Capital Flows to Latin America and the Caribbean: Recent Developments

For six years, the global economy has been driven by the U.S. Federal Reserve’s policies of easy money. Liquidity has flowed from developed to developing economies, financing infrastructure and corporate investment and allowing consumers to indulge in credit-fuelled retail spending. Thus the effective ending of the Fed’s third round of asset purchases (QE3) at the end of October represents both a watershed and the beginning of a new stage in the world economy. The end of asset-purchases comes at a challenging time for emerging markets, with China’s economy slowing, the Euro zone struggling to avoid a recession and the Japanese economy already in recession. The unwinding of the U.S. monetary stimulus, while the European Central Bank and the Bank of Japan step up their monetary stimulus, has underpinned an appreciation by the U.S. dollar, in which most commodities are priced. An appreciated dollar makes dollar-denominated commodities more expensive to buyers, thereby creating pressure for sellers to lower their prices. Latin American markets ended the third quarter of 2014 under pressure from a stronger U.S. dollar. In this changing external context, there are many signs that a slowdown in Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) financial markets, particularly debt markets, which have been breaking issuance records for the past six years, may slowdown from now on. Commodity prices – including those of oil, base metals and some goods – are in a prolonged slump. The Bloomberg commodity price index, a benchmark of commodity investments, has fallen to a five-year low as China’s economy slows down, and with it the demand for commodities. Investment into the LAC region has decelerated, in large part because of a deceleration of mining investments. Latin American currencies have suffered depreciations, as current account deficits have widening for a number of countries. And LAC companies, having issued record amounts of foreign currency bonds may now struggle to service their debt. In October, credit-rating agency Moody’s downgraded the bonds of Brazil’s Petrobras to tow notches above speculative grade because of the impact of falling oil prices and the weaker real on its debt. Growth prospects look brighter in 2015 relative to 2014, but a strengthening U.S. dollar, uneven global growth and weakness in commodity prices are skewing the risk toward the downside for the 2015 forecasts across the region. The Institute of International Finance expects the strengthening of the dollar to have a divergent impact across the region, however, depending on trade and financial linkages. The Institute of International Finance, Capital Flows to Emerging Markets, October 2, 2014. A stronger dollar lifts U.S. purchasing power, supporting exports, growth and capital inflows in countries with close trade links to the U.S. economy. However, rising dollar financing costs will increase pressure on countries with weak external positions. Given the effects of falling oil prices and a stronger dollar, some companies in the region, having issued record amounts of foreign currency bonds, may now struggle to service their debts. Prospects of Fed rate hikes resulting in tighter global liquidity amid the rapid rise in the corporate external bond stock has indeed raised concerns over some companies. However, there is still a shortage of bonds at a global level and the region still enjoys good economic policy management for the most part, so LAC debt markets may continue to enjoy momentum despite occasional bursts of high volatility – even if not at the record levels of recent years.

Preliminary Overview of the Economies of Latin America and the Caribbean 1998

Includes bibliography.

Preliminary Overview of the Economies of Latin America and the Caribbean 1997

Incluye Bibliografía.

Relação de longo prazo entre o investimento direto externo e variáveis macroeconômicas entre janeiro de 1999 à dezembro de 2007

Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico (CNPq)

Lograr estética y función en el sector posterior con resinas compuestas

La operatoria dental actual cuenta con un conocimiento más profundo de las diferentes estructuras dentarias que sumado al gran adelanto tecnológico y científico en la ciencia de los biomateriales; fruto de innumerables investigaciones, nos permiten contar hoy, con una nueva generación de materiales restauradores, lo que hace más crítico y exigente el conocimiento y análisis por parte del profesional, de las técnicas a efectuar, la realización depurada de procedimientos y los biomateriales a utilizar, con el fin de realizar tratamientos que sean biocompatibles, eficientes y de importante longevidad.

How does country risk matter for foreign direct investment?

In this paper, we aim to identify the political and financial risk components that matter most for the activities of multinational corporations. Our paper is the first paper to comprehensively examine the impact of various components of not only political risk but also financial risk on inward FDI, from both long-run and short-run perspectives. Using a sample of 93 countries (including 60 developing countries) for the period 1985-2007, we find that among the political risk components, government stability, socioeconomic conditions, investment profile, internal conflict, external conflict, corruption, religious tensions, democratic accountability, and ethnic tensions have a close association with FDI flows. In particular, socioeconomic conditions, investment profile, and external conflict appear to be the most influential components of political risk in attracting foreign investment. Among the financial risk components, only exchange rate stability yields statistically significant positive coefficients when estimated only for developing countries. In contrast, current account as a percentage of exports of goods and services, foreign debt as a percentage of GDP, net international liquidity as the number of months of import cover, and current account as a percentage of GDP yield negative coefficients in some specifications. Thus, multinationals do not seem to consider seriously the financial risk of the host country.

Diseño de instrumentos para configurar una política industrial en España basada en los postulados de la economía evolutiva

La evidencia empírica aplicada a países de cierto tamaño y desarrollo económico, muestra que existe una relación directa y positiva entre la intensidad de la industria manufacturera, medida como porcentaje de su PIB, y ciertas variables económicas como, el crecimiento, el desempleo y la balanza exterior de bienes y servicios. En el caso de esta última, se verifica empíricamente, que los países con una proporción de actividad manufacturera inferior al 20%, tienen una marcada tendencia a presentar déficits crónicos de balanza de bienes y servicios, lo que conduce a persistentes déficits por cuenta corriente, al ser el primer déficit el principal componente del segundo. Esto trae consigo un continuado incremento del endeudamiento externo que no cesa, y que terminará en algún momento por desequilibrar el conjunto de la economía de los países con esos déficits crónicos. Las anteriores conclusiones, abren una vía de orientación de la política económica, que tiene como objetivo la promoción de la industria manufacturera de cada país. Y esto es un hecho ya en 2014. Países relevantes, como Alemania o Francia en la UE, incluso los EEUU y últimamente el Reino Unido, y por supuesto países del área asiática como Japón, Corea del Sur y China, llevan años promoviendo su industria manufacturera. Resulta significativo, que el debate ideológico sobre la bondad de la aplicación política industrial por parte de los gobiernos, frente a las teorías liberales de mantener a los poderes públicos lejos de ese tipo de actividades, haya dado paso a un modelo generalizado de corte más bien horizontal, donde los países casi sin excepciones apoyan el desarrollo de sus empresas con numerosos instrumentos, que van bastante más lejos de los habituales de I+D. Se valora por tanto, la industria manufacturera como algo vital para el equilibrio económico. Incluso la UE, defensora durante décadas de la no intervención de los diferentes Estados miembros en actividades de promoción industrial más allá del apoyo a las actividades de I+D, realiza un giro copernicano, que termina en 2012 proclamando que la industria manufacturera es vital para el equilibrio económico de la UE, que hay que promoverla, e incluso marca un objetivo, precisamente del 20%, como contribución manufacturera a su PIB. Es decir, se da por asumido que los servicios no son un sustituto indefinido de la industria y que por tanto tienen un límite, lo que se contrapone frontalmente contra la anterior creencia de que el aumento de la participación de los servicios en la economía, no solo era bueno, sino un síntoma de desarrollo. Esta premisa ya ha dejado de ser cierta para esos y otros países. En cambio, en España nada de esto sucede en las dos últimas décadas, sino que la industria manufacturera no recibe especial atención de los poderes públicos y se desliza en una pendiente de disminución de su contribución al PIB, que incluso se acelera con la crisis económica que comienza en 2007, hasta alcanzar cifras del orden del 12% del PIB en 2013. La política económica que se aplica es la de la deflación de costes, con los efectos consecuentes sobre los salarios y sobre la capacidad de la economía de generar riqueza. Se apuesta por un modelo de mano de obra barata, que recuerda al de los años 60. Como indicador relevante de esta situación, lo que exporta la industria manufacturera española, no ha ganado en contenido tecnológico en los últimos quince años. Esta situación se ve empeorada por un hecho significativo adicional, y es que casi el 40% de las ventas de la industria manufacturera española provienen de empresas de propiedad extranjera, con lo que eso supone por una parte de dependencia tecnológica del exterior como en el caso del automóvil, y de incertidumbre sobre su futuro, al estar basadas en el mantenimiento en el futuro de una mano de obra barata, que frenará que los españoles que trabajan en esas empresas, progresen económicamente. La propuesta de esta Tesis, es en cambio apostar por un modelo de crecimiento para España que tenga como uno de sus pilares el desarrollo de una industria manufacturera sólida y con cada vez mayor contenido tecnológico. Para ello, se propone un Plan de política industrial, donde se incluye la creación de actores impulsores de este plan, que deben ser del máximo nivel político. Si los diferentes gobiernos no entienden y asumen esta necesidad de apoyo a la industria a largo plazo e independiente de los cambios políticos, no será posible llevar a cabo este Plan. Para su puesta en marcha, se propone la creación o refuerzo de numerosos instrumentos de apoyo a la industria manufacturera de carácter fundamentalmente horizontal que van mucho más allá de los habituales del I+D, y que en varios casos, tienen una clara semejanza con otros existentes ya en otros países desarrollados desde hace años. La promoción de la industria manufacturera necesita nuevos instrumentos, como una financiación a largo plazo para las empresas, una promoción ordenada y eficaz de la actividad internacional de las empresas exportadoras, la mayoría de las cuales exportan productos manufacturados, una educación y formación profesional que esté alineada con estos objetivos, unos instrumentos que apoyen en especial el desarrollo la industria manufacturera, o la participación minoritaria pero significativa, del Estado en empresas españolas pertenecientes a sectores estratégicos entre otros. En resumen, esta Tesis propone una alternativa de política económica radicalmente diferente a la de dejar la industria manufacturera española a su suerte, y basar el futuro económico de España en una mano de obra barata. ABSTRACT The empirical evidence, applied to countries of certain size and economic development, shows that there exists a direct and positive relationship between industrial manufacturing activity, measured as a percentage of GDP, and certain economic variables, such as growth, unemployment and the foreign balance of trade. In the case of the latter, it is verified empirically that the countries with a percentage of manufacturing activity below 20% have a marked tendency for chronic deficits of the balance of trade, leading to persistent deficits in the current account, being that the former deficit is the main component of the latter. This brings about a continued increase in foreign debt that does not cease, and that will end at some point by disrupting the economy of the countries with these chronic deficits. The previous conclusions open the way to a new direction for economic policy, which promotes industrial manufacturing in each country. This is already a fact in 2014. Relevant countries, such as Germany or France in the EU, even the US and ultimately the UK, and of course countries of East Asia such as Japan, South Korea and China, have been promoting their industrial manufacturing for years. It becomes significant that the ideological debate about the goodwill of the application of industrial policy by governments, against liberal theories that maintain public powers far from these kinds of activities, has taken a step towards a horizontal-cut generalized model, where countries, with almost no exception, rely on various instruments to develop their companies that go much further than the usual R&D. Industrial manufacture is therefore valued as vital for economic stability. Even the EU, proponent for decades of non-intervention policy that goes beyond R&D, has gone full circle, ending in 2012 by proclaiming that industrial manufacture is vital for the economic stability of the EU, that it must be promoted. They even mark precisely 20% as an objective for manufacturing as a percentage of GDP. In other words, it is a given that services are not an indefinite substitute for industry, and that therefore it has a limit as such. This rejects the notion that the increase in services at the cost of manufacture is not only healthy, but is also a symptom of development. This premise is no longer true for these and other countries. On the other hand, none of this happens in Spain, where industrial manufacture receives no special attention from the public authorities, and it slides on a downward slope of percentage contribution to GDP, which accelerates the economic crisis that begins in 2007, until manufacture reaches values of around 12% of GDP in 2013. The economic policy applied is that of cost deflation, with consequential effects on wages and the capacity of the economy to generate wealth. A model is proposed for cheaper labor, akin to that of the 1960s. As a relevant indicator of this situation, manufacturing exports from Spain have not grown technologically in the last 15 years. The situation is made worse by another significant fact: almost 40% of sales of the manufacturing industry originate from companies of foreign origin, which supposes on one hand a technological dependence on foreign countries, such as in the case of the automotive industry, and on the other hand uncertainty in its future, being that they are based on maintaining cheap labor in the future, which will slow economic progress of Spaniards working in these companies. The proposition of this Thesis is to bet on a growth model for Spain that has as one of its pillars the development of a solid manufacturing industry, with increasing technological content. For this, an industrial policy plan is proposed, which includes the creation of driving agents for this plan, which must be of maximum political level. If the various governments don’t understand and assume this necessity for support of industry in the long term, independent of political change, this plan will not be accomplished. To start it, the creation or reinforcement of numerous instruments to promote the manufacturing activities are proposed, with a fundamentally horizontal nature that goes far beyond the usual R&D, and that, in several cases, have a clear similarity with others existing in other countries, having been developed for years. The promotion of the manufacturing industry needs new instruments, such as the long-term financing of companies, an orderly and efficient promotion of international activity of exporting companies, the most of which export manufactured goods, education and professional training which is in tune with these objectives, some instruments which support in particular the development of the manufacturing industry, or the minor yet significant participation of the State in Spanish companies belonging to strategic sectors, among others. In summary, this Thesis proposes an different alternative to the economic policy of leaving the manufacturing industry of Spain to its chances, and to base the economic future of Spain on a cheaper labor force.

UMA ANÁLISE DA RELAÇÃO ENTRE VARIÁVEIS MACROECONÔMICAS E O COMPORTAMENTO DAS AÇÕES DE MAIOR LIQUIDEZ DO ÍNDICE IBOVESPA

As ações de maior liquidez do índice IBOVESPA, refletem o comportamento das ações de um modo geral, bem como a relação das variáveis macroeconômicas em seu comportamento e estão entre as mais negociadas no mercado de capitais brasileiro. Desta forma, pode-se entender que há reflexos de fatores que impactam as empresas de maior liquidez que definem o comportamento das variáveis macroeconômicas e que o inverso também é uma verdade, oscilações nos fatores macroeconômicos também afetam as ações de maior liquidez, como IPCA, PIB, SELIC e Taxa de Câmbio. O estudo propõe uma análise da relação existente entre variáveis macroeconômicas e o comportamento das ações de maior liquidez do índice IBOVESPA, corroborando com estudos que buscam entender a influência de fatores macroeconômicos sobre o preço de ações e contribuindo empiricamente com a formação de portfólios de investimento. O trabalho abrangeu o período de 2008 a 2014. Os resultados concluíram que a formação de carteiras, visando a proteção do capital investido, deve conter ativos com correlação negativa em relação às variáveis estudadas, o que torna possível a composição de uma carteira com risco reduzido.

Desoxyepothilone B is curative against human tumor xenografts that are refractory to paclitaxel

The epothilones are naturally occurring, cytotoxic macrolides that function through a paclitaxel (Taxol)-like mechanism. Although structurally dissimilar, both classes of molecules lead to the arrest of cell division and eventual cell death by stabilizing cellular microtubule assemblies. The epothilones differ in their ability to retain activity against multidrug-resistant (MDR) cell lines and tumors where paclitaxel fails. In the current account, we focus on the relationship between epothilone and paclitaxel in the context of tumors with multiple drug resistance. The epothilone analogue Z-12,13-desoxyepothilone B (dEpoB) is >35,000-fold more potent than paclitaxel in inhibiting cell growth in the MDR DC-3F/ADX cell line. Various formulations, routes, and schedules of i.v. administration of dEpoB have been tested in nude mice. Slow infusion with a Cremophor-ethanol vehicle proved to be the most beneficial in increasing efficacy and decreasing toxicity. Although dEpoB performed similarly to paclitaxel in sensitive tumors xenografts (MX-1 human mammary and HT-29 colon tumor), its effects were clearly superior against MDR tumors. When dEpoB was administered to nude mice bearing our MDR human lymphoblastic T cell leukemia (CCRF-CEM/paclitaxel), dEpoB demonstrated a full curative effect. For human mammary adenocarcinoma MCF-7/Adr cells refractory to paclitaxel, dEpoB reduced the established tumors, markedly suppressed tumor growth, and surpassed other commonly used chemotherapy drugs such as adriamycin, vinblastine, and etoposide in beneficial effects.

Fashions and fads in finance: contingent emulation and the political economy of sovereign wealth fund creation. IHS Political Science Series No. 131, July 2012

Sovereign wealth funds (SWFs), government-owned or managed investment vehicles, have proliferated at a remarkable rate over the past decade, even as political controversy has surrounded them. Why? The extant literature depicts the process of SWF creation as driven by functional imperatives associated with “excess” revenue and reserves accumulated from commodity booms and large current account surpluses. I argue that SWF creation also reflects in large part a process of contingent emulation in which first this policy has been constructed as appropriate for countries with given characteristics, and then when countries took on these characteristics, they followed their peers. Put simply, fashions and fads in finance matter for policy diffusion. I assess this argument using a new dataset on SWF creation that covers nearly 80 countries from 1984 to 2007. The results suggest peer-based contingent emulation has been a crucial factor shaping the decision of many countries to create a SWF, especially among fuel exporters. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC, 2 – 5 September 2010. The author would like to thank Eric Neumayer for his many suggestions and comments on previous versions of the manuscript. The author would also like to thank Zachary Elkins for sharing data. Finally, the author would like to acknowledge the research assistance of Natali Bulamacioglu and Christopher Gandrud.

The long haul: managing exit from financial assistance. Bruegel Policy Contribution Issue 2014/03, 20 February 2014

Countries can make a clean exit from financial assistance, or enter a new programme or a precautionary programme, depending on the sustainability of their public debt and their vulnerability to shocks. Ireland made a clean exit in December 2013, supported by significant budgetary and current-account adjustment and signs of economic recovery. But Irish debt sustainability is not guaranteed and prudence will be needed to avoid future difficulties. A clean exit for Portugal is not recommended when its programme ends in May 2014, because compared to Ireland it faces higher interest rates, has poorer growth prospects and has probably less ability to generate a consistently high primary surplus. A precautionary arrangement would be advisable. In case debt sustainability proves difficult to achieve later, some form of debt restructuring may prove necessary. It is unlikely that Greece will be able to exit its programme in December 2014. A third programme should be put in place to take Greece out of the market until 2030, accompanied by enhanced budgetary and structural reform commitments by Greece, a European boost to economic growth in the euro-area periphery and willingness on the part of lenders to reduce loan charges below their borrowing costs, should public debt levels prove unsustainable despite Greece meeting the loan conditions. Even assuming all goes well, the three countries will be subject to enhanced post-pro-gramme surveillance for decades. Managing such long-term relationships will be a key challenge.

Turkey's economy: a story of success with an uncertain future. OSW Commentary No. 120, 2013-11-05

In the decade since the Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power, Turkey’s economy has become synonymous with success and well-implemented reforms. Economic development has been the basis of both socio-political stability inside the country and of an ambitious foreign policy agenda pursued by the AKP. However, the risks associated with a series of unresolved issues are becoming increasingly apparent. These include the country’s current account deficit, its over-reliance on short-term external financing, and unfinished reforms, for example of the education sector. This leaves Turkey exposed to over-dependence on investors, especially from the West. Consequently, Ankara has become a hostage of its own image as an economically successful state with a stable socio-political system. Any changes to this image would cause capital flight, as exemplified by the outflow of portfolio investment1 and an increase in the cost of external debt2 that followed the nationwide protests over the proposed closure of Gezi Park last summer. In addition, Turkey remains vulnerable to potential changes in investor sentiment towards emerging markets.

A stronger, growth-oriented surveillance for EMU. EuropEos Commentary No. 1, 19 April 2010

This Commentary finds that the recent adjustment measures taken by the Greek government in combination with the financial support proffered by the Eurogroup may not be sufficient to deal with the risk of instability in EMU in the longer term. The author argues that other imbalances, most notably the current account imbalances within EMU, need to be addressed to avoid a deflation spiral that would aggravate sustainability problems in highly indebted countries. The Greek crisis highlights the need to take steps to strengthen the economic governance of the euro area. A key component of these steps would be a stronger, growth-oriented, surveillance.

Filling the gap: open economy considerations for more reliable potential output estimates. Bruegel Working Paper 2015/11, October 2015

This paper argues that the Phillips curve relationship is not sufficient to trace back the output gap, because the effect of excess demand is not symmetric across tradeable and non-tradeable sectors. In the non-tradeable sector, excess demand creates excess employment and inflation via the Phillips curve, while in the tradeable sector much of the excess demand is absorbed by the trade balance. We set up an unobserved-components model including both a Phillips curve and a current account equation to estimate ‘sustainable output’ for 45 countries. Our estimates for many countries differ substantially from the potential output estimates of the European Commission, IMF and OECD. We assemble a comprehensive real-time dataset to estimate our model on data which was available in each year from 2004-15. Our model was able to identify correctly the sign of pre-crisis output gaps using real time data for countries such as the United States, Spain and Ireland, in contrast to the estimates of the three institutions, which estimated negative output gaps real-time, while their current estimates for the pre-crisis period suggest positive gaps. In the past five years the annual output gap estimate revisions of our model, the European Commission, IMF, OECD and the Hodrick-Prescott filter were broadly similar in the range of 0.5-1.0 percent of GDP for advanced countries. Such large revisions are worrisome, because the European fiscal framework can translate the imprecision in output gap estimates into poorly grounded fiscal policymaking in the EU.

Are Germans wasting their savings abroad? CEPS Commentary, 7 April 2016

Germany is running a current account surplus of about 8% of GDP, which means that about one-third of all German savings (equal to 24% of GDP) has to be invested abroad every year. It has become by now almost a cliché that these huge excess savings are being wasted abroad. But this is a popular misconception based on the divergence between the available data on the (cumulated) current account balance (cCAB) of Germany and its net international investment position (NIIP). A closer look at the data actually suggests that the NIIP is probably not measured correctly and that the observed returns on German investment abroad have remained above most domestic returns.