Empirical essays on IPOS: the Brazilian case

The purpose of this study is to empirically analyze the main factors that determine the first-day return and the Flipping activity in Brazilian IPOs, taking into account expected results according to national and international researches. The data base encompasses IPOs that took place between May 2004 and February 2011, summing up to 129 IPOs and approximately R$ 128 billion offering. The first-day return, which means the “money left on the table”, was on average 4.6% taking into consideration the issue price, while the Flipping activity totalized R$ 7.2 billion, meaning 5.6% of the offering. The first-day return was analyzed before and after the first trade, and evidences were found supporting (a) the exogenous determination of the issue price, (b) the opening price dependence of prospectus disclosure and of other variables, observable previously to the bookbuilding process, and (c) the cascade behavior of investors in the pricing after the first trade, particularly driven by the underwriter behavior. In regards to the Flipping, it was notorious depending on how much the IPO succeeded, being concentrated in and homogeneous along the first-day, despite the intense negotiation in the first minute. As a general contribution to literature, it was concluded that Information Asymmetry Theory arguments are not sufficient to explain the first-day Underpricing and the Flipping, being necessary arguments based on Behavioral Finance adapted to an intraday perspective.

Fundo de investimento imobiliário: metodologia para subsidiar o investidor a formar uma carteira eficiente

O presente trabalho tem por objetivo subsidiar o investidor de Fundos de Investimento Imobiliário na escolha de uma carteira de aplicação de FIIs, visando obter performance igual ou superior ao índice de referência do setor (IFIX). Tal subsídio é constituído, inicialmente, por uma metodologia que considera que o conceito de Carteira Eficiente (Risco/Retorno) preconizada por Markowitz pode trabalhar em conjunto com a dimensão do conceito das Finanças Comportamentais, liderada por Daniel Kahneman, constituindo as bases de orientação do investidor. Acrescentamos o caminho metodológico com as indicações, sugeridas por Bazerman e Moore, no processo de tomada de decisão, que reduza os efeitos de heurísticas e vieses.

The scent of stress: Pintado catfish differentially respond to chemical cues from stressed conspecifics

We examined whether pintado catfish (Pseudoplatystoma corruscans) can discriminate between scents of non-injured conspecifics stressed by a predator or by confinement and how fish use this information in the trade-off between feeding and predator avoidance. In the confinement stress condition, fish ingested the food, whereas in the predator stress condition, fish did not eat. This finding and comparisons of the latency to food ingestion and the time spent swimming between the confinement and predator-stress conditions indicated that pintado catfish can discriminate between conspecifics stressed by a predator or confinement using chemical cues, and use this information for adjusting the trade-off between food intake and predator avoidance.

Il conflitto fra trasparenza sui mercati finanziari ed esigenza di riservatezza della società

The thesis main topic is the conflict between disclosure in financial markets and the need for confidentiality of the firm. After a recognition of the major dynamics of information production and dissemination in the stock market, the analysis moves to the interactions between the information that a firm is tipically interested in keeping confidential, such as trade secrets or the data usually covered by patent protection, and the countervailing demand for disclosure arising from finacial markets. The analysis demonstrates that despite the seeming divergence between informational contents tipically disclosed to investors and information usually covered by intellectual property protection, the overlapping areas are nonetheless wide and the conflict between transparency in financial markets and the firm’s need for confidentiality arises frequently and sistematically. Indeed, the company’s disclosure policy is based on a continuous trade-off between the costs and the benefits related to the public dissemination of information. Such costs are mainly represented by the competitive harm caused by competitors’ access to sensitive data, while the benefits mainly refer to the lower cost of capital that the firm obtains as a consequence of more disclosure. Secrecy shields the value of costly produced information against third parties’ free riding and constitutes therefore a means to protect the firm’s incentives toward the production of new information and especially toward technological and business innovation. Excessively demanding standards of transparency in financial markets might hinder such set of incentives and thus jeopardize the dynamics of innovation production. Within Italian securities regulation, there are two sets of rules mostly relevant with respect to such an issue: the first one is the rule that mandates issuers to promptly disclose all price-sensitive information to the market on an ongoing basis; the second one is the duty to disclose in the prospectus all the information “necessary to enable investors to make an informed assessment” of the issuers’ financial and economic perspectives. Both rules impose high disclosure standards and have potentially unlimited scope. Yet, they have safe harbours aimed at protecting the issuer need for confidentiality. Despite the structural incompatibility between public dissemination of information and the firm’s need to keep certain data confidential, there are certain ways to convey information to the market while preserving at the same time the firm’s need for confidentality. Such means are insider trading and selective disclosure: both are based on mechanics whereby the process of price reaction to the new information takes place without any corresponding activity of public release of data. Therefore, they offer a solution to the conflict between disclosure and the need for confidentiality that enhances market efficiency and preserves at the same time the private set of incentives toward innovation.