean that Russia has ultimately solved the problem of Chechen separatism.

The invisible hand... of the Kremlin. Capitalism 'a la russe'. OSW Point of View, February 2007

This study describes the two main economic processes observed in Russia during President Vladimir Putin's second term; renationalisation, and the concentration of economic assets. As a result of these processes, the share of state-owned property has increased and the position of the state in the economy has strengthened. According to the authorities, the wide-range renationalisation of the assets and the construction of superholdings based on the state enterprises are intended to boost Russia's potential and stimulate the development of the whole economy. However, in practice the current ruling elite are using these superholdings to strengthen Russia's position on the international arena and to promote their vested interests.

Reintegration or Reconquest? Georgia's policy towards Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the context of the internal and international situation. OSW Point of View, May 2008

The conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia have been Georgia's main security problem since the beginning of the 1990s, and, along with the Armenian-Azeri conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, have made up the main security problems in the South Caucasus.

The Great Game around Turkmenistan. OSW Point of View, August 2008

The rise of a new leader of the state of Turkmenistan – President Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov, who became ruler of the central Asian state after the 21-year rule of Saparmurad Niyazov, the self-proclaimed Turkmenbashi, who died on December 21, 2006 – has initiated changes in Turkmenistan’s political life. The new president has broken with the previous policy of self-isolation, and has directed the country towards openness to the outside world. Opportunities have thereby arisen for competitors in the ‘Great Game’, to gain political influence in Turkmenistan and access to hitherto unexploited Turkmen deposits of gas and oil. A new stage in the Great Game, which has been played for influence in Central Asia and control of access to its energy resources for many years, can thus be said to have been launched, and Turkmenistan has become the main setting for it. The major actors involved are Russia, the United States, China and the European Union.

The Paradoxes of Moldovan Sports. An insight into the nature of the Transnistrian conflict. OSW Point of View, November 2011

Mutual relations in the area of sports, which in contemporary international contacts often not only reflect the true nature of political relations but sometimes even affect them, can be a valuable contribution to the analysis of this conflict’s nature. Why did the Transnistrian government, despite the use of anti-Moldovan rhetoric, agree to Transnistrian athletes representing Moldova during the Olympics and in other international competitions? Why does it accept the presence of sports teams from both banks of the Dniester playing in the same leagues? Why does Transnistria, despite being much smaller, predominate in many sports? How is it that Sheriff Tiraspol, the flagship football club of the business and political circles controlling Transnistria, managed to win the Moldovan championship ten times in a row and is the main source of players for Moldova’s national team? Does sport really ‘know no borders’ or perhaps the border on the Dniester is different than seems at first sight?

The bear watches the dragon. The Russian debate on China. OSW Point of View Number 31, February 2013

Most participants in the Russian public debate seem to agree in their evaluation of the present condition of Russian-Chinese relations. There is awareness of increasing inequality between these two powers and Russia’s weakening position as compared to China.Those who share the optimistic view see co-operation with China as an opportunity for the Russian economy and a key element of Russia’s multi-directional foreign policy, an opportunity for Russia to avoid unilateral dependence on the West. The pessimists view the deepening co-operation with China through the prism of threats resulting from the increasing imbalance in bilateral relations. The greatest source of concern is the model of economic relations, which is often referred to as neo-colonial, where Russia’s role is reduced to that of a supplier of raw materials to China. The possible consequences are evaluated in different ways, ranging from the political subordination of Russian interests the Chinese ones to real loss of control over the Russian Far East. Those who share such views believe that Moscow should slow down its rapprochement with China and search for other partners in Eastern Asia, relations with whom could counterbalance the Chinese influence.

From stabilisation to stagnation. Viktor Yanukovych's reforms. OSW Point of View Number 32, March 2013

After winning the 2010 presidential election, Viktor Yanukovych and his government developed an ambitious and comprehensive programme of reforms across key areas of social and political life. The return to a presidential system of government created the ideal conditions for the introduction of deep reforms: it allowed Viktor Yanukovych to consolidate more power than any other Ukrainian president before him.The authorities launched an overhaul of the tax and the pension systems, and of the Ukrainian gas sector. Kyiv also completed its negotiations on an Association Agreement with the EU and on a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area. However, the reformist zeal of Ukraine’s political elite progressively diminished as the parliamentary election approached, the economy slowed down, and the polls showed a decline in support for the ruling Party of Regions. Many of the reforms still remain in the planning stages, and in many areas the government has moved backwards. Viktor Yanukovych has proved unable to make systemic changes, and has increasingly used his powers to crush political opposition in Ukraine. The outcome of the latest parliamentary elections prevents the formation of a stable parliamentary majority, which in turn, removes any chance of reform before the 2015 presidential ballot.

Support as a means of subordination. Russia's policy on Belarus. OSW Point of View Number 34, May 2013

Despite the conflicts and frictions in their bilateral relations, Russia has for years regularly invested in Belarus. Moscow’s support has become an important factor allowing the Belarusian economic model to continue, which in turn helps maintain the stability of the Belarusian political system. Russia's continued readiness to offer assistance to its neighbour reflects the importance Moscow attaches to Belarus.Belarus also features prominently in Moscow’s current policy objectives – especially with regard to the expansion of the Customs Union. The implementation of this project is seen as crucial in Russia, particularly in relation to Ukraine. For this reason, since 2011 we have been witnessing a rise in Russian aid for Belarus. In 2012, the support intensified and moved beyond purely financial help to include political assistance also. Russia’s support, however, has come at a price. Moscow’s long-term goal is to establish control over the Belarusian economy, which would also, in effect, allow the Kremlin to influence the way other areas of the Belarusian state are governed. As Minsk’s dependence on Russian support deepens, Alexander Lukashenko will ultimately have no choice but to gradually accede to Russia’s demands.

The fragile ‘reset’. The balance sheet and the prospects for changes in Russian-US relations. OSW Point of View (Policy Brief), April 2011

The ‘reset’ policy proposed by the USA has brought Russia a number of geopolitical, prestigious and economic benefits. The most important of those are: the resumption of arms control, the USA’s withdrawal from plans to locate elements of its strategic missile defence system in Poland and the Czech Republic, and the entry into force of the so-called 123 Agreement. In response, Russia has assisted the United States in resolving the Iranian crisis, and offered help with the Afghanistan operation, covering the transit of supplies and supporting the Afghan government. Moscow has also eased up on its anti-American rhetoric. The changes which have taken place in Russian-US relations are not durable. The two parties have not resolved their major disputes (for example, regarding missile defence), and any differences are hushed up for tactical reasons.

In Putin’s Shadow: Dmitry Medvedev’s presidency. OSW Point of View, November 2011

Dmitry Medvedev’s presidency was an experiment carried out by the Russian ruling elite. Even though the new president has been a loyal member of the ruling camp, this decision involved certain risk that the extensive constitutional powers could eventually encourage the new president to seek emancipation, which could provoke internal conflicts and splits in the elite. This paper analyses Medvedev’s presidency and tries to answer the question why this scenario did not take place and why Medvedev failed to overcome the restrictions imposed on him at the start of his presidential term. The paper also presents the activation of certain social groups during Medvedev’s presidency and their calls for a new social contract with the government.

'The power gained, we will never surrender': Russian ruling elite versus the succession and economic crisis. OSW Point of View (Policy Brief), October 2009

Even though the economic crisis proved harmful to the Russian economy and people's living standards, it has nonetheless failed to make the elite revise its policy. Despite some problems, the government has managed to sustain economic and political stability, thanks to the reserves it amassed in the times of prosperity, and to the propaganda campaign that protected it, above all Vladimir Putin. The crisis failed to force the elite to implement deeper structural and political reforms. Moreover, it has actually reinforced existing tendencies, such as state control over the economy and its oil-oriented character, the elite's economic expansion at the expense of private businesses, and the preservation of political power. Thus, the crisis has so far failed to dismantle Putinism, indeed quite the reverse - it has in fact contributed to its becoming 'set in stone'.

The Revolution that never was. Five years of 'Orange' Ukraine. OSW Point of View (Policy Brief), November 2009

On the fifth anniversary of the Orange Revolution and in the final period of the presidency of Viktor Yushchenko, who then embodied the hopes for state reform, a tentative assessment of the situation in Ukraine is appropriate. Did the revolutionary social upheaval bear revolutionary fruit? Have democratic mechanisms strengthened? Has the post-Soviet oligarchic state model been overcome? Has media freedom expanded? Has there been any progress with regard to economic transformation? Has integration with the European structures materialised? Five years on, what remains of the hopes of millions of Ukrainians and of the goodwill of the international community?

Jihad vs The New Great Game: Paradoxes of militant Islamic threats in Central Asia. OSW Point of View (Policy Brief), January 2010

Threats linked to Islamic fundamentalism have been hanging over Central Asia for almost two decades. Many believe that militant Islam has played a significant part in each major political crisis in the region, and Central Asia is perceived as an almost perfect environment for its further development. Such a picture of this region is a result of serious abuses and manipulations. The real threat posed by militant Islam seems to be rather limited, and its roots lie outside Central Asia. This region is unlikely to become a key front of global jihad. Nevertheless, this does not guarantee peace and safety in Central Asia, as the Islamic threat remains an element of the geopolitical rivalry in the region – the ‘New Great Game’.

Ukraine, Another point of view. OSW Point of View (Unspecified), February 2003

Ukraine is a difficult partner for the West, and recently, it has been perceived as an enfant terrible because of the Kolchuga affair. Western and Polish press describe Ukraine as an authoritarian regime plagued by an internal crisis or even threatened by destabilisation. This picture is certainly one-sided and oversimplified, and it fails to accurately present the reality of Ukraine. Apart from experiencing definitely adverse political developments, Ukraine has also been successful in some ways in terms of its internal and foreign policies and the economy. At the same time, certain processes take place among the Ukrainian elites, that might be difficult to capture in social surveys, but may become the starting point for the future modernisation and democratisation of the country. To realise that there are some favourable aspects to the changes occurring in Ukraine is not to recognise Ukraine as a country heading to democratisation and a market economy in the Western sense. Still, it is worthwhile to understand that the positive developments, even if isolated, do occur in Ukraine and that they could be strengthened by adequate policies of the Ukrainian authorities and the Western states.