Korrupció: mérhetőség és modellezés = In the core of our study we focus on the connection of Foreign Direct Investment and corruption.

Tanulmányunk középpontjában a közvetlen külföldi befektetések és a korrupció kapcsolata áll. Feltételezésünk az, hogy a közvetlen külföldi befektetők a kevésbé korrupt országokat kedvelik, mivel a korrupció egy további kockázati tényezőt jelent a befektetők számára, amely növelheti a befektetések költségeit. Megítélésünk szerint ezt kvantitatív módszerekkel lehet a leginkább vizsgálni, így elemzésünk során 79 országot vizsgálunk meg 10 évre vonatkozó átlagokkal a GRETL program és az OLS becslőfüggvény segítségével. Több modell lefuttatása után azt az eredményt kaptuk, hogy a közvetlen külföldi befektetők döntéseiben a korrupció szignifikáns tényező, a két változó között negatív korrelációt figyelhetünk meg. ____ We assume that investors prefer countries where corruption level is lower, as corruption an additional risk factor that might increase the cost of investment. We believe that the best way to prove the previous statement if we use quantitative methods, so we set up a model where 79 countries are tested for 10 years averages, with the help of the GRETL and OLS estimator. After running several models our finding was that corruption is a significant factor in the decisions of foreign investors, and there is a negative correlation between corruption and FDI.

Foreign Direct Investment and Political Uncertainty

Recent developments in the general equilibrium theory of multinationals emphasize the importance of multilateral considerations. Yet, existing explanations and corresponding estimations of FDI patterns have largely limited political and institutional investment impediments to a bilateral framework. Through the application of spatial econometric techniques, I demonstrate that the presence of both domestic and regional political uncertainty generate real options effects that lead to the delay or redirection of foreign direct investment. The magnitude and direction of these effects is conditional upon the host country regime type and the predominant multinational integration strategies in the region. Comparing these results with FDI of U.S. origin, I find evidence for divergent investment behavior by U.S. multinationals during regime changes in partner countries. Additionally, I find no evidence that multinationals from developing countries are more likely to complete cross-border deals in environments characterized by greater political risk or political uncertainty.

INTERNATIONALIZATION OF STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES THROUGH FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT

ABSTRACT State-owned enterprises (SOEs) are created to focus on domestic needs, and yet recent evidence points to increasing outward foreign direct investment by SOEs. Existing International Business (IB) theories focus on efficiency-based motives for internationalization; therefore, they do not fully capture SOEs' internalization dynamics, which are driven largely by political factors and social welfare considerations. We integrate public management and IB theories to develop propositions that combine these questions: why SOEs internationalize; what are their motivations; and what are the main managerial outcomes of SOEs' internationalization. Our findings suggest that SOEs display little hesitancy in entering international markets, and that SOE international expansion is not contradictory with the goals of state-ownership if the purpose is to adjust the company to changing institutional environments both in the domestic and international markets. Our propositions about SOE internationalization are based on an in-depth case study of the outward foreign direct investment conducted by Brazil's Petrobras over the past three decades.

Oil, foreign aid and FDI flows: The missing link?

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Economics from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

The transatlantic business community faced with US direct investment in Western Europe, 1958-1968

This article examines the position of US and European business in the debate about American direct investment in Western Europe in a historical perspective, from the establishment of the Common Market to the introduction of US regulation of foreign direct investment (FDI) a decade later. Based on abundant and diverse archival documents, it sheds new light on the process of Americanisation and contributes to existing research on transnational networks, by revealing the active role industrial leaders on both sides of the Atlantic played in shaping the political responses to problems raised by the American firms' massive presence in the Common Market.