I doveri e le responsabilità contabili nella corporate governance delle società di capitali

La costruzione di un modello efficiente di corporate governance deve offrire una disciplina adeguata dei doveri contabili. Ciò nonostante, gli ordinamenti giuridici configurano i doveri di contabilità in modo incompleto, giacché l’inadempimento di questi non comporta una sanzione diretta per il soggetto inadempiente. Come informazione sulla situazione economica e finanziaria della società, esiste un interesse pubblico nella contabilità, e questa può servire come base di giudizio a soggetti interni ed esterni all’impresa, nell’adozione delle sue scelte. Disporre di un’informazione falsa o inesatta al riguardo può comportare un danno ingiustificato alla società stessa, ai soci o ai terzi, che potranno esercitare le azioni precise per il risarcimento del danno cagionato. Per evitare la produzione di questi danni, da una prospettiva preventiva, la corporate governance delle società di capitali può prevedere dei meccanismi di controllo che riducano il rischio di offrire un’informazione sbagliata. Questi controlli potranno essere esercitati da soggetti interni o esterni (revisori legali) alla struttura della società, ed avranno una configurazione diversa a seconda che le società adottino una struttura monistica o dualistica di governance. Questo ci colloca di fronte ad una eventuale situazione di concorrenza delle colpe, giacché i diversi soggetti che intervengono nel processo d’elaborazione dell’informazione contabile versano la sua attuazione sullo stesso documento: il bilancio. Risulta dunque cruciale determinare il contributo effettivo di ciascuno per analizzare il suo grado di responsabilità nella produzione del danno.

Corporate Governance and Dividend Policy in European Banking

This dissertation investigates corporate governance and dividend policy in banking. This topic has recently attracted the attention of numerous scholars all over the world and currently remains one of the most discussed topics in Banking. The core of the dissertation is constituted by three papers. The first paper generalizes the main achievements in the field of relevant study using the approach of meta-analysis. The second paper provides an empirical analysis of the effect of banking corporate governance on dividend payout. Finally, the third paper investigates empirically the effect of government bailout during 2007-2010 on corporate governance and dividend policy of banks. The dissertation uses a new hand-collected data set with information on corporate governance, ownership structure and compensation structure for a sample of listed banks from 15 European countries for the period 2005-2010. The empirical papers employ such econometric approaches as Within-Group model, difference-in-difference technique, and propensity score matching method based on the Nearest Neighbor Matching estimator. The main empirical results may be summarized as follows. First, we provide evidence that CEO power and connection to government are associated with lower dividend payout ratios. This result supports the view that banking regulators are prevalently concerned about the safety of the bank, and powerful bank CEOs can afford to distribute low payout ratios, at the expense of minority shareholders. Next, we find that government bailout during 2007-2010 changes the banks’ ownership structure and helps to keep lending by bailed bank at the pre-crisis level. Finally, we provide robust evidence for increased control over the banks that receive government money. These findings show the important role of government when overcoming the consequences of the banking crisis, and high quality of governance of public bailouts in European countries.

Regulating State Aid: Inter-jurisdictional competition, public choice, and corporate governance

Depending on the regulatory regime they are subject to, governments may or may not be allowed to hand out state aid to private firms. The economic justification for state aid can address several issues present in the competition for capital and the competition for transfers from the state. First, there are principal-agent problems involved at several stages. Self-interested politicians might enter state aid deals that are the result of extensive rent-seeking activities of organized interest groups. Thus the institutional design of political systems will have an effect on the propensity of a jurisdiction to award state aid. Secondly, fierce competition for firm locations can lead to over-spending. This effect is stronger if the politicians do not take into account the entirety of the costs created by their participation in the firm location race. Thirdly, state aid deals can be incomplete and not in the interest of the citizens. This applies if there are no sanctions if firms do not meet their obligations from receiving aid, such as creating a certain number of jobs or not relocating again for a certain amount of time. The separation of ownership and control in modern corporations leads to principal-agent problems on the side of the aid recipient as well. Managers might receive personal benefits from subsidies, the use of which is sometimes less monitored than private finance. This can eventually be to the detriment of the shareholders. Overall, it can be concluded that state aid control should also serve the purpose of regulating the contracting between governments and firms. An extended mandate for supervision by the European Commission could include requirements to disincentive the misuse of state aid. The Commission should also focus on the corporate governance regime in place in the jurisdiction that awards the aid as well as in the recipient firm.

Major elements and trace ferrides in deep sea cores obtained during the Swedish Deep-Sea Expedition in 1947-1948

Samples from sediment cores collected during the Swedish Deep-Sea Expedition 1947-1948 have been analyzed in the Geochemical laboratory of the Geological Survey of Sweden. Most samples were placed at our disposal by Professor Hans Pettersson, leader of the expedition mentioned. For complementary studies, samples from the Atlantic and Indian oceans were included in our investigation and the samples placed at our disposal by Professor B. Kullenberg, Göteborg. From the Tyrrhenian Sea we got samples from Professor E. Norin, Uppsala.

Corporate Governance in Indonesia: A Study on Governance of Business Groups

This study deals with the issue of corporate governance in the case of Indonesian business groups. It examines what factors can be attributed to failures of corporate governance. Through case studies of six different types of business groups, it evidences that self-governance by owner-managers can function well if there is no other key stakeholder and no collusion with the government. When this is not the case, however, self-governance does not work, and governance by creditors or professional managers over owner-managers has limitations. For better corporate governance, there is a need not only for building internal governance mechanism of business groups, but also for strengthening external monitoring institutions including creditors, capital markets, the governmental as well as non-governmental systems.

Aircraft accident report : collision with trees and crash short of the runway, Corporate Airlines flight 5966, BAE systems BAE-J3201, N875JX, Kirksville, Missouri, October 19, 2004 /

On October 19, 2004, about 1937 central daylight time, Corporate Airlines (doing business as American Connection) flight 5966, a BAE Systems BAE-J3201, N875JX, struck trees on final approach and crashed short of runway 36 at the Kirksville Regional Airport (IRK), Kirksville, Missouri. The flight was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 as a scheduled passenger flight from Lambert-St. Louis International Airport, in St. Louis, Missouri, to IRK. The captain, first officer, and 11 of the 13 passengers were fatally injured, and 2 passengers received serious injuries. The airplane was destroyed by impact and a post impact fire. Night instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) prevailed at the time of the accident, and the flight operated on an instrument flight rules flight plan. The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the accident was the pilots' failure to follow established procedures and properly conduct a nonprecision instrument approach at night in IMC, including their descent below the minimum descent altitude (MDA) before required visual cues were available (which continued unmoderated until the airplane struck the trees) and their failure to adhere to the established division of duties between the flying and nonflying (monitoring) pilot. Contributing to the accident was the pilots' failure to make standard callouts and the current Federal Aviation Regulations that allow pilots to descend below the MDA into a region in which safe obstacle clearance is not assured based upon seeing only the airport approach lights. The pilots' unprofessional behavior during the flight and their fatigue likely contributed to their degraded performance. The safety issues in this report focus on operational and human factors issues, including the pilots' professionalism and sterile cockpit procedures, nonprecision instrument approach procedures, flight and duty time regulations, fatigue, and flight data/image recorder requirements.