Förteckning uppå afl. protokolls-sekreteraren O. Meurmans efterlemnade böcker, som försäljas på auction i Helsingfors den [24 maj e.m., 1851]

Imprimatur: H. Molander.

Förteckning öfver böcker, som komma att å auction försäljas

Imprimatur: G. F. Aminoff.

Förteckning å framlidne förste expeditions-secreteraren C. Boijes efterlemnade böcker, som komma att å offentelig auction försäljas

Imprimatur: N. A. Gyldén.

Broadside advertising a Real Estate Auction in the Village of Niagara Falls [New York], July, 1836.

Benjamin Rathburn (1790-1873) was a builder, banker and hotel-keeper who was well-known for his work in the development and expansion of Buffalo in the 1830s. He also conducted business in the Village of Niagara Falls. He purchased large tracts of land (largely on credit) with the intent to sell the land at a profit. However, the sales did not meet his expectations and Rathburn found himself over-extended on credit, ultimately leading to his financial ruin.Jesse P. Haines (1793-1877) was an American cartographer who is credited with mapping the Villages of Lockport and Niagara Falls, New York.

Broadside advertising a Real Estate Auction in the Village of Niagara Falls [New York], July, 1836.

Benjamin Rathburn (1790-1873) was a builder, banker and hotel-keeper who was well-known for his work in the development and expansion of Buffalo in the 1830s. He also conducted business in the Village of Niagara Falls. He purchased large tracts of land (largely on credit) with the intent to sell the land at a profit. However, the sales did not meet his expectations and Rathburn found himself over-extended on credit, ultimately leading to his financial ruin. Jesse P. Haines (1793-1877) was an American cartographer who is credited with mapping the Villages of Lockport and Niagara Falls, New York.

Notice from the Crown Lands Department of Ottawa that the lands on Long Point, Lake Erie would be offered at public auction on May 4, 1866

Notice from the Crown Lands Department of Ottawa that the lands on Long Point, Lake Erie would be offered at public auction on May 4, 1866. This is attached to a small newspaper clipping with the same information, dated April 20, 1866.

Clipping advertising the auction to be held at 28 College Street in Toronto, Ontario

Clipping advertising the auction to be held at 28 College Street in Toronto, Ontario, April 1939.

Catalogue of items from Devaux [DeVeaux] Hall to be sold in Toronto at auction

Catalogue of items from Devaux [DeVeaux] Hall to be sold in Toronto at auction on April 24-26, 1939. The list of items included items such as lamps, curtain rods, furniture, original art, vases, kitchen items and books. The auction was held in 6 sessions over a 3 day period. There were 855 items listed in the 45 page catalogue. The auction was put on by Ward-Price Auctioneers of Toronto, Apr. 1939.

Auction Sale Notice

Auction Sale notice concerning a brick and stone carpenter shop; a frame wheel-house building and a stone machine shop building all located on Cascade Street in Niagara Falls, Ontario. The Superintendent of the State Reservation at Niagara is listed as Thomas W. Welch. The names Thomas Dolphin – Suspension Bridge; W.A. Frazer – Suspension Bridge; Alice L. [illegible] – Niagara Falls and James C. [illegible] are written on the notice in blue pencil. There is a tear at the top of the notice and wear along the sides. Text is not affected. The item is slightly discoloured and mounted on cardboard, 28 cm x 20 cm, January 27, 1886.

Corruption and individual ethics: insights from a public procurement auction

This article proposes an auction model where two firms compete for obtaining the license for a public project and an auctioneer acting as a public official representing the political power, decides the winner of the contest. Players as firms face a social dilemma in the sense that the higher is the bribe offered, the higher would be the willingness of a pure monetary maximizer public official to give her the license. However, it implies inducing a cost of reducing all players’ payoffs as far as our model includes an endogenous externality, which depends on bribe. All players’ payoffs decrease with the bribe (and increase with higher quality). We find that the presence of bribe aversion in either the officials’ or the firms’ utility function shifts equilibrium towards more pro-social behavior. When the quality and bribe-bid strategy space is discrete, multiple equilibria emerge including more pro-social bids than would be predicted under a continuous strategy space.

First-Price auction symmetric equlibria with a general distribution

In this paper I obtain the mixed strategy symmetric equilibria of the first-price auction for any distribution. The equilibrium is unique. The solution turns out to be a combination of absolutely continuous distributions case and the discrete distributions case.

First-price auction symmetric equilibria with a general distribution

In this paper I obtain the mixed strategy symmetric equilibria of the first-price auction for any distribution. The equilibrium is unique. The solution turns out to be a combination of absolutely continuous distributions case and the discrete distributions case.

An auction theoretical approach to fiscal wars

I examine a situation where a firm has to choose to locate a new factory in one of several jurisdictions and it depends on the private information held by each jurisdiction. Jurisdiction compete for the location of the new factory. This competition may take the form of expenditures already incurred on infraestructure, commitments to spend on infraestructure, tax incentives or even cash payments. The model combines two elements that are usually considered separately; competition is desirable because we want the factory to be located in the jurisdiction that values it the most, but competition in itself is wasteful. I show that expected total amount paid to the firm under a large family of arrangements. Moreover, I show that the ex-ante optimal mechanism that guarantees that the firm chooses the jurisdiction with the highest value for the factory, minimizes the total expected payment to the firm, and balances the budget in an ex-ante sense - can be implemented by running a standard auction and subsidizing participation.