Business as Usual? : The Implementation of the UNESCO Convention on Cultural Diversity and EU Media Law and Policies

Irrespective of the diverse stances taken on the effect of the UNESCO Convention on Cultural Diversity in the external relations context, since its wording is fairly open-ended, it is clear to all observers that the Convention’s impact will largely depend on how it is implemented domestically. The discussion on the national implementation of the Convention, both in the policy and in the academic discourses, is only just emerging, although six years the Convention’s entry into force have passed. The implementation model of the EU can set an important example for the international community and for the other State Parties that have ratified the UNESCO Convention, as both the EU and its Member States acting individually, have played a critical role in the adoption of the Convention, as well as in the longer process of promoting cultural concerns on the international scene. Against this backdrop, this article analyses the extent to which the EU internal law and policies, in particular in the key area of media, take into account the spirit and the letter of the UNESCO Convention on Cultural Diversity. Next to an assessment of the EU’s implementation of the Convention, the article also offers remarks of normative character – in the sense of what should be done to actually attain the objective of protecting and promoting cultural diversity. The article seeks to critically evaluate the present state of affairs and make some recommendations for calibration of future policies.

Outcome of aplastic anaemia in children. A study by the severe aplastic anaemia and paediatric disease working parties of the European group blood and bone marrow transplant.

This study analysed the outcome of 563 Aplastic Anaemia (AA) children aged 0-12 years reported to the Severe Aplastic Anaemia Working Party database of the European Society for Blood and Marrow Transplantation, according to treatment received. Overall survival (OS) after upfront human leucocyte antigen-matched family donor (MFD) haematopoietic stem cell transplantation (HSCT) or immunosuppressive treatment (IST) was 91% vs. 87% (P 0·18). Event-free survival (EFS) after upfront MFD HSCT or IST was 87% vs. 33% (P 0·001). Ninety-one of 167 patients (55%) failed front-line IST and underwent rescue HSCT. The OS of this rescue group was 83% compared with 91% for upfront MFD HSCT patients and 97% for those who did not fail IST up-front (P 0·017). Rejection was 2% for MFD HSCT and HSCT post-IST failure (P 0·73). Acute graft-versus-host disease (GVHD) grade II-IV was 8% in MFD graft vs. 25% for HSCT post-IST failure (P < 0·0001). Chronic GVHD was 6% in MFD HSCT vs. 20% in HSCT post-IST failure (P < 0·0001). MFD HSCT is an excellent therapy for children with AA. IST has a high failure rate, but remains a reasonable first-line choice if MFD HSCT is not available because high OS enables access to HSCT, which is a very good rescue option.

Bargaining for power and information : an experimental and theoretical analysis of the interaction between institutions, externalities and adverse selection

Bargaining is the building block of many economic interactions, ranging from bilateral to multilateral encounters and from situations in which the actors are individuals to negotiations between firms or countries. In all these settings, economists have been intrigued for a long time by the fact that some projects, trades or agreements are not realized even though they are mutually beneficial. On the one hand, this has been explained by incomplete information. A firm may not be willing to offer a wage that is acceptable to a qualified worker, because it knows that there are also unqualified workers and cannot distinguish between the two types. This phenomenon is known as adverse selection. On the other hand, it has been argued that even with complete information, the presence of externalities may impede efficient outcomes. To see this, consider the example of climate change. If a subset of countries agrees to curb emissions, non-participant regions benefit from the signatories’ efforts without incurring costs. These free riding opportunities give rise to incentives to strategically improve ones bargaining power that work against the formation of a global agreement. This thesis is concerned with extending our understanding of both factors, adverse selection and externalities. The findings are based on empirical evidence from original laboratory experiments as well as game theoretic modeling. On a very general note, it is demonstrated that the institutions through which agents interact matter to a large extent. Insights are provided about which institutions we should expect to perform better than others, at least in terms of aggregate welfare. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the problem of adverse selection. Effective operation of markets and other institutions often depends on good information transmission properties. In terms of the example introduced above, a firm is only willing to offer high wages if it receives enough positive signals about the worker’s quality during the application and wage bargaining process. In Chapter 1, it will be shown that repeated interaction coupled with time costs facilitates information transmission. By making the wage bargaining process costly for the worker, the firm is able to obtain more accurate information about the worker’s type. The cost could be pure time cost from delaying agreement or cost of effort arising from a multi-step interviewing process. In Chapter 2, I abstract from time cost and show that communication can play a similar role. The simple fact that a worker states to be of high quality may be informative. In Chapter 3, the focus is on a different source of inefficiency. Agents strive for bargaining power and thus may be motivated by incentives that are at odds with the socially efficient outcome. I have already mentioned the example of climate change. Other examples are coalitions within committees that are formed to secure voting power to block outcomes or groups that commit to different technological standards although a single standard would be optimal (e.g. the format war between HD and BlueRay). It will be shown that such inefficiencies are directly linked to the presence of externalities and a certain degree of irreversibility in actions. I now discuss the three articles in more detail. In Chapter 1, Olivier Bochet and I study a simple bilateral bargaining institution that eliminates trade failures arising from incomplete information. In this setting, a buyer makes offers to a seller in order to acquire a good. Whenever an offer is rejected by the seller, the buyer may submit a further offer. Bargaining is costly, because both parties suffer a (small) time cost after any rejection. The difficulties arise, because the good can be of low or high quality and the quality of the good is only known to the seller. Indeed, without the possibility to make repeated offers, it is too risky for the buyer to offer prices that allow for trade of high quality goods. When allowing for repeated offers, however, at equilibrium both types of goods trade with probability one. We provide an experimental test of these predictions. Buyers gather information about sellers using specific price offers and rates of trade are high, much as the model’s qualitative predictions. We also observe a persistent over-delay before trade occurs, and this mitigates efficiency substantially. Possible channels for over-delay are identified in the form of two behavioral assumptions missing from the standard model, loss aversion (buyers) and haggling (sellers), which reconcile the data with the theoretical predictions. Chapter 2 also studies adverse selection, but interaction between buyers and sellers now takes place within a market rather than isolated pairs. Remarkably, in a market it suffices to let agents communicate in a very simple manner to mitigate trade failures. The key insight is that better informed agents (sellers) are willing to truthfully reveal their private information, because by doing so they are able to reduce search frictions and attract more buyers. Behavior observed in the experimental sessions closely follows the theoretical predictions. As a consequence, costless and non-binding communication (cheap talk) significantly raises rates of trade and welfare. Previous experiments have documented that cheap talk alleviates inefficiencies due to asymmetric information. These findings are explained by pro-social preferences and lie aversion. I use appropriate control treatments to show that such consideration play only a minor role in our market. Instead, the experiment highlights the ability to organize markets as a new channel through which communication can facilitate trade in the presence of private information. In Chapter 3, I theoretically explore coalition formation via multilateral bargaining under complete information. The environment studied is extremely rich in the sense that the model allows for all kinds of externalities. This is achieved by using so-called partition functions, which pin down a coalitional worth for each possible coalition in each possible coalition structure. It is found that although binding agreements can be written, efficiency is not guaranteed, because the negotiation process is inherently non-cooperative. The prospects of cooperation are shown to crucially depend on i) the degree to which players can renegotiate and gradually build up agreements and ii) the absence of a certain type of externalities that can loosely be described as incentives to free ride. Moreover, the willingness to concede bargaining power is identified as a novel reason for gradualism. Another key contribution of the study is that it identifies a strong connection between the Core, one of the most important concepts in cooperative game theory, and the set of environments for which efficiency is attained even without renegotiation.

An Ever Closer Union? The Nationalisation of Political Parties in Switzerland, 1991–2015

The contribution of this research note is a systematic description of levels of party nationalisation in Switzerland, using results from the elections to the Swiss National Council between 1991 and 2015. Party nationalisation is understood as the territorial homogeneity of a party's electoral performance and measured using the inverted and standardised Gini index. Our results indicate a trend towards more nationalisation in the Swiss party system over the time period covered, and distinct patterns for single parties. The SVP and the GLP have made big leaps towards stronger nationalisation, with the former closing in on the levels of the SP and the FDP, while the CVP remains a weakly nationalised party, considering its size.

Tab.1: Total estimated muskox numbers and quotas in management zones of the Northwest Territories and Nunavut

In view of the drastic growth in the Canadian Inuit population, the rising costs of living, the missing job and income alternatives and the high unemployment rate in the arctic, efforts are being made to make use of the muskox populations in order to provide additional sources of food and/or revenue. The present paper attempts to review the course of muskox utilization in the Canadian Arctic and to tentatively assess its present as weIl as its future economic importance. Starting with the pre-European status of muskoxen in Canada, the drastic reduction in numbers resulting from the combined efforts of hide traders, whalers and expedition parties in the 19th and early 20th centuries, the impact of the legal protection and the recovery since 1917 are being described. Establishing muskox farms with semi-domesticated herds failed in Canada in the 1970's. Since 1969, though, increasing numbers of animals have been allotted to many Inuit communities, and despite the fact that most of the animals were primarily used for subsistence purposes, some communities could reserve part of their quotas for trophy (sport) hunters. While controlled sustainable subsistence and trophy hunts may eventually be carried out over the whole muskox range, including recently colonized northern Quebec, commercial harvesting for meat, hides and wool, introduced in 1981, will at least for some time be restricted to Banks and Victoria islands which at present show 78 % of the Canadian muskox population and 94 % of the overall quota.

The Experience of the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) : Political Parties in Kenya from 1991 to 2007

This paper first examines splits and mergers among Kenya’s political parties (and inner-party factions) from the restoration of a multi-party system in 1991 until 2007, before the turbulent 10th general elections were conducted. It then considers what functions “political parties” have in Kenya with special reference to the period since 2002, the year in which President Moi announced his intention to retire. A look back at NARC’s five years of rule reveals that, although it succeeded in changing the government, NARC, as a “political party,” remained throughout an organization without any real substance. The paper looks at (1) NARC’s de facto split after its overwhelming win in the ninth general election, (2) malfunctions of the anti-defection laws that were introduced in the 1960s, and (3) Kenya’s election rules that require candidates to be nominated by registered political parties in general elections. The paper proceeds to argue that as a result of the operation of these three elements, Kenya’s political parties, and especially the victorious coalition sides, tend to end up being nothing more than temporary vehicles for political elites angling for post-election posts.

Toward controlling gene expression at will: Specific regulation of the erbB-2/HER-2 promoter by using polydactyl zinc finger proteins constructed from modular building blocks

To create a universal system for the control of gene expression, we have studied methods for the construction of novel polydactyl zinc finger proteins that recognize extended DNA sequences. Elsewhere we have described the generation of zinc finger domains recognizing sequences of the 5′-GNN-3′ subset of a 64-member zinc finger alphabet. Here we report on the use of these domains as modular building blocks for the construction of polydactyl proteins specifically recognizing 9- or 18-bp sequences. A rapid PCR assembly method was developed that, together with this predefined set of zinc finger domains, provides ready access to 17 million novel proteins that bind the 5′-(GNN)6-3′ family of 18-bp DNA sites. To examine the efficacy of this strategy in gene control, the human erbB-2 gene was chosen as a model. A polydactyl protein specifically recognizing an 18-bp sequence in the 5′-untranslated region of this gene was converted into a transcriptional repressor by fusion with Krüppel-associated box (KRAB), ERD, or SID repressor domains. Transcriptional activators were generated by fusion with the herpes simplex VP16 activation domain or with a tetrameric repeat of VP16’s minimal activation domain, termed VP64. We demonstrate that both gene repression and activation can be achieved by targeting designed proteins to a single site within the transcribed region of a gene. We anticipate that gene-specific transcriptional regulators of the type described here will find diverse applications in gene therapy, functional genomics, and the generation of transgenic organisms.

Assessment of University External Internships. Towards a Mixed Model for Measuring the Acquisition of Skills and the Satisfaction of Parties Involved

The continuous improvement of management and assessment processes for curricular external internships has led a group of university teachers specialised in this area to develop a mixed model of measurement that combines the verification of skill acquisition by those students choosing external internships with the satisfaction of the parties involved in that process. They included academics, educational tutors of companies and organisations and administration and services personnel in the latter category. The experience, developed within University of Alicante, has been carried out in the degrees of Business Administration and Management, Business Studies, Economics, Advertising and Public Relations, Sociology and Social Work, all part of the Faculty of Economics and Business. By designing and managing closed standardised interviews and other research tools, validated outside the centre, a system of continuous improvement and quality assurance has been created, clearly contributing to the gradual increase in the number of students with internships in this Faculty, as well as to the improvement in satisfaction, efficiency and efficacy indicators at a global level. As this experience of educational innovation has shown, the acquisition of curricular knowledge, skills, abilities and competences by the students is directly correlated with the satisfaction of those parties involved in a process that takes the student beyond the physical borders of a university campus. Ensuring the latter is a task made easier by the implementation of a mixed assessment method, combining continuous and final assessment, and characterised by its rigorousness and simple management. This report presents that model, subject in turn to a persistent and continuous control, a model all parties involved in the external internships are taking part of. Its short-term results imply an increase, estimated at 15% for the last course, in the number of students choosing curricular internships and, for the medium and long-term, a major interweaving between the academic world and its social and productive environment, both in the business and institutional areas. The potentiality of this assessment model does not lie only in the quality of its measurement tools, but also in the effects from its use in the various groups and in the actions that are carried out as a result of its implementation and which, without any doubt and as it is shown below, are the real guarantee of a continuous improvement.