The Challenges of the EU Banking Union - will it succeed in dealing with the next financial crisis? Bruges European Economic Policy Briefings 36/2015

The EU Banking Union combines micro- and macro-prudential regulation. It aims at breaking the “doom loop” between banks and sovereign debt, promoting financial stability and mitigating the next financial shock to the real EU economy, at the lowest possible cost to the financial institutions and to the taxpayers. Success, or failure, is determined by how the banking union copes with the challenges to its two main pillars, the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM). Under the SSM, in its new supervisory role, the ECB may be subject to conflicts between the objectives of price and financial stability, and the single-supervisor role may be sub-optimal. Two regulators might have been preferable and more focus on ECB accountability will now be required. The shock-absorbing Single Resolution Fund (SRF), which is part of the SRM, may not have the capacity to deal with a crisis of the size of the one of 2008. Especially as the nature and severity of a future financial crisis cannot be forecasted. The design of the banking union is not the result of theoretical studies, but a political compromise to deal with an acute crisis. The theoretical studies that are included in this paper are not supportive of the banking union in its current form. Nevertheless, there is a good chance that the EU Banking Union may succeed, as ECB supervision of the 123 systemically important banks should contain potential demands on the SRM. In the event of a crisis that is too severe for the banking union to absorb with its current capability, the crucial assumption is that there is political will to rapidly provide new resources. The same applies, if a major financial crisis develops before the banking union is fully operational.

The Challenges of the EU Banking Union - will it succeed in dealing with the next financial crisis? Bruges European Economic Policy (BEEP) Briefings 36/2015

The EU Banking Union combines micro- and macro-prudential regulation. It aims at breaking the “doom loop” between banks and sovereign debt, promoting financial stability and mitigating the next financial shock to the real EU economy, at the lowest possible cost to the financial institutions and to the taxpayers. Success, or failure, is determined by how the banking union copes with the challenges to its two main pillars, the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM). Under the SSM, in its new supervisory role, the ECB may be subject to conflicts between the objectives of price and financial stability, and the single-supervisor role may be sub-optimal. Two regulators might have been preferable and more focus on ECB accountability will now be required. The shock-absorbing Single Resolution Fund (SRF), which is part of the SRM, may not have the capacity to deal with a crisis of the size of the one of 2008. Especially as the nature and severity of a future financial crisis cannot be forecasted. The design of the banking union is not the result of theoretical studies, but a political compromise to deal with an acute crisis. The theoretical studies that are included in this paper are not supportive of the banking union in its current form. Nevertheless, there is a good chance that the EU Banking Union may succeed, as ECB supervision of the 123 systemically important banks should contain potential demands on the SRM. In the event of a crisis that is too severe for the banking union to absorb with its current capability, the crucial assumption is that there is political will to rapidly provide new resources. The same applies, if a major financial crisis develops before the banking union is fully operational.

Economic impact of Southern European member states exiting the eurozone. Policy Brief #2012/06

While Greece defaulting on its sovereign debt and leaving the European Monetary Union would in and of itself have a relatively minor effect on the world economy, such a move could, however, undermine investor confidence in the Portuguese, Spanish and Italian capital markets and thus provoke not only a sovereign default in those states as well, but also a severe worldwide recession. This would in turn reduce economic growth by a total of 17.2 trillion euros in the world’s 42 largest economies in the lead-up to 2020. Hence it is incumbent upon the community of nations to prevent Greece from a sovereign default as well as leaving the euro, and the domino effect that this event could induce.

Directional mobility of debt ratings

In this paper we describe a method to decompose a well-known measure of debt ratings mobility into it's directional components. We show, using sovereign debt ratings as an example, that this directional decomposition allows us to better understand the underlying characteristics of debt ratings migration and, for the case of the data set used, that the standard Markov chain model is not homogeneous in either the time or cross-sectional dimensions. We find that the directional decomposition also allows us to sign the change in quality of debt over time and across sub-groups of the population.

A comprehensive approach to the euro-area debt crisis

The euro area‘s sovereign debt crisis continues though significant steps have been taken to resolve it. This paper proposes a comprehensive solution to the crisis based on three pillars: a plan to restore banking sector soundness in the whole euro area, a resolution of sovereign debt crisis -including a revision of EU assistance facilities and a reduction of the Greek public debt- and a strategy to foster growth and competitiveness. The paper provides novel estimates and analysis focusing on the current situation of Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain.

Megmenthető-e az euróövezet? (Can the eurozone be saved?)

Az euró válságának szélesebb globális összefüggései vannak, mind a kiváltó okait, mind a nemzetközi pénzügyi rendszer működésének hiányosságait illetően. Az európai monetáris integráció szilárd reálgazdasági alapokon nyugszik. Az euró teljesítménye mind az árstabilitás, mind az árfolyamok ingadozása tekintetében megfelelőnek tekinthető. Az euróválság szuverénadósság-válság, és leginkább a zóna egyes (déli) országait érinti. Az euróválság okai többrétűek: ezek között az eurózóna hibás konstrukcióját, téves koncepcionális feltételezéseit, a politikai kompromisszumokkal folyamatosan megnyomorított működését említhetjük leginkább. A közös pénz önmagában nem oka a válságnak és nem is bűvös ellenszer. A hibás gazdaságpolitikáért belül ugyanúgy bűnhődni kell, mint kívül. Görögország, vagy Írország elsősorban nem azért került válságba, mert tagjai az eurózónának, hanem mert hibás gazdaságpolitikát folytattak. Nem zárható ki az eurózóna szétesése, de kicsi az esélye. / === / The euro crisis has broad global connections, both in terms of deficiencies of the international monetary system, and of the crisis of the global financial markets. The European monetary integration is based on strong real-economic foundations. The performance of the euro has been satisfactory both in terms of price and exchange rate stability. The present crisis is a sovereign debt crisis, and it is concentrated mainly on some Southern members. The causes of the crisis are manifold: wrong institutional and policy structures, mistaken conceptual assumptions, and the distortion of its operation by continuous political compromises. The contradictions between common monetary policy and the national fiscal policies, the failure of disciplining role of the markets, the weakness of control of national fiscal policies, the dangers of "one size fits all" monetary policy, the failure of finding the proper national policy mixes, particularly in terms of income and structural policies, and the underestimation of social and cultural differences, can be particularly stressed. The common monetary policy failed to secure the necessary equilibrium among liquidity, stability and growth. Greece and Ireland got in crisis not because they are members of the euro zone, but because of their mistaken economic policies. The collapse of the euro zone cannot be excluded, but the chances of it are limited.

Sobre o contágio nos mercados bolsistas internacionais: evidência de nove países

Mestrado em Contabilidade e Análise Financeira

Volatility Spillover and Multivariate Volatility Impulse Response Analysis of GFC News Events

This paper applies two measures to assess spillovers across markets: the Diebold Yilmaz (2012) Spillover Index and the Hafner and Herwartz (2006) analysis of multivariate GARCH models using volatility impulse response analysis. We use two sets of data, daily realized volatility estimates taken from the Oxford Man RV library, running from the beginning of 2000 to October 2016, for the S&P500 and the FTSE, plus ten years of daily returns series for the New York Stock Exchange Index and the FTSE 100 index, from 3 January 2005 to 31 January 2015. Both data sets capture both the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and the subsequent European Sovereign Debt Crisis (ESDC). The spillover index captures the transmission of volatility to and from markets, plus net spillovers. The key difference between the measures is that the spillover index captures an average of spillovers over a period, whilst volatility impulse responses (VIRF) have to be calibrated to conditional volatility estimated at a particular point in time. The VIRF provide information about the impact of independent shocks on volatility. In the latter analysis, we explore the impact of three different shocks, the onset of the GFC, which we date as 9 August 2007 (GFC1). It took a year for the financial crisis to come to a head, but it did so on 15 September 2008, (GFC2). The third shock is 9 May 2010. Our modelling includes leverage and asymmetric effects undertaken in the context of a multivariate GARCH model, which are then analysed using both BEKK and diagonal BEKK (DBEKK) models. A key result is that the impact of negative shocks is larger, in terms of the effects on variances and covariances, but shorter in duration, in this case a difference between three and six months.

Banca Digital

Em plena quarta revolução industrial, todas as industrias se estão a transformar para se ajustar aos novos paradigmas de relação com os clientes, altamente influenciados pelos pioneiros digitais como a Uber, Netflix ou Amazon, porém no setor financeiro há desafios acrescidos, pois os clientes esperam juntar essas expectativas digitais com a manutenção da iteração humana, enquanto, do lados bancos, em simultâneo, necessitam de recuperar da crise da dívida soberana que impôs necessidades de ajustamento dos balanços. O momento de desenvolvimento tecnológico potenciado pelo forte crescimento do acesso à internet em mobilidade traz novos hábitos e expectativas na relação com as entidades, com dispositivos cada vez mais potentes a cada vez menor custo, o que criou a oportunidade perfeita para o surgimento de startups tecnológicas dispostas a transformar os modelos de negócio de intermediação clássica, dando origem, no setor financeiro, às fintechs – empresas de base tecnológica dedicadas à prestação de serviços financeiros - impondo uma disrupção na industria financeira, com destaque para mercados como os EUA e Reino Unido. Olhando aos últimos cinco anos do setor financeiro, será muito difícil antecipar como estará o setor financeiro dentro de cinco anos, mas sabemos que estará seguramente muito diferente do que conhecemos hoje, por esse fato este trabalho é assente essencialmente em referências bibliográficas dos últimos 5 anos, tendo sido feito utilizados estudos de investigação de empresas e documentos académicos para a caracterização do setor neste contexto de inovação permanente e em que medida este processo de “digitalização” do setor financeiro influencia a propensão dos clientes na contratação de mais produtos e serviços, sendo esse um fator central para os bancos em Portugal recuperarem economicamente. É também analisada a dimensão seguida pelas instituições de regulação e supervisão do setor financeiro com vista a potenciar a concorrência e inovação do setor financeiro, enquanto mantém a garantia de segurança, confiança e controlo de risco sistémico. É bastante escassa a literatura disponível para caracterizar a banca em Portugal numa ótica de inovação e transformação, porém este trabalho procura caracterizar o sistema financeiro português face à forma como está a responder aos desafios de transformação tecnológica e digital. Procurou-se estabelecer uma metodologia de investigação que permita caracterizar a perceção de valor acrescentado para os clientes da utilização de serviços digitais e em que medida estes se podem substituir aos balcões e à intervenção humana dos profissionais dos bancos, tendo-se concluído que estes dois elementos são ainda fatores centrais para os clientes.

Is the supply of long-term debt independent of the term premia? Evidence from Portugal

An important assumption in the statistical analysis of the financial market effects of the central bank’s large scale asset purchase program is that the "long-term debt stock variables were exogenous to term premia". We test this assumption for a small open economy in a currency union over the period 2000M3 to 2015M10, via the determinants of short- term financing relative to long-term financing. Empirical estimations indicate that the maturity composition of debt does not respond to the level of interest rate or to the term structure. These findings suggest a lower adherence to the cost minimization mandate of debt management. However, we find that volatility and relative market size respectively decrease and increase short-term financing relative to long-term financing, while it decreases with an increase in government indebtedness.

Escaping the debt trap: peripheral countries in prolonged debt crises and how to exit

This thesis is an interdisciplinary piece of academic research, situated within Critical Theory but engaging with other disciplines, mainly Political Economy and Politics, to tackle the topic at hand; sovereign debt crises. The thesis deals with the Problem of Debt and, more specifically, the Problem of Prolonged Sovereign Debt Crises, which is described in this thesis as the phenomenon of the “Debt Trap”. The specific question that will occupy us in this thesis is why countries appear unable to exit these prolonged debt crises. By exiting a debt crisis, we mean here a state of affairs in which a country has managed to render its debt sustainable, regain its democratic sovereignty, achieve economic recovery and, what is more, mitigate adverse effects of the crisis, especially in what human development, social inequality and poverty rates are concerned. This question is tackled through the use of an interdisciplinary approach that combines critical theory perspectives -which are grouped in two paradigms, the Subjectivity paradigm and the genealogies of Capitalism paradigm- with financialisation literature. The purpose is to form an interdisciplinary intellectual framework that will allow us to analyse with a critical perspective the two case studies of the Greek crisis from 2009 to 2015 and the Argentinean crisis from 1983 to 2005. The aim of the thesis is to develop a theoretical framework that allows us to deconstruct the various ideological approaches to these two particular cases of Debt traps, including neoclassical and neoliberal approaches, Conservative and Keynesian approaches and uncover the political, economic and class relation that underpin the prolonged crises that the two countries have experienced.

O papel das agências de rating e a dívida pública portuguesa

Durante as últimas décadas observou-se o crescimento da importância das avaliações fornecidas pelas agências de rating, sendo este um fator decisivo na tomada de decisão dos investidores. Também os emitentes de dívida são largamente afetados pelas alterações das classificações atribuídas por estas agências. Esta investigação pretende, por um lado, compreender se estas agências têm poder para conseguirem influenciar a evolução da dívida pública e qual o seu papel no mercado financeiro. Por outro, pretende compreender quais os fatores determinantes da dívida pública portuguesa, bem como a realização de uma análise por percentis com o objetivo de lhe atribuir um rating. Para a análise dos fatores que poderão influenciar a dívida pública, a metodologia utilizada é uma regressão linear múltipla estimada através do Método dos Mínimos Quadrados (Ordinary Least Squares – OLS), em que num cenário inicial era composta por onze variáveis independentes, sendo a dívida pública a variável dependente, para um período compreendido entre 1996 e 2013. Foram realizados vários testes ao modelo inicial, com o objetivo de encontrar um modelo que fosse o mais explicativo possível. Conseguimos ainda identificar uma relação inversa entre o rating atribuído por estas agências e a evolução da dívida pública, no sentido em que para períodos em que o rating desce, o crescimento da dívida é mais acentuado. Não nos foi, no entanto, possível atribuir um rating à dívida pública através de uma análise de percentis.

Covered interest parity

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Finance from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Financial crisis spillovers to the corporate sector: Bank-dependent borrowers versus bond market paticipants

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Finance from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Nominal and inflation-linked government bonds: An assessment of arbitrage opportunities in UK Gilt Market

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Finance from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics