On the determinants of optimal border enforcement

We extend the current immigration-enforcement literature by incorporating both the practice of people smuggling and a role for non-wage income into a two-country, dynamic general equilibrium model. We use the model economy to examine three questions. First, how does technological progress in the smuggling industry affect the level of migration and capital accumulation for a given level of enforcement? Second, do changes in border enforcement affect the level of migration, capital accumulation, and smuggling activity? Third, is the optimal level of enforcement sensitive to technological progress in the smuggling industry? We show that the government chooses to devote resources to border enforcement only if the deterrent effect on smugglers is large enough. Otherwise, it is not worth taxing host-country natives as the taxes paid will more than offset any income gain resulting from fewer migrants.

The impact of buffer zone size and management on illegal extraction, park protection and enforcement

Many protected areas or parks in developing countries have buffer zones at their boundaries to achieve the dual goals of protecting park resources and providing resource benefits to neighbouring people. Despite the prevalence of these zoning policies, few behavioural models of people’s buffer zone use inform the sizing and management of those zones. This paper uses a spatially explicit resource extraction model to examine the impact of buffer zone size and management on extraction by local people, both legal and illegal, and the impact of that extraction on forest quality in the park’s core and buffer zone. The results demonstrate trade-offs between the level of enforcement, the size of a buffer zone, and the amount of illegal extraction in the park; and describe implications for “enrichment” of buffer zones and evaluating patterns of forest degradation.

Insiders, outsiders, and the role of local enforcement in forest management: an example from Tanzania

In low-income countries, both nearby local villagers, “insiders”, and non-locals, “outsiders”, extract products from protected forests even though their actions are illegal. Forest managers typically combine enforcement and livelihood projects offered to nearby communities to reduce this illegal activity, but with limited budgets cannot deter all extraction. We develop a game theoretic model of a forest manager's decision interacting with the extraction decisions of insiders and outsiders. Our analysis suggests that, depending on the relative ecological damage caused by each group, budget-constrained forest managers may reduce total forest degradation by legalizing “insider” extraction in return for local villagers' involvement in enforcement activities against outsiders.

Emergence of the individual as an international juristic entity: enforcement of International Human Rights

In this article it is contended that state practice, as evidenced in the  declarations of the judiciary and the many treaties and conventions  guaranteeing human rights, reveals a consensus of opinion acknowledging the individual to be an international juristic entity. So extensive is this practice that it could be seen as marking the emergence of a new customary international norm; or at least a general principle of international law, yet to crystallise into a custom; acknowledging the individual as the beneficiary of international rights. This is important for individuals and minority groups because if they possess international rights independently of the State, enforcement of their rights will no longer depend on the interests of the State. Where the State is often the offender of human rights, international law will not effectively confer any real rights unless the individual is so recognised as an international juristic entity.

A prospective study on building quality : enforcement of control in the Australian housing industry

The Australian housing industry is beset with quality issues with repeated building defects causing problems with customer satisfaction and housing performance. These defects are caused by a combination of initial poor workmanship and poor quality materials and subsequently by poorly executed or inadequate maintenance. These poor work practices increase the cost and maintenance of housing. The waste and rectification work generated by such practices means that the housing industry generally is not engaged with sustainability. Building Control is part of achieving quality of building output. Whilst the Australian Building Code has regulations for initial-build material quality and workmanship, there is no continuing control and effective enforcement over a house over its life span. Sustainability is not dealt with as a topic at all in the Building Code with only energy efficiency concerns regulated. Inadequate knowledge transfer, to the mainly small builders who produce the majority of Australia’s housing, is seen to be a key issue. Mechanisms to make the transfer of knowledge to those who need to use it need to be improved. Building regulations, for example, could be more visual and accessible in their content and small builders should be encouraged to update their knowledge and skills. This comparative research will guide industry service providers in improving their performance and suggest how overall housing quality can be improved (thereby reducing wasteful practices), by considering more appropriate mechanisms for knowledge transfer among industry service providers in the Australian housing industry.

Contract enforcement and incentive compatibility in large economies with differential information: the role of exact feasibility

We consider exchange economies with a continuum of agents and differential information about finitely many states of nature. It was proved in Einy, Moreno and Shitovitz (2001) that if we allow for free disposal in the market clearing (feasibility) constraints then an irreducible economy has a competitive (or Walrasian expectations) equilibrium, and moreover, the set of competitive equilibrium allocations coincides with the private core. However when feasibility is defined with free disposal, competitive equilibrium allocations may not be incentive compatible and contracts may not be enforceable (see e.g. Glycopantis, Muir and Yannelis (2002)). This is the main motivation for considering equilibrium solutions with exact feasibility. We first prove that the results in Einy et al. (2001) are still valid without free-disposal. Then we define an incentive compatibility property motivated by the issue of contracts’ execution and we prove that every Pareto optimal exact feasible allocation is incentive compatible, implying that contracts of a competitive or core allocations are enforceable.

Reparation and enforcement of judgments : a comparative analysis of the European and Inter-American human rights systems

The inter-American human rights system has been conceived following the example of the European system under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) before it was modified by Protocol No 11. However, two important differences exist. First, the authority of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) to order reparation has been strictly limited by the principle of subsidiarity. Thus, the ECtHR's main function is to determine whether the ECHR has been violated. Beyond the declaratory effect of its judgments, according to Article 41 ECHR, it may only "afford just satisfaction to the injured party". The powers of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) were conceived in a much broader fashion in Article 63 of the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR), giving the Court the authority to order a variety of individual and general measures aimed at obtaining restitutio in integrum. The first main part of this thesis shows how both Courts have developed their reparation practice and examines the advantages and disadvantages of each approach. Secondly, the ECtHR's rather limited reparation powers have, interestingly, been combined with an elaborate implementation system that includes several of the Council of Europe's organs, principally the Committee of Ministers. In the Inter-American System, no dedicated mechanism was implemented to oversee compliance with the IACtHR's judgments. The ACHR limits itself to inviting the Court to point out in its annual reports the cases that have not been complied with and to propose measures to be adopted by the General Assembly of the Organization of American States. The General Assembly, however, hardly ever took action. The IACtHR has therefore filled this gap by developing a proper procedure to oversee compliance with its judgments. Both the European and the American solutions to ensure compliance are presented and compared in the second main part of this thesis. Finally, based on the results of both main parts, a comparative analysis of the reparation practice and the execution results in both human rights systems is being provided, aimed at developing proposals for the improvement of the functioning of either human rights protection system.

Enforcement of the GNU GPL in Germany and Europe

GPL enforcement is successful in Europe. In several court decisions and out of court settlements the license conditions of the GPL have been successfully enforced. In particular, embedded systems are the main focus of such compliance activities. The article describes the practice of enforcement activities and the legal prerequisites under the application of German law.