985 resultados para Violent conflict prevention
Resumo:
Racial and ethnic violence takes many forms. Genocides, ethnic cleansing, pogroms, civil wars, and violent separatist movements are the most obvious and extreme expressions, but less organized violence such as rioting, and hate crimes by individuals or small groups are products of racial and ethnic conflict as well. Also, the distribution of criminal violence within societies, which may or may not be aimed at members of another group, is in some places a by-product of ongoing conflicts between superior and subordinated racial or ethnic groups. Although estimates of the number of deaths attributable to ethnic violence vary widely, range of eleven to twenty million given for the period between 1945 and the early 1990s show the gravity of this type of conflict (Williams 1994, 50). So it comes as no surprise that scholars have paid increasing attention to such conflicts over the last decades.
Resumo:
This pilot study evaluated the effect of skills training and of social influences on self-reported aggressive behavior in a sample of 239 sixth-grade students. The effect of two intervention groups and one control group were compared. In the first intervention group, a 15-session, violence-prevention curriculum was taught by the teacher. In the second intervention group, the same curriculum was taught by the teacher with the assistance of peer leaders trained to modify social norms about violence. The control group was evaluated but did not receive any training. The design included four schools. In two schools, three classes were assigned to one of the two interventions or to the control group. In the other two schools, two classes were assigned to either intervention (teacher only) or control. Students were evaluated before and after the implementation of the curriculum using a standardized questionnaire.^ The primary outcome was the effect of the curriculum and peer leaders on self-reported aggressive behaviors. The secondary outcome was their impact on intervening variables: knowledge about violence, conflict-resolution skills, self-efficacy, and attitudes.^ The intervention had a moderate effect on reducing self-reported aggressive behaviors among boys in two of the six classes that received the curriculum. Both classes with peer leaders reduced their aggressive behavior, but this reduction was significant in only one. A peer leader selection problem could probably explain this lack of effect.^ In three of the four schools, both interventions had an overall significant effect on increasing knowledge about violence and skills to reduce violence. Students also developed a more negative attitude toward violence after the intervention. As hypothesized, attitude change was stronger among students from the teacher plus peer leader group. No intervention effect was observed on self-efficacy nor on attitudes toward skills to reduce violence. Limitations of the study and implications for violence prevention in schools are discussed. ^
Resumo:
Title: The perception of critical situations involving football fans – how conflicts escalate or de-escalate Authors: Brechbühl, A.1, Schumacher, A.1 & Seiler, R.1 1Institute of Sport Science, University of Bern, Switzerland Abstract: Introduction: Fan violence in the context of football matches is a prominent issue in today’s western societies and Switzerland presents no exception. A lot of research has been conducted on reasons for fan violence, mostly with fans of national teams. A prominent model is the Elaborated Social Identity Model (ESIM; Drury & Reicher, 2000): ESIM highlights the importance of interactions between the involved groups and their effect on the development of social identities. Another model is the aggravation mitigation model (AM model; Hylander & Guvå, 2010) which illustrates factors that can contribute towards an escalation or non-escalation of group violence, such as the “categorization” of the opponent group. Despite these models, research about the individual perceptions, and in particular, what factors distinguish between an escalation versus a non-escalation of a potentially violent situation in domestic football, is as yet scarce. This explorative study examines perceptions of critical situations in the domestic football fan context in Switzerland. Methods: An explorative qualitative design was employed to gather data about critical situations (CS) around football matches of two clubs of the Raiffeisen Super League. A CS is defined as a setting in or around the football stadium where violence between football fans and another group could occur. Eight CS were identified and analysed. Fifty-nine narrative interviews with individuals involved in a CS, e.g. fans, police officers or security personnel, were conducted. Interviews were analysed using interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA). Results: The involved opposing groups expressed group-specific perceptions. Furthermore a strong tendency to negatively stereotype the opponent group was observed. Provocative symbols, such as balaclavas or riot-gear uniforms, were considered as highly relevant for the interpretation of the situation. Successful communication and sufficient distance between opponent groups supported the appeasement of a CS. These findings also underline the importance of knowledge about the local fan culture. This culture serves as basis for the perception of legitimacy, which was assessed to be essential for a de-escalation of a CS by fans. Discussion/Conclusion: This study improves the understanding of fan violence in the domestic football context in Switzerland. Based on the results it is suggested to deploy security or police forces without riot gear but with the goal of seeking dialogue with the fans to increase the likelihood of a peaceful ending in a CS. The findings also support the applicability of the ESIM (Drury & Reicher, 2000) and the AM model (Hylander & Guvå, 2010) in the context of domestic fan violence. Due to possible differences in the local fan cultures in Switzerland, research in this area should be continued. References: Drury, J., & Reicher, S. (2000). Collective action and psychological change: The emergence of new social identities. British Journal of Social Psychology, 39, 579-604. Hylander, I., & Guvå, G. (2010). Misunderstanding of out-group behaviour: Different interpretations of the same crowd events among police officers and demonstrators. Nordic Psychology, 62, 25-47.
Resumo:
Nowadays, the intensive use of Technology Information (TI) provide solutions to problems of the high population density, energy conservation and cities management. This produces a newest concept of the city, Smart City. But the inclusion of TI in the city brings associated new problems, specifically the generation of electromagnetic fields from the available and new technological infrastructures installed in the city that did not exist before. This new scenario produces a negative effect on a particular group of the society, as are the group of persons with electromagnetic hypersensitivity pathology. In this work we propose a system that would allow you to detect and prevent the continuous exposure to such electromagnetic fields, without the need to include more devices or infrastructure which would only worsen these effects. Through the use of the architecture itself and Smart City services, it is possible to infer the necessary knowledge to know the situation of the EMF radiation and thus allow users to avoid the areas of greatest conflict. This knowledge, not only allows us to get EMF current map of the city, but also allows you to generate predictions and detect future risk situations.
Resumo:
When Federica Mogherini visited the South Caucasus in March, she was quoted as saying that the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was a top priority for the EU. Facts, however, do not seem to match the words of the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. As violent clashes in the conflict zone unfolded over the past week, the EU was a passive observer, with few visible signs of engagement apart from a cursory phone call urging Armenia and Azerbaijan to show restraint. The escalation has shown how quickly and dangerously the situation can develop, and the unassailable nature of the Line of Contact (LoC). If the diplomatic efforts to resolve the conflict show no progress, a repetition is very probable. Furthermore, it is likely the next incident will be more devastating in human and material costs than this recent one, and may not be contained so quickly. The EU needs to be part of the renewed diplomatic effort.
Resumo:
Update to: State responses to serious and violent juvenile crime.
Resumo:
Title from cover.
Resumo:
In June 2000, the Authority convened a Criminal Justice Planning Assembly in which policy makers, service providers, researchers, practitioners, and elected officials participated. The goals and objectives for the criminal justice system, which came out of the Assembly, were refined in the following months and recommended action steps to address identified priorities were developed. This work resulted in a Criminal Justice Plan for the State of Illinois. A primary purpose of the Plan was the development of a framework for a comprehensive statewide approach to coordinating the allocation and expenditure of all federal and state funds appropriated to the Authority and made available for juvenile and criminal justice purposes. The Plan as well as past funding initiatives, the latest data on drug and violent crime in Illinois, and new criminal justice issues that have arisen in the last several years were taken into account in the development of the strategy. The strategy describes the role that Illinois' Anti-Drug Abuse Act Edward Byrne Memorial Fund award plays in the larger plan for Illinois, coordinating research, policy, and the legislative activities with funding initiatives.
Resumo:
"January 1990."
Resumo:
Mode of access: Internet.
Resumo:
Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Washington, 2016-06
Resumo:
In the years following the fall of Slobodan Milo evic, Serbian social, cultural and political responses to the wars of the 1990s have fallen under intense international scrutiny. But is this scrutiny justfied, and how can these responses be better understood? Jelena Obradovic engages with ideas about post-conflict societies, memory, cultural trauma, and national myths of victimhood and justified war to shed light upon Serbian denial and justification of war crimes - for example, Serbia's reluctant cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Rather than treating denial as a failure to come to terms with the past or as resurgent nationalism, Obradovic argues that the justification of atrocities are often the result of a societal need to understand and incorporate violent events within culturally acceptable boundaries.
Resumo:
In response to a crime epidemic afflicting Latin America since the early 1990s, several countries in the region have resorted to using heavy-force police or military units to physically retake territories de facto controlled by non-State criminal or insurgent groups. After a period of territory control, the heavy forces hand law enforcement functions in the retaken territories to regular police officers, with the hope that the territories and their populations will remain under the control of the state. To a varying degree, intensity, and consistency, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, and Jamaica have adopted such policies since the mid-1990s. During such operations, governments need to pursue two interrelated objectives: to better establish the state’s physical presence and to realign the allegiance of the population in those areas toward the state and away from the non-State criminal entities. From the perspective of law enforcement, such operations entail several critical decisions and junctions, such as: Whether or not to announce the force insertion in advance. The decision trades off the element of surprise and the ability to capture key leaders of the criminal organizations against the ability to minimize civilian casualties and force levels. The latter, however, may allow criminals to go to ground and escape capture. Governments thus must decide whether they merely seek to displace criminal groups to other areas or maximize their decapitation capacity. Intelligence flows rarely come from the population. Often, rival criminal groups are the best source of intelligence. However, cooperation between the State and such groups that goes beyond using vetted intelligence provided by the groups, such as a State tolerance for militias, compromises the rule-of-law integrity of the State and ultimately can eviscerate even public safety gains. Sustaining security after initial clearing operations is at times even more challenging than conducting the initial operations. Although unlike the heavy forces, traditional police forces, especially if designed as community police, have the capacity to develop trust of the community and ultimately focus on crime prevention, developing such trust often takes a long time. To develop the community’s trust, regular police forces need to conduct frequent on-foot patrols with intensive nonthreatening interactions with the population and minimize the use of force. Moreover, sufficiently robust patrol units need to be placed in designated beats for substantial amount of time, often at least over a year. Establishing oversight mechanisms, including joint police-citizens’ boards, further facilities building trust in the police among the community. After disruption of the established criminal order, street crime often significantly rises and both the heavy-force and community-police units often struggle to contain it. The increase in street crime alienates the population of the retaken territory from the State. Thus developing a capacity to address street crime is critical. Moreover, the community police units tend to be vulnerable (especially initially) to efforts by displaced criminals to reoccupy the cleared territories. Losing a cleared territory back to criminal groups is extremely costly in terms of losing any established trust and being able to recover it. Rather than operating on a priori determined handover schedule, a careful assessment of the relative strength of regular police and criminal groups post-clearing operations is likely to be a better guide for timing the handover from heavy forces to regular police units. Cleared territories often experience not only a peace dividend, but also a peace deficit – in the rise new serious crime (in addition to street crime). Newly – valuable land and other previously-inaccessible resources can lead to land speculation and forced displacement; various other forms of new crime can also significantly rise. Community police forces often struggle to cope with such crime, especially as it is frequently linked to legal business. Such new crime often receives little to no attention in the design of the operations to retake territories from criminal groups. But without developing an effective response to such new crime, the public safety gains of the clearing operations can be altogether lost.
Resumo:
This article considers the opportunities of civilians to peacefully resist violent conflicts or civil wars. The argument developed here is based on a field-based research on the peace community San José de Apartadó in Colombia. The analytical and theoretical framework, which delimits the use of the term ‘resistance’ in this article, builds on the conceptual considerations of Hollander and Einwohner (2004) and on the theoretical concept of ‘rightful resistance’ developed by O’Brien (1996). Beginning with a conflict-analytical classification of the case study, we will describe the long-term socio-historical processes and the organizational experiences of the civilian population, which favoured the emergence of this resistance initiative. The analytical approach to the dimensions and aims of the resistance of this peace community leads to the differentiation of O`Brian’s concept of ‘rightful resistance’.
Resumo:
Northern Ireland (NI) is emerging from a violent period in its troubled history and remains a
society characterized by segregation between its two main communities. Nowhere is this more
apparent than in education, where for the most part Catholic and Protestant pupils are
educated separately. During the last 30 years there has been a twofold pressure placed on the
education system in NI - at one level to respond to intergroup tensions by promoting
reconciliation, and at another, to deal with national policy demands derived from a global neoliberalist
economic agenda. With reference to current efforts to promote shared education
between separate schools, we explore the uneasy dynamic between a school-based
reconciliation programme in a transitioning society and system-wide values that are driven by
neo-liberalism and its organizational manifestation - new managerialism. We argue that whilst
the former seeks to promote social democratic ideals in education that can have a potentially
transformative effect at societal level, neoliberal priorities have the potential to both subvert
shared education and also to embed it.