A study of the co-operative banking system in kerala

The co-operative credit structure in a state set up consists of 3 tiers — Primary Societies at the base, District Co-operative Banks at the middle and State Cooperative Bank at the top. But, some societies at the primary level are governed by, in addition to Co-operative Societies Act, the Banking Regulation Act. Thus they are under dual control. In addition, they are working under the direct purview of Reserve Bank of India. The scope of this study is restricted to such Primary Societies, District Co-operative Banks and State Co-operative Bank. For the evaluation of the working of Co-operative Banks, the board of directors and staff were interviewed with the help of pre-constructed and pre-tested interview schedules. However, the share holders and customers were not interviewed mainly because almost all respondents were reluctant to provide copies of an exhaustive list of share holders and non-share holder customers, for the purpose of maintaining secrecy. This being an individual work, it was found physically and financially very difficult to extend the study so as to cover the share holders and non-share holder customers. Limitations of time were also responsible for restricting this study. The period of study was restricted to 1980-'81 to 1983-'84 as the data relating to earlier periods were firstly not available from all banks and secondly the prior data was considered out of date for the purpose of the study.

Receivable Management in Non Banking Finance Companies with Special Reference to Vehicle Financing

In the absence of entry barrier or regulatory restrictions, Non Banking Financial Companies frantically grew and accessed the public deposit without any regulatory control. The deposit of NBFCs grew from Rs. 41.9 crore in 1971 to 53116.0 crore in 1997. This growth was the result of a combined effect of increase in the number of NBFCs and increase in the amount of deposits. The deposits amazed as above was invested in various assets especially that in motor vehicles by these asset financing NBFCs. Various tactics were adopted by these NBFCs and their agents for recovering the receivable outstanding from such assets. Both central government and RBI were concerned about the protection of depositors‘ interest and various committees were set up to frame a comprehensive regulation for the functioning of these NBFCs.

Service provider switching: a study on the switching process in retail banking

In a business environment that is characterized by intense competition, building customer loyalty has become a key area of focus for most financial institutions. The explosion of the services sector, changing customer demographics and deregulation and emergence of new technology in the financial services industry have had a critical impact on consumers’ financial services buying behaviour. The changes have forced banks to modify their service offerings to customers so as to ensure high levels of customer satisfaction and also high levels of customer retention. Banks have historically had difficulty distinguishing their products from one another because of their relative homogeneity; with increasing competition,the problem has only intensified with no coherent distinguishing theme. Rising wealth, product proliferation, regulatory changes and newer technologies are together making bank switching easier for customers. In order to remain competitive, it is important for banks to retain their customer base. The financial services sector is the foundation for any economy and plays the role of mobilization of resources and their allocation. The retail banking sector in India has emerged as one of the major drivers of the overall banking industry and has witnessed enormous growth. Switching behaviour has a negative impact on the banks’ market share and profitability as the costs of acquiring customers are much higher than the costs of retaining. When customers switch, the business loses the potential for additional profits from the customer the initial costs invested in the customer by the business get . The Objective of the thesis was to examine the relationship among triggers that customers experience, their perceptions of service quality, consumers’ commitment and behavioral intentions in the contemporary India retail banking context through the eyes of the customer. To understand customers’ perception of these aspects, data were collected from retail banking customers alone for the purpose of analysis, though the banks’ views were considered during the qualitative work carried out prior to the main study. No respondent who is an employee of a banking organization was considered for the final study to avoid the possibility of any bias that could affect the results adversely. The data for the study were collected from customers who have switched banks and from those who were non switchers. The study attempted to develop and validate a multidimensional construct of service quality for retail banking from the consumer’s perspective. A major conclusion from the empirical research was the confirmation of the multidimensional construct for perceived service quality in the banking context. Switching can be viewed as an optimization problem for customers; customers review the potential gains of switching to another service provider against the costs of leaving the service provider. As banks do not provide tangible products, their service quality is usually assessed through service provider’s relationship with customers. Thus, banks should pay attention towards their employees’ skills and knowledge; assessing customers’ needs and offering fast and efficient services.

Does it pay to be socially responsible? Evidence from spanish retail banking sector

This paper presents a theoretical and empirical analysis of strategic competition in retail banking when some of the financial firms are non-profit organisations that invest in social activities. Banking literature about competition is fairly large, but the strategic interaction between profit maximizing and non profit maximizers has not been extensively analysed except for Purroy and Salas (1999). In this paper, a completely different approach is taken. An adaptation of Hotelling’s two stage model of spatial competition is developed to take into account consumer perceptions respect to the two different types of financial institutions. The empirical analysis confirms that consumers take into account other features different from the price, such as social contribution or closer service to make a deposit or mortgage decision. These conclusions are of interest in the debate about a firm’s social or ethical activities. It is shown that if consumers value social activities, firms can improv

The effects of information and communication technologies on the banking sector and the payments system

This dissertation studies the effects of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) on the banking sector and the payments system. It provides insight into how technology-induced changes occur, by exploring both the nature and scope of main technology innovations and evidencing their economic implications for banks and payment systems. Some parts in the dissertation are descriptive. They summarise the main technological developments in the field of finance and link them to economic policies. These parts are complemented with sections of the study that focus on assessing the extent of technology application to banking and payment activities. Finally, it includes also some work which borrows from the economic literature on banking. The need for an interdisciplinary approach arises from the complexity of the topic and the rapid path of change to which it is subject. The first chapter provides an overview of the influence of developments in ICT on the evolution of financial services and international capital flows. We include main indicators and discuss innovation in the financial sector, exchange rates and international capital flows. The chapter concludes with impact analysis and policy options regarding the international financial architecture, some monetary policy issues and the role of international institutions. The second chapter is a technology assessment study that focuses on the relationship between technology and money. The application of technology to payments systems is transforming the way we use money and, in some instances, is blurring the definition of what constitutes money. This chapter surveys the developments in electronic forms of payment and their relationship to the banking system. It also analyses the challenges posed by electronic money for regulators and policy makers, and in particular the opportunities created by two simultaneous processes: the Economic and Monetary Union and the increasing use of electronic payment instruments. The third chapter deals with the implications of developments in ICT on relationship banking. The financial intermediation literature explains relationship banking as a type of financial intermediation characterised by proprietary information and multiple interactions with customers. This form of banking is important for the financing of small and medium-sized enterprises. We discuss the effects of ICT on the banking sector as a whole and then apply these developments to the case of relationship banking. The fourth chapter is an empirical study of the effects of technology on the banking business, using a sample of data from the Spanish banking industry. The design of the study is based on some of the events described in the previous chapters, and also draws from the economic literature on banking. The study shows that developments in information management have differential effects on wholesale and retail banking activities. Finally, the last chapter is a technology assessment study on electronic payments systems in Spain and the European Union. It contains an analysis of existing payment systems and ongoing or planned initiatives in Spain. It forms part of a broader project comprising a series of country-specific analyses covering ten European countries. The main issues raised across the countries serve as the starting point to discuss implications of the development of electronic money for regulation and policies, and in particular, for monetary-policy making.

Customer satisfaction in the banking industry: a comparative study of Ghana and Spain

La satisfacció és una preocupació crucial pels clients i per les organitzacions, incloent els bancs. L'estudi examina la satisfacció global dels clients dels bancs a Ghana i Espanya. Així s'analitzen aspectes com la relació entre satisfacció global i les dimensions de qualitat dels serveis bancari, així com les pròpies dimensions principals de la qualitat d'aquests serveis. Finalment, les percepcions sobre aquestes dimensions son comparades entre els bancs de Ghana i Espanya. S'han analitzat els clients de 819 bancs de Ghana i Espanya, els resultats van mostrar que els clients espanyols estaven més descontents respecte les dimensions tangibles i empatia metre que els clients de Ghana puntuaven pitjar la dimensió conveniència. En general, els clients de Ghana estaven força més descontents amb els serveis bancaris que els d'Espanya. La fiabilitat, l'empatia i la conveniència son els predictors de satisfacció global en Ghana, mentres que la fiabilitat és la única dimensió que explica la satisfacció global a Espanya.

What kind of European Banking Union? Bruegel Policy Contribution [2012/12?]June 25, 2012

This paper discusses the creation of a European Banking Union. First, we discuss questions of design. We highlight seven fundamental choices that decision makers will need to make: Which EU countries should participate in the banking union? To which categories of banks should it apply? Which institution should be tasked with supervision? Which one should deal with resolution? How centralised should the deposit insurance system be? What kind of fiscal backing would be required? What governance framework and political institutions would be needed? In terms of geographical scope, we see the coverage of the banking union of the euro area as necessary and of additional countries as desirable, even though this would entail important additional economic difficulties. The system should ideally cover all banks within the countries included, in order to prevent major competitive and distributional distortions. Supervisory authority should be granted either to both the ECB and a new agency, or to a new agency alone. National supervisors, acting under the authority of the European supervisor, would be tasked with the supervision of smaller banks in accordance with the subsidiarity principle. A European resolution authority should be established, with the possibility of drawing on ESM resources. A fully centralized deposit insurance system would eventually be desirable, but a system of partial reinsurance may also be envisaged at least in a first phase. A banking union would require at least implicit European fiscal backing, with significant political authority and legitimacy. Thus, banking union cannot be considered entirely separately from fiscal union and political union. The most difficult challenge of creating a European banking union lies with the short-term steps towards its eventual implementation. Many banks in the euro area, and especially in the crisis countries, are currently under stress and the move towards banking union almost certainly has significant distributional implications. Yet it is precisely because banks are under such stress that early and concrete action is needed. An overarching principle for such action is to minimize the cost to the tax payers. The first step should be to create a European supervisor that will anchor the development of the future banking union. In parallel, a capability to quickly assess the true capital position of the system’s most important banks should be created, for which we suggest establishing a temporary European Banking Sector Task Force working together with the European supervisor and other authorities. Ideally, problems identified by this process should be resolved by national authorities; in case fiscal capacities would prove insufficient, the European level would take over in the country concerned with some national financial participation, or in an even less likely adverse scenario, in all participating countries at once. This approach would require the passing of emergency legislation in the concerned countries that would give the Task Force the required access to information and, if necessary, further intervention rights. Thus, the principle of fiscal responsibility of respective member states for legacy costs would be preserved to the maximum extent possible, and at the same time, market participants and the public would be reassured that adequate tools are in place to address any eventuality.

Banking Union in the Eurozone and the European Union. CEPS Commentary, 12 June 2012

In this new CEPS Commentary, Jacopo Carmassi, Carmine Di Noia and Stefano Micossi present a rationale and detailed outline for the creation of a banking union in Europe. They argue that it is essential to clearly distinguish between what is needed to address a ‘systemic’ confidence crisis hitting the banking system – which is mainly or solely a eurozone problem – and ‘fair weather’ arrangements to prevent individual bank crises and, when they occur, to manage them in an orderly fashion so as to minimise systemic spillovers and the cost to taxpayers, which is of concern for the entire European Union.

Banking Union in three steps. CEPS Commentary, 12 June 2012

As the banking crisis in the eurozone becomes even more acute, CEPS Chief Executive Karel Lannoo exhorts the EU to not lose further precious time in creating a fully functional bank union, which would entail three main steps: creating a single supervisory authority, a common deposit protection and a harmonised bank resolution and liquidation system.

An incomplete step toward a banking union. CEPS Commentary, 5 July 2012

In this Commentary, Daniel Gros applauds the decision taken by Europe’s leaders at the eurozone summit at the end of June to transfer responsibility for banking supervision in the eurozone to the European Central Bank. It represents explicit recognition of the important fact that problems might originate at the national level, but, owing to monetary union, they can quickly threaten the stability of the entire eurozone banking system. In his view, the next small, incremental step, although one not yet officially acknowledged, will necessarily be the creation of a common bank rescue fund.

The roadmap to banking union: a call for consistency. CEPS Commentary, 30 August 2012

The proposal to move to a full banking union in the eurozone means a radical regime shift for the EU, since the European Central Bank will supervise the eurozone banks and effectively end ‘home country rule’. But how this is implemented raises a number of questions and needs close monitoring, explains CEPS CEO Karel Lannoo in this new Commentary.

Banking Union: A Federal Model for the European Union with Prompt Corrective Action. CEPS Policy Brief No. 282, 18 September 2012

The European Commission has published its proposals for the transfer of supervisory responsibilities to the European Central Bank (ECB),1 under Article 127(6) of the TFEU, providing a comprehensive and courageous ‘first step’ towards a European banking Union, the other steps being European deposit insurance and resolution procedures. However, on a number of issues the Commission’s chosen path raises questions that should be brought out in the open and fully recognized before final deliberation by the Council.

The fiscal implications of a banking union. Bruegel Policy Brief 2012/02 [3?], September 2012

Systemic banking crises are a threat to all countries whatever their development level. They can entail major fiscal costs that can undermine the sustainability of public finances. More than anywhere else, however, a number of euro-area countries have been affected by a lethal negative feedback loop between banking and sovereign risk, followed by disintegration of the financial system, real economic fragmentation and the exposure of the European Central Bank. Recognising the systemic dimension of the problem, the Euro-Area Summit of June 2012 called for the creation of a banking union with common supervision and the possibility for the European Stability Mechanism to recapitalise banks directly.

Europe's single supervisory mechanism and the long journey towards banking union. Bruegel Policy Contribution 2012/16, 4 October 2012

Problems in the banking system are at the core of the current crisis. The establishment of a banking union is a necessary (though not sufficient) condition for eventual crisis resolution that respects the integrity of the euro. The European Commission’s proposal for the establishment of a Single Supervisory Mechanism and related reform of the European Banking Authority (EBA) do not and cannot create a fully-fledged banking union, but represent a broadly adequate step on the basis of the leaders’ declaration of 29 June 2012 and of the decision to use Article 127(6) of the treaty as legal basis. The proposal rightly endows the European Central Bank (ECB) with broad authority over banks within the supervisory mechanism’s geographical perimeter; however, the status of non-euro area member states willing to participate in this mechanism, and the governance and decision-making processes of the ECB in this respect, call for further elaboration. Further adjustments are also desirable in the proposed reform of the EBA, even though they must probably retain a stopgap character pending the more substantial review planned in 2014.