Winning the war for talent: Does CSR matter in the recruitment process?

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Do the psychological impacts of war cause poverty?: Evidence from Mozambique

This paper evaluates the extent to which war-related psychological distress causes poverty. The endogeneous nature of mental distress is addressed by using exposure to the civil war in Mozambique as an instrument. It is found that exposure to war has a significant and positive long-lasting impact on mental distress. Furthermore, the causal impact of war-related psychological distress on income and wealth is shown to be significant, negative, and nonnegligible. One standard deviation increase in mental distress decreases income by half a standard deviation. These findings are robust to alternative specifications, including the use of an alternative database on the incidence of PTSD in Mozambique.

Espírito Santo Saúde: The bidding war

This case study describes the current situation of Espírito Santo Saúde, which involved an eventful takeover process. The company initially went public on February 2014 and later that year, due to the financial situation of its holdings it had to be sold. The bidding war began in August 2014, after Ángeles announced the first offer. Other participants who also pitched bids include José de Mello Saúde, UnitedHealth and Fosun. Furthermore, the potential projects Espírito Santo Saúde was considering implementing prior to the sale and the current situation of the healthcare industry in Portugal, will also be analysed.

An outbreak of Portuguese man-of-war (Physalia physalis - Linnaeus, 1758) envenoming in Southeastern Brazil

Introduction Portuguese man-of-war, Physalia physalis (Linnaeus, 1758), are cnidarians capable of discharging intracellular organelles filled with venom, resulting in severe envenomation in humans. Methods We report the clinical and therapeutic aspects of 331 accidents involving Portuguese man-of-war in an outbreak on the coast of the State of São Paulo, Brazil. Results The clinical manifestations of envenomation were rare and mild and mostly local, systemic reactions; there was a low rate of late complications. Conclusions The consequences of envenomation were of moderate severity, and first aid measures were effective in controlling the pain. Outbreaks of accidents involving Portuguese man-of-war occur periodically in the area without a clear explanation.

Taxonomic redescription of the Portuguese man-of-war, Physalia physalis (Cnidaria, Hydrozoa, Siphonophorae, Cystonectae) from Brazil

Although Physalia physalis (Linnaeus, 1758) is widely known from the Brazilian waters, specimens from this coast were never properly described. We describe Brazilian specimens of P. physalis including information on morphology, cnidome, SEM, and histological studies. Taxonomical issues concerning the development of the colonies and eventual synonymy with Physalia utriculus (La Martinière, 1787) are also added.

Optimism and commitment: An elementary theory of bargaining and war

We propose an elementary theory of wars fought by fully rational contenders. Two parties play a Markov game that combines stages of bargaining with stages where one side has the ability to impose surrender on the other. Under uncertainty and incomplete information, in the unique equilibrium of the game, long confrontations occur: war arises when reality disappoints initial (rational) optimism, and it persist longer when both agents are optimists but reality proves both wrong. Bargaining proposals that are rejected initially might eventually be accepted after several periods of confrontation. We provide an explicit computation of the equilibrium, evaluating the probability of war, and its expected losses as a function of i) the costs of confrontation, ii) the asymmetry of the split imposed under surrender, and iii) the strengths of contenders at attack and defense. Changes in these parameters display non-monotonic effects.

Civil war and foreign influence

We study a symmetric information bargaining model of civil war where a third (foreign) party can affect the probabilities of winning the conflict and the size of the post conflict spoils. We show that the possible alliance with a third party makes peaceful agreements difficult to reach and might lead to new commitment problems that trigger war. Also, we argue that the foreign party is likely to induce persistent informational asymmetries which might explain long lasting civil wars. We explore both political and economic incentives for a third party to intervene. The explicit consideration of political incentives leads to two predictions that allow for identifying the influence of foreign intervention on civil war incidence. Both predictions are confirmed for the case of the U.S. as a potential intervening nation: (i) civil wars around the world are more likely under Republican governments and (ii) the probability of civil wars decreases with U.S. presidential approval rates.

Opening Education Beyond the Property Relation: From Commons to Communism

Open Education, and specifically the OER movement, seeks to provide universal access to knowledge, undermining the historical enclosure and the increasing privatisation of the public education system. In this paper we examine this aspiration by submitting the implicit theoretical assumptions of Open Education to the test of critical political economy. We acknowledge the Open Education movement's revolutionary potential but outline the inherent limitations of its current focus on the commons (property relations) rather than the social relations of capitalist production (wage work, the company) and because of this, argue that it will only achieve limited, rather than revolutionary, impact.

War and Natural Resource Exploitation

We build a theoretical framework that allows for endogenous conflict behaviour (i.e., fighting efforts) and for endogenous natural resource exploitation (i.e., speed, ownership, and investments). While depletion is spread in a balanced Hotelling fashion during peace, the presence of conflict creates incentives for rapacious extraction, as this lowers the stakes of future contest. This voracious extraction depresses total oil revenue, especially if world oil demand is relatively elastic and the government's weapon advantage is weak. Some of these political distortions can be overcome by bribing rebels or by government investment in weapons. The shadow of conflict can also make less efficient nationalized oil extraction more attractive than private extraction, as insecure property rights create a holdup problem for the private firm and lead to a lower license fee. Furthermore, the government fights less intensely than the rebels under private exploitation, which leads to more government turnover. Without credible commitment to future fighting efforts, private oil depletion is only lucrative if the government's non-oil office rents are large and weaponry powerful, which guarantees the government a stronger grip on office and makes the holdup problem less severe.