Popper or Kuhn: Truth and the progress of science

The questions of whether science pursues truth as correspondence to reality and whether science in fact progresses towards attaining a truthful understanding of physical reality are fundamental and contested in the philosophy of science. On one side of the debate stands Popper, who argues that science is objective, necessarily assumes a correspondence theory of truth, and inevitably progresses toward truth as physical theories develop, gaining a more truthful understanding of reality through progressively more sophisticated empirical analysis. Conversely Kuhn, influenced by postmodern philosophy, argues that ultimate truth cannot be attained since no objective metaphysical reality exists and it cannot be known, and consequently the notion of scientific objectivity and "progress" is a myth, marred by philosophical and ideological value judgments. Ultimately, Kuhn reduces so-called scientific progress through the adoption of successive paradigms to leaps of "faith". This paper seeks a reconciliation of the two extremes, arguing that Popper is correct in the sense that science assumes a correspondence theory of truth and may progress toward truth as physical theories develop, while simultaneously acknowledging with Kuhn that science is not purely objective and free of value judgments. The notion of faith is also critical, for it was the acknowledgement of God's existence as the creator and instituter of observable natural laws which allowed the development of science and the scientific method in the first place. Therefore, accepting and synthesising the contentions that science is to some extent founded on faith, assumes and progresses toward truth, and is subject to value judgments is necessary for the progress of science.

The high speed water tunnel facility at the Indian Institute of Science

The present article about the high speed water tunnel facility at the Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore, provides a general description of the tunnel circuit, and brief reports on the performance of the facility and some typical results from investigations carried out in it. A unique aspect of the facility is that it has a horizontal resorber in the form of a large cylindrical tank located in the lower leg of the circuit. The facility has been used, among other things, for flow visualization studies, and investigations on marine propeller hydrodynamics and “synthetic cavitation”. The last topic has been primarily developed at the Indian Institute of Science and shows considerable promise for basic work in cavitation inception and noise.

Tracking the evolution of waste recycling research using overlay maps of science

Tracking the evolution of research in waste recycling science (WRS) can be valuable for environmental agencies, as well as for recycling businesses. Maps of science are visual, easily readable representations of the cognitive structure of a branch of science, a particular area of research or the global spectrum of scientific production. They are generally built upon evidence collected from reliable sources of information, such as patent and scientific publication databases. This study uses the methodology developed by Rafols et al. (2010) to make a “double overlay map” of WRS upon a basemap reflecting the cognitive structure of all journal-published science, for the years 2005 and 2010. The analysis has taken into account the cognitive areas where WRS articles are published and the areas from where it takes its intellectual nourishing, paying special attention to the growing trends of the key areas. Interpretation of results lead to the conclusion that extraction of energy from waste will probably be an important research topic in the future, along with developments in general chemistry and chemical engineering oriented to the recovery of valuable materials from waste. Agricultural and material sciences, together with the combined economics, politics and geography field, are areas with which WRS shows a relevant and ever increasing cognitive relationship.

The Ballad of Whoi Bob: a tale of the IGY or the Briny Deep Discovered, with many particulars of the extraordinary adventures and the heroic tasks of science at sea

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Formal methods in the foundations of science

The intent of this study is to provide formal apparatus which facilitates the investigation of problems in the methodology of science. The introduction contains several examples of such problems and motivates the subsequent formalism.

A general definition of a formal language is presented, and this definition is used to characterize an individual’s view of the world around him. A notion of empirical observation is developed which is independent of language. The interplay of formal language and observation is taken as the central theme. The process of science is conceived as the finding of that formal language that best expresses the available experimental evidence.

To characterize the manner in which a formal language imposes structure on its universe of discourse, the fundamental concepts of elements and states of a formal language are introduced. Using these, the notion of a basis for a formal language is developed as a collection of minimal states distinguishable within the language. The relation of these concepts to those of model theory is discussed.

An a priori probability defined on sets of observations is postulated as a reflection of an individual’s ontology. This probability, in conjunction with a formal language and a basis for that language, induces a subjective probability describing an individual’s conceptual view of admissible configurations of the universe. As a function of this subjective probability, and consequently of language, a measure of the informativeness of empirical observations is introduced and is shown to be intuitively plausible – particularly in the case of scientific experimentation.

The developed formalism is then systematically applied to the general problems presented in the introduction. The relationship of scientific theories to empirical observations is discussed and the need for certain tacit, unstatable knowledge is shown to be necessary to fully comprehend the meaning of realistic theories. The idea that many common concepts can be specified only by drawing on knowledge obtained from an infinite number of observations is presented, and the problems of reductionism are examined in this context.

A definition of when one formal language can be considered to be more expressive than another is presented, and the change in the informativeness of an observation as language changes is investigated. In this regard it is shown that the information inherent in an observation may decrease for a more expressive language.

The general problem of induction and its relation to the scientific method are discussed. Two hypotheses concerning an individual’s selection of an optimal language for a particular domain of discourse are presented and specific examples from the introduction are examined.