The European Convention on Human Rights after Enlargement

The Council of Europe has dramatically enlarged its membership over the past decade, encompassing the vast majority of the formerly Communist states of Central and Eastern Europe. With this dramatic enlargement, the Council has sought to secure its place in the complex institutional architecture of post-Cold War Europe, building on its traditional strengths in the promotion of democratic governance and human rights. Yet, both inside and outside the organisation, voices have been raised to suggest that the Council has lowered its admission standards in a manner which risks compromising the legitimacy of the European Convention on Human Rights. Against the background of these ongoing controversies, this article assesses the impact of enlargement on the European human rights system. Focusing on the composition of the European Court of Human Rights and the initial pattern of cases from the Central and East European member states, it is demonstrated that the short-term impact of enlargement has been quite limited. Nevertheless, it is clear that the Court will face major new challenges over the coming years. In part, the Court will have to assume the role of an adjudicator of transition. More generally, there will also be mounting pressures for it to (re)cast itself more clearly as a European constitutional court.

The Equalization of Effective Communicative Freedom: Democratic Justice in the Constitutional State and Beyond

Jurgen Habermas takes the realization of rights through the democratic self-organization of legal communities to be the normative core of emancipatory politics. In this article I explore the implications of this claim in relation to the requirements of justice. I argue that Habermas's discourse theory of democratic legitimacy presupposes a substantive principle of justice that demands the equalization of effective communicative freedom for all structurally constituted social groups in any constitutional state. This involves the elimination of a range of structural injustices rooted in the complex interrelationships between political, economic and cultural orders. In the final section I sketch briefly the implications of this analysis in the context of ongoing globalization processes. It is suggested that the most effective way to establish a just system of global governance is to equalize effective communicative freedom among nation-states.

How could Human Rights Law be used by the Courts to assist Victims of Domestic Violence? A Comparative Study

It has been increasingly recognised in recent years that domestic violence constitutes a human rights issue. This article seeks to shed light on the question of how human rights law may be used in the area of domestic violence through the medium of a litigation strategy. The method used is a comparative assessment of the approaches taken towards gender issues by the Constitutional Courts in three states that have famously dynamic judiciaries- India, South Africa and Canada. A number of the obstacles to the effectiveness of human rights law are also examined.

Taking the Next Step? Achieving another Bill of Rights

The aim of this article is to explore the recent Bill of Rights debate in the UK. This is deliberately located in the UK’s complex ‘national question’ because of the obsessive focus on achieving a proper grounding for human rights. A new form of national human rights protectionism appears to be emerging and merits careful consideration. The article suggests that it is better to acknowledge and accept the existence of a plurality of nationalisms in the UK in these discussions and understand how an essentially ‘British nationalist’ discourse sounds and works in that overall context. The concern is that the Bill of Rights debate is becoming an inadequate surrogate for the more challenging constitutional conversations that are required, and human rights discourse thus invested with expectations of national renewal that it can never meet and does not have the internal resources to resolve. If the process does go forward it may be better to prepare the ground for a deeper and wider constitutional dialogue across these islands than stumble clumsily and divisively into this territory simply via ‘another’ UK Bill of Rights.

Courts and Consociations:How human rights courts may destabilize power-sharing settlements

We consider the use of consociational arrangements to manage ethno-nationalist, ethno-linguistic, and ethno-religious conflicts, and their compatibility with non-discrimination and equality norms. Key questions include to what extent, if any, consociations conflict with the dictates of global justice and the liberal individualist preferences of international human rights institutions, and to what extent consociational power-sharing may be justified to preserve peace and the integrity of political settlements. In three critical cases, the European Court of Human Rights has considered equality challenges to important consociational practices, twice in Belgium and, most recently, in Sejdic and Finci, concerning the constitutional arrangements established for Bosnia Herzegovina under the Dayton Agreement. The Court’s recent decision in Sejdic and Finci has significantly altered the approach it previously took to judicial review of consociational arrangements in the Belgian cases. We seek to account for this change and assess its implications. We identify problematic aspects of the judgment and conclude that, although the Court’s decision indicates one possible trajectory of human rights courts’ reactions to consociations, this would be an unfortunate development because it leaves future negotiators in places riven by potential or manifest bloody ethnic conflicts with considerably less flexibility in reaching a settlement. That in turn may unintentionally contribute to sustaining such conflicts and make it more likely that advisors to negotiators will advise them to exclude regional and international courts from having standing in the management of political settlements.

Economic and social integration the challenge for EU constitutional law

'At a time of crisis and therefore a crucial juncture in European politics, Dagmar Schiek offers us an inspiring vision of the potential of the European Union. In her brilliant study, she exposes the obstacles that economic integration has posed for achievement of social justice, and provides a bold solution. Rejecting more limited models of constitutionalism, she presents a convincing alternative which is socially embedded, allowing space for action by manifold actors at multiple levels of governance.' - Tonia Novitz, University of Bristol, UK. © Dagmar Schiek 2012. All rights reserved.

Northern Ireland Representation at Westminster: Constitutional Conundrums and Political Manoeuvres

This article focuses on the issue of Northern Ireland's representation at Westminster. It investigates the political context of the decision to increase Northern Ireland's representation in the house of commons at Westminster from 12 members to 17 in 1978-9. Exploring this episode in more detail, it is argued, provides a more informed overall understanding of the history of devolution in the UK and of the way issues concerning Northern Ireland often overlapped with questions of constitutional change in Scotland and Wales. The article also throws light on the matter of Northern Ireland MPs and their voting rights at Westminster during Northern Ireland's experience of devolution prior to 1972.

Constitutional Questions

Constitutional Questions
Professor John Morison MRIA School of Law, Queen’s University Belfast
How should we live together? Is there any ethical question more fundamental than this?
Is a constitution only about who does what in government or is it about what is to be done? Does a constitution provide the ground rules for deciding this or is it part of the answer itself? Is it the repository of fundamental values about how to live? What is the good life anyway? Is it about the preservation of life and liberty, and the pursuit of happiness? Or something more? What about preserving (or radically reordering) the distribution of property? Or ensuring that everyone has the same chances? Is it the job of the constitution to simply promise dignity, equality and freedom, or to deliver these values?
If the constitution is the place where the state undertakes “to promote the welfare of the whole people”, what does this actually mean in practical terms? And who pays for it? Should a constitution give us an entitlement to at least a basic minimum by way of a lifestyle? Or is it the job only of the political process to decide issues about the allocation of resources? What do we do if we feel that we cannot trust our politicians? Are there basic rules that should govern the operation of politics and are there fundamental values that should not be overridden? Are these “sacred and undeniable”? Or to be interpreted in line with modern conditions and within a “margin of appreciation”? Who decides on this in individual cases?
Who is entitled to any of this, and on what basis? Is everyone equal? Is the constitution about making it clear that no-one is better than you, and that in turn, you are better than no-one? Is a constitution about ensuring that you will always be an end in yourself and never simply a means to anyone else’s end? Or does it simply reinforce the existing distribution of power and wealth?
Are citizens to be given more than those who are not citizens? Is more to be expected from them, and what might that be? Can the constitution tell us how we should treat those from outside who now live with us?
What is the relationship between a constitution and a nation? Who is in the nation anyway? Should we talk about “we the people” or “we the peoples”? Should a constitution confirm a nationality or facilitate diversity? Is the constitution the place to declare aspirations for a national territory? Or to confirm support for the idea of consent? What about all our neighbours – on the island of Ireland and in Great Britain? Or in Europe? And beyond?
What is the relationship between a constitution and democracy? Is a constitution simply the rules by which the powerful govern the powerless? In what sense does a constitution belong to everyone, across past, present and future generations? Is it the place where we state common values? Are there any? Do they change across time? Should the people be asked about changes they may want? How often should this be done? Should the constitution address the past and its problems? How might this be done? What do we owe future generations?
Finally, if we can agree that the constitution is about respecting human rights, striving for social justice and building a fair and democratic Ireland – North and South – how do we make it happen in practice?

Dignity and the Challenge to Liberty :Reading Andras Sajo's Constitutional Sentiments

This paper considers debates about the anti-liberal tendencies of the concept of “human dignity”, in particular those conceptions that are “expressivist”. My aim is to examine how far conceptions of dignity are expressivist, and if so what problems the concept of dignity understood in this way poses for liberty. I consider concerns about dignity’s potential illiberality, in particular the potential illiberality of respect-based conceptions of dignity, in the context of Professor András Sajó’s recent writing, illustrating the discussion with examples drawn from recent judicial decisions of the European Court of Human Rights regarding freedom of speech.

Using Comparative Constitutionalism in Human Rights Discourse:Ireland’s Past and Scotland’s Future

The article considers the use of comparisons in constitutional development, specifically the use of comparative reasoning in the context of debates about human rights in newly emerging independent states, using the examples of Ireland and Scotland.

Rights, Rationality and Reproduction: Balancing Interests in the Abortion Debate

As medical technology has advanced, so too have our attitudes towards the level of control we can or should expect to have over our procreative capacities. This creates a multidimensional problem for the law and family planning services in terms of access to services – whether to avoid conception or terminate a pregnancy – and the negligent provision of these services. These developments go to the heart of our perception of autonomy. Unsurprisingly, these matters also raise a moral dilemma for the law. Distinctively, discourse in this area is dominated by assertions of subjective moral value; in relation to life, to personal choice and to notions of the archetypal family. Against this, I stress that a model of objective morality can answer these challenging questions and resolve the inherent problems of legal regulation. Therefore, I argue that notions of autonomy must be based on a rational, action-based understanding of what it means to be a ‘moral agent’. I claim that from this we might support a legal standard, based on objective rational morality, which can frame our constitutional norms and our conception of justice in these contentious areas. This paper claims that the current regulation of abortion is outdated and requires radical reform. It proposes a scheme that would shift the choice towards the mother (and the father), remove the unnecessarily broad disability ground and involve doctors having a role of counsel (rather than gatekeeper).

Limiting rights, Canadian style : the Supreme Court of Canada, American jurisprudence and section 1 of the Charter /

The addition of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms represented a fundamental shift in Canadian governance. Many saw the tabling of such a document as a further, even fmal, step towards the Americanization of the Canadian polity. While the Charter's presence has significantly altered the relationship between citizens, government and the courts, it has done so by maintaining the traditional values and experiences that has been the hallmarks of Canadian constitutionalism. This is in contrast to the fears harboured by critics suggesting that the Charter was a further Americanization of the Canadian Polity, notwithstanding the very different natures of the American Bill of Rights and the Canadian Charter. Analyzing American Supreme Court precedent use by the Canadian Supreme Court has demonstrated that such an Americanization has not, in fact, occurred. In the present analysis of American precedent use in section 1 limitation of rights cases, the citation of these precedents are at best episodic, at least on the quantitative level. Qualitatively, the Canadian Supreme Court generally uses American jurisprudence to further support broad definitions of 'great rights' . As for the more intricate details of rights limitations and the process involved in detennining how Charter rights are limited, one would be hard pressed to find even cursory references to American case law.

Rights jurisprudence and the charter : evaluating the changing structure of Canadian federalism /

Abstract . Rights jiirisprudence in Canada dates back as far as Confederation in 1867. Between this date and 1982, the organizing principle of Confederation - federalism - has kept this jurisprudence solely within the supremacy of Parliament, subject to its confines and division of powers. After 1982, however, a new constitutional organizing principle was introduced, when Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau introduced the patriation initiative, touted as the "people's package". Individual rights and freedoms were now guaranteed by the Constitution. Citizens of Canada now had a direct link to the Constitution via the Charter and there were now two significantly different organizing principles within the constitutional order widch created an unstable coexistence. This instability has led to a clash between judicially enforced Charter rights and federalism. The Charter has since had both a nationalizing and centralizing effect on Canadian federalism. This thesis explores the relationship between rights and federalism in Canada fix)m Confederation to present day by comparing the jurisprudence of pre and post Charter Canada. An analysis of Supreme Court's (and its predecessor's, the JCPC) decisions shows the profound effect the Charter has had on Canadian federalism. The result has been an undermining of federalism in Canada, with Parliamentary Supremacy replaced by Constitutional supremacy, and ultimately. Judicial Supremacy. Moreover, rights discourse has largely replaced federalism discourse. Canadians have become very attached to their Charter, and are unwilling to allow any changes to the constitution that may affect their rights as political elites discovered the hard way after the collapse of the Meech and Charlottetown Accords. If federalism is to remain a relevant and viable organizing principle in the Constitution, then governments, especially at the provincial level, must find new and iimovative ways to assert their importance within the federation.

Canada’s Unfathomable Unwritten Constitutional Principles

Since the advent of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982, Canadians courts have become bolder in the law-making entreprise, and have recently resorted to unwritten constitutional principles in an unprecedented fashion. In 1997, in Reference re Remuneration of Judges of the Provincial Court of Prince Edward Island, the Supreme Court of Canada found constitutional justification for the independence of provincially appointed judges in the underlying, unwritten principles of the Canadian Constitution. In 1998, in Reference re Secession of Quebec, the Court went even further in articulating those principles, and held that they have a substantive content which imposes significant limitations on government action. The author considers what the courts' recourse to unwritten principles means for the administrative process. More specifically, he looks at two important areas of uncertainty relating to those principles: their ambiguous normative force and their interrelatedness. He goes on to question the legitimacy of judicial review based on unwritten constitutional principles, and to critize the courts'recourse to such principles in decisions applying the principle of judicial independence to the issue of the remuneration of judges.