Why do national court judges refer to human rights treaties?: A comparative international law analysis of CEDAW

An analysis was conducted of 325 national judicial decisions across 55 jurisdictions, in which CEDAW was referred to in the reported decision. Despite predictions to the contrary based on previous scholarship, significant variations between courts in their interpretation of CEDAW occurred relatively infrequently, courts referred relatively seldom to interpretations of CEDAW by other national courts, and there was little evidence of transnational dialogic approaches to judging. An analysis of these results suggests that domestic judges invoking CEDAW act primarily as domestic actors who use international law in order to advance domestic goals, rather than acting primarily as agents of the international community in applying CEDAW domestically, or contributing to the transnational shaping of international law to suit national interests. The Article suggests an understanding of the domestic implementation of a human rights treaty as not only law, but a unique kind of law that performs a particular function, in light of its quality as something akin to hard and soft law simultaneously.

Limiting rights, Canadian style : the Supreme Court of Canada, American jurisprudence and section 1 of the Charter /

The addition of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms represented a fundamental shift in Canadian governance. Many saw the tabling of such a document as a further, even fmal, step towards the Americanization of the Canadian polity. While the Charter's presence has significantly altered the relationship between citizens, government and the courts, it has done so by maintaining the traditional values and experiences that has been the hallmarks of Canadian constitutionalism. This is in contrast to the fears harboured by critics suggesting that the Charter was a further Americanization of the Canadian Polity, notwithstanding the very different natures of the American Bill of Rights and the Canadian Charter. Analyzing American Supreme Court precedent use by the Canadian Supreme Court has demonstrated that such an Americanization has not, in fact, occurred. In the present analysis of American precedent use in section 1 limitation of rights cases, the citation of these precedents are at best episodic, at least on the quantitative level. Qualitatively, the Canadian Supreme Court generally uses American jurisprudence to further support broad definitions of 'great rights' . As for the more intricate details of rights limitations and the process involved in detennining how Charter rights are limited, one would be hard pressed to find even cursory references to American case law.

Triangulation of rights, balancing of interests : exploring the tensions between freedom of conscience and freedom of religion in comparative constitutional law

La liberté de religion, souvent reconnue comme étant la « première liberté » dans de nombreuses traditions juridiques, reflète également les différentes conceptions de la place de l’individu et de la communauté dans la société. Notre étude analysera les modèles constitutionnels canadien, américain et européen de liberté de religion et conscience. Dans un premier chapitre, nous examinerons les conceptions théoriques de la religion dans les sciences sociales ainsi les approches juridiques afin de mieux cerner comment la religion est conçue et de plus, comprendre les diverses influences sur sa conceptualisation. Dans un second et troisième chapitre, nous tenterons d’une part, de qualifier la relation entre la liberté de conscience et la liberté de religion au Canada en nous livrant à une analyse approfondie des deux libertés et d’autre part, d’identifier les questions qui demeurent irrésolues. Dans le chapitre final, nous observerons comment la liberté de conscience a été interprétée dans les contextes américain et dans l’Union Européenne, par le biais de la Cour Européenne des droits de l’Homme. Notre hypothèse est que l’on peut arriver à une meilleure compréhension de la relation entre les libertés de conscience et religion en clarifiant les conceptions théoriques de la religion et de la conscience en droit constitutionnel comparé.

The Influence of ICC Arbitral Decisions on Canadian Law: Comparative Study between Civil Law and Common Law Jurisdictions

L’objectif de cette recherche est de démontrer que les décisions arbitrales de la Chambre de commerce internationale peuvent être considérées comme une source potentielle de droit au Canada. Il existe actuellement une incertitude quant au droit matériel utilisé en arbitrage international pour résoudre les différends commerciaux. Bien que l’utilisation de la lex mercatoria pour résoudre un litige soit une option, elle se heurte à de nombreuses incertitudes terminologiques et conceptuelles. L’utilisation d’une approche méthodologique de la lex mercatoria permettrait une classification de ses sources en deux branches: (1) le droit statutaire international et (2) le stare decisis des tribunaux d’arbitrage commercial international. Une telle approche méthodologique conférerait plus de certitude quant à l’application d’un droit uniforme. De plus, elle faciliterait l’étude de l’interlégalité entre les règles de la lex mercatoria et le droit matériel interne. Plus particulièrement, elle permet de comparer les similitudes et les différences des règles du droit matériel entre les décisions arbitrales internationales, le droit statutaire international et les juridictions canadiennes de common law et de droit civil. Cette comparaison rend possible une évaluation de l’influence potentielle des décisions arbitrales de la Chambre de commerce internationale sur le droit matériel canadien et si cette influence est plus importante en droit civil ou en common law.

"Judicial Activism in the ""Eye of the Beholder"" : the Israeli High Court of Justice and the Human Rights of the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories"

Il est mondialement reconnu que les institutions judiciaires jouent un rôle central dans le processus de prise de décisions politiques, à la fois au niveau national et international. C’est d’ailleurs le cas à la Haute Cour de justice d’Israël. L’étendue de son succès (ou de son échec) dans la tentative de trouver une solution aux violations des droits humains dans les territoires occupés est un problème qui continue de faire l’objet de bien des débats et de recherches académiques. À cet égard, il a été suggéré que, malgré l’absence de constitution écrite et l’existence d’un état d’urgence prolongé en Israël, la Haute Cour de justice a réussi à adopter une approche « judiciairement active » quant à la protection et la promotion des droits de l’homme de manière générale, y compris ceux des Palestiniens dans les territoires occupés. Dans cette perspective, le débat sur le processus d’examen judiciaire de la Haute Cour de Justice tient pour acquise la notion qu’Israël est une démocratie. Ainsi, cet article cherche à examiner cette hypothèse. Premièrement, en adoptant la position que le processus de révision judiciaire est compatible avec la démocratie et la règle de loi. Deuxièmement, il examine l’approche « judiciairement active » de la Cour et soumet un bref aperçu du processus, des outils et des principes légaux que la Cour adopte pour examiner les actions des autorités israéliennes, y compris l’armée, et imposer une loi commune de protection des droits de la personne, donc ceux des Palestiniens dans les territoires occupés. L’article argumente également que le contrôle prolongé des territoires occupés par Israël a eu des conséquences significatives, car tout effort fourni par la Cour pour garantir le respect des droits humains de la population civile palestinienne doit se faire sans compromettre la sécurité du pouvoir israélien. La conclusion à laquelle on arrive ici dépend de la façon dont on qualifie ce contrôle: une occupation à long terme ou une annexion (ce qui n’est pas réglementaire par rapport à loi internationale), ce qui n’est pas sans conséquence sur le rôle que la Haute Cour de justice peut effectivement jouer pour faire respecter les droits de la personne dans les territoires occupés.

Just another case of treaty interpretation? Reconciling humanitarian law and human rights law in the ICJ

This chapter offers a fresh critique of the approach taken by the International Court of Justice to the relationship between humanitarian law and human rights law. In so doing, it seeks to move beyond the intractable debates that have dominated this area, offering an original account of the relationship that is firmly grounded in general international law concepts of treaty interpretation.

The status of flag desecration in Australian law

Law relating to the desecration of the Australian flag in a public place - the influence of the flag on Australia's culture and politics - whether flag desecration is a constitutionally protected political communication - the constitutionality of the Flags (Protection of Australian Flags) Amendment Bill 2008 - whether the treatment of flag desecration under Australian law is likely to change if and when a statutory bill of rights is enacted.

Mineral law and the doctrine of rights : a microscope of magnification?

The doctrine of rights has become part of private law jurisprudence. In this article the application of the doctrine in two decisions dealing with surface support in mineral law is examined. It is argued that the decision of Kriegler J in Elektrisiteitsvoorsieningskommissie v Fourie, namely, that the right to surface support is an entitlement, is more correct than Anglo Operations Ltd v Sandhurst Estates (Pty) Ltd in which it was decided that the right to surface support is a competence. It is submitted that depending on the legal location of the entitlement in the relationship between owner and miner of land one may simply refer to either an owner's entitlement to surface support or a miner's entitlement to undertake opencast-cast mining.

Facts, threats and reds : common law constitutionalism and the rule of law

In a concurring judgment in Thomas v Mowbray, a High Court of Australia case turning on the Constitutional validity of terrorism-related control orders, Callinan J offers a re-evaluation of the Court’s earlier decision in the Australian Communist Party case to curtail executive power. According to Callinan J, factual matters knowable (but not known) at the time of the earlier decision might have given rise to a different outcome. In a dissenting judgment by Kirby J in the same case the Court’s reasoning in the Australian Communist Party case is robustly defended. These contested issues connect with the theoretical dispute between ‘common law constitutionalism’ and ‘constitutional positivism’ analysed by Dyzenhaus in the context of states of emergency where the limits of executive action and the role of supporting facts become particularly salient. They press the question of the status of the rule of law in the international as well as in the municipal sphere.

The nature and scope of rights of removal

The rationale underlying the fixtures and accession presumptions is the need to protect the value of the chattel as well as the need to protect third-party interests. The destruction of the independent legal status of an attached chattel is generally deemed appropriate where the value of the co-mingled asset will be diminished if the chattel retains a separate legal title and this would generate unfairness because third parties have dealt with the co-mingled asset on the basis of its overall value. Rights to remove have evolved under both common law and equity to moderate the scope of these presumptions. Common law will uphold the right of a tenant to remove chattels that have been attached to leased premises during the currency of the lease. Equity on the other hand will uphold the right to remove affixed chattels in circumstances where the enforcement of such an entitlement is consistent with contractual intention and transactional fairness. This article examines the different rights of removal that have evolved under Australian law to date and the emergent statutory framework supporting these rights. It discusses the historical purpose and structural utility of these entitlements within a land framework that supports fixtures presumptions. Rights of removal, whether validated at law or in equity, confer positive entitlements upon the holder to access and remove affixed goods in circumstances where, because of the fixtures and accession presumptions, those goods no longer retain any separate legal status. The capacity of the holder to enforce this right against third parties is illustrative of their distinctive proprietary perspective.

Consent as a Common Law Defence to Non-Sexual Assaults: The Effect of Neal v The Queen

The following discussion is an exposition of the recognised exceptions to the general rule that the law will not sanction the giving of a lawful consent to the application or threat of actual or grievous bodily harm. The discussion will also focus on a series of decisions in the UK and Australia, particularly Neal v The Queen, that have altered the law's approach to these exceptions and, more importantly, now permit a personto give an informed consent to the risk of contracting HIV or any other sexually transmitted diseases, provided there was no intention on the part of the accused to actually infect the other person. The underlying rationale for sanctioning an informed consent to such a risk is that consenting adults should be accorded the utmost autonomy in conductingtheir private affairs, and particularly so in the context of the choices they make regarding their private sexual activities. Whether one agrees or disagrees with the notion of allowing one to lawfully consent to such a risk, it raises an important question as to the current status of the general rule that one cannot generally give an informed consent to the applicationor threat of actual or grievous bodily harm. More succinctly stated, if the law is prepared to allow an informed consent to the risk of contracting a potentially fatal disease, then what remains of what had previously been a well-settled rule that, save for a few well-recognised exceptions, persons were generally prohibited from consenting to the application or threat of actual or grievous bodily harm?