The Governance of Sexual Offending Across Europe: Penal Policies, Political Economies and the Institutionalization of Risk

This article examines why England and Wales have comparatively one of the most stringent systems for the governance of sexual offending within Western Europe. While England and Wales, like the USA, have adopted broadly exclusionary, managerialist penal policies based around incapacitation and targeted surveillance, many other Western European countries have opted for more inclusionary therapeutic interventions. Divergences in state approaches to sex offender risk, particularly in relation to notification and vetting schemes, are initially examined with reference to the respective theoretical frameworks of ‘policy transfer’ and differing political economies. Chiefly, however, differences in penal policies are attributed to the social and political construction of risk and its control. There may be multiple expressions of risk relating to expert, lay, moral or emotive aspects. It is argued, however, that it is the particular convergence and alignment of these dimensions on the part of the various stakeholders in the UK – government, media, public and professional – that leads to risk becoming institutionalized in the form of punitive regulatory policies for managing the dangerous.

Socio-political context and accounts of national identity in adolescence

Psychological research into national identity has considered both the banal quality of nationalism alongside the active, strategic construction of national categories and boundaries. Less attention has been paid to the conflict between these processes for those whose claims to national identity may be problematic. In the present study, focus groups were conducted with 36 Roman Catholic adolescents living in border regions of Ireland, in which participants were asked to talk about their own and others’ Irish national identity. Discursive analysis of the data revealed that those in the Republic of Ireland strategically displayed their national identity as obvious and ‘banal’, while those in Northern Ireland proactively claimed their Irishness. Moreover, those in Northern Ireland displayed an assumption that their fellow Irish in the Republic shared their imperative to assert national identity, while those in the Republic actively distanced themselves from this version of Irishness. These results suggest that for dominant ethnic groups, ‘banality’ may itself provide a marker of national identity while paradoxically the proactive display of national identity undermines minority groups claims to national identity.

Relations Between Political Violence and Child Adjustment: a four-wave test of the role of emotional insecurity about community

This study further explored the impact of sectarian violence and children's emotional insecurity about community on child maladjustment using a 4-wave longitudinal design. The study included 999 mother-child dyads in Belfast, Northern Ireland (482 boys, 517 girls). Across the 4 waves, child mean age was 12.19 (SD = 1.82), 13.24 (SD = 1.83), 13.61 (SD = 1.99), and 14.66 years (SD = 1.96), respectively. Building on previous studies of the role of emotional insecurity in child adjustment, the current study examines within-person change in emotional insecurity using latent growth curve analyses. The results showed that children's trajectories of emotional insecurity about community were related to risk for developing conduct and emotion problems. These findings controlled for earlier adjustment problems, age, and gender, and took into account the time-varying nature of experience with sectarian violence. Discussion considers the implications for children's emotional insecurity about community for relations between political violence and children's adjustment, including the significance of trajectories of emotional insecurity over time.

Religious Political Parties and the Limits of Political Liberalism

Political parties have only recently become a subject of investigation in political theory. In this paper I analyse religious political parties in the context of John Rawls’s political liberalism. Rawlsian political liberalism, I argue, overly constrains the scope of democratic political contestation and especially for the kind of contestation channelled by parties. This restriction imposed upon political contestation risks undermining democracy and the development of the kind of democratic ethos that political liberalism cherishes. In this paper I therefore aim to provide a broader and more inclusive understanding of ‘reasonable’ political contestation, able to accommodate those parties (including religious ones) that political liberalism, as customarily understood, would exclude from the democratic realm. More specifically, I first embrace Muirhead and Rosenblum’s (Perspectives on Politics 4: 99–108 2006) idea that parties are ‘bilingual’ links between state and civil society and I draw its normative implications for party politics. Subsequently, I assess whether Rawls’s political liberalism is sufficiently inclusive to allow the presence of parties conveying religious and other comprehensive values. Due to Rawls’s thick conceptions of reasonableness and public reason, I argue, political liberalism risks seriously limiting the number and kinds of comprehensive values which may be channelled by political parties into the public political realm, and this may render it particularly inhospitable to religious political parties. Nevertheless, I claim, Rawls’s theory does offer some scope for reinterpreting the concepts of reasonableness and public reason in a thinner and less restrictive sense and this may render it more inclusive towards religious partisanship.

Religiosity, Political Orientation, and Consequentialist Moral Thinking

Three studies demonstrated that the moral judgments of religious individuals and political conservatives are highly insensitive to consequentialist (i.e., outcome-based) considerations. In Study 1, both religiosity and political conservatism predicted a resistance toward consequentialist thinking concerning a range of transgressive acts, independent of other relevant dispositional factors (e.g., disgust sensitivity). Study 2 ruled out differences in welfare sensitivity as an explanation for these findings. In Study 3, religiosity and political conservatism predicted a commitment to judging “harmless” taboo violations morally impermissible, rather than discretionary, despite the lack of negative consequences rising from the act. Furthermore, non-consequentialist thinking style was shown to mediate the relationship religiosity/conservatism had with impermissibility judgments, while intuitive thinking style did not. These data provide further evidence for the influence of religious and political commitments in motivating divergent moral judgments, while highlighting a new dispositional factor, non-consequentialist thinking style, as a mediator of these effects.

A Social–Ecological, Process-Oriented Perspective on Political Violence and Child Development

Youth's risk for adjustment problems amid political violence is well documented, but outcomes vary widely, with many children functioning well. Accordingly, researchers are seeking to identify the mechanisms and conditions that contribute to children's adjustment, with an interest in understanding effects on children in terms of changes in the social contexts in which they live and the psychological processes engaged by these social ecologies. In this article, we look at the importance of studying many levels of the social ecology and of differentiating the effects of exposure to contexts of political versus nonpolitical violence, and we address theories about explanatory processes. We review research pertinent to these themes, including a six-wave longitudinal study on political violence and children in Northern Ireland.