O desenvolvimento do pensamento abstrato através de game-based learning e do Scratch

Relatório de estágio de mestrado em Ensino de Informática

Annual report of the Commissioners on Fisheries and Game.

1912

Annual report of the Commissioners on Fisheries and Game.

1916

Children, computer and creativity : usability guidelines for designing a game authoring tool for children

Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Informatik, Diss., 2009

A collection of Colombian game birds.

v.37:no.1(1955)

Two new game birds from Peru.

v.39:no.32(1959)

Coalition formation in a contest game with three heterogeneous players

We analyze the incentives for cooperation of three players differing in their efficiency of effort in a contest game. We concentrate on the non-cooperative bargaining foundation of coalition formation, and therefore, we adopt a two-stage model. In the first stage, individuals form coalitions following a bargaining protocol similar to the one proposed by Gul (1989). Afterwards, coalitions play the contest game of Esteban and Ray (1999) within the resulting coalition structure of the first stage. We find that the grand coalition forms whenever the distribution of the bargaining power in the coalition formation game is equal to the distribution of the relative efficiency of effort. Finally, we use the case of equal bargaining power for all individuals to show that other types of coalition structures may be observed as well.

A generalized assignment game

The proposed game is a natural extension of the Shapley and Shubik Assignment Game to the case where each seller owns a set of different objets instead of only one indivisible object. We propose definitions of pairwise stability and group stability that are adapted to our framework. Existence of both pairwise and group stable outcomes is proved. We study the structure of the group stable set and we finally prove that the set of group stable payoffs forms a complete lattice with one optimal group stable payoff for each side of the market.

Does affirmative action reduce effort incentives? A contest game analysis

In this paper a contest game with heterogeneous players is analyzed in which heterogeneity could be the consequence of past discrimination. Based on the normative perception of the heterogeneity there are two policy options to tackle this heterogeneity: either it is ignored and the contestants are treated equally, or affirmative action is implemented which compensates discriminated players. The consequences of these two policy options are analyzed for a simple two-person contest game and it is shown that the frequently criticized trade-off between affirmative action and total effort does not exist: Instead, affirmative action fosters effort incentives. A generalization to the n-person case and to a case with a partially informed contest designer yields the same result if the participation level is similar under each policy.

Inter-group conflict and intra-group punishment in an experimental contest game

We study how conflict in a contest game is influenced by rival parties being groups and by group members being able to punish each other. Our main motivation stems from the analysis of socio-political conflict. The relevant theoretical prediction in our setting is that conflict expenditures are independent of group size and independent of whether punishment is available or not. We find, first, that our results contradict the independence of group-size prediction: conflict expenditures of groups are substantially larger than those of individuals, and both are substantially above equilibrium. Towards the end of the experiment material losses in groups are 257% of the predicted level. There is, however, substantial heterogeneity in the investment behaviour of individual group members. Second, allowing group members to punish each other after individual contributions to the contest effort are revealed leads to even larger conflict expenditures. Now material losses are 869% of the equilibrium level and there is much less heterogeneity in individual group members' investments. These results contrast strongly with those from public goods experiments where punishment enhances efficiency and leads to higher material payoffs.

Entrepreneurial Orientation, Intangible Assets and Firm Growth: the impact of ‘Spirit and Material’ on the growth of Chinese private firms

This paper has three contributions. First, it shows how field work within small firms in PR Chinese has provided new evidence which enables us to measure and calibrate Entrepreneurial Orientation (EO), as ‘spirit’, and Intangible Assets (IA), as ‘material’, for use in models of small firm growth. Second, it uses inter-item correlation analysis and both exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis to provide new measures of EO and IA, in index and in vector form, for use in econometric models of firm growth. Third, it estimates two new econometric models of small firm employment growth in PR China, under the null hypothesis of Gibrat’s Law, using our two new index-based and vector-based measures of EO and IA. Estimation is by OLS with adjustment for heteroscedasticity, and for sample selectivity. Broadly, it finds that EO attributes have had little significant impact on small firm growth, and indeed innovativeness and pro-activity paradoxically may even dampen growth. However, IA attributes have had a positive and significant impact on growth, with networking, and technological knowledge being of prime importance, and intellectual property and human capital being of lesser but still significant importance. In the light of these results, Gibrat’s Law is generalized, and Jovanovic’s learning theory is extended, to emphasise the importance of IA to growth. These findings cast new empirical light on the oft-quoted national slogan in PR China of “spirit and material”. So far as small firms are concerned, this paper suggests that their contribution to PR China’s remarkable economic growth is not so much attributable to the ‘spirit’ of enterprise (as suggested by propaganda) as, more prosaically, to the pursuit of the ‘material’.