Consent as a Common Law Defence to Non-Sexual Assaults: The Effect of Neal v The Queen

The following discussion is an exposition of the recognised exceptions to the general rule that the law will not sanction the giving of a lawful consent to the application or threat of actual or grievous bodily harm. The discussion will also focus on a series of decisions in the UK and Australia, particularly Neal v The Queen, that have altered the law's approach to these exceptions and, more importantly, now permit a personto give an informed consent to the risk of contracting HIV or any other sexually transmitted diseases, provided there was no intention on the part of the accused to actually infect the other person. The underlying rationale for sanctioning an informed consent to such a risk is that consenting adults should be accorded the utmost autonomy in conductingtheir private affairs, and particularly so in the context of the choices they make regarding their private sexual activities. Whether one agrees or disagrees with the notion of allowing one to lawfully consent to such a risk, it raises an important question as to the current status of the general rule that one cannot generally give an informed consent to the applicationor threat of actual or grievous bodily harm. More succinctly stated, if the law is prepared to allow an informed consent to the risk of contracting a potentially fatal disease, then what remains of what had previously been a well-settled rule that, save for a few well-recognised exceptions, persons were generally prohibited from consenting to the application or threat of actual or grievous bodily harm?

A ascensão de aspectos do common law no sistema processual civil brasileiro: uma crítica à aplicação da jurisprudência e à doutrina dos precedentes judiciais

Pós-graduação em Direito - FCHS

A teoria da constituição no common law : reflexões teóricas sobre o peculiar constitucionalismo britânico

Inclui notas explicativas, bibliográficas e bibliografia

Mineral rights management by private landowners.

Mode of access: Internet.

What is the Point of Copyright History?:Reflections on Copyright at Common law in 1774 by H. Tomás Gómez-Arostegui

Copyright history has long been a subject of intense and contested enquiry. Historical narratives about the early development of copyright were first prominently mobilised in eighteenth century British legal discourse, during the so-called Battle of the Booksellers between Scottish and London publishers. The two landmark copyright decisions of that time – Millar v. Taylor (1769) and Donaldson v. Becket (1774) – continue to provoke debate today. The orthodox reading of Millar and Donaldson presents copyright as a natural proprietary right at common law inherent in authors. Revisionist accounts dispute that traditional analysis. These conflicting perspectives have, once again, become the subject of critical scrutiny with the publication of Copyright at Common Law in 1774 by Prof Tomas Gomez-Arostegui in 2014, in the Connecticut Law Review ((2014) 47 Conn. L. Rev. 1) and as a CREATe Working Paper (No. 2014/16, 3 November 2014).

Taking Prof Gomez-Arostegui’s extraordinary work in this area as a point of departure, Dr Elena Cooper and Professor Ronan Deazley (then both academics at CREATe) organised an event, held at the University of Glasgow on 26th and 27th March 2015, to consider the interplay between copyright history and contemporary copyright policy. Is Donaldson still relevant, and, if so, why? What justificatory goals are served by historical investigation, and what might be learned from the history of the history of copyright? Does the study of copyright history still have any currency within an evidence-based policy context that is increasingly preoccupied with economic impact analysis?

This paper provides a lasting record of these discussions, including an editorial introduction, written comments by each of the panelists and Prof. Gomez-Arostegui and an edited transcript of the Symposium debate.

Institutional Persistence and Change in England's Common Law: 1700-1865

Institutions are widely regarded as important, even ultimate drivers of economic growth and performance. A recent mainstream of institutional economics has concentrated on the effect of persisting, often imprecisely measured institutions and on cataclysmic events as agents of noteworthy institutional change. As a consequence, institutional change without large-scale shocks has received little attention. In this dissertation I apply a complementary, quantitative-descriptive approach that relies on measures of actually enforced institutions to study institutional persistence and change over a long time period that is undisturbed by the typically studied cataclysmic events. By placing institutional change into the center of attention one can recognize different speeds of institutional innovation and the continuous coexistence of institutional persistence and change. Specifically, I combine text mining procedures, network analysis techniques and statistical approaches to study persistence and change in England’s common law over the Industrial Revolution (1700-1865). Based on the doctrine of precedent - a peculiarity of common law systems - I construct and analyze the apparently first citation network that reflects lawmaking in England. Most strikingly, I find large-scale change in the making of English common law around the turn of the 19th century - a period free from the typically studied cataclysmic events. Within a few decades a legal innovation process with low depreciation rates (1 to 2 percent) and strong past-persistence transitioned to a present-focused innovation process with significantly higher depreciation rates (4 to 6 percent) and weak past-persistence. Comparison with U.S. Supreme Court data reveals a similar U.S. transition towards the end of the 19th century. The English and U.S. transitions appear to have unfolded in a very specific manner: a new body of law arose during the transitions and developed in a self-referential manner while the existing body of law lost influence, but remained prominent. Additional findings suggest that Parliament doubled its influence on the making of case law within the first decades after the Glorious Revolution and that England’s legal rules manifested a high degree of long-term persistence. The latter allows for the possibility that the often-noted persistence of institutional outcomes derives from the actual persistence of institutions.